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  1. .[author unknown] - unknown
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  2. Il Sistema di Jacobi: Ragione, Esistenza, Persona.Ariberto Acerbi - 2010 - G. Olms.
    An interpretation of Jacobi's philosophical realism.
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  3. Review: Bondeli, Apperzeption und erfahrung: Kants transzendentale deduktion im spannungsfeld der frühen rezeption und kritik. [REVIEW]Rolf Ahlers - 2009 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (3):pp. 475-476.
    This book deals with the epicenter of modern philosophy, Kant's transcendental thinking self. It lives and breathes not only in the unity of reason in Kant himself, but also spells out how the problems that emerge in that conception were dealt with in the intellectual world of early German idealism. Bondeli shows how Kant's unity of reason is variously conceived by Kant as the "I think," the "highest point" of the "unity of apperception," as well as the more traditional concept (...)
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  4. Signaling Systems and the Transcendental Deduction.A. Ahmed - forthcoming - In T. Goldschmidt K. Pearce (ed.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics.
    The paper offers a model of Kant's claim that unity of consciousness entails objectivity of experience. This claim has nothing especially to do with thought, language or the categories but is a general truth about arbitrary signaling systems of the sort modeled in the paper. In conclusion I draw some consequences for various forms of idealism.
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  5. Apperception and Analyticity in the B-Deduction.Henry E. Allison - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 44:233-252.
    This paper defends the thesis of the analyticity of the principle of apperception, as developed in the first part of the B-Deduction, against recent criticisms by Paul Guyer and Patricia Kitchen The first part presents these criticisms, the most important of which being that the analyticity thesis is incompatible with both the avowed goal of which being that the Deduction of establishing the validity of the categories and Üie account of apperception in the A-Deduction. The second part argues that Kant's (...)
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  6. Reflections on the B-Deduction.Henry E. Allison - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (S1):1-15.
  7. C. Thomas Powell., Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW]Karl Ameriks - 1994 - International Studies in Philosophy 26 (2):143-144.
  8. Kant and Guyer on Apperception.Karl Ameriks - 1983 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 65 (2):174-186.
  9. The Problem of the Unity of Consciousness: A Study of Apperception and Reflection.Scot William Anderson - 1988 - Dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder
    The problem of the unity of consciousness gains its impetus from the work of Immanuel Kant in The Critique of Pure Reason. The problem Kant leaves us is that the unity of consciousness is taken to be the ground for and basis of the very possibility of our having the kinds of experiences that we have. Yet while this unity explains all sorts of phenomena, it itself remains in some very real sense beyond our grasp. To unravel the problem of (...)
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  10. Unity of Apperception and the Division of Labour in the Transcendental Analytic.Richard E. Aquila - 1997 - Kantian Review 1 (1):17-52.
    In the Critique of Fure Reason Kant distinguishes two sorts of conditions of knowledge. First, there are the space and time of pure intuition, introduced in the Transcendental Aesthetic. They are grounded in our dependence on a special sort of perceptual field for the location of objects. Second, there are pure concepts of the understanding, or categories, introduced in the Analytic. In one respect these are grounded in the logical function of the understanding in judgements, introduced in the first chapter (...)
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  11. Self-Consciousness, Self-Determination, and Imagination in Kant.Richard E. Aquila - 1988 - Topoi 7 (1):65-79.
    I argue for a basically Sartrean approach to the idea that one's self-concept, and any form of knowledge of oneself as an individual subject, presupposes concepts and knowledge about other things. The necessity stems from a pre-conceptual structure which assures that original self-consciousness is identical with one's consciousness of objects themselves. It is not a distinct accomplishment merely dependent on the latter. The analysis extends the matter/form distinction to concepts. It also requires a distinction between two notions of consciousness: one (...)
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  12. Egologische reflexion.Hermann Ulrich Asemissen - 1958 - Kant-Studien 50 (1-4):262-272.
  13. Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness.Lewis Baldacchino - 1980 - Kant-Studien 71 (1-4):393-405.
    There is a widespread misinterpretation of kant according to which an analytic judgment is one that follows from a definition. Through a study of kant's theory of definition, And the role in knowledge that he ascribes to definition, It is shown that this is indeed a misinterpretation. Much criticism of kant's theory of analytic judgments is vitiated by substituting a modern definition of "analytic" for the one kant gave.
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  14. Apperception and Spontaneity.Gary Banham - manuscript
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  15. Kant on Cosmological Apperception.Manfred Baum - 1989 - International Philosophical Quarterly 29 (3):281-289.
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  16. The Unity of Apperception in the Critique of Pure Reason.José Luis Bermúdez - 1994 - European Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):213-240.
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  17. Kant zur moralischen Selbsterkenntnis.Sven Bernecker - 2006 - Kant-Studien 97 (2):163-183.
    Der intentionalistischen Ethik oder Gesinnungsethik zufolge ist das, was an einer Handlung moralisch beurteilt wird, die Handlungsabsicht oder Intention. Der bedeutendste Vertreter des ethischen Intentionalismus, Immanuel Kant, spricht freilich nicht von "Absichten" sondern von "Maximen". Dem hier zugrundegelegten Verständnis zufolge sind Maximen weder Handlungsmotive noch Handlungsstrukturen, sondern Handlungsabsichten. Jedoch ist nicht jede beliebige Absicht eine Maxime. Eine Maxime zu haben, heißt für Kant, sich bewußt entschlossen zu haben, so-und-so zu handeln. Handeln nach Maximen ist regelgeleitetes Verhalten. Der Begriff der Maxime (...)
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  18. Kant and the Significance of Self-Consciousness.Matthew Boyle - forthcoming - Philosophy.
    Human beings who have mastered a natural language are self-conscious creatures: they can think, and indeed speak, about themselves in the first person. This dissertation is about the significance of this capacity: what it is and what difference it makes to our minds. My thesis is that the capacity for self-consciousness is essential to rationality, the thing that sets the minds of rational creatures apart from those of mere brutes. This, I argue, is what Kant was getting at in a (...)
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  19. Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge.Matthew Boyle - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):133-164.
    I argue that a variety of influential accounts of self-knowledge are flawed by the assumption that all immediate, authoritative knowledge of our own present mental states is of one basic kind. I claim, on the contrary, that a satisfactory account of self-knowledge must recognize at least two fundamentally different kinds of self-knowledge: an active kind through which we know our own judgments, and a passive kind through which we know our sensations. I show that the former kind of self-knowledge is (...)
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  20. Review: Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel. Lectures on German Idealism. [REVIEW]Daniel Breazeale - 2008 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (2):pp. 330-331.
    As the author explains, the title of this work is intended to distinguish it from ordinary, Whiggish accounts of the development of German philosophy “from Kant to Hegel.” Instead, Heinrich treats the positions of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel as potentially viable alternatives, none of which must be viewed as aufgehoben by those that followed, and all of which deserve reconsideration by contemporary philosophers.Dieter Henrich is known for two things: first, for championing a minutely-detailed, revisionist approach to the history of post-Kantian (...)
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  21. Review: Keller, Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness[REVIEW]William F. Bristow - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):272-275.
  22. Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness.William F. Bristow & Pierre Keller - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):272.
  23. Kant's View of the Mind and Consciousness of Self.Andrew Brook - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  24. Kant: A Unified Representational Base for All Consciousness.Andrew Brook - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 89-109.
  25. Kant, Self-Awareness, and Self-Reference.Andrew Brook - 2001 - In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins. pp. 9--30.
  26. Kant and the Mind.Andrew Brook - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
    Kant made a number of highly original discoveries about the mind - about its ability to synthesise a single, coherent representation of self and world, about the unity it must have to do so, and about the mind's awareness of itself and the semantic apparatus it uses to achieve this awareness. The past fifty years have seen intense activity in research on human cognition. Even so, Kant's discoveries have not been superseded, and some of them have not even been assimilated (...)
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  27. Kant, Polysolipsism, and the Real Unity of Experience.Richard Brown - manuscript
    [written in 2002/2003 while I was a graduate student at the University of Connecticut and ultimately submitted as part of my qualifying exam for the Masters of Philosophy] The question I am interested in revolves around Kant’s notion of the unity of experience. My central claim will be that, apart from the unity of experiencings and the unity of individual substances, there is a third unity: the unity of Experience. I will argue that this third unity can be conceived of (...)
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  28. One More Failed Transcendental Argument.Anthony Brueckner - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):633 - 636.
    In "The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism," Douglas C. Long presents a transcendental argument against epistemological skepticism.' The argument has a distinctively Kantian flavor (though Long does not highlight this connection), in that it proceeds from the premise that I have self-knowledge and ends with the conclusion that I have perceptual knowledge of an objective, material subject of mental states. If the skeptic wishes to accept the transcendental argument's premise (as he seems to do), then he must reject his claim that (...)
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  29. Another Failed Transcendental Argument.Anthony Brueckner - 1989 - Noûs 23 (4):525-530.
  30. Transcendental Arguments II.Anthony Brueckner - 1984 - Noûs 18 (2):197-225.
    In part I of the present work, I used the term 'Kantian transcendental argument' to refer to any argument which purports to establish that the existence of outer objects is a logically necessary condition for the possibility of self-conscious experience. In this second part, then, I examine Kantian transcendental arguments which proceed from the premise that one is the subject of widely construed self-conscious experience.
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  31. Transcendental Arguments I.Anthony Brueckner - 1983 - Noûs 17 (4):551-575.
    A Kantian transcendental argument is an argument which purports to show that the existence of physical objects of a certain general character is a condition for the possibility of self-conscious experience. Both the Transcendental Deduction and the Refutation of Idealism satisfy this characterization. But we have seen that even a successful Kantian transcendental argument would be somewhat disappointing. Even though such an argument would refute the extreme Cartesian skepticism about the very existence of physical objects, it would not certify any (...)
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  32. Reid, Kant and the Philosophy of Mind.Etienne Brun-Rovet - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):495-510.
    I suggest a possible rehabilitation of Reid's philosophy of mind by a constructive use of Kant's criticisms of the common sense tradition. Kant offers two criticisms, explicitly claiming that common sense philosophy is ill directed methodologically, and implicitly rejecting Reid's view that there is direct epistemological access by introspection to the ontology of mind. Putting the two views together reveals a tension between epistemology and ontology, but the problem which Kant finds in Reid also infects his own system, as his (...)
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  33. Review: Kitcher, Kant's Thinker, Transcendental Apperception: Consciousness or Self-Consciousness? [REVIEW]Ralf Busse - 2014 - Kantian Review 19 (1):109-117.
    A core thesis of Kitcher's is that thinking about objects requires awareness of necessary connections between one's object-directed representations and that this is what Kant means by the transcendental unity of apperception. I argue that Kant's main point is the spontaneity or of combination rather than the requirement of reflexive awareness of combination, that Kitcher provides no plausible account of how recognition of representations should be constituted and that in fact Kant himself appears to lack the theoretical resources to clearly (...)
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  34. Apperception and Spontaneity.Wolfgang Carl - 1997 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (2):147 – 163.
    The interest contemporary philosophy takes in Kant's notion of apperception is restricted to his criticism of the Cartesian Ego and to his refutation of scepticism, but there is a profound lack of concern for the notion itself and for the act of spontaneity in particular which is connected with the use of the word T. Starting from a comparison of Wittgenstein's account of this use with Kant's considerations it is argued that the latter aims at a theory of formal conditions (...)
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  35. Kant, Husserl, and the Nonempirical Ego.David Carr - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (11):682-690.
  36. The Role of Apperception in Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.Hector-Neri Castañeda - 1990 - Noûs 24 (1):147-157.
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  37. Kant et l'égologie.Stéphane Chauvier - 2001 - Archives de Philosophie 4 (4):647-667.
    Abstract : That paper proposes an interpretation of the kantian theory of I-thoughts and self-knowledge. We show that Kant has admitted the humean theory of the elusiveness of the Self, but that he hasn’t endorse a “no-owner theory”. He has argued in favor of the apriority of the « I think ». We scrutinize how that conception can be applied to some varieties of ordinary I-thoughts and stress upon its difficulties.
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  38. Kant on Representation and Objectivity.A. B. Dickerson - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a study of the second-edition version of the 'Transcendental Deduction', which is one of the most important and obscure sections of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. By way of a close analysis of the B-Deduction, Adam Dickerson makes the distinctive claim that the Deduction is crucially concerned with the problem of making intelligible the unity possessed by complex representations - a problem that is the representationalist parallel of the semantic problem of the unity of the proposition. Along (...)
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  39. Constitution and Structure of Self-Identity: Kant's Theory of Apperception and Hegel's Criticism.Klaus Düsing - 1983 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8 (1):409-431.
  40. The Principles of Apperception.Corey W. Dyck - forthcoming - In Giuseppe Motta & Udo Thiel (eds.), Immanuel Kant: Die Einheit des Bewusstseins (Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte). DeGruyter.
    In this paper, I argue that there are multiple principles of apperception which jointly constitute the foundation of Kant's argument in the transcendental deduction.
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  41. A Wolff in Kant's Clothing: Christian Wolff's Influence on Kant's Accounts of Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Psychology.Corey W. Dyck - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):44-53.
    In attempts to come to grips with Kant’s thought, the influence of the philosophy of Christian Wolff (1679-1754) is often neglected. In this paper, I consider three topics in Kant’s philosophy of mind, broadly construed, where Wolff’s influence is particularly visible: consciousness, self-consciousness, and psychology. I argue that we can better understand Kant’s particular arguments and positions within this context, but also gain a more accurate sense of which aspects of Kant’s accounts derive from the antecedent traditions and which constitute (...)
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  42. Empirical Consciousness Explained: Self-Affection, (Self-)Consciousness and Perception in the B Deduction.Corey W. Dyck - 2006 - Kantian Review 11 (1):29-54.
    Few of Kant’s doctrines are as difficult to understand as that of self-affection. Its brief career in the published literature consists principally in its unheralded introduction in the Transcendental Aesthetic and unexpected re-appearance at a key moment in the Deduction chapter in the B edition of the first Critique. Kant’s commentators, confronted with the difficulty of this doctrine, have naturally resorted to various strategies of clarification, ranging from distinguishing between empirical and transcendental self-affection, divorcing self-affection from the claims of self-knowledge (...)
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  43. Unity of Apperception.Stephen Engstrom - 2013 - Studi Kantiani 26:37-54.
    This essay chiefly concerns the unity of self-consciousness expounded under the heading "the original synthetic unity of apperception" in Kant's transcendental deduction. It focuses mainly on Kant's identification of this unity with the understanding, the faculty of knowledge, with the aim of throwing light on the understanding and on knowledge as well as on synthetic unity.
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  44. The Structure of I-Thoughts. Kant and Wittgenstein on the Genesis of Cartesian Self.Luca Forgione - forthcoming - Paradigmi. Rivista di Critica Filosofica.
    Perry and Recanati describe I-thoughts or de se thoughts as thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’. The analysis of the structure of the I-thoughts is intertwined with several epistemic and metaphysical questions. The aim of this paper is to highlight that the absence of an identification component does not imply that the I doesn’t perform a referential function, nor that it necessarily involves a specific metaphysical thesis on the nature of the self-conscious subject. Particularly, as far as the genesis of the (...)
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  45. Kant and the Simple Representation “I”.Luca Forgione - 2017 - International Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):173-194.
    The aim of this paper is to focus on certain characterizations of “I think” and the “transcendental subject” in an attempt to verify a connection with certain metaphysical characterizations of the thinking subject that Kant introduced in the critical period. Most importantly, two distinct meanings of “I think” need be distinguished: in the Transcendental Deduction “I think” is the act of apperception; in the Transcendental Deduction and in the section of Paralogisms “I think” is taken in its representational nature. It (...)
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  46. Non-Objectal Subjectivity.Manfred Frank - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):152-173.
    The immediate successors of Kant in classical German philosophy considered a subjectivity irreducible to objecthood as the core of personhood. The thesis of an irreducible subjectivity has, after the German idealists, been advocated by the phenomenological movement, as well as by analytical philosophers of self-consciousness such as Hector-Neri Castaneda and Sydney Shoemaker. Their arguments together show that self-consciousness cannot be reduced to a relation whereby a subject grasps itself as an object, but that there must be a core of subjectivity (...)
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  47. Fragments of a History of the Theory of Self-Consciousness From Kant to Kierkegaard.Manfred Frank - 2004 - Critical Horizons 5 (1):53-136.
    In the development of modern philosophy self-consciousness was not generally or unanimously given important consideration. This was because philosophers such as Descartes, Kant and Fichte thought it served as the highest principle from which we can 'deduce' all propositions that rightly claimed validity. However, the Romantics thought that the consideration of self-consciousness was of the highest importance even when any claim to foundationalism was abandoned. In this respect, Hölderlin and his circle, as well as Novalis and Schleiermacher, thought that self-consciousness, (...)
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  48. Der Begriff des Selbstbewußtseins bei Kant.Karen Gloy - 1991 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 39 (1-6):255-261.
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  49. Unity, Objectivity, and the Passivity of Experience.Anil Gomes - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):946-969.
    In the section ‘Unity and Objectivity’ of The Bounds of Sense, P. F. Strawson argues for the thesis that unity of consciousness requires experience of an objective world. My aim in this essay is to evaluate this claim. In the first and second parts of the essay, I explicate Strawson's thesis, reconstruct his argument, and identify the point at which the argument fails. Strawson's discussion nevertheless raises an important question: are there ways in which we must think of our experiences (...)
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  50. The Aporia of Inner Sense: The Self-Knowledge of Reason and the Critique of Metaphysics in Kant.Garth Green - 2010 - Brill.
    This work identifies Kant’s doctrine of inner sense as a central element within the ‘architectonic of pure reason’ of the first Critique, exposes its variant construals, and considers the implications of its problematicity for Kant’s theoretical philosophy most generally.
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