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Justification

Assistant editor: Charles Bakker (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. Epistemic Conservatism and Bare Beliefs.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Synthese:1-14.
    My subject is the kind of Epistemic Conservatism (EC) that says that an agent is in some measure justified in maintaining a belief simply in virtue of the fact that the agent has that belief. Quine’s alternative to positivist foundationalism, Chisholmian particularism, Rawls’s reflective equilibrium, and Bayesianism all seem to rely on EC. I argue that, in order to evaluate EC, we must consider an agent holding a bare belief, that is, a belief stripped of all personal memory and epistemic (...)
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  2. Strength of Justification – The Rational Degree of Certainty Approach.Christoph Lumer - 2018 - In Steve Oswald (ed.), Argumentation and Inference. Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017. London, GB: College Publications. pp. 315-333.
    In this paper, I present the fundamental ideas of a new theory of justification strength. This theory is based on the epistemological approach to argumentation. Even the thesis of a valid justification can be false for various reasons. The theory outlined here identifies such possible errors. Justification strength is equated with the degree to which such possible errors are excluded. The natural expression of this kind of justification strength is the (rational) degree of certainty of the belief in the thesis.
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  3. Destructive Defeat and Justificational Force: The Dialectic of Dogmatism, Conservatism, and Meta-Evidentialism.Matthias Steup - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2907-2933.
    Defeaters can prevent a perceptual belief from being justified. For example, when you know that red light is shining at the table before you, you would typically not be justified in believing that the table is red. However, can defeaters also destroy a perceptual experience as a source of justification? If the answer is ‘no’, the red light defeater blocks doxastic justification without destroying propositional justification. You have some-things-considered, but not all-things-considered, justification for believing that the table is red. If (...)
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  4. How Supererogation Can Save Intrapersonal Permissivism.Han Li - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Rationality is intrapersonally permissive just in case there are multiple doxastic states that one agent may be rational in holding at a given time, given some body of evidence. One way for intrapersonal permissivism to be true is if there are epistemic supererogatory beliefs – beliefs that go beyond the call of epistemic duty. Despite this, there has been almost no discussion of epistemic supererogation in the permissivism literature. This paper shows that this is a mistake. It does this by (...)
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  5. Habilidade e causalidade: uma proposta confiabilista para casos típicos de conhecimento.Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos - 2014 - In Jaimir Conte & Cezar Mortari (eds.), Temas em Filosofia Contemporânea. Florianópolis, State of Santa Catarina, Brazil: pp. 38-48.
    Debates em epistemologia recente têm se pautado, em grande medida, pelo problema de caracterizar a natureza da justificação. De modo geral, a tarefa tem sido explorar o status epistêmico que faz com que uma crença verdadeira seja uma instância de conhecimento. Este debate traz consigo uma discussão mais ampla acerca do conteúdo da definição de conhecimento, ou seja, uma discussão cujo propósito é identificar o que compõe de forma necessária e suficiente esta noção epistêmica central. No entanto, paralelamente a este (...)
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  6. Was Emily Brown American Empress in Korea?Jong-pil Yoon - 2018 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 12 (1):71-92.
    _ Source: _Page Count 22 This paper investigates the limits and meaning of historical inquiry in light of inferential contextualism that holds as its central tenet that the epistemic status of a proposition depends on the context of the subject. Historical inquiry, the discussion will show, is an epistemic practice that operates under the reliabilist presupposition that beliefs formed through the processes, whose pragmatic utility has been already proven in problem solving situations, may be taken to be rationally justified.As for (...)
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  7. Having False Reasons.Juan Comesaña & Matthew McGrath - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press. pp. 59-80.
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  8. Etiological Information and Diminishing Justification.Paul Silva - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (2):1-25.
    Sometimes it’s reasonable to reduce confidence in a proposition in response to gaining etiological information. Suppose, for example, a theist learns that her theism is ‘due to’ her religious upbringing. There is a clear range of cases where it would be reasonable for her to respond by slightly decreasing her confidence in God’s existence. So long as reasonability and justification are distinct, this reasonability claim would appear consistent with the thesis that this kind of etiological information cannot, all by itself, (...)
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  9. Knowing How to Put Knowledge First in the Theory of Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):393-412.
    I provide a novel knowledge-first account of justification that avoids the pitfalls of existing accounts while preserving the underlying insight of knowledge-first epistemologies: that knowledge comes first. The view I propose is, roughly, this: justification is grounded in our practical knowledge (know-how) concerning the acquisition of propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). I first refine my thesis in response to immediate objections. In subsequent sections I explain the various ways in which this thesis is theoretically superior to existing knowledge-first accounts of justification. The (...)
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  10. What Are Explanatory Virtues Indicative Of?Belkoniene Miloud - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (2):179-193.
    This paper discusses an assumption on which explanationist accounts of the evidential support relation rely with a focus on McCain’s recent account. Explanationist accounts define the relation of evidential support in terms of relations of best explanation that hold between the evidence a subject possesses and the propositions she believes. Such a definition presupposes that the explanatory virtues of what best explains a subject’s body of evidence is indicative of its truth. Yet, recent cases offered in the literature against McCain’s (...)
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  11. Sinnott‐Armstrong Meets Modest Epistemological Intuitionism.Hossein Dabbagh - 2017 - Philosophical Forum 48 (2):175-199.
    Sinnott-Armstrong has attacked the epistemology of moral intuitionism on the grounds that it is not justified to have some moral beliefs without needing them to be inferred from other beliefs. He believes that our moral judgments are inferentially justified because the “framing effects” which are mostly discussed in the empirical psychology cast doubt on any non-inferential justification. In this paper, I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument is question begging against intuitionists and his description of epistemological intuitionism is a diluted version that (...)
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  12. Zalabardo on Pritchard and the Evidential Problem.Tommaso Piazza - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (3):199-205.
    _ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 3, pp 199 - 205 It is an alleged virtue of Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism that it makes available a promising line of resistance against the sceptic about perceptual knowledge. According to José Zalabardo’s reconstruction of it, however, this line of resistance—in particular, the solution it supplies to what Pritchard calls the Evidential Problem—is ultimately flawed. Whether or not the solution criticized by Zalabardo is the one supplied by ED —which Pritchard has denied—my aim in this (...)
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  13. Alain Finkielkraut, The Defeat of the Mind. [REVIEW]T. Quigley - 1995 - Philosophy in Review 15:239-241.
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  14. Evaluational Illusions and Skeptical Arguments.Steven L. Reynolds - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):529-558.
    A traditional diagnosis of the error in the Cartesian skeptical arguments holds that they exploit our tendencies to take a representationalist view of perception. Thinking that we perceive only our own sensory states, it seems to us that our perceptual beliefs about physical objects must be justified qua explanations of those sensory states. Such justification requires us to have reasons to reject rival explanations, such as the skeptical hypotheses, which we lack. However, those who adopt the direct realist view of (...)
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  15. Subjective Justification.de Pierris Graciela - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):363-382.
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  16. The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality.Julien Dutant (ed.) - forthcoming - Oxford University PRess.
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  17. On What We May Believe About Beliefs.Benson Saler - 2009 - In Understanding Religion: Selected Essays. Walter de Gruyter.
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  18. Inferring.Helen E. Longino - 1978 - Philosophy Research Archives 4:17-26.
    This paper is a discussion of the nature of inferring and focusses on the relation between reasons for belief and causes of belief. Two standard approaches to the analysis of inference, the epistemological and the psychological, are identified and discussed. While both approaches incorporate insights concerning, inference, counterexamples show that neither provides by itself an adequate account. A third account is developed and recommended on the grounds that it encompasses the essential insights of the rejected analyses while being immune to (...)
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  19. Towards an Internalist Conception of Justification in African Epistemology.Adebayo A. Ogungbure - 2014 - Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya 6 (2):39-54.
    In current discussions on African epistemology, the issue of justification of beliefs has mainly been considered from an externalist perspective, such that justification is described as achievable merely through the means of empirical verification and social context of discourse. However, this results in a knowledge-gap since both internalist and externalist perspectives are needed to arrive at a holistic notion of epistemic justification. Consequently, the objective of this article is to fill this gap by employing the methods of conceptual and critical (...)
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  20. Epistemic Justification Revisited.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:1-16.
    In his Beyond Justification, Bill Alston argued that there is no single property picked out by ‘epistemic justification,’ and that instead epistemological theory should investigate the range of epistemic desiderata that beliefs may enjoy. In this paper I argue that none of his arguments taken singly, nor the collection as a group, gives us a reason to abandon the traditional idea that there is a property of epistemic justification. I conclude by suggesting how Alston’s proposal to investigate the variety of (...)
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  21. Alternative Self-Defeat Arguments: A Reply to Mizrahi.Michael Huemer - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (2):223-229.
    I address Moti Mizrahi‟s objections to my use of the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservatism. Mizrahi contends that other epistemologicaltheories can be supported by parallel self-defeat arguments. I argue that the self-defeat arguments for other theories either are compatible with PC and thus present no problem, or have a false premise, unlike the self-defeat argument for PC.
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  22. Justification and Truth Conditions in the Concept of Knowledge.Dale Jacquette - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (3):429-447.
    The traditional concept of propositional knowledge as justified true belief, even when modified, typically in its justification condition, to avoid Gettier-typecounterexamples, remains subject to a variety of criticisms. The redefinition proposed here puts pressure more specifically on the concept of truth as redundant in light of and inaccessible beyond the most robust requirements of best justification. Best-J is defined as justification for believing in a proposition’s truth where there is no better countermanding justification for believing instead the proposition’s negation. A (...)
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  23. Internalist Evidentialism and Epistemic Virtue: Re-Reply to Axtell.Trent Dougherty - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (2):281-289.
    In this brief re-reply to Axtell, I reply to key criticisms of my previous reply and flesh out a bit my notions of the relationship between internalist evidentialism and epistemic virtue and epistemic value.
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  24. An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.
    White, Christensen, and Feldman have recently endorsed uniqueness, the thesis that given the same total evidence, two rational subjects cannot hold different views. Kelly, Schoenfield, and Meacham argue that White and others have at best only supported the weaker, merely intrapersonal view that, given the total evidence, there are no two views which a single rational agent could take. Here, we give a new argument for uniqueness, an argument with deliberate focus on the interpersonal element of the thesis. Our argument (...)
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  25. Defending Confirmational Chorism Against Holism: Limited Coherence and Coordination as Sources of Epistemic Justification.Susannah K. Devitt - unknown
    This paper examines the role of coherence as a source of epistemic justification, particularly the argument that all beliefs must cohere within one’s ‘web of belief’, aka confirmational holism. Confirmational holism runs across a potentially devastating argument that a more coherent set of beliefs resulting from the addition of a belief to a less coherent set of beliefs is less likely to be true than the less coherent set of beliefs. I propose confirmational chorism to avoid this troubling outcome. CC (...)
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  26. Kāšġarī on the Beliefs and Superstitions of the TurksKasgari on the Beliefs and Superstitions of the Turks.Robert Dankoff - 1975 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 95 (1):68.
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  27. The Justification of the Law.Chauncey S. Goodrich & Clarence Morris - 1973 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 93 (3):419.
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  28. Supposition and Blindness.Markos Valaris - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):895-901.
    In ‘Reasoning and Regress’ I argued that inferring a conclusion from a set of propositions may simply consist in taking it that the conclusion follows from these propositions—thereby defusing familiar regress arguments. Sinan Dogramaci challenges the generality of this view, on the grounds that sometimes you may draw conclusions from no premisses that you believe. I respond by clarifying a distinction between the premisses of an argument from the reasons your conclusion is based upon. While suppositional reasoning may involve no (...)
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  29. Beliefs, Lebensformen.Peter Harrison - forthcoming - Metascience:1-8.
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  30. Higher-Order Defeat is Object-Independent.Joshua DiPaolo - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Higher-order defeat occurs when one loses justification for one's beliefs as a result of receiving evidence that those beliefs resulted from a cognitive malfunction. Several philosophers have identified features of higher-order defeat that distinguish it from familiar types of defeat. If higher-order defeat has these features, they are data an account of rational belief must capture. In this article, I identify a new distinguishing feature of higher-order defeat, and I argue that on its own, and in conjunction with the other (...)
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  31. Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief.Peter Murphy - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):602-617.
    Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially (...)
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  32. Ethique de la Croyance Et Justification.Pascal Engel - unknown
    The paper surveys the main issues raised by doxastic voluntarism and the ethics of belief in contemporary epistemology. It argues that the deontological theory of justification fails.
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  33. Reasons as Experiments: Judgment and Justification in the “Hard Look”.Jamison E. Colburn - 2012 - Contemporary Pragmatism 9 (2):205-239.
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  34. Knowledge and Justified Presumption.James W. Lamb - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (5):123.
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  35. The Digressions in Beowulf. Andrien Bonjour.Kemp Malone - 1951 - Speculum 26 (1):148-150.
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  36. BonJour on Foundationalism.Hugo Meynell - 1990 - New Blackfriars 71 (841):391-398.
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  37. Ariadne and Justification.Hamish F. G. Swanston - 1977 - New Blackfriars 58 (687):372-381.
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  38. Justification and Verification.Geoffrey Turner - 1974 - New Blackfriars 55 (644):25-33.
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  39. XII—Some Patterns of Justification in Ethics.H. S. Eveling - 1966 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66 (1):149-166.
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  40. Bootstrapping Lexical Knowledge From Unsegmented Text Using Graph Kernels.Masato Hagiwara, Yasuhiro Ogawa & Katsuhiko Toyama - 2011 - Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence 26:440-450.
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  41. Common Ground and Discursive Justification: Approaching the Traditional Epistemological Questions From an Untraditional Angle.Ryan Simonelli - unknown
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  42. Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.
    This collection brings together a selection of my recently published or forthcoming articles. What unites them is their common concern with one of the central ambitions of philosophy, namely to get clearer about our first-personal perspective onto the world and our minds. Three aspects of that perspective are of particular importance: consciousness, intentionality, and rationality. The collected essays address metaphysical and epistemological questions both concerning the nature of each of these aspects and concerning the various connections among them. More generally, (...)
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  43. 11. The Psychological Theory of the Belief in an External World.John StuartHG Mill - 1979 - In An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy: Volume 9. University of Toronto Press. pp. 177-187.
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  44. Why Worry About Epistemic Circularity?Michael P. Lynch & Paul Silva - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:33-52.
    Although Alston believed epistemically circular arguments were able to justify their conclusions, he was also disquieted by them. We will argue that Alston was right to be disquieted. We explain Alston’s view of epistemic circularity, the considerations that led him to accept it, and the purposes he thought epistemically circular arguments could serve. We then build on some of Alston’s remarks and introduce further limits to the usefulness of such arguments and introduce a new problem that stems from those limits. (...)
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  45. Epistemic Justification Revisited in Advance.Sanford C. Goldberg - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.
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  46. Basic Factive Perceptual Reasons.Ian Schnee - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1103-1118.
    Many epistemologists have recently defended views on which all evidence is true or perceptual reasons are facts. On such views a common account of basic perceptual reasons is that the fact that one sees that p is one’s reason for believing that p. I argue that that account is wrong; rather, in the basic case the fact that p itself is one’s reason for believing that p. I show that my proposal is better motivated, solves a fundamental objection that the (...)
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  47. Coherentism in the Epistemology of Memory.Erik J. Olsson - unknown
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  48. Comment on John Greco's Putting Skeptics in Their Place.Reza Lahroodi & Frederick F. Schmitt - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):457-465.
  49. Justified and Justifiable Beliefs: The Case of Question-Begging.Juho Ritola - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):565-583.
    This paper discusses Lippert-Rasmussen’s [Philosophical Studies 104, (2001) 123–141] claim that there are reasonable question-begging arguments. It is first argued that his arguments devalue the distinction between justifiable and justified beliefs, a distinction that is important for the fallacy theory. Second, it is argued that the role of the argument in the discussed cases can be questioned. In addition, the role of second order beliefs is discussed.
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  50. What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.
    According to a captivating picture, epistemic justification is essentially a matter of epistemic or evidential likelihood. While certain problems for this view are well known, it is motivated by a very natural thought—if justification can fall short of epistemic certainty, then what else could it possibly be? In this paper I shall develop an alternative way of thinking about epistemic justification. On this conception, the difference between justification and likelihood turns out to be akin to the more widely recognised difference (...)
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