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  1. Transcendental Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory and Constitutive A Priori Fist Principles (2021).Robert Chis-Ciure - manuscript
    This paper engages with the epistemological foundations of Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which have recently been questioned from different angles. A recurrent motif of the skeptical attacks involves IIT’s central identity, according to which a particular conscious experience is identical with a particular Maximally Irreducible Cause-effect Structure (MICS). This implies that the same existence is described by the axioms from the phenomenological perspective, and by the postulates in causal terms. My argument is meant to strengthen the theory’s foundations by showing (...)
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  2. Meier, Reimarus and Kant on Animal Minds.Jacob Browning - forthcoming - Kantian Review:1-24.
    Close attention to Kant’s comments on animal minds has resulted in radically different readings of key passages in Kant. A major disputed text for understanding Kant on animals is his criticism of G. F. Meier’s view in the 1762 False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures. In this article, I argue that Kant’s criticism of Meier should be read as an intervention into an ongoing debate between Meier and H. S. Reimarus on animal minds. Specifically, while broadly aligning himself with (...)
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  3. Kant on Plants: Self-Activity, Representations, and the Analogy with Life.Tyke Nunez - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    Do plants represent according to Kant? This is closely connected to the question of whether he held plants are alive, because he explains life in terms of the faculty to act on one’s own representations. He also explains life as having an immaterial principle of self-motion, and as a body’s interaction with a supersensible soul. I argue that because of the way plants move themselves, Kant is committed to their being alive, to their having a supersensible ground of their self-activity, (...)
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  4. Kant on Inner Sensations and the Parity Between Inner and Outer Sense.Yibin Liang - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (10):307-338.
    Does inner sense, like outer sense, provide inner sensations or, in other words, a sensory manifold of its own? Advocates of the disparity thesis on inner and outer sense claim that it does not. This interpretation, which is dominant in the preexisting literature, leads to several inconsistencies when applied to Kant’s doctrine of inner experience. Yet, while so, the parity thesis, which is the contrasting view, is also unable to provide a convincing interpretation of inner sensations. In this paper, I (...)
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  5. Animals and Objectivity.Colin McLear - 2020 - In Lucy Allais & John Callanan (eds.), Kant and Animals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 42-65.
    Starting from the assumption that Kant allows for the possible existence of conscious sensory states in non-rational animals, I examine the textual and philosophical grounds for his acceptance of the possibility that such states are also 'objective'. I elucidate different senses of what might be meant in crediting a cognitive state as objective. I then put forward and defend an interpretation according to which the cognitive states of animals, though extremely limited on Kant's view, are nevertheless minimally objective.
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  6. “I Am the Original of All Objects”: Apperception and the Substantial Subject.Colin McLear - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (26):1-38.
    Kant’s conception of the centrality of intellectual self-consciousness, or “pure apperception”, for scientific knowledge of nature is well known, if still obscure. Here I argue that, for Kant, at least one central role for such self-consciousness lies in the acquisition of the content of concepts central to metaphysical theorizing. I focus on one important concept, that of <substance>. I argue that, for Kant, the representational content of the concept <substance> depends not just on the capacity for apperception, but on the (...)
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  7. Kant and the Demands of Reflection. [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2019 - SGIR Review 2 (1):42-59.
    From an author meets critics session on Melissa Merritt's *Kant on Reflection and Virtue*.
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  8. I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant and Back Again. [REVIEW]Dennis Schulting - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):107-111.
    review of Béatrice Longuenesse latest book on Kant and self-consciousness I, Me, Mine (Oxford 2017).
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  9. Kant on the Role of the Imagination (and Images) in the Transition From Intuition to Experience.Clinton Tolley - 2019 - In Konstantin Pollok & Gerad Gentry (eds.), Imagination in German Idealism and Romanticism. Cambridge, UK: pp. 27-47.
    In this chapter I will argue against both of these interpretations and will begin to develop an alternate account of imagination in experience. Against those who minimize imagination’s role, I will highlight the distinctive contribution of the imagination to experience. In particular, I will foreground the specific role that the imagination plays in making possible the distinct mental act, intermediate between intuition and experience, that Kant calls “perception [Wahrnehmung]” as the “empirical consciousness [Bewußtsein]” of appearances (cf. B207). Because perception involves (...)
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  10. Consciousness as Inner Sensation: Crusius and Kant.Jonas Jervell Indregard - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    What is it that makes a mental state conscious? Recent commentators have proposed that for Kant, consciousness results from differentiation: A mental state is conscious insofar as it is distinguished, by means of our conceptual capacities, from other states and/or things. I argue instead that Kant’s conception of state consciousness is sensory: A mental state is conscious insofar as it is accompanied by an inner sensation. Interpreting state consciousness as inner sensation reveals an underappreciated influence of Crusius on Kant’s view, (...)
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  11. Why Kantian Nonconceptualists Can't Have Their Cake and Eat It—Reply To Sacha Golob.Dennis Schulting - 2018 - Critique:00-00.
    In this article I respond to Sacha Golob's critique of my stance on Kantian nonconceptualism, objectivity, and animal perception of spatial particulars.
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  12. Kant on Consciousness, Obscure Representations and Cognitive Availability.Yibin Liang - 2017 - Philosophical Forum 48 (4):345-368.
  13. Kant on the Place of Cognition in the Progression of Our Representations.Clinton Tolley - 2017 - Synthese:1-30.
    I argue for a new delimitation of what Kant means by ‘cognition [Erkenntnis]’, on the basis of the intermediate, transitional place that Kant gives to cognition in the ‘progression [Stufenleiter]’ of our representations and our consciousness of them. I show how cognition differs from mental acts lying earlier on this progression—such as sensing, intuiting, and perceiving—and also how cognition differs from acts lying later on this progression—such as explaining, having insight, and comprehending. I also argue that cognition should not be (...)
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  14. Consciousness in Early Modern Philosophy: Remarks on Udo Thiel.Christian Barth - 2016 - Kant-Studien 107 (3):515-525.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 3 Seiten: 515-525.
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  15. Why the Transcendental Deduction is Compatible with Nonconceptualism.Sacha Golob - 2016 - In Dennis Schulting (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 27-52.
    One of the strongest motivations for conceptualist readings of Kant is the belief that the Transcendental Deduction is incompatible with nonconceptualism. In this article, I argue that this belief is simply false: the Deduction and nonconceptualism are compatible at both an exegetical and a philosophical level. Placing particular emphasis on the case of non-human animals, I discuss in detail how and why my reading diverges from those of Ginsborg, Allais, Gomes and others. I suggest ultimately that it is only by (...)
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  16. Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel.Colin R. Marshall - 2016 - In Sally Sedgwick & Dina Emundts (eds.), Bewusstsein/Consciousness. De Gruyter. pp. 281-285.
  17. Between ‘Perception’ and Understanding, From Leibniz to Kant.Clinton Tolley - 2016 - Estudos Kantianos 4 (2):71-98.
  18. Kant and the Problem of Self-Identification.Luca Forgione - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (2):178-198.
    Ever since Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense, the transcendental apperception device has become a theoretical reference point to shed light on the criterionless selfascription form of mental states, reformulating a contemporary theoretical place tackled for the first time in explicit terms by Wittgenstein’s Blue Book. By investigating thoroughly some elements of the critical system the issue of the identification of the transcendental subject with reference to the I think will be singled out. In this respect, the debate presents at least (...)
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  19. Kant on Freedom of Empirical Thought.Markus Kohl - 2015 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (2):301-26.
    It is standardly assumed that, in Kant, “free agency” is identical to moral agency and requires the will or practical reason. Likewise, it is often held that the concept of “spontaneity” that Kant uses in his theoretical philosophy is very different from, and much thinner than, his idea of practical spontaneity. In this paper I argue for the contrary view: Kant has a rich theory of doxastic free agency, and the spontaneity in empirical thought (which culminates in judgments of experience) (...)
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  20. Transcendental Apperception and Consciousness in Kant's Lectures on Metaphysics.Dennis Schulting - 2015 - In Robert R. Clewis (ed.), Reading Kant's Lectures. De Gruyter. pp. 89-113.
  21. Transcendental Apperception: Consciousness or Self-Consciousness? Comments on Chapter 9 of Patricia Kitcher's Kant's Thinker.Ralf Busse - 2014 - Kantian Review 19 (1):109-117.
    A core thesis of Kitcher's is that thinking about objects requires awareness of necessary connections between one's object-directed representations ‘as such’ and that this is what Kant means by the transcendental unity of apperception. I argue that Kant's main point is the spontaneity or ‘self-made-ness’ of combination rather than the requirement of reflexive awareness of combination, that Kitcher provides no plausible account of how recognition of representations ‘as such’ should be constituted and that in fact Kant himself appears to lack (...)
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  22. Sensations as Representations in Kant.Tim Jankowiak - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (3):492-513.
    This paper defends an interpretation of the representational function of sensation in Kant's theory of empirical cognition. Against those who argue that sensations are ?subjective representations? and hence can only represent the sensory state of the subject, I argue that Kant appeals to different notions of subjectivity, and that the subjectivity of sensations is consistent with sensations representing external, spatial objects. Against those who claim that sensations cannot be representational at all, because sensations are not cognitively sophisticated enough to possess (...)
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  23. Replies.Patricia Kitcher - 2014 - Kantian Review 19 (1):149-159.
  24. Kant on the Content of Cognition.Clinton Tolley - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):200-228.
    I present an argument for an interpretation of Kant's views on the nature of the ‘content [Inhalt]’ of ‘cognition [Erkenntnis]’. In contrast to one of the longest standing interpretations of Kant's views on cognitive content, which ascribes to Kant a straightforwardly psychologistic understanding of content, and in contrast as well to the more recently influential reading of Kant put forward by McDowell and others, according to which Kant embraces a version of Russellianism, I argue that Kant's views on this topic (...)
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  25. A crítica de Kant à subjetividade cartesiana.Marco Vinícius de Siqueira Côrtes - 2013 - Dissertation, UFPR, Brazil
  26. Unity of Apperception.Stephen Engstrom - 2013 - Studi Kantiani 26:37-54.
    This essay chiefly concerns the unity of self-consciousness expounded under the heading "the original synthetic unity of apperception" in Kant's transcendental deduction. It focuses mainly on Kant's identification of this unity with the understanding, the faculty of knowledge, with the aim of throwing light on the understanding and on knowledge as well as on synthetic unity.
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  27. Conciencia moral y Gesinnung.Claudio La Rocca - 2013 - Ideas Y Valores 62 (S1):133-152.
    Kant ha subrayado el carácter problemático del auto-conocimiento en el campo de la antropología y la psicología: desde sus primeras obras insistió en la imposibilidad de conocer con certeza, sobre la base de las acciones, la disposición moral subjetiva, la única que da a la acción un valor moral. Esta dificultad no se atenúa cuando el juicio moral es dirigido sobre el sujeto mismo. A los problemas cognitivos se añade una tendencia al auto-engaño que está activa en toda la vida (...)
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  28. Kant's Philosophy of the Unconscious.Riccardo Pozzo, Piero Giordanetti & Marco Sgarbi (eds.) - 2012 - Walter de Gruyter.
  29. Pequeñas Percepciones E Ilustración En Leibniz y Kant. Una Revisión de la Interpretación Deleuziana.Manuel Sánchez Rodríguez - 2012 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica 51 (129):281-89.
    In this paper we focus on Deleuze’s interpretation of small perceptions in Leibniz’s thought, as well as on the supposed abandon of this notion in Kant. In connection with the two issues we contend that the way both authors deal with them makes sense within the framework of the Enlightenment.
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  30. Non-Apperceptive Consciousness.Dennis Schulting - 2012 - In Riccardo Pozzo, Piero Giordanetti & Marco Sgarbi (eds.), Kant's Philosophy of the Unconscious. de Gruyter.
  31. Apperzeption und idealrealistische Begründung.Patrick Grüneberg - 2011 - In Elena Ficara (ed.), Die Begründung der Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus. Königshausen & Neumann. pp. 221--230.
    Das Projekt einer Begründung der Philosophie, insbesondere der Metaphysik als Wissenschaft, verbindet sich programmatisch mit dem kritischen Werk Kants und dort mit dem Konzept der transzendentalen Apperzeption. Dieser „höchste Punkt“ bildete seinerseits auch einen der zentralen Anknüpfungspunkte nachfolgender idealistischer Entwürfe und sich daraus entwickelnder Systeme. Die nachkantische Entwicklung wird dabei häufig mit dem Rubrum einer spekulativen Überhöhung des transzendentalen Kritizismus Kants belegt. Dabei ging es Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer – um nur die prominenten Vertreter zu nennen – in erster Linie (...)
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  32. Kant on Animal Consciousness.Colin McLear - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.
    Kant is often considered to have argued that perceptual awareness of objects in one's environment depends on the subject's possession of conceptual capacities. This conceptualist interpretation raises an immediate problem concerning the nature of perceptual awareness in non-rational, non-concept using animals. In this paper I argue that Kant’s claims concerning animal representation and consciousness do not foreclose the possibility of attributing to animals the capacity for objective perceptual consciousness, and that a non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s position concerning perceptual awareness can (...)
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  33. Review: Kitcher, Patricia, Kant's Thinker[REVIEW]Nicholas Stang - 2011 - Notes Dame Philosophical Reviews:unknown.
  34. Kant's Subjective Deduction.Nathan Bauer - 2010 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):433-460.
    In the transcendental deduction, the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seeks to secure the objective validity of our basic categories of thought. He distinguishes objective and subjective sides of this argument. The latter side, the subjective deduction, is normally understood as an investigation of our cognitive faculties. It is identified with Kant’s account of a threefold synthesis involved in our cognition of objects of experience, and it is said to precede and ground Kant’s proof of the (...)
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  35. Kant e la capacità conoscitive degli animali.Chiara Fabbrizi - 2010 - Fogli di Filosofia 1:17-83.
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  36. Cognition and Consciousness: Kantian Affinities with Contemporary Vision Research.Eric LaRock - 2010 - Kant-Studien 101 (4):445-464.
    After providing a critique of Andreas Engel's neural mechanistic approach to object feature binding (OFB), I develop a Kantian approach to OFB that bears affinity with recent findings in cognitive psychology. I also address the diachronic object unity (DOU) problem and discuss the shortcomings of a purely neural mechanistic approach to this problem. Finally, I motivate a Kantian approach to DOU which suggests that DOU requires the persisting character of the cognizing subject. If plausible, the cognizing subject could make an (...)
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  37. Kant and the Scientific Study of Consciousness.Thomas Sturm & Falk Wunderlich - 2010 - History of the Human Sciences 23 (3):48-71.
    We argue that Kant’s views about consciousness, the mind-body problem, and the status of psychology as a science all differ drastically from the way in which these topics are conjoined in present debates about the prominent idea of a science of consciousness. Kant did never use the concept of consciousness in the now dominant sense of phenomenal qualia; his discussions of the mind-body problem center not on the reducibility of mental properties but of substances; and his views about the possibility (...)
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  38. Empirical Consciousness.Patricia Kitcher & Ellen Fridland - 2009 - In Georg Mohr, Jürgen Stolzenburg & Marcus Willaschek (eds.), Kant-Lexikon. De Gruyter.
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  39. Review: Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel. Lectures on German Idealism. [REVIEW]Daniel Breazeale - 2008 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (2):pp. 330-331.
    As the author explains, the title of this work is intended to distinguish it from ordinary, Whiggish accounts of the development of German philosophy “from Kant to Hegel.” Instead, Heinrich treats the positions of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel as potentially viable alternatives, none of which must be viewed as aufgehoben by those that followed, and all of which deserve reconsideration by contemporary philosophers.Dieter Henrich is known for two things: first, for championing a minutely-detailed, revisionist approach to the history of post-Kantian (...)
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  40. Kantian Non-Conceptualism.Robert Hanna - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.
    There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true, then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or (...)
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  41. Der dunkle Verstand. Unbewusste Vorstellungen und Selbstbewusstsein bei Kant.Claudio La Rocca - 2008 - In Valerio Hrsg V. Rohden, Ricardo Terra & Guido Almeida (eds.), Recht Und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. pp. 447-458.
  42. The Green Kant: Kant's Treatment of Animals.Holly L. Wilson - 2008 - In Paul Pojman Louis Pojman (ed.), in Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application.
    Kant's theory of animals is based on his belief that animals have presentations and consciousness and in this are like human beings. When we abuse animals then we are more likely to abuse human beings. But animals are organic beings that have internal purposiveness and hence are ends for which other things are means. In this limited sense animals have intrinsic value.
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  43. Selbstbewusstsein und Bewusstsein des eigenen Körpers. Variationen über ein kantisches Thema.Béatrice Longuenesse - 2007 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 55 (6):859-875.
    Kants Unterscheidung zwischen Bewusstsein seiner selbst „als Subjekt” und Bewusstsein seiner selbst „als Objekt” ist in jüngster Zeit lebendig diskutiert worden. Der Artikel bietet eine Diskussion des üblichen Vorwurfs, dem zufolge Kant ignoriert, dass ich, als Subjekt, meiner selbst als eines physischen Objektes beziehungsweise eines lebendigen Körpers bewusst bin. Gegen Quassim Cassams Argument zu dieser These argumentiert der Artikel, dass Kants Begriff des Ichs eher im Lichte seiner Rolle bei der Einigung unserer Vorstellungen zu verstehen ist als im Lichte zeitgenössischer (...)
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  44. Review: Wunderlich, Kant Und Die Bewußtseinstheorien des 18. Jahrhunderts[REVIEW]Eric Watkins - 2007 - Review of Metaphysics 61 (2):452-454.
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  45. Consciousness and its Transcendental Conditions: Kant’s Anti-Cartesian Revolt.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2007 - In Lähteenmäki & Remes Heinämaa (ed.), Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy. Springer.
    Kant was the first great anti-Cartesian in epistemology and philosophy of mind. He criticised five central tenets of Cartesianism and developed sophisticated alternatives to them. His transcendental analysis of the necessary a priori conditions for the very possibility of self-conscious human experience invokes externalism about justification and proves externalism about mental content. Semantic concern with the unity of the proposition—required for propositionally structured awareness and self-awareness—is central to Kant’s account of the unity of any cognitive judgment. The perceptual ‘binding problem’ (...)
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  46. Kant: A Unified Representational Base for All Consciousness.Andrew Brook - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 89-109.
  47. Self-Consciousness and Consciousness of One’s Own Body: Variations on a Kantian Theme.Béatrice Longuenesse - 2006 - Philosophical Topics 34 (1/2):283-309.
  48. Sensory Consciousness in Kant and Sellars.John McDowell - 2006 - Philosophical Topics 34 (1/2):311-326.
  49. "I Think ...." Kant on Self-Consciousness.Jens Saugstad - 2002 - In Audun Øfsti, Peter Ulrich & Truls Wyller (eds.), Indexicality and Idealism Ii. The Self in Philosophical Perspective. Mentis. pp. 103-125.
  50. Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness.William F. Bristow - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):272.
    In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes the interesting, but obscure claim that the normative constraints that constitute the objectivity of our representations have their source ultimately in transcendental apperception. Keller focuses on this claim. He interprets Kant’s condition of transcendental apperception as the claim that I must represent myself in an impersonal way, and he argues that impersonal self-consciousness is a necessary condition under which I can distinguish my particular take on things from the way things are independently (...)
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