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  1. Why We Shouldn’T Reject Conflicts: A Critique of Tadros.Uwe Steinhoff - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (3):315-322.
    Victor Tadros thinks the idea that in a conflict both sides may permissibly use force should (typically) be rejected. Thus, he thinks that two shipwrecked persons should not fight for the only available flotsam (which can only carry one person) but instead toss a coin, and that a bomber justifiably attacking an ammunitions factory must not be counterattacked by the innocent bystanders he endangers. I shall argue that Tadros’s claim rests on unwarranted assumptions and is also mistaken in the light (...)
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  2. (Draft) Bringing the Myth to Life: Three Prima Facie Cases of Optional War.Benjamin Davies - manuscript
    Kieran Oberman argues that there is no such thing, in realistic circumstances, as an optional war, i.e. a war that it is permissible for a state to wage, but not obligatory. Regarding a central kind of war – humanitarian intervention – this is due to what Oberman calls the Cost Principle, which says that states may not impose humanitarian costs on their citizens that those citizens do not have independent humanitarian obligations to meet. Essentially, this means that if the seriousness (...)
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  3. Shortcomings of and Alternatives to the Rights-Forfeiture Theory of Justified Self-Defense and Punishment.Uwe Steinhoff - manuscript
    I argue that rights-forfeiture by itself is no path to permissibility at all (even barring special circumstances), neither in the case of self-defense nor in the case of punishment. The limiting conditions of self-defense, for instance – necessity, proportionality (or no gross disproportionality), and the subjective element – are different in the context of forfeiture than in the context of justification (and might even be absent in the former context). In particular, I argue that a culpable aggressor, unlike an innocent (...)
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  4. Finlay on Legitimate Authority: A Critical Comment.Uwe Steinhoff - manuscript
    Christopher J. Finlay claims “that a principle of moral or legitimate authority is necessary in just war theory for evaluating properly the justifiability of violence by non-state entities when they claim to act on behalf of the victims of rights violations and political injustice.” In particular, he argues that states, unlike non-state actors, possess what he calls “Lesser Moral Authority.” This authority allegedly enables states to invoke “the War Convention,” which in turn entitles even individual soldiers on the aggressive side (...)
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  5. McMahan, Symmetrical Defense and the Moral Equality of Combatants.Uwe Steinhoff - manuscript
    McMahan’s own example of a symmetrical defense case, namely his tactical bomber example, opens the door wide open for soldiers to defend their fellow-citizens (on grounds of their special obligations towards them) even if as part of this defense they target non-liable soldiers. So the soldiers on both sides would be permitted to kill each other and, given how McMahan defines “justification,” they would also be justified in doing so and hence not be liable. Thus, we arrive, against McMahan’s intentions, (...)
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  6. Self-Defense and Imminence.Uwe Steinhoff - manuscript
    This paper argues that there is a significant moral difference between force applied against (imminent) attackers on the one hand and force applied against “threatening” people who are not (imminent) attackers on the other. Given that there is such a difference, one should not blur the lines by using the term “self-defense” (understood as including other-defense) for both uses of force. Rather, only the former is appropriately called self-defense, while for the latter, following German legal terminology, the term “justifying defensive (...)
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  7. Self-Defense and the Necessity Condition.Uwe Steinhoff - manuscript
    Rights forfeiture or liability are not a path to the permissibility of self-defense (not even barring extraordinary circumstances), and the necessity condition is not intrinsic to justified self-defense. Rather, necessity in the context of justification must be distinguished from necessity in the context of rights forfeiture. While innocent aggressors only forfeit their right against necessary self-defense, culpable aggressors also forfeit, on grounds of a principle of reciprocity, certain rights against unnecessary self-defense. Yet, while culpable aggressors would therefore not be wronged (...)
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  8. Not Just Wars.Fritz Allhoff (ed.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
    This volume seeks to divide challenges to the just war tradition into thematic categories, to better outline the changing landscape of the Just War tradition. The motivating idea and common thread that will carry through the collection is to engage in a process of reflective equilibrium where the various authors will not only present some element in the Just War tradition to see how it applies to modern warfare, but how the facts about modern warfare can and ought to bear (...)
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  9. A Role for Coercive Force in the Theory of Global Justice?Endre Begby - forthcoming - In Thom Brooks (ed.), New Waves in Gobal Justice. Palgrave-MacMillan.
  10. Scope Restrictions, National Partiality, and War.Jeremy Davis - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Most of us believe that partiality applies in a broad range of relationships. One relationship on which there is much disagreement is co-nationality. Some writers argue that co-national partiality is not justified in certain cases, like killing in war, since killing in defense of co-nationals is intuitively impermissible in other contexts. I argue that this approach overlooks an important structural feature of partiality—namely, that its scope is sometimes restricted. In this essay, I show how some relationships that generate reasons of (...)
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  11. Drones and the Threshold for Waging War.Ezio Di Nucci - forthcoming - Politik.
    I argue that, if drones make waging war easier, the reason why they do so may not be the one commonly assumed within the philosophical debate – namely the promised reduction in casualties on either side – but a more complicated one which has little to do with concern for one’s own soldiers or, for that matter, the enemy; and a lot more to do with the political intricacies of international relations and domestic politics; I use the example of the (...)
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  12. Introduction: Symposium on The Ethics of Indirect Intervention.Helen Frowe & Benjamin Matheson - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Philosophy.
  13. Cosmopolitan Peace Cecile Fabre. [REVIEW]Michael Kocsis - forthcoming - Dialogue.
  14. National Defence, Self Defence, and the Problem of Political Aggression.Seth Lazar - forthcoming - In Seth Lazar & Cécile Fabre (eds.), The Morality of Defensive War. Oxford University press. pp. 10-38.
    Wars are large-scale conflicts between organized groups of belligerents, which involve suffering, devastation, and brutality unlike almost anything else in human experience. Whatever one’s other beliefs about morality, all should agree that the horrors of war are all but unconscionable, and that warfare can be justified only if we have some compel- ling account of what is worth fighting for, which can justify contributing, as individu- als and as groups, to this calamitous endeavour. Although this question should obviously be central (...)
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  15. Just War, Citizens’ Responsibility, and Public Intellectuals.Christian Nadeau - forthcoming - Revue Internationale de Philosophie.
    To what extent do the moral principles of just war theory lend themselves to providing an account of the moral and political responsibility of citizens in general, and of public intellectuals in particular, in times of war? An analysis of Michael Walzer’s thought opens promising avenues for answering this question. It will be necessary, first of all, to re-examine the classic distinction between combatants and noncombatants – a thesis that Walzer defended but that several philosophers have criticized in recent years. (...)
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  16. Is There a Duty to Militarily Intervene to Stop a Genocide?Uwe Steinhoff - forthcoming - In Christian Neuhäuser & Christoph Schuck (eds.), Military Interventions: Considerations from Philosophy and Political Science.
    Is there is a moral obligation to militarily intervene in another state to stop a genocide from happening (if this can be done with proportionate force)? My answer is that under exceptional circumstances a state or even a non-state actor might have a duty to stop a genocide (for example if these actors have promised to do so), but under most circumstances there is no such obligation. To wit, “humanity,” states, collectives, and individuals do not have an obligation to make (...)
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  17. Just Cause and the Continuous Application of Jus Ad Bellum.Uwe Steinhoff - forthcoming - In Larry May May, Shannon Elizabeth Fyfe & Eric Joseph Ritter (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook on Just War Theory. Cambridge University Press.
    What one is ultimately interested in with regard to ‘just cause’ is whether a specific war, actual or potential, is justified. I call this ‘the applied question’. Answering this question requires knowing the empirical facts on the ground. However, an answer to the applied question regarding a specific war requires a prior answer to some more general questions, both descriptive and normative. These questions are: What kind of thing is a ‘just cause’ for war (an aim, an injury or wrong (...)
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  18. On Anti‐Abortion Violence.Jeremy Williams - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Anti‐abortion violence (‘AAV’) is anathema to almost everyone, on all sides of the abortion debate. Yet, as this article aims to show, it is far more difficult than has previously been recognised to avoid the deeply unpalatable conclusion that it can sometimes be justified. Some of the most frequently‐occupied positions on the morality of abortion will imply precisely that conclusion, I argue, unless conjoined with an especially stringent and unattractive form of pacifism. This is true not only of strict anti‐abortion (...)
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  19. Collective Complicity in War Crimes. Some Remarks on the Principle of Moral Equality of Soldiers.Adam Cebula - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1313-1332.
    The article critically analyzes one of the central assumptions of Michael Walzer’s version of just war theory, as presented in his main work devoted to war ethics. As requested by the author of Just and Unjust Wars, the controversial nature of the principle of the moral equality of soldiers is revealed by discussing the actual course of events of a historical military conflict – namely, the outbreak of World War II, one of the main issues dealt with in Walzer’s book. (...)
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  20. Just War Theory Symposium: Introduction.Adam Cebula - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1289-1290.
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  21. Toward a Collectivist National Defense.Jeremy Davis - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1333-1354.
    Most philosophers writing on the ethics of war endorse “reductivist individualism,” a view that holds both that killing in war is subject to the very same principles of ordinary morality ; and that morality concerns individuals and their rights, and does not treat collectives as having any special status. I argue that this commitment to individualism poses problems for this view in the case of national defense. More specifically, I argue that the main strategies for defending individualist approaches to national (...)
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  22. Complicity and the Responsibility Dilemma.Morten Højer Jensen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):109-127.
    Jeff McMahan famously defends a moral inequality of combatants, where liability to be attacked and potentially killed in war, should be grounded in the individual combatant’s moral responsibility for posing an unjust threat. In a response, Seth Lazar shows that McMahan’s criterion for liability leads to an unacceptable dilemma between “contingent pacifism” and “total war”, i.e. between war being practically infeasible, or implausibly many civilians being legitimate targets. The problem is that McMahan grounds liability mainly in the individual’s causal responsibility (...)
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  23. Would Armed Humanitarian Intervention Have Been Justified to Protect the Rohingyas?Benjamin D. King - 2020 - Journal of Military Ethics 19 (4):269-284.
    The mass killings, large-scale gang rape and large-scale expulsion of the Rohingyas from Myanmar constitute one of the most repugnant world events in recent years. This article addresses the question of whether armed humanitarian intervention would have been morally permissible to protect the Rohingyas. It approaches the question from the perspective of the jus ad bellum criteria of just war theory. This approach does not yield a definitive answer because knowing whether certain jus ad bellum conditions might have been satisfied (...)
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  24. An African Theory of Just Causes for War.Thaddeus Metz - 2020 - In Luis Rodrigues-Cordeiro & Danny Singh (eds.), Comparative Just War Theory. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 131-155.
    In this chapter, I add to the new body of philosophical literature that addresses African approaches to just war by reflecting on some topics that have yet to be considered and by advancing different perspectives. My approach is two-fold. First, I spell out a foundational African ethic, according to which one must treat people’s capacity to relate communally with respect. Second, I derive principles from it to govern the use of force and violence, and compare and contrast their implications for (...)
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  25. Revolution and Intervention.Massimo Renzo - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):533–253.
    Provided that traditional jus ad bellum principles are fulfilled, military humanitarian intervention to stop large scale violations of human rights (such as genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes) is widely regarded as morally permissible. In cases of “supreme humanitarian emergency”, not only are the victims morally permitted to rebel, but other states are also permitted to militarily intervene. Things are different if the human rights violations in question fall short of supreme humanitarian emergency. Because of the importance of respecting (...)
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  26. Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Moral Equality of Combatants.Michael Skerker, Duncan Purves & Ryan Jenkins - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 3 (6).
    To many, the idea of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) killing human beings is grotesque. Yet critics have had difficulty explaining why it should make a significant moral difference if a human combatant is killed by an AWS as opposed to being killed by a human combatant. The purpose of this paper is to explore the roots of various deontological concerns with AWS and to consider whether these concerns are distinct from any concerns that also apply to long- distance, human-guided weaponry. (...)
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  27. Doing Away with “Legitimate Authority”.Uwe Steinhoff - 2020 - Journal of Military Ethics 18 (4):314-332.
    I argue in this paper that traditional just war theory did allow private, indeed even individual war, and that arguments in support of a legitimate authority criterion, let alone in support of the “priority” of this criterion, fail. I further argue that what motivates the insistence on “legitimate authority” is the assumption that doing away with this criterion will lead to chaos and anarchy. I demonstrate that the reasoning, if any, underlying this assumption is philosophically profoundly confused. The fact of (...)
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  28. The Indispensable Mental Element of Justification and the Failure of Purely Objectivist (Mostly “Revisionist”) Just War Theories.Uwe Steinhoff - 2020 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie (1):51-67.
    The “right intention” requirement, in the form of a requirement that the agent must have a justified true belief that the mind-independent conditions of the justification to use force are fulfilled, is not an additional criterion, but one that constrains the interpretation of the other criteria. Without it, the only possible interpretation of the mind-independent criteria is purely objectivist, that is, purely fact-relative. Pure objectivism condemns self-defense and just war theory to irrelevance since it cannot provide proper action guidance: it (...)
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  29. Killing From the Inside Out: Moral Injury and Just War. By Robert Emmet Meagher. Pp. 161, Eugene, OR, Cascade Books, 2014. [REVIEW]Nico Vorster - 2020 - Heythrop Journal 61 (1):197-199.
  30. Consequentialism and the Case of Symmetrical Attackers.Stephen Kershnar - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (4):395-413.
    There are puzzle cases that forfeiture theory has trouble handling, such as the issue of what happens to the rights of two qualitatively identical people who simultaneously launch unprovoked attacks against the other. Each person either has or lacks the right to defend against the other. If one attacker has the right, then the other does not and vice versa. Yet the two are qualitatively identical so it is impossible for one to have the right if the other does not. (...)
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  31. War Refugees: Risk, Justice, and Moral Responsibility.Jennifer Kling - 2019 - New York, USA: Lexington Books.
    Jennifer Kling argues that war refugees suffer a series of wrongs and oppressions and so are owed restitution and aid—as a matter of justice—by socio political institutions. She makes the case that they should be viewed differently than migrants but that their circumstances do not wholly alleviate their own moral responsibilities.
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  32. Engaging in a Cover-Up: The “Deep Morality” of War.Jennifer Kling - 2019 - In Pacifism, Politics, and Feminism: Intersections and Innovations. The Netherlands: pp. 96-116.
    This chapter examines whether, as Jeff McMahan argues, we should not integrate what he refers to as the “deep morality” of war into our military and international public policies and laws, because of the possible negative consequences of doing so. On the basis of feminist epistemology, I argue that McMahan is wrong to think that publicizing and legalizing the deep morality of war will have the negative consequences that he claims. Through a comparison with the Women's Suffrage Movement in the (...)
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  33. Ethiek voor Cyberkrijg en Cyberkrijgers.Peter Olsthoorn - 2019 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 111 (1):95-109.
    Although some claim that the term cyber war is merely metaphorical, there are good reasons to see cyber war as a form of warfare ‐ even if it is not war as we have hitherto known it. This poses the question whether the principles of the Just War Tradition, which claims to offer an alternative for pacifism and realism, apply to this specific kind of war too. This article argues that the jus in bello principles of discrimination and proportionality are (...)
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  34. Instrumental Authority and Its Challenges: The Case of the Laws of War.Jonathan Parry & Daniel Viehoff - 2019 - Ethics 129 (4):548-575.
    Law and Morality at War offers a broadly instrumentalist defense of the authority of the laws of war: these laws serve combatants by helping them come closer to doing what they have independent moral reason to do. We argue that this form of justification sets too low a bar. An authority’s directives are not binding, on instrumental grounds, if the subject could, within certain limits, adopt an alternative, and superior, means of conforming to morality’s demands. It emerges that Haque’s argument (...)
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  35. Political Authority and Unjust Wars.Massimo Renzo - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):336-357.
    Just war theory is currently dominated by two positions. According to the orthodox view, provided that jus in bello principles are respected, combatants have an equal right to fight, regardless of the justice of the cause pursued by their state. According to “revisionists” whenever combatants lack reasons to believe that the war they are ordered to fight is just, their duty is to disobey. I argue that when members of a legitimate state acting in good faith are ordered to fight, (...)
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  36. A Two Level Account of Executive Authority.Michael Skerker - 2019 - In Michael Skerker & Claire Finkelstein (eds.), Sovereignty and the New Executive Authority. Oxford, UK:
    The suite of secretive national security programs initiated in the US since 9/11 has created debate not only about the merits of targeted killing, torture, secret detention, cyberwar, global signals intercepts, and data-mining, but about the very secrecy in which these programs were conceived, debated by government officials, and implemented. Law must be revealed to those who are expected to comply with its demands. Law is a mere pretext for coercion if the laws permitting the government to coerce people for (...)
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  37. Compassion for Enemies.Michael Skerker & John Sattler - 2019 - In David Whetham, Michael Skerker & Donald Carrick (eds.), Military Virtues. London, UK:
    A case study exploring the importance of compassion for enemies appealing to a series of targeting decisions, co-written with the senior Marine in Iraq in 2003-4.
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  38. Is Obedience a Virtue?Jessica Wolfendale - 2019 - In Michael Skerker, Donald G. Carrick & David Whetham (eds.), Military Virtues. Havant, UK: Howgate Publishing Limited. pp. 62-69.
    In the United States, all military personnel swear to obey “the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me.” Military personnel must obey orders promptly in order to facilitate effective military functioning. Yet, obedience to orders has been associated with the commission of war crimes. Military personnel of all ranks have committed torture, rape, genocide, and murder under orders. “I was just following orders” (respondaet superior) is no longer accepted as a (...)
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  39. Weighing Lives in War- Foreign Vs. Domestic.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2018 - In Larry May (ed.), Cambridge Handbook on the Just War. pp. 186-198.
    I argue that the lives of domestic and enemy civilians should not receive equal weight in our proportionality calculations. Rather, the lives of enemy civilians ought to be “partially discounted” relative to the lives of domestic civilians. We ought to partially discount the lives of enemy civilians for the following reason (or so I argue). When our military wages a just war, we as civilians vest our right to self-defense in our military. This permits our military to weigh our lives (...)
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  40. Humanitarian Intervention and the Problem of Genocide and Atrocity.Jennifer Kling - 2018 - In Andrew Fiala (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Pacifism and Nonviolence. London, UK: Routledge. pp. 327-346.
    We tend to think that mass atrocities and attempted genocides call for humanitarian intervention by other states. (Nonviolent intervention if possible, military intervention if need be.) In this chapter, I discuss these two related claims in turn. What, if anything, justifies humanitarian intervention in certain states by other states? Ought such interventions, if justified, be pacifist in nature, or is it legitimate in some cases to intervene violently? To discuss these questions, I draw primarily on principles and arguments found in (...)
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  41. “Saving Lives or Saving Stones?” The Ethics of Cultural Heritage Protection in War.Erich Hatala Matthes - 2018 - Public Affairs Quarterly 32 (1):67-84.
    In discussion surrounding the destruction of cultural heritage in armed conflict, one often hears two important claims in support of intervention to safeguard heritage. The first is that the protection of people and the protection of heritage are two sides of the same coin. The second is that the cultural heritage of any people is part of the common heritage of all humankind. In this article, I examine both of these claims, and consider the extent to which they align with (...)
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  42. A Life of Struggle as Ubuntu.Thaddeus Metz - 2018 - In Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Busani Ngcaweni (eds.), Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela: Decolonial Ethics of Liberation and Servant Leadership. Africa World Press. pp. 97-111.
    In this chapter I aim to provide a moral-philosophical grounding for much of Nelson Rolihlaha Mandela’s life. I spell out a principled interpretation of ubuntu that focuses on its moral import, and then apply it to salient facets of Mandela’s 50+ struggle years, contending that they exemplify it in many ways. Specifically, I first address Mandela’s decisions to fight apartheid in the 1940s, to use violence in response to it in the 1950s and ‘60s, and to refuse to renounce the (...)
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  43. Lethal Military Robots: Who is Responsible When Things Go Wrong?Peter Olsthoorn - 2018 - In Rocci Luppicini (ed.), The Changing Scope of Technoethics in Contemporary Society. Hershey, PA, USA: pp. 106-123.
    Although most unmanned systems that militaries use today are still unarmed and predominantly used for surveillance, it is especially the proliferation of armed military robots that raises some serious ethical questions. One of the most pressing concerns the moral responsibility in case a military robot uses violence in a way that would normally qualify as a war crime. In this chapter, the authors critically assess the chain of responsibility with respect to the deployment of both semi-autonomous and (learning) autonomous lethal (...)
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  44. The Secret to the Success of the Doctrine of Double Effect : Biased Framing, Inadequate Methodology, and Clever Distractions.Uwe Steinhoff - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (3-4):235-263.
    There are different formulations of the doctrine of double effect, and sometimes philosophers propose “revisions” or alternatives, like the means principle, for instance. To demonstrate that such principles are needed in the first place, one would have to compare cases in which all else is equal and show that the difference in intuitions, if any, can only be explained by the one remaining difference and thus by the principle in question. This is not the methodology defenders of the DDE and (...)
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  45. Bennett, Intention and the DDE – The Sophisticated Bomber as Pseudo-Problem.Uwe Steinhoff - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):73-80.
    Arguing against the doctrine of double effect, Bennett claims that the terror bomber only intends to make his victims appear dead. An obvious reply is that he intends to make them appear dead by killing them. I argue that the alleged refutations of this reply rest on a mistaken test question to determine what an agent intends, as Bennett's own test question confirms, and that Bennett is misled by confusing metaphorical death and literal death. Moreover, Bennett's argument is half-hearted anyway, (...)
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  46. Sharing the Costs of Fighting Justly.Sara Van Goozen - 2018 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (2):1-21.
    Combatants who attempt to obey the laws of war often have to take considerable risks in order to effectively discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets. Sometimes this task is made even more complicated by systemic factors which influence their ability to discriminate effectively without unduly risking their lives or the mission. If they fail to do so, civilians often pay the price. In this paper, I argue that to the extent that non-combatants benefit from the attempt to fight justly, and (...)
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  47. Harming Civilians and the Associative Duties of Soldiers.Sara Van Goozen - 2018 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 35 (3):584-600.
    According to International Humanitarian Law and many writing on just war theory, combatants who foresee that their actions will harm or kill innocent non-combatants are required to take some steps to reduce these merely foreseen harms. However, because often reducing merely foreseen harms place burdens on combatants – including risk to their lives – this requirement has been criticised for requiring too much of combatants. One reason why this might be the case is that combatants have duties to each other (...)
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  48. Non-Combatant Immunity and War-Profiteering.Saba Bazargan - 2017 - In Helen Frowe & Lazar Seth (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethics and War. Oxford University Press.
    The principle of noncombatant immunity prohibits warring parties from intentionally targeting noncombatants. I explicate the moral version of this view and its criticisms by reductive individualists; they argue that certain civilians on the unjust side are morally liable to be lethally targeted to forestall substantial contributions to that war. I then argue that reductivists are mistaken in thinking that causally contributing to an unjust war is a necessary condition for moral liability. Certain noncontributing civilians—notably, war-profiteers—can be morally liable to be (...)
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  49. Compensation and Proportionality in War.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2017 - In Claire Finkelstein, Larry Larry & Jens David Ohlin (eds.), Weighing Lives in War. Oxford University Press).
    Even in just wars we infringe the rights of countless civilians whose ruination enables us to protect our own rights. These civilians are owed compensation, even in cases where the collateral harms they suffer satisfy the proportionality constraint. I argue that those who authorize or commit the infringements and who also benefit from those harms will bear that compensatory duty, even if the unjust aggressor cannot or will not discharge that duty. I argue further that if we suspect antecedently that (...)
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  50. Standards of Risk in War and Civil Life.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2017 - In Florian Demont-Biaggi (ed.), The Nature of Peace and the Morality of Armed Conflict. Palgrave.
    Though the duties of care owed toward innocents in war and in civil life are at the bottom univocally determined by the same ethical principles, Bazargan-Forward argues that those very principles will yield in these two contexts different “in-practice” duties. Furthermore, the duty of care we owe toward our own innocents is less stringent than the duty of care we owe toward foreign innocents in war. This is because risks associated with civil life but not war (a) often increase the (...)
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