Kalam Cosmological Argument

In Laws book X Plato tries to give us conclusive evidence that there are at least two gods (one good and the other bad). The reasoning depends crucially on the idea of ‘self moving motion.’ In this paper I try to show that the ‘evidence’ is not persuasive. (Nevertheless, the idea of ‘self – moving motion is interesting.).

An application of some recent work on the science of generic thought.

This paper considers two problems -- one in philosophy of religion and another in philosophy of physics -- and shows that the two problems have one solution. Some Christian philosophers have endorsed the views that (i) there was a first finitely long period of time, (ii) God is in time, and yet (iii) God did not have a beginning. If there was a first finitely long period of time and God is in time then there was a first finitely long (...) period of time in God's life. But if God's life includes a first finitely long period of time, then, on one initially intuitive conception of beginning to exist, God began to exist. Thus, at first glance, (i)-(iii) are not mutually compatible. Meanwhile, on a variety of proposals for quantum gravity theories or interpretations of quantum theory, space-time is not fundamental to physical reality and instead can (somehow) be explained in terms of yet more fundamental physical substructures. As I show, there is a strong intuition that if space-time is not fundamental to physical reality, then, even if there were a first finitely long period in the life of physical reality, physical reality would be beginningless. Thus, both theistic philosophers and philosophers of physics have developed theories on which some beginningless entities have a first finitely long temporal period in their lives and so both groups should be interested in developing criteria that distinguish such entities from entities with a beginning. In this paper, I offer one necessary (but not sufficient) condition, namely, that entities that begin to exist are absent from the closest possible worlds without time. The view that I defend has one significant upshot: no sound argument can use the mere fact (if it is a fact) that past time is finite to reach the conclusion that the totality of physical reality had a beginning. (shrink)

In a recent paper published in 2020, Alex Malpass & Wes Morriston discuss the difference between beginningless past and an endless future and try to show that beginningless series of past events and an endless series of future ones are in the same boat. So if (as they believe) an endless series of events is possible, then the possibility of a beginningless series of past events should not be rejected merely on the ground that it would be an actual infinite. (...) I will show in this paper that Malpass and Morriston’s refutations are flawed and that their argument does not provide any evidence that a beginningless past is possible. (shrink)

The Successive Addition Argument (SAA) is one of the key arguments espoused by William Lane Craig for the thesis that the universe began to exist. Recently, Malpass, Mind, 131(523), 786–804 (2021) has developed a challenge to the SAA by way of constructing a counterexample that originates in the work of Fred Dretske. In this paper, I show that the Malpass-Dretske counterexample is in fact no counterexample to the argument. Utilizing a distinction between properties of members and properties of collections, I (...) argue that Malpass’ counterexample has no bearing on the soundness of the SAA. I also develop a novel parity argument against Malpass’ argument that I demonstrate can only be resolved by way of the aforementioned analysis. (shrink)

According to the orthodox interpretation of bounce cosmologies, the universe was born from an entropy-reducing phase in a previous universe. To defend the thesis that the whole of physical reality was caused to exist a finite time ago, Craig and Sinclair have argued the low-entropy interface between universes should instead be understood as the beginning of two universes. Here, I present Craig and Sinclair with a dilemma. On the one hand, if the direction of time is reducible, as friends of (...) the Mentaculus—for example, Albert, Loewer, and Papineau—maintain, then there is reason to think that the direction of time and the entropic arrow of time align. But on that account, efficient causation is likely reducible to non-causal phenomena. In consequence, contrary to Craig and Sinclair’s theological aims, things can begin to exist without causes. On the other hand, if the direction of time is not reducible, Craig and Sinclair’s interpretation of bounce cosmologies is unjustified. Lastly, a reply to a potential objection motivates a discussion of how to interpret bounce cosmologies on the tensed theory of absolute time favoured by Craig and Sinclair. I offer two interpretations of bounce cosmologies that, given a tensed theory of absolute time, are preferable to those Craig and Sinclair offer, yet inconsistent with their project in natural theology; on one interpretation, the universe does not require a supernatural cause and, on the other, bounce cosmologies represent the universe as never having begun to exist. (shrink)

This dissertation is concerned with two of the largest questions that we can ask about the nature of physical reality: first, whether physical reality begin to exist and, second, what criteria would physical reality have to fulfill in order to have had a beginning? Philosophers of religion and theologians have previously addressed whether physical reality began to exist in the context of defending the Kal{\'a}m Cosmological Argument (KCA) for theism, that is, (P1) everything that begins to exist has a cause (...) for its beginning to exist, (P2) physical reality began to exist, and, therefore, (C) physical reality has a cause for its beginning to exist. While the KCA has traditionally been used to argue for God's existence, the KCA does not mention God, has been rejected by historically significant Christian theologians such as Thomas Aquinas, and raises perennial philosophical questions -- about the nature and history of physical reality, the nature of time, the nature of causation, and so on -- that should be of interest to all philosophers and, perhaps, all humans. While I am not a religious person, I am interested in the questions raised by the KCA. In this dissertation, I articulate three necessary conditions that physical reality would need to fulfill in order to have had a beginning and argue that, given the current state of philosophical and scientific inquiry, we cannot determine whether physical reality began to exist. -/- Friends of the KCA have sought to defend their view that physical reality began to exist in two distinct ways. As I discuss in chapter 2, the first way in which friends of the KCA have sought to defend their view that physical reality began to exist involves a family of a priori arguments meant to show that, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, the past must be finite. If the past is necessarily finite, then the past history of physical reality is necessarily finite. And if having a finite past suffices for having a beginning, then, since the past history of physical reality is necessarily finite, physical reality necessarily began to exist. I show that the arguments which have been offered thus far for the view that the past is necessarily finite do not succeed. Moreover, as I elaborate on in chapter 5, having a finite past does not suffice for having a beginning. -/- As I discuss in chapter 3, the second way in which friends of the KCA have sought to defend their view that physical reality began to exist involves a family of a posteriori arguments meant to show that we have empirical evidence that physical reality has a finite past history. For example, the big bang is sometimes claimed to have been the beginning of physical reality and, since we have excellent empirical evidence for the big bang, we have excellent empirical evidence for the beginning of physical reality. The big bang can be understood in two ways. On the one hand, the big bang can be understood as a theory about the history and development of the observable universe. Understood in that sense, then I agree that the big bang is supported by excellent empirical evidence and by a scientific consensus. On the other hand, some authors (particularly science popularizers, science journalists, and religious apologists) have wrongly interpreted big bang theory as a theory about the beginning of the whole of physical reality. As I argue, while a beginning of physical reality may be consistent with classical big bang theory, classical big bang theory does not provide good reason for thinking that physical reality began to exist. -/- In part II, I turn to discussing three necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, conditions for physical reality to have a beginning. Before discussing the three conditions, in chapter 4, I introduce three metaphysical accounts of the nature of time (A-theory, B-theory, and C-theory) as well as some formal machinery that will subsequently become useful in the dissertation. I introduce the first of the three conditions in chapter 5. According to the Modal Condition, physical reality began to exist only if, at the closest possible worlds without time, physical reality does not exist. I show that this condition helps us to make sense of various views in both theology and philosophy of physics. In chapter 6}, I introduce the second of my three conditions, the Direction Condition, according to which, roughly, physical reality began to exist only if all space-time points agree about the direction of time, so that all space-time points can agree that physical reality's putative beginning took place in their objective past. In chapter 7, I discuss the third condition, the Boundary Condition, according to which physical reality began to exist only if there is a past temporal boundary such that physical reality did not exist before the boundary. I show that there are two senses in which physical reality could be said to have had a past temporal boundary. Lastly, in chapter 8, I show that there is a relationship between my three conditions and classical big bang theory, even though the relationship is not the one usually identified in the literature. -/- In part III, I present four arguments for the view that, at the present stage of philosophical and scientific inquiry, we cannot know whether physical reality satisfies the three necessary conditions to have had a beginning and, consequently, we cannot know whether physical reality had a beginning. As I will prove in chapter 9, no set of observations that we currently have, when conjoined with General Relativity, entails that physical reality satisfies the Direction or Boundary Conditions. As I show in chapter 10, considerations in the philosophical foundations of statistical mechanics entail either that the Cosmos violates the Modal Condition or else that there is a transcendental condition on the possibility of our knowledge of the past that prevents our access to data we would need to gather to determine whether physical reality satisfies the Boundary Condition. In chapter 11, I show that there are a number of live cosmological models according to which physical reality does not satisfy the Boundary Condition. As long as we don't know whether any of those cosmological models are correct, we do not know whether physical reality satisfies the Boundary Condition. Lastly, I turn to confirmation theory and show that, at our present stage of inquiry, ampliative inferences for the conclusion that physical reality satisfies the Modal, Direction, and Boundary Conditions are not successful. (shrink)

Suppose one accepts the argument that past infinity is not acceptable. This does not eliminate the possibility that the beginning of time is not equivalent across objects. Along with breakdown of absolute simultaneity of events in relativity, there may even be no agreement on whether an event existed. There may be no consistent way to totally order events. In such a case, despite every object, conscious or not, having finite lifetime, there may be no single point called “the beginning,” and (...) the universe stays as it is without requiring a cause of existence. (shrink)

This essay aims to evaluate each element of the Kalam Cosmological Argument. I first examine premise (2) and one popular objection to it. I then do the same for premise (1). Second, I propose an original objection to premise (1), and then refute the objection. In my self-refutation, I share two insights into the nature of philosophical inquiry. I finish with an overview of the Argument’s conclusion.

Explicit atheism is a philosophical position according to which belief in God is irrational, and thus it should be rejected. In this paper, I revisit, extend, and defend against the most telling counter arguments the Kalām Cosmological Argument in order to show that explicit atheism must be deemed as a positively irrational position.

It is often claimed that belief in God is based on faith, while non-belief is grounded in rationality. This claim is inaccurate. Moral philosopher Carlo Alvaro takes the reader through his philosophical journey—a journey taken with the absolute absence of faith. Through reasoning alone, and with an objective assessment of the classical theistic arguments, Deism takes the reader from disbelief to a particular version of deism. Deism discusses such arguments as the Kalam Cosmological, the asymmetry against the evil-god challenge, the (...) anthropic principle, and the moral. Such arguments lead to the undeniable conclusion that there exists a timeless, space-less, wholly good, and infinitely powerful being endowed with freedom of the will, who brought the universe into existence a finite time ago. An objective appraisal of such arguments leads to the conclusions that atheism is an irrational philosophical position, that God does not interact with humans, at least not during our physical existence on earth, and that God is the best explanation of the objectivity of moral value and duty. (shrink)

Consider an infinite series whose items are each explained by their immediate successor. Does such an infinite explanation explain the whole series or does it leave something to be explained? Hume arguably claimed that it does fully explain the whole series. Leibniz, however, designed a very telling objection against this claim, an objection involving an infinite series of book copies. In this paper, I argue that the Humean claim can, in certain cases, be saved from the Leibnizian “infinite book copies” (...) objection, and that this provides an interesting way to defuse some cosmological arguments for the existence of God and to give a non-theistic but complete explanation of the Universe. In the course of my argumentation, I also show that circular explanations can be “self-explanatory” as well: explaining two items by each other can explain the couple of items tout court. (shrink)

This book contains a unique perspective: that of a scientifically and philosophically educated agnostic who thinks there is impressive—if maddeningly hidden—evidence for the existence of God. Science and philosophy may have revealed the poverty of the familiar sources of evidence, but they generate their own partial defense of theism. Bryan Frances, a philosopher with a graduate degree in physics, judges the standard evidence for God’s existence to be awful. And yet, like many others with similar scientific and philosophical backgrounds, he (...) argues that the usual reasons for atheism, such as the existence of suffering and success of science, are weak. In this book you will learn why so many people with scientific and philosophical credentials are agnostics despite judging all the usual evidence for theism to be fatally flawed. (shrink)

Logical limits of omnipotence, the problem of evil, and a compelling cosmological argument suggest the position of supreme providence and the foremost creation out of nothing that coheres with the constraints of physics. The Supreme Being possesses everlasting love, perception, and force while governing the universe of probabilistic processes and freewill creatures. For example, the Supreme Being intervenes in the processes of creation by the means of synergism with freewill creatures and cannot meticulously control the created universe.

Many physicists have thought that absolute time became otiose with the introduction of Special Relativity. William Lane Craig disagrees. Craig argues that although relativity is empirically adequate within a domain of application, relativity is literally false and should be supplanted by a Neo-Lorentzian alternative that allows for absolute time. Meanwhile, Craig and co-author James Sinclair have argued that physical cosmology supports the conclusion that physical reality began to exist at a finite time in the past. However, on their view, the (...) beginning of physical reality requires the objective passage of absolute time, so that the beginning of physical reality stands or falls with Craig's Neo-Lorentzian metaphysics. Here, I raise doubts about whether, given Craig's NeoLorentzian metaphysics, physical cosmology could adequately support a beginning of physical reality within the finite past. Craig and Sinclair's conception of the beginning of the universe requires a past boundary to the universe. A past boundary to the universe cannot be directly observed and so must be inferred from the observed matter-energy distribution in conjunction with auxilary hypotheses drawn from a substantive physical theory. Craig's brand of Neo Lorentzianism has not been sufficiently well specified so as to infer either that there is a past boundary or that the boundary is located in the finite past. Consequently, Neo Lorentzianism implicitly introduces a form of skepticism that removes the ability that we might have otherwise had to infer a beginning of the universe. Furthermore, in analyzing traditional big bang models, I develop criteria that Neo-Lorentzians should deploy in thinking about the direction and duration of time in cosmological models generally. For my last task, I apply the same criteria to bounce cosmologies and show that Craig and Sinclair have been wrong to interpret bounce cosmologies as including a beginning of physical reality. (shrink)

According to the orthodox interpretation of bounce cosmologies, the universe was born from an entropy-reducing phase in a previous universe. To defend the thesis that the whole of physical reality was caused to exist a finite time ago, Craig and Sinclair have argued the low-entropy interface between universes should instead be understood as the beginning of two universes. Here, I present Craig and Sinclair with a dilemma. On the one hand, if the direction of time is reducible, as friends of (...) the Mentaculus—for example, Albert, Loewer, and Papineau—maintain, then there is reason to think that the direction of time and the entropic arrow of time align. But on that account, efficient causation is likely reducible to non-causal phenomena. In consequence, contrary to Craig and Sinclair’s theological aims, things can begin to exist without causes. On the other hand, if the direction of time is not reducible, Craig and Sinclair’s interpretation of bounce cosmologies is unjustified. Lastly, a reply to a potential objection motivates a discussion of how to interpret bounce cosmologies on the tensed theory of absolute time favoured by Craig and Sinclair. I offer two interpretations of bounce cosmologies that, given a tensed theory of absolute time, are preferable to those Craig and Sinclair offer, yet inconsistent with their project in natural theology; on one interpretation, the universe does not require a supernatural cause and, on the other, bounce cosmologies represent the universe as never having begun to exist. (shrink)

This article evaluates the discussion concerning the relationship between the Kalām Cosmological Argument and Divine Omniscience in recent articles in Sophia, 263–272, 2016; Erasmus Sophia, 57, 151–156, 2018a). I argue that, in his latest article, Erasmus is guilty of shifting the focus of the discussion from the KCA to the Infinity Argument. I contribute to the discussion by replying to the four difficulties Erasmus Sophia, 57, 151–156, mentions against my defence of the notion that God has an undivided intuition of (...) all reality. I show that Erasmus has failed to allay the worry that the redefinition of omniscience by Erasmus and Verhoef is unmotivated and problematic. (shrink)

An eternal society with the abilities of ordinary humans in each year of its existence would have had the ability to actualize a logical contradiction. This fact casts doubt on the metaphysical possibility of an infinite past. In addition to using this paradox in an argument against an infinite past, one can also use the paradox mutatis mutandis as a decisive argument against the sempiternality of God.

This chapter provides an overview and critical discussion of cosmological arguments for theism, with special focus on the Kalam argument and arguments from contingency.

This book provides an up to date, high-level exchange on God in a uniquely productive style. Readers witness a contemporary version of a classic debate, as two professional philosophers seek to learn from each other while making their cases for their distinct positions. In their dialogue, Joshua Rasmussen and Felipe Leon examine classical and cutting-edge arguments for and against a theistic explanation of general features of reality. The book also provides original lines of thought based on the authors’ own contributions (...) to the field, and offers a productive and innovative inquiry into on one of the biggest questions people ask: what is the ultimate explanation of things? (shrink)

This is a review of *The Kalām Cosmological Argument* (edited by Paul Copan and William Lane Craig). In this review, I focus primarily on the papers in the first volume by Waters, Loke, and Oderberg. (I have also written an independent review of the second volume.).

This is a commissioned review of Copan, P. and Craig, W. The Kalām Cosmological Argument Volume Two: Scientific Evidence for the Beginning of the Universe New York: Bloomsbury, US$172.50, ISBN 978-1-50-133587-7.

This book offers a discussion of the kalām cosmological argument, and presents a defence of a version of that argument after critically evaluating three of the most important versions of the argument. It argues that, since the versions of the kalām cosmological argument defended by Philoponus (c. 490–c. 570), al-Ghazālī (1058– 1111), and the contemporary philosopher, William Lane Craig, all deny the possibility of the existence of an actual infinite, these arguments are incompatible with Platonism and the view that God (...) foreknows an endless future. This conclusion, however, is not a problem for the proponents of the kalām cosmological argument, for the book shows how the argument can be defended without denying the possibility of the actual infinite. -/- In order to offer a comprehensive analysis of Philoponus and al-Ghazālī’s cosmological arguments, the book draws on recent English translations of some of their works. Next, the book advances a detailed argument against the popular argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite. Finally, the book offers a unique defence of the kalām cosmological argument by defending philosophical arguments for a beginning of time that do not deny the actual infinite, evaluating which hypothesis best explains the discoveries of modern cosmology, and offering an argument in support of the premise that, if the universe came into existence, then God brought it into existence. (shrink)

In a recent article, Andrew Ter Ern Loke raises several objections to Jacobus Erasmus and Anné Hendrik Verhoef’s exposition and response to the so-called ‘Infinite God Objection’ to the kalām cosmological argument. According to this objection, the argument against the possibility of an actual infinite brings into question the view that God’s knowledge is infinite. Erasmus and Verhoef’s solution to this objection, which Loke criticises, depends on an unusual account of omniscience. In this article, I respond to Loke and show (...) that his objections are unsuccessful. (shrink)

In the Quran, as well as the belief in tawhid -which means the oneness of Allah in terms of divinity, omnipotency and creating-, belief in the prophets and in the afterlife also have an important place. He who believes in the prophet must also believe in what he conveys. And he who does not believe in the prophet is not accepted within the religion. People need prophets. Finding Allah only through reason can’t save man from responsibility. After finding Allah by (...) the help of his reason, the human being must know the necessities of that belief from its revelational sources and fulfill them. In this respect, sending prophets to the mankind is a divine favor and a blessing from Allah. Allah sent countless prophets during the history as a result of His grace. On the other hand there are deists who believe in Allah but do not accept the possibility of prophethood, revelation and miracles. With an over reliance, they claim that they also deny the necessity of prophethood by using a mathematical inference. Islam is a reasonable religion. But yet, in this study we will try to prove that it is not right to understand all issues related to Islam within the scope of strict rules of reason and logic. One of these issues is the prophecy. (shrink)

After the belief in Allah and in the necessities of His religion, the first of our duties towards Him is to learn our responsibilities as an ‘abd [servant] and worshipping according to His will. Worship is to do what Allah commands and not to do what He prohibits. Worship is legislated by Allah and His Prophet. Thus, the unity and solidarity in worship is achieved. Some reasons and causes for worships are known however the main purpose of worshipping is to (...) serve Allah. Not all the worships are bound with a standard reward scale. Allah has put some standard reward scales as a result of His grace and blessings on His servants. The most common of these is ten-to-one. Worships like az-Zakah [obligatory charity] and as-Sadaqa [voluntary charity] are given seven hundreds -to-one or more reward. Iḥyaʾ Laylat al-Qadr (keeping vigil in that night) is equal to worshipping in a thousand months. In addition, there are unlimited and uncounted blessings in this World and in the hereafter. Also the reward of the worships (like prayer, fasting, giving charity and pilgrimage) is determined by Allah and is subjected to special reward scales. He is who determines the worships and their rewards. One of the greatest blessings of Allah to His slaves is Tawbah [repentance from sins] which means a chance for human beings to make themselves forgiven. Also there is ar-Riya’ [showing off, insincerity] which annuls the worship and limits its reward to this World only. (shrink)

The political turmoil at the end of the period of Righteous Caliphs and in the early periods of the Umayyads had left the Islamic community facing factionalism and civil war. Accordingly, people have witnessed that the acts considered among the great sins such as assassination may be committed even by companions of the Prophet (pbuh). This situation brought the question on the status of believers who committed great sins in this World and in the Hereafter, to the agenda of scholars. (...) The Kharijis and the Mu’tazila did not consider the person who committed A great sin among the believers. According to the Ahl al-Sunna and Al-Jaṣṣās, to commit a great sin does not cause the exclusion of the person from religion. Al-Jaṣṣās has taken into account the issue of great sin, when dealing with the issues of general term, specialization of the cause and infallibilism in diligence (al-ijtihād), since it constitutes the theological (Kalāmī) side of the subject. Although al-Jaṣṣās’ followed a line close to Mu’tazila in the aforementioned matters concerning the jurisprudence, he defended the view of Abū Ḥanīfah in his approach to the person who committed a great sin. His approach to the matter of great sin also clarifies the relationship between islamic law and Islamic thought. (shrink)

Yishai Cohen raises three related objections to the kalam cosmological argument. Firstly, Cohen argues that, if the argument against the possibility of an actual infinite, which is used to support the kalam cosmological argument, is sound, then a predetermined endless future must also be impossible. Secondly, Cohen argues that the possibility of a predetermined endless future entails the possibility of an actual infinite. Finally, Cohen maintains that Robert C. Koons’ Grim Reaper paradox shows that a predetermined endless future is impossible. (...) I intend to show that Cohen’s three arguments are not sound and that the possibility of an endless future is not a thorn in the kalam cosmological argument. (shrink)

In a recent paper, John J. Park argues (1) that an abstract object can bring a universe into existence, and (2) that, according to the Big Bang Theory, the initial singularity is an abstract object that brought the universe into existence. According to Park, if (1) and (2) are true, then the kalam cosmological argument fails to show that the cause of the universe must be divine. I argue, however, that both (1) and (2) are false. In my argument I (...) analyse the abstract/concrete distinction and conclude that, by its nature, an abstract object is causally inefficacious in the sense that it cannot bring something into existence. (shrink)

While there has been much work on cosmological arguments, novel objections will be presented against the modern day rendition of the Kalām cosmological argument as standardly articulated by William Lane Craig. The conclusion is reached that this cosmological argument and several of its variants do not lead us to believe that there is inevitably a supernatural cause to the universe. Moreover, a conditional argument for atheism will be presented in light of the Big Bang Theory.

Some philosophers contend that the past must be finite in duration, because otherwise reaching the present would have involved the sequential occurrence of an actual infinity of events, which they regard as impossible. I recently developed a new objection to this finitist argument, to which Andrew Ter Ern Loke and Travis Dumsday have replied. Here I respond to the three main points raised in their replies.

I argue that the existence of a necessary concrete being can be derived from an exceedingly weak causal principle coupled with two contingent truths one of which falls out of very popular positions in contemporary analytic metaphysics. I then show that the argument resists a great many objections commonly lodged against natural theological arguments of the cosmological variety.

Wes Morriston contends that William Lane Craig's argument for the impossibility of a beginningless past results in an equally good argument for the impossibility of an endless future. Craig disagrees. I show that Craig's reply reveals a commitment to an unmotivated position concerning the relationship between actuality and the actual infinite. I then assess alternative routes to the impossibility of a beginningless past that have been offered in the literature, and show that, contrary to initial appearances, these routes similarly seem (...) to support the impossibility of an endless future. (shrink)

[from the publisher's website] Questions about the existence and attributes of God form the subject matter of natural theology, which seeks to gain knowledge of the divine by relying on reason and experience of the world. Arguments in natural theology rely largely on intuitions and inferences that seem natural to us, occurring spontaneously—at the sight of a beautiful landscape, perhaps, or in wonderment at the complexity of the cosmos—even to a nonphilosopher. In this book, Helen De Cruz and Johan De (...) Smedt examine the cognitive origins of arguments in natural theology. They find that although natural theological arguments can be very sophisticated, they are rooted in everyday intuitions about purpose, causation, agency, and morality. Using evidence and theories from disciplines including the cognitive science of religion, evolutionary ethics, evolutionary aesthetics, and the cognitive science of testimony, they show that these intuitions emerge early in development and are a stable part of human cognition. -/- De Cruz and De Smedt analyze the cognitive underpinnings of five well-known arguments for the existence of God: the argument from design, the cosmological argument, the moral argument, the argument from beauty, and the argument from miracles. Finally, they consider whether the cognitive origins of these natural theological arguments should affect their rationality. (shrink)

In this article, we evaluate various responses to a noteworthy objection, namely, the infinite God objection to the kalām cosmological argument. As regards this objection, the proponents of the kalām argument face a dilemma—either an actual infinite cannot exist or God cannot be infinite. More precisely, this objection claims that God’s omniscience entails the existence of an actual infinite with God knowing an actually infinite number of future events or abstract objects, such as mathematical truths. We argue, however, that the (...) infinite God objection is based on two questionable assumptions, namely, that it is possible for an omniscient being to know an actually infinite number of things and that there exist an actually infinite number of abstract objects for God to know. (shrink)

William Lane Craig has revived interest in the medieval kalām argument to the point where it is now one of the most discussed arguments for God’s existence in the secondary literature. Still, the reception of Craig’s argument among philosophers of religion has been mostly critical. In the interest of developing an argument that more philosophers of religion would be inclined to support, I will lay the philosophical groundwork for a new kalām cosmological argument that, in contrast with Craig’s argument, does (...) not adopt such controversial positions as the dynamic theory of time and the metaphysical impossibility of an actual infinite. (shrink)

William Lane Craig's defence of the kalam cosmological argument rests heavily on two philosophical arguments against a past-eternal universe. In this article I take issue with one of these arguments, what I call the – namely, that the metaphysical absurdity of an actually infinite number of things existing precludes the possibility of a beginningless past. After explaining this argument, I proceed to raise some initial doubts. After setting those aside, I show that the argument is ineffective against proponents of presentism. (...) The remainder of the article considers and rejects possible replies on Craig's behalf. (shrink)

Craig's second philosophical argument for a beginning of the universe presupposes a dynamic theory of time, a limitation which makes the argument unacceptable for those who do not hold this theory. I argue that the argument can be modified thus: If time is beginning -less, then it would be the case that a person existing and counting as long as time exists would count an actual infinite by counting one element after another successively, but the consequent is metaphysically impossible, hence (...) the antecedent is metaphysically impossible. I defend the premises and show that this argument does not presuppose the dynamic theory. (shrink)

Many philosophers have argued that the past must be finite in duration because otherwise reaching the present moment would have involved something impossible, namely, the sequential occurrence of an actual infinity of events. In reply, some philosophers have objected that there can be nothing amiss in such an occurrence, since actually infinite sequences are ‘traversed’ all the time in nature, for example, whenever an object moves from one location in space to another. This essay focuses on one of the two (...) available replies to this objection, namely, the claim that actual infinities are not traversed in nature because space, time, and other continuous wholes divide into parts only in so far as we divide them in thought, and thus divide into only a finite number of parts. I grant that this reply succeeds in blunting the anti-finitist objection, but I argue that it also subverts the very argument against an eternal past that it was intended to save. (shrink)

William Lane Craig modified Bertrand Russell’s Tristram Shandy example in order to derive an absurdity that would demonstrate the finitude of the past. Although his initial attempt at such an argument faltered, further developments in the literature suggested that such an absurdity was indeed in the offing provided that a couple extra statements were also shown to be true. This article traces the development of a particular line of argument that arose from Craig’s Tristram Shandy example before advancing an argument (...) of its own that attempts to fill in the relevant gaps so as to yield a new argument for the finitude of the past. (shrink)

Gottesbeweise gehören zu den großen Themen der abendländischen Philosophie. Im 20. Jahrhundert sind sie mit Hilfe der modernen Logik neu formuliert worden und auch in der analytischen Philosophie werden Gottesbeweise seit Jahrzehnten kontrovers diskutiert. Offenkundig ist die Frage nach der Existenz Gottes im nachmetaphysischen Zeitalter aktueller denn je. Der Band versammelt die großen Gottesbeweise des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit ebenso wie die klassischen Einwände von Hume und Kant. Die sprachanalytische Debatte wird ausführlich dokumentiert und ein eigener Teil ist Kurt Gödel (...) gewidmet, dessen ontologischer Beweis bis heute nicht stichhaltig widerlegt worden ist. Umfassende einleitende Essays führen in die Problematik der Gottesbeweise ein und bieten gut verständliche Rekonstruktionen der jeweiligen Beweisversuche. (shrink)

A key premise of the kalam cosmological argument is that the universe began to exist. However, while a number of philosophers have offered powerful criticisms of William Lane Craig’s defense of the premise, J.P. Moreland has also offered a number of unique arguments in support of it, and to date, little attention has been paid to these in the literature. In this paper, I attempt to go some way toward redressing this matter. In particular, I shall argue that Moreland’s philosophical (...) arguments against the possibility of traversing a beginningless past are unsuccessful. (shrink)

The notion of creatio ex nihilo has become a doctrine firmly established in the three Abrahamic religions (i.e., Christianity, Judaism and Islam). Almost all groups of Islamic thinkers accept the truth of the createdness (creatio) of the universe, and that it is preceded by its “non-existence” (ex nihilo). However, there is a diversity of opinions as to whether the concept of creatio ex nihilo is compatible with alternative accounts of the origin of the physical world, and this diversity is particularly (...) marked between Islamic philosophers and kalam theologians (Mutakallimun). Three major factors, independently or together, play a fundamental role on how Islamic scholars deal with this very issue: (a) their views of the physical world; (b) their approaches to the divine attributes; and (c) their understandings of the teachings of their religion. The aim of this chapter is to investigate whether four different notions of creatio ex nihilo espoused by different Islamic thinkers are compatible with seven alternative accounts of the origins of the universe (five philosophical/theological doctrines – first level of compatibility; and two possible interpretations of a modern scientific theory – second level of compatibility). (shrink)

Cosmological argument is one of the arguments used to prove the existence of God and has been noticed by philosophers from Plato’s time until now. In this research, the new writings of Allameh Tabataba’i on these arguments, in particular on cause and effect and movement are surveyed and compared with the convictions of Avicenna. To begin with, the related arguments proposed by Avicenna are extracted from his writings and reported in this study. In a comparative survey of Allameh’s writings on (...) the above arguments and those of Avicenna, Allameh’s inspirations from Avicenna and his innovations are summarized here. In this regard, Allameh’s innovations, compared with Avicenna, are worth mentioning among which most of Allameh’s arguments are found to be in a higher level of stability than those of Avicenna. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Did the Universe Begin to Exist? Everything That Begins to Exist Has a Cause The Cause of the Universe Properties of the First Cause Objections Conclusion References.

Hypotheses about the shape of causal reality admit of both theistic and non-theistic interpretations. I argue that, on the simplest hypotheses about the causal shape of reality—infinite regress, contingent initial boundary, necessary initial boundary—there is good reason to suppose that non-theism is always either preferable to, or at least the equal of, theism, at least insofar as we restrict our attention merely to the domain of explanation of existence. Moreover, I suggest that it is perfectly proper for naturalists to be (...) undecided between these simple hypotheses about the causal shape of reality: contrary to the proponents of cosmological arguments, there are no decisive objections to any of these simple hypotheses. (I argue this case in detail in connection with objections offered by William Lane Craig; however, I believe that the case holds quite generally.). (shrink)