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Justification

Assistant editor: Charles Bakker (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. Recensioni-J. Sutton, Without Justification.M. Cristina Amoretti - 2009 - Epistemologia 32 (1):147.
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  2. On the Possible Evolutionary Justification of Our Epistemic Capacities.Armando Cíntora - 2001 - Ludus Vitalis 9 (16):27-46.
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  3. Alvin T. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition. [REVIEW]Andy Clark - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (53):526.
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  4. LEHRER, K. "Knowledge". [REVIEW]M. Clark - 1977 - Mind 86:142.
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  5. Review of Keith Lehrer, Knowledge. [REVIEW]Michael Clark - 1977 - Mind 86.
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  6. Reliability, Justification, and Knowledge.Murray Cameron Clarke - 1986 - Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada)
    During the last twenty years or so a number of philosophers have proposed theories that attempt to naturalize epistemology. One especially thinks of Quine, Goldman and Dretske in this context. Working in this tradition, I provide an externalist, reliable process analysis of epistemic justification and knowledge. In particular, I attempt to develop and improve upon the Goldman-Kornblith-Schmitt reliable process account of epistemic justification and show how it can be extended to provide an account of knowledge. ;First I defend the idea (...)
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  7. On Victory and Defeat: From "on War".Carl vonHG Clausewitz & Peter Paret - 1989 - Princeton University Press.
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  8. Self-Supporting Arguments.Andrew D. Cling - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):279–303.
    Deductive and inductive logic confront this skeptical challenge: we can justify any logical principle only by means of an argument but we can acquire justification by means of an argument only if we are already justified in believing some logical principle. We could solve this problem if probative arguments do not require justified belief in their corresponding conditionals. For if not, then inferential justification would not require justified belief in any logical principle. So even arguments whose corresponding conditionals are epistemically (...)
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  9. Empirical Justification. By Paul K. Moser.Andrew D. Cling - 1989 - Modern Schoolman 67 (1):71-73.
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  10. Justification of Empirical Belief: Problems with Haack's Foundherentism.Alan C. Clune - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (281):460 - 463.
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  11. Justification of Empirical Belief: Problems with Haack's Foundherentism: Discussion.Alan C. Clune - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (281):460-463.
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  12. Lehrer on the Analysis of 'I Can'.David Coder - 1973 - Philosophical Studies 24 (4):280 - 281.
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  13. Knowledge First?E. J. Coffman - unknown
    The Orthodox View (OV) of the relation between epistemic justification and knowledge has it that justification is conceptually prior to knowledge—and so, can be used to provide a noncircular account of knowledge. OV has come under threat from the increasingly popular “Knowledge First” movement (KFM) in epistemology. I assess several anti-OV arguments due to three of KFM’s most prominent members: Timothy Williamson, Jonathan Sutton, and Alexander Bird. I argue that OV emerges from these attacks unscathed.
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  14. Why Should the Science of Nature Be Empirical?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1975 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 9:168-183.
    In the past empiricist philosophy has urged one or other or both of two interconnected, and sometimes interconfused, theses. The first has been a thesis about the causal origins of certain beliefs, the second a thesis about the proper criteria for appraising these beliefs. The causal thesis is that all beliefs about the structure and contents of the natural world are the end-product of a process that originates wholly in individual experiences of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, or touching. The criterial (...)
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  15. Is There an Issue About Justified Belief?Stewart Cohen - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (1):113-127.
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  16. Defeasibility and Background Beliefs.Stewart Cohen - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 39 (3):263 - 273.
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  17. Reasons as Experiments: Judgment and Justification in the “Hard Look”.Jamison E. Colburn - 2012 - Contemporary Pragmatism 9 (2):205-239.
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  18. A Foundationalist Theory of Empirical Justification.Timothy Robert Colburn - 1979 - Dissertation, Brown University
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  19. Jonah Lehrer: How We Decide. [REVIEW]Peter Collins - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2).
    Jonah Lehrer: How We Decide Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2009, 302 pp.
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  20. Conservatism, Preservationism, Conservationism and Mentalism.J. Comesana - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):489-492.
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  21. Without Justification, by Jonathan Sutton. [REVIEW]J. Comesana - 2009 - Mind 118 (471):878-882.
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  22. Having False Reasons.Juan Comesaña & Matthew McGrath - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press. pp. 59-80.
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  23. There Is No Immediate Justification.Juan Comesaria - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 222.
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  24. The Basic Nature of Epistemic Justification.Earl Conee - 1988 - The Monist 71 (3):389-404.
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  25. Perceptual Learning and Cognitive Penetration (Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop, Question Two).Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor - manuscript
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: Can perceptual experience be modified by reason?
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  26. Perceptual Learning and Perceptual Phenomenology (Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop, Question Three).Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor - manuscript
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: How does perceptual learning alter perceptual phenomenology?
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  27. Foundational Versus Nonfoundational Theories of Empirical Justification.James W. Cornman - 1977 - American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (4):287 - 297.
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  28. Philosophical Problems and Arguments an Introduction [by] James W. Cornman and Keith Lehrer. --.James W. Cornman & Keith Jt Author Lehrer - 1968 - Macmillan.
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  29. Knowledge Without Justification.William Davis Cornwell - 2003 - Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
    This dissertation argues that there can be unjustified perceptual and testimonial knowledge. By "justification," I mean an internalist conception according to which a belief's justification is some relation that the belief bears to another belief. ;The first chapter characterizes the theory of proper functions that underlies my epistemic theory. ;The second chapter discusses the reasons for thinking that there is unjustified knowledge. My argument proceeds indirectly by first critiquing the two major theories that require all knowledge to be justified: coherentism (...)
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  30. The Justification of Attitudes.Carl Cranor - 1978 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):21-33.
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  31. God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God.I. M. Crombie & Alvin Plantinga - 1970 - Philosophical Quarterly 20 (80):312.
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  32. 1645 Defeat of Charles I at Naseby By.Oliver Cromwell - 2010 - In S. J. Savonius-Wroth Paul Schuurman & Jonathen Walmsley (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Locke. Continuum. pp. 37.
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  33. Reasons and the Justification of Belief.Robert Gerald Cronin - 1976 - Dissertation, University of Kansas
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  34. The Millian Case for Orthodox Epistemic Conservatism.Seth Crook - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):549-573.
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  35. Probability, Justification, and Epistemic Rationality.Jack Stuart Crumley - 1984 - Dissertation, Tulane University
    In this essay I construct a theory of epistemic justification. Specifially, I utilize and modify techniques adopted from cognitive decision theory to develop an account of the conditions under which an agent is justified in believing some proposition. Thus, my principal interest is in an internalist analysis of justified belief. That is, the conditions of justified belief are a function of the agent's subjective conception of his cognitive situation and his assessments of the relationships between the various parameters of justification. (...)
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  36. What Are Seemings?Andrew Cullison - 2010 - Ratio 23 (3):260-274.
    We are all familiar with the phenomenon of a proposition seeming true. Many think that these seeming states can yield justified beliefs. Very few have seriously explored what these seeming states are. I argue that seeming states are not plausibly analyzed in terms of beliefs, partial beliefs, attractions to believe, or inclinations to believe. Given that the main candidates for analyzing seeming states are unsatisfactory, I argue for a brute view of seemings that treats seeming states as irreducible propositional attitudes.
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  37. Descartes Was Clearly, in Some Sense, a Foundationalist. He Thought That Among Our Beliefs, Some Are Based on Other Beliefs We Have, Whereas Others Are Not. The Ones Not Based on Others We Can Call Basic Beliefs. The Ones Based on Others We Can Call Derivative Beliefs. Our Basic Beliefs Provide the Foundations for Our System of Beliefs; Our Derivative Beliefs Are the Superstruc-Ture. This Metaphor of Our System of Beliefs as a Building, Which has Foundations and a Superstructure, and Might Collapse If ... [REVIEW]Edwin Curley - 2006 - In Stephen Gaukroger (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Descartes' Meditations. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 2--30.
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  38. Sinnott‐Armstrong Meets Modest Epistemological Intuitionism.Hossein Dabbagh - 2017 - Philosophical Forum 48 (2):175-199.
    Sinnott-Armstrong has attacked the epistemology of moral intuitionism on the grounds that it is not justified to have some moral beliefs without needing them to be inferred from other beliefs. He believes that our moral judgments are inferentially justified because the “framing effects” which are mostly discussed in the empirical psychology cast doubt on any non-inferential justification. In this paper, I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument is question begging against intuitionists and his description of epistemological intuitionism is a diluted version that (...)
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  39. Justification, Commonplaces and Evidence.Emmanuelle Danblon - unknown
    Justification is a basic component of reasoning because it provides us with the warrant which should ground the acceptability of the whole argument. Indeed, justifying an argument consists in providing some principle which is seen as reasonable. In t his perspective, the set of possible justifications may be regarded as the set of those commonplaces that are admitted by a human community and are grounded on the values that are commonly endorsed by the community. I will try to show how (...)
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  40. Arguments From Illusion.Jonathan Dancy - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):421-438.
  41. Kāšġarī on the Beliefs and Superstitions of the TurksKasgari on the Beliefs and Superstitions of the Turks.Robert Dankoff - 1975 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 95 (1):68.
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  42. Believing the Evidence.Jason Davies - 2011 - In Philip Dawid, William Twining & Mimi Vasilaki (eds.), Evidence, Inference and Enquiry. Oup/British Academy. pp. 395.
    The study of ancient religion, partly in response to anthropology, moved in recent decades away from thinking in terms of ‘belief’ to studying ‘ritual’: this has a fundamental effect on how we treat the evidence. This chapter argues that the transition is incomplete and explores some of the deeper implications of thinking in terms of ‘belief’. It argues that these continue to hamper our perspective on ancient religion. The ‘otherness’ of ancient religion does not reside in the ‘rationality’ of their (...)
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  43. Justified Believing:Avoiding the Paradox.Gregory W. Dawes - 2012 - In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor: Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne. Springer.
    Colin Cheyne has argued that under certain circumstances an internalist or deontological theory of epistemic justification will give rise to a paradox. The paradox, he argues, arises when a principle of epistemic justification is both justifiably believed (in terms of the theory) and false. To avoid this paradox, Cheyne recommends abandoning the principle of justification-transference, which states that acts of believing made on the basis of a justifiably-believed principle are themselves justified. Since such a principle seems essential to any internalist (...)
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  44. Empirical Justification. [REVIEW]Timothy Joseph Day - 1990 - Noûs 24 (4):613-617.
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  45. Subjective Justification.de Pierris Graciela - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):363-382.
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  46. Subjective Justification.Graciela de Pierris - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):363-382.
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  47. Subjective Justification.Graciela De Pierris - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):363 - 382.
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  48. Foundations of Empirical Knowledge—Again.C. F. Delaney - 1976 - New Scholasticism 50 (1):1-19.
    This paper takes up again the perennial issue of the foundations of empirical knowledge. the general issue is seen to have three distinct though interrelated facets: those of "meaning", "justification", and "truth". first, how is it that our statements about the world acquire meaning; secondly, how is it that our beliefs about the world are justified; and thirdly, in what precisely consists the truth or falsity of the propositional content of our beliefs? answers to these questions are invariably interdependent, and (...)
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  49. Conversations with a Schizoid About Rationality, Belief in the External World, and Pain.Blanchard Leroy Demerchant - 1977 - Dissertation, Wayne State University
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  50. From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):55-77.
    ABSTRACT: Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of the relevant evaluative property. We then investigate the (...)
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