About this topic
Summary The concept of respect (Achtung – previously translated as ‘reverence’) is one of the most characteristic, and controversial, features of Kant’s moral philosophy. At its core, respect is two things: an attitude and a feeling. The attitude of respect is directed towards three objects in Kant’s philosophy: 1) the moral law, 2) human beings insofar as they exemplify the moral law, and 3) human beings simply insofar as they are human, ends in themselves, and possessors of dignity. These two ‘aspects’ of respect are described by Kant as being identical; to have the attitude is to have the feeling. Kant’s understanding of the attitude of respect for persons as such has been particularly influential, and is considered by many to be one of, if not the, central concepts of his moral philosophy. The feeling of respect is extremely controversial. Kant describes the feeling of respect as different in kind from all other sensible feelings, namely as a feeling that is produced by reason rather than sensibility. Famously, it is this ‘rational’ feeling that Kant describes as the ‘incentive’ of moral action. Interpreters are divided with respect to what role this feeling plays in moral motivation, if it plays one at all.
Key works

Some of the most important discussions of respect in the history of Kant scholarship are those by Rehberg 1788 and Henrich 1963. More recent influential interpretations of the feeling of respect are those by Broadie & Pybus 1975, Reath 1989, and McCarty 1993. Key works on Kant and respect for persons as such are E. Hill 1980, Korsgaard 1996, Sensen 2011, Wood 1999. For a discussion of Kant’s understanding of respect for persons insofar as they exemplify the law, see Darwall 2008. For Kant on self-respect, see Massey 1983.

Introductions In addition to the works mentioned above, for discussions of the various objects of respect see Gregor 1963, Allison 2011, and Klimchuk 2004. A good first point of contact are the articles on respect/Achtung in Wuerth 2021 and Willaschek et al 2015.
Related categories

73 found
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1 — 50 / 73
  1. Kant on Moral Respect.Anastasia Berg - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    Kant’s account of the feeling of moral respect has notoriously puzzled interpreters: on the one hand, moral action is supposed to be autonomous and, in particular, free of the mediation of any feeling; on the other hand, the subject’s grasp of the law somehow involves the feeling of moral respect. I argue that moral respect for Kant is not, pace both the ‘intellectualists’ and ‘affectivists,’ an effect of the determination of the will by the law—whether it be a mere effect (...)
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  2. Rethinking Kant on Duty.Samuel J. M. Kahn - forthcoming - Review of Metaphysics.
    According to a common caricature of Kant’s ethics, it is synonymous with the Categorical Imperative (CI) and with the sublime and clarion call of duty. But in this paper, I argue that the conjunction of Kant’s concept of duty and his idea of morality as a system of imperatives is unsustainable on the grounds that it commits him to the following two theses: (I) If an agent has a duty to D, then she must be constrained to D, and (II) (...)
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  3. The Phenomenology of Kantian Respect for Persons.Uriah Kriegel & Mark Timmons - forthcoming - In R. Dean & O. Sensen (eds.), Respect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Emotions can be understood generally from two different perspectives: (i) a third-person perspective that specifies their distinctive functional role within our overall cognitive economy and (ii) a first-person perspective that attempts to capture their distinctive phenomenal character, the subjective quality of experiencing them. One emotion that is of central importance in many ethical systems is respect (in the sense of respect for persons or so-called recognition-respect). However, discussions of respect in analytic moral philosophy have tended to focus almost entirely on (...)
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  4. Kant and the Second Person.Janis David Schaab - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    According to Darwall’s Second-Personal Account, moral obligations constitutively involve relations of authority and accountability between persons. Darwall takes this account to lend support to Kant’s moral theory. Critics object that the Second-Personal Account abandons central tenets of Kant’s system. I respond to these critics’ three main challenges by showing that they rest on misunderstandings of the Second-Personal Account. Properly understood, this account is not only congenial to Kant’s moral theory, but also illuminates aspects of that theory which have hitherto received (...)
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  5. Achtung in Kant and Smith.Michael H. Walschots - forthcoming - Kant-Studien.
    Although it is clear that Kant read Adam Smith’s ‘Theory of Moral Sentiments’ (TMS) soon after it was translated into German in 1770, work remains to be done in order to determine whether or not Smith had a lasting influence on Kant’s moral philosophy, and in what way. One of Kant’s main reasons for reading Smith would have been the latter’s careful analysis of the passions and human motivation and in this paper I illustrate a fairly substantial, but underappreciated, way (...)
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  6. Equal Respect for Rational Agency.Michael Cholbi - 2020 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol. 10. pp. 182-203.
    Individuals are owed equal respect. But on the basis of what property of individuals are they owed such respect? A popular Kantian answer —rational agency — appears less plausible in light of the growing psychological evidence that human choice is subject to a wide array of biases (framing, laziness, etc.); human beings are neither equal in rational agency nor especially robust rational agents. Defenders of this Kantian answer thus need a non-ideal theory of equal respect for rational agency, one that (...)
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  7. Reason’s Feeling: A Systematic Reconstruction of Kant’s Theory of Moral Respect.Jörg Noller - 2019 - SATS 20 (1):1-18.
    In my paper, I shall take seriously Kant’s puzzling statements about the moral feeling of respect, which is, according to him, “a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept and therefore specifically different” from all common feelings. I will focus on the systematic position of the moral feeling of respect within the framework of Kant’s transcendental idealism. By considering its volitional structure, I argue for a compatibilist account of the moral feeling of respect, according to which both intellectualist and (...)
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  8. The Sublime.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2018 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This Element considers Kant's account of the sublime in the context of his predecessors both in the Anglophone and German rationalist traditions. Since Kant says with evident endorsement that 'we call sublime that which is absolutely great' and nothing in nature can in fact be absolutely great, Kant concludes that strictly speaking what is sublime can only be the human calling to perfect our rational capacity according to the standard of virtue that is thought through the moral law. The Element (...)
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  9. Kant, Guyer, and Tomasello on the Capacity to Recognize the Humanity of Others.Lucas Thorpe - 2018 - In Kate Moran (ed.), Kant on Freedom and Spontaneity. pp. 107-136.
    On the surface Kant himself seems quite clear about who is deserving of respect: The morally relevant others are all “rational, free beings” or all “human beings.” It is clear, however, that Kant does not want to identify “human beings” in this sense with members of a particular biological species, for he is explicitly open to the idea that there might be non-biologically human rational beings. Thus, for example he is explicitly open to the possibility of extraterrestrial rational beings, who (...)
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  10. Kant on Space, Time, and Respect for the Moral Law as Analogous Formal Elements of Sensibility.Jessica Tizzard - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):630-646.
    To advance a successful reading of Kant's theory of motivation, his interpreter must have a carefully developed position on the relation between our rational and sensible capacities of mind. Unfortunately, many of Kant's commentators hold an untenably dualistic conception, understanding reason and sensibility to be necessarily conflicting aspects of human nature that saddle Kant with a rigoristic and fundamentally divided moral psychology. Against these interpreters, I argue for a reading that maintains a unified conception, claiming that we must think of (...)
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  11. Love, Respect, and Individuals: Murdoch as a Guide to Kantian Ethics.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1844-1863.
    I reconsider the relation between love and respect in Kantian ethics, taking as my guide Iris Murdoch's view of love as the fundamental moral attitude and a kind of attention to individuals. It is widely supposed that Kantian ethics disregards individuals, since we don't respect individuals but the universal quality of personhood they instantiate. We need not draw this conclusion if we recognise that Kant and Murdoch share a view about the centrality of love to virtue. We can then see (...)
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  12. Practical Reason and Respect for Persons.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (1):53-79.
    My project is to reconsider the Kantian conception of practical reason. Some Kantians think that practical reasoning must be more active than theoretical reasoning, on the putative grounds that such reasoning need not contend with what is there anyway, independently of its exercise. Behind that claim stands the thesis that practical reason is essentially efficacious. I accept the efficacy principle, but deny that it underwrites this inference about practical reason. My inquiry takes place against the background of recent Kantian metaethical (...)
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  13. Moral Sense Theory and the Development of Kant's Ethics.Michael Walschots - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Western Ontario
    This dissertation investigates a number of ways in which an eighteenth century British philosophical movement known as “moral sense theory” influenced the development of German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) moral theory. I illustrate that Kant found both moral sense theory’s conception of moral judgement and its conception of moral motivation appealing during the earliest stage of his philosophical development, but eventually came to reject its conception of moral judgement, though even in his early writings Kant preserves certain features of its (...)
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  14. Reseña de Jeanine Grenberg, "Kant's Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013.Paula Satne - 2015 - Con-Textos Kantianos 1:309-322.
  15. Reason, Value, and Respect: Kantian Themes From the Philosophy of Thomas E. Hill, Jr.Mark Timmons (ed.) - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    In thirteen specially written essays, leading philosophers explore Kantian themes in moral and political philosophy that are prominent in the work of Thomas E. Hill, Jr., such as respect and self-respect, practical reason, conscience, and duty. In conclusion Hill offers an overview of his work and responses to the preceding essays.
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  16. Accessing the Moral Law Through Feeling.Owen Ware - 2015 - Kantian Review 20 (2):301-311.
    In this article I offer a critical commentary on Jeanine Grenberg’s claim that, by the time of the second Critique, Kant was committed to the view that we only access the moral law’s validity through the feeling of respect. The issue turns on how we understand Kant’s assertion that our consciousness of the moral law is a ‘fact of reason’. Grenberg argues that all facts must be forced, and anything forced must be felt. I defend an alternative interpretation, according to (...)
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  17. Throwing Oneself Away: Kant on the Forfeiture of Respect.Aaron Bunch - 2014 - Kantian Review 19 (1):71-91.
    Surprisingly often Kant asserts that it is possible to behave in such a degrading way that one ‘throws oneself away’ and turns oneself ‘into a thing’, as a result of which others may treat one ‘as they please’. Rather than dismiss these claims out of hand, I argue that they force us to reconsider what is meant and required by ‘respect for humanity’. I argue that to ‘throw away’ humanity is not to lose or extinguish it, but rather to refuse (...)
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  18. Respect for the Moral Law: The Emotional Side of Reason.Janelle DeWitt - 2014 - Philosophy 89 (1):31-62.
    Respect, as Kant describes it, has a duality of nature that seems to embody a contradiction – i.e., it is both a moral motive and a feeling, where these are thought to be mutually exclusive. Most solutions involve eliminating one of the two natures, but unfortunately, this also destroys what is unique about respect. So instead, I question the non-cognitive theory of emotion giving rise to the contradiction. In its place, I develop the cognitive theory implicit in Kant's work, one (...)
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  19. Kant's Empirical Psychology.Patrick R. Frierson - 2014 - Cambridge University Press.
    Throughout his life, Kant was concerned with questions about empirical psychology. He aimed to develop an empirical account of human beings, and his lectures and writings on the topic are recognizable today as properly 'psychological' treatments of human thought and behavior. In this book Patrick R. Frierson uses close analysis of relevant texts, including unpublished lectures and notes, to study Kant's account. He shows in detail how Kant explains human action, choice, and thought in empirical terms, and how a better (...)
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  20. Consideraciones en torno a la concepción kantiana de dignidad humana desde una perspectiva heterónoma.Federico Ignacio Viola - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 39 (1):187-201.
    En el presente artículo se arriesga una nueva interpretación del concepto kantiano de autonomía, abordándolo desde una perspectiva “heterónoma”. En efecto, sin soslayar la interpretación ya clásica de aquél se indaga sobre la posibilidad de pensarlo como tributario de una heteronomía que señala de alguna manera a la autonomía una dignidad sobre la cual ésta no puede tener prácticamente ninguna injerencia. Se pone de relieve así pues el hecho de que esta dignidad inviolable marca una diferencia práctica más radical que (...)
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  21. Forgiveness and Respect for Persons.Owen Ware - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (3).
    The concept of respect for persons is often rejected as a basis for understanding forgiveness. As many have argued, to hold your offender responsible for her actions is to respect her as a person; but this kind of respect is more likely to sustain, rather than dissolve, your resentment toward her (Garrard & McNaughton 2003; 2011; Allais 2008). I seek to defend an alternative view in this paper. To forgive, on my account, involves ceasing to identify your offender with her (...)
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  22. Kant on Moral Sensibility and Moral Motivation.Owen Ware - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (4):727-746.
    Despite Kant’s lasting influence on philosophical accounts of moral motivation, many details of his own position remain elusive. In the Critique of Practical Reason, for example, Kant argues that our recognition of the moral law’s authority must elicit both painful and pleasurable feelings in us. On reflection, however, it is unclear how these effects could motivate us to act from duty. As a result, Kant’s theory of moral sensibility comes under a skeptical threat: the possibility of a morally motivating feeling (...)
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  23. Understanding Kant’s Duty of Respect as a Duty of Virtue.Melissa Seymour Fahmy - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (6):723-740.
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  24. Shame and Contempt in Kant's Moral Theory.Krista K. Thomason - 2013 - Kantian Review 18 (2):221-240.
    Attitudes like shame and contempt seem to be at odds with basic tenets of Kantian moral theory. I argue on the contrary that both attitudes play a central role in Kantian morality. Shame and contempt are attitudes that protect our love of honour, or the esteem we have for ourselves as moral persons. The question arises: how are these attitudes compatible with Kant's claim that all persons deserve respect? I argue that the proper object of shame and contempt is not (...)
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  25. An Unfamiliar and Positive Law: On Kant and Schiller.Reed Winegar - 2013 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 95 (3):275-297.
    A familiar post-Kantian criticism contends that Kant enslaves sensibility under the yoke of practical reason. Friedrich Schiller advanced a version of this criticism to which Kant publicly responded. Recent commentators have emphasized the role that Kant’s reply assigns to the pleasure that accompanies successful moral action. In contrast, I argue that Kant’s reply relies primarily on the sublime feeling that arises when we merely contemplate the moral law. In fact, the pleasures emphasized by other recent commentators depend on this sublime (...)
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  26. Was bedeutet „Ehrfurcht“ in Albert Schweitzers Verantwortungsethik? Eine Begriffsanalyse im Vergleich mit Schwantje, Kant, Goethe und Nietzsche.Heike Baranzke - 2012 - Synthesis Philosophica 27 (1):7-29.
    Aufgrund der Tatsache, dass Albert Schweitzer seine Ethik der Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben auf Anorganisches wie auf die Gesellschaft und die Welt im Ganzen beziehen kann, nimmt der Beitrag anstelle des Gegenstandsbereichs den Begriff der Ehrfurcht in den Blick. Immanuel Kants und Johann Wolfgang von Goethes Konzeptionen säkularer Ehrfurcht weisen den Weg zu Schweitzers Ehrfurcht als einer Verschränkung des ethischen Selbst- und Weltverhältnisses des menschlichen Subjekts als Ergebnis einer konsequent reflektierten Selbstkultivierung zur Verantwortungsbereitschaft. Mit Nietzsche verweigert sich Schweitzer jeglicher normativen (...)
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  27. A New Look at Kantian Respect for Persons.Ernesto V. Garcia - 2012 - Kant Yearbook 4 (1).
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  28. Schopenhauer, Kant and Compassion.Paul Guyer - 2012 - Kantian Review 17 (3):403-429.
    Schopenhauer presents his moral philosophy as diametrically opposed to that of Kant: for him, pure practical reason is an illusion and morality can arise only from the feeling of compassion, while for Kant it cannot be based on such a feeling and can be based only on pure practical reason. But the difference is not as great as Schopenhauer makes it seem, because for him compassion is supposed to arise from metaphysical insight into the unity of all being, thus from (...)
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  29. Respect-Worthiness and Dignity.Carol Hay - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (4):587-612.
    In this paper I consider the possibility that failing to fulfill the Kantian obligation to protect one’s rational nature might actually vitiate future instances of this obligation. I respond to this dilemma by defending a novel interpretation of Kant’s views on the relation between the value we have and the respect we are owed. I argue, contra the received view among Kant scholars, that the feature in virtue of which someone has unconditional and incomparable value is not the same feature (...)
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  30. The Moral Source of the Kantian Sublime.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2012 - In Timothy Costelloe (ed.), The Sublime: From Antiquity to the Present (pp. 37-49). Cambridge University Press.
    A crucial feature of Kant's critical-period writing on the sublime is its grounding in moral psychology. Whereas in the pre-critical writings, the sublime is viewed as an inherently exhausting state of mind, in the critical-period writings it is presented as one that gains strength the more it is sustained. I account for this in terms of Kantian moral psychology, and explain that, for Kant, sound moral disposition is conceived as a sublime state of mind.
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  31. Once Again: What is the ‘First Proposition’ in Kant's Groundwork? Some Refinements, a New Proposal, and a Reply to Henry Allison.Dieter Schönecker - 2012 - Kantian Review 17 (2):281-296.
    Discussing the concept of duty in Groundwork 1, Kant refers to a ‘second proposition’ and a ‘third proposition’, the latter being a ‘Folgerung aus beiden vorigen’. However, Kant does not identify what the ‘first proposition’ is. In this paper, I will argue that the first proposition is this: An action from duty is an action from respect for the moral law. I defend this claim against a critique put forward by Allison according to which ‘respect’ is a concept that is (...)
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  32. Some Considerations on the Feeling of Respect for the Moral Law.Johnny Antonio Dávila - 2011 - Discusiones Filosóficas 12 (18):145 - 154.
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  33. Rational Feelings and Moral Agency.Ido Geiger - 2011 - Kantian Review 16 (2):283-308.
    Kant's conception of moral agency is often charged with attributing no role to feelings. I suggest that respect is the effective force driving moral action. I then argue that four additional types of rational feelings are necessary conditions of moral agency: The affective inner life of moral agents deliberating how to act and reflecting on their deeds is rich and complex . To act morally we must turn our affective moral perception towards the ends of moral action: the welfare of (...)
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  34. The Obligation to Resist Oppression.Carol Hay - 2011 - Journal of Social Philosophy 42 (1):21-45.
    In this paper I argue that, in addition to having an obligation to resist the oppression of others, people have an obligation to themselves to resist their own oppression. This obligation to oneself, I argue, is grounded in a Kantian duty of self-respect.
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  35. Kant on Why Autonomy Deserves Respect.Mark Piper - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
    A reconstruction of Kant's argument for why autonomy deserves respect.
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  36. Immanuel Kant on the Moral Feeling of Respect.Ina Goy - 2010 - In Pablo Muchnik (ed.), Rethinking Kant. Current Trends in North American Kantian Scholarship. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 156-179.
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  37. Kant on Respect, Dignity, and the Duty of Respect.Monika Betzler - 2008 - In Kant's Ethics of Virtue. Walter de Gruyter.
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  38. The Fact of Reason and the Feeling of Respect.Fldvia Carvalho Chagas - 2008 - In Valerio Hrsg V. Rohden, Ricardo Terra & Guido Almeida (eds.), Recht Und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. pp. 83.
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  39. Dignity, Contractualism and Consequentialism.David Cummiskey - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (4):383-408.
    Kantian respect for persons is based on the special status and dignity of humanity. There are, however, at least three distinct kinds of interpretation of the principle of respect for the dignity of persons: the contractualist conception, the substantive conception and the direct conception. Contractualist theories are the most common and familiar interpretation. The contractualist assumes that some form of consent or agreement is the crucial factor that is required by respect for persons. The substantive conceptions of dignity, on the (...)
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  40. Kant on Respect, Dignity, and the Duty of Respect.Stephen Darwall - 2008 - In Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant's Ethics of Virtues. De Gruyter. pp. 175-200.
  41. Toward a Serresian Reconceptualization of Kantian Respect.Bryan Lueck - 2008 - Philosophy Today 52 (1):52-59.
    According to Immanuel Kant, moral experience is made possible by respect, an absolutely unique feeling in which the sensible and the intelligible are given immediately together. This paper argues that Kant's moral philosophy underemphasizes the role of this sensibility at the heart of moral experience and that a more rigorous conception of respect, grounded in Michel Serres's concepts of the parasite, the excluded/included third, and noise would yield a moral philosophy more consistent with Kant's own basic insights.
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  42. Immanuel Kant über das moralische Gefühl der Achtung.Ina Goy - 2007 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 61 (3):337 - 360.
    Die Abhandlung „Immanuel Kant über das moralische Gefühl der Achtung“ legt nach einer Einführung in den historischen und werkgeschichtlichen Hintergrund wesentliche systematische Züge des moralischen Gefühls der Achtung dar. Es wird gezeigt, dass das apriorische Gefühl der Achtung einerseits von allen anderen empirischen Gefühlen unterschieden, dennoch aber ein Gefühl ist und in seiner spezifischen Sonderstellung drei bedeutende moralphilosophische Funktionen übernehmen kann: eine evaluative, eine kausale und eine bildende Funktion. Kants These, dass es im strengen Sinn nur ein rein moralisches Gefühl (...)
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  43. Kant's Account of Respect: A Bridge Between Rationality and Anthropology.Jane Singleton - 2007 - Kantian Review 12 (1):40-60.
    Kant starts the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals by emphasizing the importance of separating the a priori or rational part of moral philosophy from the a posteriori or empirical aspects. Indeed, he reserves the term moral philosophy for the rational part. He writes ‘ethics … the empirical part might be given the special title practical anthropology, the term moral philosophy being properly used to refer just to the rational part’. Throughout his writings in both theoretical and practical philosophy the (...)
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  44. Duty and Inclination.Audrey L. Anton - 2006 - Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):199-207.
  45. Respect as a Moral Emotion: A Phenomenological Approach.John J. Drummond - 2006 - Husserl Studies 22 (1):1-27.
  46. Judging Because Understanding: A Defence of Retributive Censure.Thaddeus Metz - 2006 - In Pedro Tabensky (ed.), Judging and Understanding: Essays on Free Will, Narrative, Meaning and the Ethical Limits of Condemnation. Ashgate. pp. 221-40.
    Thaddeus Metz defends the retributive theory of punishment against challenges mounted by some of the contributors to this collection. People, he thinks, ought to be censured in a way that is proportional to what they have done and for which they are responsible. Understanding does not conflict with judging. On the contrary, according to him, the more we understand, the better we are able to censure appropriately. Metz’s argument is Kantian insofar as he argues that ‘respect for persons [victims, responsible (...)
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  47. Respect for the Law and the Use of Dynamical Terms in Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation.Melissa Zinkin - 2006 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 88 (1):31-53.
    Kant's discussion of the feeling of respect presents a puzzle regarding both the precise nature of this feeling and its role in his moral theory as an incentive that motivates us to follow the moral law. If it is a feeling that motivates us to follow the law, this would contradict Kant's view that moral obligation is based on reason alone. I argue that Kant has an account of respect as feeling that is nevertheless not separate from the use of (...)
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  48. Love, That Indispensable Supplement: Irigaray and Kant on Love and Respect.Marguerite La Caze - 2005 - Hypatia 20 (3):92-114.
    Is love essential to ethical life, or merely a supplement? In Kant's view, respect and love, as duties, are in tension with each other because love involves drawing closer and respect involves drawing away. By contrast, Irigaray says that love and respect do not conflict because love as passion must also involve distancing and we have a responsibility to love. I argue that love, understood as passion and based on respect, is essential to ethics.
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  49. Love, That Indispensable Supplement: Irigaray and Kant on Love and Respect.Marguerite La Caze - 2005 - Hypatia 20 (3):92-114.
    Is love essential to ethical life, or merely a supplement? In Kant’s view, respect and love, as duties, are in tension with each other because love involves drawing closer and respect involves drawing away. By contrast, Irigaray says that love and respect do not conflict because love as passion must also involve distancing and we have a responsibility to love. I argue that love, understood as passion and based on respect, is essential to ethics.
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  50. Why Must We Treat Humanity with Respect? Evaluating the Regress Argument.Michael Ridge - 2005 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (1):57-73.
    -- Immanuel Kant (Kant 1990, p. 46/429) The idea that our most basic duty is to treat each other with respect is one of the Enlightenment’s greatest legacies and Kant is often thought to be one of its most powerful defenders. If Kant’s project were successful then the lofty notion that humanity is always worthy of respect would be vindicated by pure practical reason. Further, this way of defending the ideal is supposed to reflect our autonomy, insofar as it is (...)
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