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Justification

Assistant editor: Charles Bakker (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. Experimental Evidence That Knowledge Entails Justification.Alexandra M. Nolte, David Rose & John Turri - forthcoming - In Tania Lombrozo, Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), Oxford studies in experimental philosophy, volume 4. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    A standard view in philosophy is that knowledge entails justification. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. We argue that this admirable and striking research suffers from an important limitation: participants were asked about knowledge but not justification. Thus it is possible that people attributed knowledge partly because they thought the belief was justified. Perhaps though, if given the opportunity, people would deny justification while still attributing knowledge. It is also possible that earlier findings were due to perspective taking. This paper reports (...)
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  2. Just Following the Rules: Collapse / Incoherence Problems in Ethics, Epistemology, and Argumentation Theory.Patrick Bondy - 2020 - In J. Anthony Blair & Christopher Tindale (eds.), Rigour and Reason: Essays in Honour of Hans Vilhelm Hansen. Windsor, ON, Canada: pp. 172-202.
    This essay addresses the collapse/incoherence problem for normative frameworks that contain both fundamental values and rules for promoting those values. The problem is that in some cases, we would bring about more of the fundamental value by violating the framework’s rules than by following them. In such cases, if the framework requires us to follow the rules anyway, then it appears to be incoherent; but if it allows us to make exceptions to the rules, then the framework “collapses” into one (...)
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  3. Rosenkranz’s Logic of Justification and Unprovability.Jan Heylen - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-14.
    Rosenkranz has recently proposed a logic for propositional, non-factive, all-things-considered justification, which is based on a logic for the notion of being in a position to know, 309–338 2018). Starting from three quite weak assumptions in addition to some of the core principles that are already accepted by Rosenkranz, I prove that, if one has positive introspective and modally robust knowledge of the axioms of minimal arithmetic, then one is in a position to know that a sentence is not provable (...)
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  4. Epistemic Value in the Subpersonal Vale.J. Adam Carter & Robert D. Rupert - 2020 - Synthese:1-30.
    A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology – one with origins in Plato’s Meno – concerns the value of knowledge, and in particular, whether and how the value of knowledge exceeds the value of mere (unknown) true opinion. The recent literature is deeply divided on the matter of how best to address the problem. One point, however, remains unquestioned: that if a solution is to be found, it will be at the personal level, the level at which states of subjects or (...)
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  5. Against Overconfidence: Arguing for the Accessibility of Memorial Justification.Jonathan Egeland Harouny - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    In this article, I argue that access internalism should replace preservationism, which has been called “a received view” in the epistemology of memory, as the standard position about memorial justification. My strategy for doing so is two-pronged. First, I argue that the considerations which motivate preservationism also support access internalism. Preservationism is mainly motivated by its ability to answer the explanatory challenges posed by the problem of stored belief and the problem of forgotten evidence. However, as I will demonstrate, access (...)
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  6. Presupposing, Believing, Having Faith.Carlos Miguel Gómez Rincón - forthcoming - Sophia:1-19.
    This paper traces the borders between presupposing, believing, and having faith. These three attitudes are often equated and confused in the contemporary image of the historically and culturally situated character of rationality. This confusion is problematic because, on the one hand, it prevents us from fully appreciating the way in which this image of rationality points towards a dissolving of the opposition between faith and reason; on the other hand, it leads to forms of fideism. After bringing this differentiation into (...)
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  7. Scientificity and The Law of Theory Demarcation.Ameer Sarwar & Patrick Fraser - 2018 - Scientonomy: Journal for the Science of Science 2:55-66.
    The demarcation between science and non-science seems to play an important role in the process of scientific change, as theories regularly transition from being considered scientific to being considered unscientific and vice versa. However, theoretical scientonomy is yet to shed light on this process. The goal of this paper is to tackle the problem of demarcation from the scientonomic perspective. Specifically, we introduce scientificity as a distinct epistemic stance that an agent can take towards a theory. We contend that changes (...)
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  8. Why Must Justification Guarantee Truth? Reply to Mizrahi.Howard Sankey - 2019 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 10 (4):445-447.
    This reply provides further grounds to doubt Mizrahi’s argument for an infallibilist theory of knowledge. It is pointed out that the fact that knowledge requires both truth and justification does not entail that the level of justification required for knowledge be sufficient to guarantee truth. In addition, an argument presented by Mizrahi appears to equivocate with respect to the interpretation of the phrase “p cannot be false”.
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  9. Presupposing, Believing, Having Faith.Carlos Miguel Gómez Rincón - forthcoming - Sophia:1-19.
    This paper traces the borders between presupposing, believing, and having faith. These three attitudes are often equated and confused in the contemporary image of the historically and culturally situated character of rationality. This confusion is problematic because, on the one hand, it prevents us from fully appreciating the way in which this image of rationality points towards a dissolving of the opposition between faith and reason; on the other hand, it leads to forms of fideism. After bringing this differentiation into (...)
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  10. Hegel's Logic as Presuppositionless Science.Miles Hentrup - 2019 - Idealistic Studies 49 (2):145-165.
    In this article, I offer a critical interpretation of Hegel’s claims regarding the presuppositionless status of the Logic. Commentators have been divided as to whether the Logic actually achieves the status of presuppositionless science, disagreeing as to whether the Logic succeeds in making an unmediated beginning. I argue, however, that this understanding of presuppositionless science is misguided, as it reflects a spurious conception of immediacy that Hegel criticizes as false. Contextualizing Hegel’s remarks in light of his broader approach to the (...)
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  11. The Pluralism of Justification.Anne Meylan - 2017 - In Nikolaj Jang Pedersen & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism. New York, État de New York, États-Unis: pp. 129-142.
    This article argues that “justification” denotes distinct technical properties in contemporary epistemology. It is structured as follows. Section 1 spells out a distinction between two ways of tackling the traditional question: “what is a justified belief?”. Sections 2 and 3 exploit some of the upshots of section 1 in order to show that classical reliabilism, accessibilism and presumably many other accounts of justification use the predicate “justified” in distinct technical ways. As we shall see, the careful vindication of the latter (...)
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  12. Unacknowledged Permissivism.Julia Jael Smith - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):158-183.
    Epistemic permissivism is the view that it is possible for two people to rationally hold incompatible attitudes toward some proposition on the basis of one body of evidence. In this paper, I defend a particular version of permissivism – unacknowledged permissivism (UP) – which says that permissivism is true, but that no one can ever rationally believe that she is in a permissive case. I show that counter to what virtually all authors who have discussed UP claim, UP is an (...)
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  13. Knowing Our Limits.Nathan Ballantyne - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Changing our minds isn't easy. Even when we recognize our views are disputed by intelligent and informed people, we rarely doubt our rightness. Why is this so? How can we become more open-minded, putting ourselves in a better position to tolerate conflict, advance collective inquiry, and learn from differing perspectives in a complex world? -/- Nathan Ballantyne defends the indispensable role of epistemology in tackling these issues. For early modern philosophers, the point of reflecting on inquiry was to understand how (...)
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  14. Reasons, Justification, and Defeat.Mona Simion & Jessica Brown (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
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  15. Imagination Cannot Justify Empirical Belief.Jonathan Egeland - forthcoming - Episteme:1-7.
    A standard view in the epistemology of imagination is that imaginings can either provide justification for modal beliefs about what is possible (and perhaps counterfactual conditionals too), or no justification at all. However, in a couple of recent articles, Kind (2016; Forthcoming) argues that imaginings can justify empirical belief about what the world actually is like. In this article, I respond to her argument, showing that imagination doesn't provide the right sort of information to justify empirical belief. Nevertheless, it can (...)
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  16. Appropriate Belief Without Evidence.Natalie Alana Ashton - 2015 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (2):7-28.
    ABSTRACT In this paper I defend a version of Wittgensteininan contextualism. This is a view about justification on which some beliefs are epistemically appropriate because evidence cannot be adduced in their favour. I trace the history of the view from Wittgenstein and Ortega to the present day, defend one version from the charge of relativism, and suggest some applications of the view both within and without philosophy.
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  17. This is Epistemology.Clayton Littlejohn & J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Wiley.
    We have written an introduction to epistemology that is accessible, engaging, and up to date. (We hope.) -/- Introduction Chapter 1: The Regress Problem Chapter 2: Perception Chapter 3: The Apriori Chapter 4: Inference Chapter 5: On Knowing the Truth Chapter 6: Memory Chapter 7: Testimony Chapter 8: Kinds of Knowledge Chapter 9: Internalism vs. Externalism Chapter 10: The Ethics of Belief Chapter 11: Skepticism .
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  18. On What We Should Believe (and When (and Why) We Should Believe What We Know We Should Not Believe).Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties.
    A theory of what we should believe should include a theory of what we should believe when we are uncertain about what we should believe and/or uncertain about the factors that determine what we should believe. In this paper, I present a novel theory of what we should believe that gives normative externalists a way of responding to a suite of objections having to do with various kinds of error, ignorance, and uncertainty. This theory is inspired by recent work in (...)
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  19. Implicit Bias, Ideological Bias, and Epistemic Risks in Philosophy.Uwe Peters - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (3):393-419.
    It has been argued that implicit biases are operative in philosophy and lead to significant epistemic costs in the field. Philosophers working on this issue have focussed mainly on implicit gender and race biases. They have overlooked ideological bias, which targets political orientations. Psychologists have found ideological bias in their field and have argued that it has negative epistemic effects on scientific research. I relate this debate to the field of philosophy and argue that if, as some studies suggest, the (...)
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  20. Critical Introduction to the Epistemology of Memory.Thomas Senor - 2019 - Bloomsbury.
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  21. Une sémantique générale des croyances justifiées.Fabien Schang & Alexandre Costa Leite - 2016 - CLE-Prints 16 (3):1-24.
    Nous proposons une logique épistémique quadrivalente AR4.
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  22. Epistemic Pluralism.Fabien Schang - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse 239 (60):337-353.
    The present paper wants to promote epistemic pluralism as an alternative view of non-classical logics. For this purpose, a bilateralist logic of acceptance and rejection is developed in order to make an important di erence between several concepts of epistemology, including information and justi cation. Moreover, the notion of disagreement corresponds to a set of epistemic oppositions between agents. The result is a non-standard theory of opposition for many-valued logics, rendering total and partial disagreement in terms of epistemic negation and (...)
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  23. No Justificatory Closure Without Truth.Francesco Praolini - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):715-726.
    It is well-known that versions of the lottery paradox and of the preface paradox show that the following three principles are jointly inconsistent: (Sufficiency) very probable propositions are justifiably believable; (Conjunction Closure) justified believability is closed under conjunction introduction; (No Contradictions) propositions known to be contradictory are not justifiably believable. This paper shows that there is a hybrid of the lottery and preface paradoxes that does not require Sufficiency to arise, but only Conjunction Closure and No Contradictions; and it argues (...)
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  24. Epistemic Conservatism and Bare Beliefs.Daniel Coren - forthcoming - Synthese:1-14.
    My subject is the kind of Epistemic Conservatism (EC) that says that an agent is in some measure justified in maintaining a belief simply in virtue of the fact that the agent has that belief. Quine’s alternative to positivist foundationalism, Chisholmian particularism, Rawls’s reflective equilibrium, and Bayesianism all seem to rely on EC. I argue that, in order to evaluate EC, we must consider an agent holding a bare belief, that is, a belief stripped of all personal memory and epistemic (...)
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  25. Justification and the Truth-Connection, by Clayton Littlejohn: Cambridge: Routledge, 2012, Pp. Vii + 269, $42.95. [REVIEW]Thomas Grundmann - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):622-624.
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  26. Strength of Justification – The Rational Degree of Certainty Approach.Christoph Lumer - 2018 - In Steve Oswald (ed.), Argumentation and Inference. Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017. London, GB: College Publications. pp. 315-333.
    In this paper, I present the fundamental ideas of a new theory of justification strength. This theory is based on the epistemological approach to argumentation. Even the thesis of a valid justification can be false for various reasons. The theory outlined here identifies such possible errors. Justification strength is equated with the degree to which such possible errors are excluded. The natural expression of this kind of justification strength is the (rational) degree of certainty of the belief in the thesis.
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  27. Destructive Defeat and Justificational Force: The Dialectic of Dogmatism, Conservatism, and Meta-Evidentialism.Matthias Steup - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2907-2933.
    Defeaters can prevent a perceptual belief from being justified. For example, when you know that red light is shining at the table before you, you would typically not be justified in believing that the table is red. However, can defeaters also destroy a perceptual experience as a source of justification? If the answer is ‘no’, the red light defeater blocks doxastic justification without destroying propositional justification. You have some-things-considered, but not all-things-considered, justification for believing that the table is red. If (...)
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  28. How Supererogation Can Save Intrapersonal Permissivism.Han Li - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):171-186.
    Rationality is intrapersonally permissive just in case there are multiple doxastic states that one agent may be rational in holding at a given time, given some body of evidence. One way for intrapersonal permissivism to be true is if there are epistemic supererogatory beliefs—beliefs that go beyond the call of epistemic duty. Despite this, there has been almost no discussion of epistemic supererogation in the permissivism literature. This paper shows that this is a mistake. It does this by arguing that (...)
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  29. Habilidade e causalidade: uma proposta confiabilista para casos típicos de conhecimento.Breno Ricardo Guimarães Santos - 2014 - In Jaimir Conte & Cezar Mortari (eds.), Temas em Filosofia Contemporânea. Florianópolis, State of Santa Catarina, Brazil: pp. 38-48.
    Debates em epistemologia recente têm se pautado, em grande medida, pelo problema de caracterizar a natureza da justificação. De modo geral, a tarefa tem sido explorar o status epistêmico que faz com que uma crença verdadeira seja uma instância de conhecimento. Este debate traz consigo uma discussão mais ampla acerca do conteúdo da definição de conhecimento, ou seja, uma discussão cujo propósito é identificar o que compõe de forma necessária e suficiente esta noção epistêmica central. No entanto, paralelamente a este (...)
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  30. Was Emily Brown American Empress in Korea?Jong-pil Yoon - 2018 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 12 (1):71-92.
    _ Source: _Page Count 22 This paper investigates the limits and meaning of historical inquiry in light of inferential contextualism that holds as its central tenet that the epistemic status of a proposition depends on the context of the subject. Historical inquiry, the discussion will show, is an epistemic practice that operates under the reliabilist presupposition that beliefs formed through the processes, whose pragmatic utility has been already proven in problem solving situations, may be taken to be rationally justified.As for (...)
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  31. Having False Reasons.Juan Comesaña & Matthew McGrath - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms. Oxford University Press. pp. 59-80.
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  32. Etiological Information and Diminishing Justification.Paul Silva - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (2):1-25.
    Sometimes it’s reasonable to reduce confidence in a proposition in response to gaining etiological information. Suppose, for example, a theist learns that her theism is ‘due to’ her religious upbringing. There is a clear range of cases where it would be reasonable for her to respond by slightly decreasing her confidence in God’s existence. So long as reasonability and justification are distinct, this reasonability claim would appear consistent with the thesis that this kind of etiological information cannot, all by itself, (...)
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  33. Knowing How to Put Knowledge First in the Theory of Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):393-412.
    I provide a novel knowledge-first account of justification that avoids the pitfalls of existing accounts while preserving the underlying insight of knowledge-first epistemologies: that knowledge comes first. The view I propose is, roughly, this: justification is grounded in our practical knowledge (know-how) concerning the acquisition of propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). I first refine my thesis in response to immediate objections. In subsequent sections I explain the various ways in which this thesis is theoretically superior to existing knowledge-first accounts of justification. The (...)
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  34. The Foundherentist View of Justification by Experience.James A. Ryan - 2000 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 4 (1):79-88.
    I show that Susan Haack's foundherentist theory of justification accounts for the role of experience in the creation of justification. Experience causes one to be justified in believing by causing certain beliefs — the truth of which is necessary to one's being justified — to be true This is revealed when we notice that, as foundherentism holds, no belief is basic in the foundationalist sense, while all beliefs derive their justification from experience, contrary to coherentism.
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  35. First Things First Redistribution, Recognition and Justification.Rainer Forst - 2007 - European Journal of Political Theory 6 (3):291-304.
    This article analyses the debate between Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth in a dialectical fashion. Their controversy about how to construct a critical theory of justice is not just one about the proper balance between `redistribution' and `recognition', it also involves basic questions of social ontology. Differing both from Fraser's `twodimensional' view of `participatory parity' and from Honneth's `monistic' theory of recognition, the article argues for a third view of `justificatory monism and diagnosticevaluative pluralism', also called the `first-things-first' approach. According (...)
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  36. What Are Explanatory Virtues Indicative Of?Belkoniene Miloud - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (2):179-193.
    This paper discusses an assumption on which explanationist accounts of the evidential support relation rely with a focus on McCain’s recent account. Explanationist accounts define the relation of evidential support in terms of relations of best explanation that hold between the evidence a subject possesses and the propositions she believes. Such a definition presupposes that the explanatory virtues of what best explains a subject’s body of evidence is indicative of its truth. Yet, recent cases offered in the literature against McCain’s (...)
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  37. Sinnott‐Armstrong Meets Modest Epistemological Intuitionism.Hossein Dabbagh - 2017 - Philosophical Forum 48 (2):175-199.
    Sinnott-Armstrong has attacked the epistemology of moral intuitionism on the grounds that it is not justified to have some moral beliefs without needing them to be inferred from other beliefs. He believes that our moral judgments are inferentially justified because the “framing effects” which are mostly discussed in the empirical psychology cast doubt on any non-inferential justification. In this paper, I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument is question begging against intuitionists and his description of epistemological intuitionism is a diluted version that (...)
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  38. A Theory of Presumption for Everyday Argumentation.David M. Godden & Douglas N. Walton - 2007 - Pragmatics and Cognition 15 (2):313-346.
    The paper considers contemporary models of presumption in terms of their ability to contribute to a working theory of presumption for argumentation. Beginning with the Whatelian model, we consider its contemporary developments and alternatives, as proposed by Sidgwick, Kauffeld, Cronkhite, Rescher, Walton, Freeman, Ullmann-Margalit, and Hansen. Based on these accounts, we present a picture of presumptions characterized by their nature, function, foundation and force. On our account, presumption is a modal status that is attached to a claim and has the (...)
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  39. Zalabardo on Pritchard and the Evidential Problem.Tommaso Piazza - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (3):199-205.
    _ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 3, pp 199 - 205 It is an alleged virtue of Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism that it makes available a promising line of resistance against the sceptic about perceptual knowledge. According to José Zalabardo’s reconstruction of it, however, this line of resistance—in particular, the solution it supplies to what Pritchard calls the Evidential Problem—is ultimately flawed. Whether or not the solution criticized by Zalabardo is the one supplied by ED —which Pritchard has denied—my aim in this (...)
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  40. Olovyof's The Justification of the Good. [REVIEW]Norman Wilde - 1920 - Journal of Philosophy 17 (21):580.
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  41. Justification et résultats d'une psychochirurgie.Pierre Wertheimer - 1951 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:337.
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  42. Inferential Visualizing is Justification and Foley's Foundations.Paul K. Moser - 1989 - Analysis 49 (2):84.
    In "the theory of epistemic rationality" (harvard university press, 1987), Richard foley presents a version of subjective foundationalism designed to avoid aristotle's famous regress problem. This paper explains why foley's theory does not provide an adequate account of the foundations of inferential epistemic justification. Foley's theory neglects the epistemic significance of 'non'belief perceptual states.
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  43. Alain Finkielkraut, The Defeat of the Mind. [REVIEW]T. Quigley - 1995 - Philosophy in Review 15:239-241.
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  44. Evaluational Illusions and Skeptical Arguments.Steven L. Reynolds - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):529-558.
    A traditional diagnosis of the error in the Cartesian skeptical arguments holds that they exploit our tendencies to take a representationalist view of perception. Thinking that we perceive only our own sensory states, it seems to us that our perceptual beliefs about physical objects must be justified qua explanations of those sensory states. Such justification requires us to have reasons to reject rival explanations, such as the skeptical hypotheses, which we lack. However, those who adopt the direct realist view of (...)
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  45. Iceberg Epistemology.David Henderson & Terrence Horgan - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):497-535.
    Accounts of what it is for an agent to be justified in holding a belief commonly carry commitments concerning what cognitive processes can and should be like. A concern for the plausibility of such commitments leads to a multi-faceted epistemology in which elements of traditionally conflicting epistemologies are vindicated within a single epistemological account. The accessible and articulable states that have been the exclusive focus of much epistemology must constitute only a proper subset of epistemologically relevant processing. The interaction of (...)
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  46. Delightful, Delovely and Externalist.Jane Duran - 1992 - Critica 24 (70):65-82.
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  47. Reasons for Belief, Perception, and Reflective Knowledge.Alan Millar - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):1-19.
    A conception of the relation between reasons for belief, justified belief, and knowledge is outlined on which a belief is justified, in the sense of being well‐founded, only if there is an adequate reason to believe it, reasons to believe something are constituted by truths, and a reason to believe something justifies one in believing it only if it is constituted by a truth or truths that one knows. It is argued that, contrary to initial appearances, perceptual justification does not (...)
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  48. Epistemological Writings. [REVIEW]M. Z. J. - 1978 - Review of Metaphysics 32 (1):141-142.
    Although some of Helmholtz’s scientific suggestions are dated with the progress of science, his ontological statements as well as his epistemological studies are still an object of philosophical controversy. The selection of Helmholtz’s epistemological writings, edited as volume 79 in the Synthese Library, contains four papers originally published in German between 1868 and 1887. In these papers are considered among others the epistemological aspects of measuring and numbering, the issues of perceptual cognition, the theory of geometrical knowledge, and the relationship (...)
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  49. A Justification of Rationality. [REVIEW]A. J. O. - 1977 - Review of Metaphysics 30 (4):766-767.
    The title John Kekes has given to his book accurately describes its contents. The book is devoted to the development and defense of an original, complex, and persuasive theory of rationality, whose goal is to provide both a theoretical and a practical alternative to skepticism. To accomplish this purpose, Kekes believes, it is necessary to show that standards of rationality can be justified without either lapsing into arbitrariness or becoming entrapped in a vicious regress.
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  50. Knowledge and Justification. [REVIEW]O. B. T. - 1976 - Review of Metaphysics 29 (4):743-744.
    In this work Pollock attempts to recast the epistemological enterprise. Traditional epistemology has been centered on the search for truth conditions. It has been assumed that unless these are found the sceptic’s attack on knowledge claims cannot be conclusively answered. Pollock contends that traditional epistemologists have been barking up the wrong tree. The problem of epistemology is not to prove the trustworthiness of the justification condition. The proper task of epistemologists is to reveal the logical connection between the source of (...)
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