Kant: Philosophy of Language, Misc

The expression “linguistic Kantianism” is widely used to refer to ideas about thought and cognition being determined by language — a conception characteristic of 20th century analytic philosophy. In this article, I conduct a comparative analysis of Kant’s philosophy and views falling under the umbrella expression “linguistic Kantianism.” First, I show that “linguistic Kantianism” usually presupposes a relativistic conception that is alien to Kant’s philosophy. Second, I analyse Kant’s treatment of linguistic determinism and the place of his ideas in the (...) 18th century intellectual milieu and provide an overview of relevant contemporary literature. Third, I show that authentic Kantianism and “linguistic Kantianism” belong to two different types of transcendentalism, to which I respectively refer as the “transcendentalism of the subject” and the “transcendentalism of the medium.” The transcendentalism of the subject assigns a central role to the faculties of the cognising subject. The transcendentalism of the medium assigns the role of an “active” element neither to the external world nor to the faculties of the cognising subject, but to something in between — language, in the case of “linguistic Kantianism.” I conclude that the expression “linguistic Kantianism” can be misleading when it comes to the origins of this theory. It would be more appropriate to refer to this theory by the expression “linguistic transcendentalism,” thus avoiding an incorrect reference to Kant. (shrink)

As is well known, the linguistic/philosophical reflection on natural kind terms has undergone a remarkable development in the early seventies with Putnam and Kripke’s essentialist approaches, touching upon different aspects of Kan’s slant. Preliminarily, however, it might be useful to review some of the theoretical stages in Locke and Leibniz’s approaches on natural kind terms in the light of contemporary reflections, to eventually pinpoint Kant’s contribution and see how some commentators have placed it within the theory of direct reference. Starting (...) with textual evidence even from the logical corpus, in the present essay I will attempt to discuss some of the arguments dismissing Kant’s adherence to this view. These assume that in his approach to the semantics of natural kind Kant appears to be still holding on to a nominalist/conceptualist position, though he seems to be well aware of a few key issues for the theorists of direct reference. (shrink)

Among modern philosophers, Immanuel Kant has few rivals for his influence over the development of contemporary philosophy as a whole. While the issue of language has become a key fulcrum of continental philosophy since the twentieth century, Kant has been overlooked as a thinker whose breadth of insight has helped to spearhead this advance. The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought remedies this historical gap by gathering new essays by distinguished Kant scholars. The chapters examine the many ways that Kant’s philosophy (...) addresses the nature of language. Although language as a formal structure of thought and expression has always been part of the philosophical tradition, the “linguistic dimension” of these essays speaks to language more broadly as a practice including communication, exchange, and dialogue. (shrink)

Despite the limited references to language in Kant’s work, there is an implicit conception of meaning in trascendental philosophy as a whole. The question about meaning is equivalent to the question about the basis of the relation between a universal representation (or type) and the token which corresponds to it. In the 59th paragraph of the Critique of Judgement, Kant considers two models which allow us to think all possible type-token relations (hypotyposis): the schematic and the symbolic exposition. The main (...) aim of our paper is to analyze the nature, function and systematic place of the schematic exposition as the signification model that applies in the theoretical domain. We will also bring about Kant’s implicit criticism of the understanding of the functioning of our concepts, as found in Locke, Berkeley and Hume. A brief glimpse into the notion of symbolic exposition will be given as well, by pointing at the problem of an exposition of our ideas of reason. (shrink)

Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason contains an original and powerful semantics of singular cognitive reference which has important implications for epistemology and for philosophy of science. Here I argue that Kant’s semantics directly and strongly supports Newton’s Rule 4 of Philosophy in ways which support Newton’s realism about gravitational force. I begin with Newton’s Rule 4 of Philosophy and its role in Newton’s justification of realism about gravitational force (§2). Next I briefly summarize Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference (§3), (...) and then show that it is embedded in and strongly supports Newton’s Rule 4, and that it rules out not only Cartesian physics (per Harper) but also Cartesian, infallibilist presumptions about empirical justification generally (§4). This result exposes a key fallacy in Bas van Fraassen’s original argument for his anti-realist Constructive Empiricism (§5). (shrink)

This paper explores Kant’s views about the logical form of “I think”-judgments. It is shown that according to Kant, in an important class of cases the prefix “I think” does not contribute to the assertoric, truth-conditional content of judgments of the form “I think that P.” Thus, judgments of this type are often merely judgments that P. The prefix “I think” does mention the subject and his thought, but it does not make the complex judgment a judgment about the subject (...) and his or her thought. Kant argues that there is a distinctive kind of self-consciousness that is adequately expressed by means of this non-assertoric “I think.” The paper explains that understanding Kant’s ideas on the logic of “I think”-judgments is fruitful both for discussions in contemporary analytic philosophy and for an adequate understanding of Kant’s philosophy. (shrink)

This article proposes a reading of the Kantian transcendental apperception that attempts both to reinforce the cognitive efficacy of its spontaneity and to determine the modus operandi of its unifying function . Thus, being irreducible to a pure logical form , the I think is meant to constitute the qualitative unity of all possible representational system, insofar as it performs an infinite process of semantic or narrative unification. From this standpoint, the I think denotes the key operation that produces meaning, (...) and thereby the very possibility of truth. It follows, from such a framework of a procedural and constructivist theory of truth, the absolute primacy of the establishment of a semantic community by and under the Self. This community lays the foundation of coherence or organic cohesion of contents, and coherence provides the ground where correspondence emerges, which, in the last analysis, expresses nothing but the ever unfinished agreement of donation and action, agreement of Self with Itself. (shrink)

Kant's brief ‘Postscript of a Friend’ serves as a peculiar coda to his life work. The last of Kant's writing to be published during his lifetime, it is both a friendly endorsement of Christian Gottlieb Mielcke's newly competed Lithuanian–German and German–Lithuanian Dictionary and a plea in Kant's own name for the preservation of minority languages, Lithuanian in particular. This support for minority languages has no visible precedent in his earlier writings, in which national, civic and linguistic identities and associated loyalties (...) tend to overlap. Indeed, Kant's understanding of the commonwealth as nation-state seems predicated on the fact or myth of ethnic and linguistic unity and homogeneity. The same apparent lack of precedent also applies to the Nachschrift's singling out as a people of peculiar civic merit of the Lithuanians, who are not otherwise mentioned in any of Kant's published or unpublished writings. The work thus raises an obvious question: why does Kant devote his last published work to a topic and cause in which he does not seem to have taken much earlier interest? (shrink)

This study rationally reconstructs Novalis’s linguistic theory. It traces Novalis’s assessment of earlier linguistic debates, illustrates Novalis’s transformation of their central questions and uncovers Novalis’s unique methodological proposal. It argues that in his critical engagement with Idealism, particularly regarding problems of representation and regulative positing, Novalis recognizes the need for both a philosophy of language and the artistic language designed to execute it. The paper contextualizes Novalis’s linguistic appropriation and repudiation of Kant and explains how, even while Novalis’s linguistic theory (...) issues Kantianism such a challenge, it also begins to demonstrate the application of Kantian designs to linguistic philosophy. The modernity and potential of Novalis’s proposal is evaluated and its significance for discussions in linguistic philosophy and aesthetics is advocated. (shrink)

1. „Schwache“ oder „freie Menschen“? „Weil es aber doch einem nachdenkenden und forschenden Wesen anständig ist, gewisse Zeiten lediglich der Prüfung seiner eigenen Vernunft zu widmen, hierbei aber alle Parteilichkeit gänzlich auszuziehen, und so seine Bemerkungen anderen zur Beurteilung öffentlich mitzuteilen; so kann es niemanden verargt, noch weniger verwehrt werden, die Sätze und Gegensätze, so wie sie sich, durch keine Drohung geschreckt, vor Geschworenen von seinem eigenen Stande verteidigen können, auftreten zu lassen.“ These: Wer diesen Text kritisch liest, stutzt – (...) was sollen die „schwachen Menschen“ hier? Ist nicht das bizarre „schwacher“ durch „freier“ zu ersetzen? Kant verbindet mit der Gerichtshofmetapher die gegen die Politik der Machtsprüche des Absolutismus, aber auch gegen die Gesetzlosigkeit des „status naturalis“ gerichtete Freiheit der Richter und Geschworenen, nicht aber deren Schwäche. Erst im Staat unter Freiheitsgesetzen könne ein Gerichtshof eingerichtet werden – „Zu dieser Freiheit gehört denn auch, seine Gedanken, seine Zweifel, die man sich nicht selbst auflösen kann, öffentlich zur Beurteilung auszustellen, ohne darüber für einen unruhigen oder gefährlichen Bürger verschrieen zu werden [„durch keine Drohung geschreckt“] Das liegt schon in dem ursprünglichen Rechte der menschlichen Vernunft, welche keinen anderen Richter erkennt, als selbst wiederum die allgemeine Menschenvernunft, worin ein jeder seine Stimme hat.“ Die Freiheit bezieht sich auf den Bürgerstand der Menschen und ihre Freiheitsgesetze. Wir befinden uns im Bereich einer Rechtsinstitution – was soll da der Appell an die Schwäche? Gibt es einen bürgerlichen Stand der Schwachen? Nein. Das Ergebnis der Gerichtsverhandlung wird sein, dass weder Satz noch Gegensatz gilt oder dass beide gelten könnten. Nun kommt hinzu, dass Kant zuvor den Menschen charakterisiert, der zwischen These und Antithese hin- und herschwankt – ein schwacher Mensch, dem der nachdenkende und forschende Mensch entgegengesetzt wird, der nun entschlossen vor dem Gerichtshof erfahren will, wie es um die Ansprüche der beiden Parteien steht. Auch im nachfolgenden Text wird emphatisch dafür argumentiert, dass der Mensch das Problem der Antinomie und seine Auflösung in seiner eigenen Vernunft findet und daher „die Verantwortung [Beantwortung?] nicht von sich abweisen und auf den unbekannten Gegenstand schieben kann“. (shrink)

resumo A terceira Crítica configura um papel inédito para a reflexão: a conformação da natureza em gêneros e espécies aparece como pressuposto de uma forma de pensar que é vaga na medida em que empresta sentido a modos particulares de finalidade. No entanto, como esse sentido vai ser pensado depende de uma leitura da lógica formal, quer porque fica subordinada a uma gramática universal, no caso de Husserl, quer porque se dissolve ela mesma numa linguagem, como em Wittgenstein. palavras-chaves sentido (...) - lógica formal - jogo de linguagem. (shrink)

Robert Hanna presents a fresh view of the Kantian and analytic traditions that have dominated continental European and Anglo-American philosophy over the last two centuries, and of the connections between them. But this is not just a study in the history of philosophy, for out of this emerges Hanna's original approach to two much-contested theories that remain at the heart of contemporary philosophy. Hanna puts forward a new 'cognitive-semantic' interpretation of transcendental idealism, and a vigorous defense of Kant's theory of (...) analytic and synthetic necessary truth, making this compelling reading for all who are interested in these fundamental philosophical issues. (shrink)

Kant's distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear, or appearances, is commonly attacked on the ground that it delivers a radical and incoherent ‘two world’ picture of what there is. I attempt to deflect this attack by questioning these terms of dismissal. Distinctions of the kind Kant draws on are in fact legion, and they make perfectly good sense. The way to make sense of them, however, is not by buying into a profligate ontology but by using (...) some rather different tools – surprisingly enough, tools first developed in the area of aesthetics. Once this is done, much of what Kant says begins to look perfectly coherent. In the final part of the paper, I point out that none the less all is not well. Kant's Critical doctrines make it hard for us to accept Kant's own version of this otherwise coherent distinction. (shrink)

The work aims at describing Kant's concept of poetry in the context of his opinions on language expressed both in the Critique of Judgment and in the Critique of Pure Reason. The analysis shows that Kant understood the relationship between language and concepts as closer than that between language and aesthetic ideas. Simultaneously he designated the aesthetic idea as nature of poetry (of fine arts generally). This enables to understand Kant's nonlinguistic characterization of poetry which veiled the difference between the (...) successive linguistic expression of poetry and the coexistent expression of visual arts as identified by the aestheticians of the Enlightenment again. (shrink)

The appeal to ontology is made by Hausman and Ricoeur in order to overcome a paradox. The paradox is that, on their interactionist understanding of the trope, a strong metaphor creates a meaning which is in some way objective or truthful, yet this meaning is new, which is to say that, prior to the metaphor, the independent subject terms could neither suggest the new meaning nor signify the concepts which would support it. If the meaning is new, what is it (...) that supplies the feeling of appropriateness? (shrink)

This book’s review discusses the reinterpretation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy offered by Ronald Harri Wettstein. In the wake of K.O. Apel and J. Habermas, Kant is interpreted in the light of J.L. Austin’s theory of speech acts. The most original part of the book is chapter 3, in which Wettstein offers an unkantian theory of permitted lie, to which belong diplomacy, politeness, and discretion.