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  1. added 2018-09-24
    O Lugar das Emoções na Ética e na Metaética.Flavio Williges, Marcelo Fischborn & David Copp (eds.) - 2018 - Pelotas: NEPFil online/Editora da UFPel.
    Esta coletânea explora o papel desempenhado pelas emoções na teorização em ética e metaética. Inclui capítulos escritos por pesquisadores do Brasil e de outros países.
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  2. added 2018-09-06
    Moral Sense Theory and the Development of Kant's Ethics.Michael Walschots - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Western Ontario
    This dissertation investigates a number of ways in which an eighteenth century British philosophical movement known as “moral sense theory” influenced the development of German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) moral theory. I illustrate that Kant found both moral sense theory’s conception of moral judgement and its conception of moral motivation appealing during the earliest stage of his philosophical development, but eventually came to reject its conception of moral judgement, though even in his early writings Kant preserves certain features of its (...)
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  3. added 2018-09-06
    A Commentary of Kant's Critique of Practical Reason.Lewis White Beck - 1960 - University of Chicago Press.
  4. added 2018-08-09
    Reseña de Jeanine Grenberg, "Kant's Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013.Paula Satne - 2015 - Con-Textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):309-322.
  5. added 2018-06-06
    Immanuel Kant on the Moral Feeling of Respect.Ina Goy - 2010 - In Pablo Muchnik (ed.), Rethinking Kant. Current Trends in North American Kantian Scholarship. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 156-179.
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  6. added 2018-05-11
    Immanuel Kant über das moralische Gefühl der Achtung.Ina Goy - 2007 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 61 (3):337 - 360.
    Die Abhandlung „Immanuel Kant über das moralische Gefühl der Achtung“ legt nach einer Einführung in den historischen und werkgeschichtlichen Hintergrund wesentliche systematische Züge des moralischen Gefühls der Achtung dar. Es wird gezeigt, dass das apriorische Gefühl der Achtung einerseits von allen anderen empirischen Gefühlen unterschieden, dennoch aber ein Gefühl ist und in seiner spezifischen Sonderstellung drei bedeutende moralphilosophische Funktionen übernehmen kann: eine evaluative, eine kausale und eine bildende Funktion. Kants These, dass es im strengen Sinn nur ein rein moralisches Gefühl (...)
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  7. added 2018-04-22
    The Sublime.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2018 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This Element considers Kant's account of the sublime in the context of his predecessors both in the Anglophone and German rationalist traditions. Since Kant says with evident endorsement that 'we call sublime that which is absolutely great' and nothing in nature can in fact be absolutely great, Kant concludes that strictly speaking what is sublime can only be the human calling to perfect our rational capacity according to the standard of virtue that is thought through the moral law. The Element (...)
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  8. added 2018-03-20
    On the Alleged Vacuity of Kant's Concept of Evil.Pablo F. Muchnik - 2006 - Kant-Studien 97 (4):430-451.
    In recent years, there has been a growing interest in Kant's doctrine of radical evil, arising from as diverse quarters as philosophy, psychoanalysis and the social sciences. This interest has contributed to the revival of the notion of evil, which had been displaced from the center of philosophical discussion in the 20th century. A common trait in the recent literature is that it takes the relevance of the use of the concept of evil for granted. Yet, before understanding what Kant (...)
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  9. added 2017-11-10
    Love, Respect, and Individuals: Murdoch as a Guide to Kantian Ethics.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1844-1863.
    I reconsider the relation between love and respect in Kantian ethics, taking as my guide Iris Murdoch's view of love as the fundamental moral attitude and a kind of attention to individuals. It is widely supposed that Kantian ethics disregards individuals, since we don't respect individuals but the universal quality of personhood they instantiate. We need not draw this conclusion if we recognise that Kant and Murdoch share a view about the centrality of love to virtue. We can then see (...)
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  10. added 2017-05-29
    Understanding Kant’s Duty of Respect as a Duty of Virtue.Melissa Seymour Fahmy - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (6):723-740.
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  11. added 2017-01-23
    Kant on Respect, Dignity, and the Duty of Respect.Monika Betzler - 2008 - In Kant's Ethics of Virtue. Walter de Gruyter.
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  12. added 2016-12-14
    Love, That Indispensable Supplement: Irigaray and Kant on Love and Respect.Marguerite La Caze - 2005 - Hypatia 20 (3):92-114.
    Is love essential to ethical life, or merely a supplement? In Kant’s view, respect and love, as duties, are in tension with each other because love involves drawing closer and respect involves drawing away. By contrast, Irigaray says that love and respect do not conflict because love as passion must also involve distancing and we have a responsibility to love. I argue that love, understood as passion and based on respect, is essential to ethics.
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  13. added 2016-12-02
    The Phenomenology of Kantian Respect for Persons.Uriah Kriegel & Mark Timmons - forthcoming - In R. Dean & O. Sensen (eds.), Respect.
    Emotions can be understood generally from two different perspectives: (i) a third-person perspective that specifies their distinctive functional role within our overall cognitive economy and (ii) a first-person perspective that attempts to capture their distinctive phenomenal character, the subjective quality of experiencing them. One emotion that is of central importance in many ethical systems is respect (in the sense of respect for persons or so-called recognition-respect). However, discussions of respect in analytic moral philosophy have tended to focus almost entirely on (...)
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  14. added 2016-08-15
    Dignity and the Phenomenology of Recognition-Respect.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - In J. J. Drummond & S. Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Emotional Experiences: Ethical and Social Significance. London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 121-136.
    What is dignity? My starting point is that dignity is one of those philosophical primitives that admit of no informative analysis. Nonetheless, I suggest, dignity might yield to indirect illumination when we consider the kind of experience we have (or rather find it fitting to have) in its presence. This experience, I claim, is what is sometimes known as recognition-respect. Through an examination of a neglected aspect of the phenomenology of recognition-respect, I argue that the possession of inner consciousness is (...)
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  15. added 2016-05-07
    Respect for Persons and Perfectionist Politics.Thaddeus Metz - 2001 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (4):417–442.
    Can a state seek to promote a thick conception of the good (such as fostering a kind of meaning or excellence in people's lives) without treating its citizens disrespectfully? The predominant answer among friends of the principle of respect for persons is "no." The most powerful Kantian objection to non-liberalism or perfectionism is the claim that citizens who do not share the state's conception of the good would be wronged in that the state would treat a certain way of life (...)
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  16. added 2016-02-29
    Duty and Inclination.Audrey L. Anton - 2006 - Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):199-207.
  17. added 2016-02-19
    The Role of Achtung in Kant's Moral Theory.Sharon E. Sytsma - 1993 - Auslegung 19 (2):117-122.
  18. added 2016-02-08
    Respect as a Moral Emotion: A Phenomenological Approach.John J. Drummond - 2006 - Husserl Studies 22 (1):1-27.
  19. added 2016-01-20
    An Unfamiliar and Positive Law: On Kant and Schiller.Reed Winegar - 2013 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 95 (3):275-297.
    A familiar post-Kantian criticism contends that Kant enslaves sensibility under the yoke of practical reason. Friedrich Schiller advanced a version of this criticism to which Kant publicly responded. Recent commentators have emphasized the role that Kant’s reply assigns to the pleasure that accompanies successful moral action. In contrast, I argue that Kant’s reply relies primarily on the sublime feeling that arises when we merely contemplate the moral law. In fact, the pleasures emphasized by other recent commentators depend on this sublime (...)
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  20. added 2015-11-25
    Practical Reason and Respect for Persons.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (1):53-79.
    My project is to reconsider the Kantian conception of practical reason. Some Kantians think that practical reasoning must be more active than theoretical reasoning, on the putative grounds that such reasoning need not contend with what is there anyway, independently of its exercise. Behind that claim stands the thesis that practical reason is essentially efficacious. I accept the efficacy principle, but deny that it underwrites this inference about practical reason. My inquiry takes place against the background of recent Kantian metaethical (...)
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  21. added 2015-10-04
    Norms of Truthfulness and Non-Deception in Kantian Ethics.Donald Wilson - 2015 - In Pablo Muchnik Oliver Thorndike (ed.), Rethinking Kant Volume 4. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 111-134.
    Questions about the morality of lying tend to be decided in a distinctive way early in discussions of Kant’s view on the basis of readings of the false promising example in his Groundwork of The metaphysics of morals. The standard deception-as-interference model that emerges typically yields a very general and strong presumption against deception associated with a narrow and rigorous model subject to a range of problems. In this paper, I suggest an alternative account based on Kant’s discussion of self-deception (...)
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  22. added 2015-10-04
    Moral Deliberation and Desire Development: Herman on Alienation.Donald Wilson - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 283-308.
    In Chapter 9 of The Practice of Moral Judgment and her later article Making Room for Character, Barbara Herman offers a distinctive response to a familiar set of concerns with the room left for character and personal relationships in Kantian ethics. She begins by acknowledging the shortcomings of her previous response on this issue and by distancing herself from a standard kind of indirect argument for the importance of personal commitments according to which these have moral weight in virtue of (...)
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  23. added 2015-10-04
    Middle Theory, Inner Freedom, and Moral Health.Donald Wilson - 2007 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (4):393 - 413.
    In her influential book, The Practice of Moral Judgment, Barbara Herman argues that Kantian ethics requires a “middle theory” applying formal rational constraints on willing to the particular circumstances and nature of human existence. I claim that a promising beginning to such a theory can be found in Kant’s discussion of duties of virtue in The Metaphysics of Morals. I argue that Kant’s distinction between perfect and imperfect duties of virtue should be understood as a distinction between duties concerned with (...)
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  24. added 2015-09-15
    Toward a Serresian Reconceptualization of Kantian Respect.Bryan Lueck - 2008 - Philosophy Today 52 (1):52-59.
    According to Immanuel Kant, moral experience is made possible by respect, an absolutely unique feeling in which the sensible and the intelligible are given immediately together. This paper argues that Kant's moral philosophy underemphasizes the role of this sensibility at the heart of moral experience and that a more rigorous conception of respect, grounded in Michel Serres's concepts of the parasite, the excluded/included third, and noise would yield a moral philosophy more consistent with Kant's own basic insights.
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  25. added 2015-09-15
    Kantian Moral Motivation and the Feeling of Respect.Richard R. McCarty - 1993 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (3):421-435.
  26. added 2015-09-14
    Consideraciones en torno a la concepción kantiana de dignidad humana desde una perspectiva heterónoma.Federico Ignacio Viola - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 39 (1):187-201.
    En el presente artículo se arriesga una nueva interpretación del concepto kantiano de autonomía, abordándolo desde una perspectiva “heterónoma”. En efecto, sin soslayar la interpretación ya clásica de aquél se indaga sobre la posibilidad de pensarlo como tributario de una heteronomía que señala de alguna manera a la autonomía una dignidad sobre la cual ésta no puede tener prácticamente ninguna injerencia. Se pone de relieve así pues el hecho de que esta dignidad inviolable marca una diferencia práctica más radical que (...)
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  27. added 2015-09-05
    Love and Respect in the Doctrine of Virtue.Marcia Baron - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (S1):29-44.
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  28. added 2015-08-27
    Concrete Kantian Respect.Nancy Sherman - 1998 - Social Philosophy and Policy 15 (1):119.
    When we think about Kantian virtue, what often comes to mind is the notion of respect. Respect is due to all persons merely in virtue of their status as rational agents. Indeed, on the Kantian view, specific virtues, such as duties of beneficence, gratitude, or self-perfection, are so many ways of respecting persons as free rational agents. To preserve and promote rational agency, to protect individuals from threats against rational agency, i.e., to respect persons, is at the core of virtue. (...)
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  29. added 2015-08-27
    The Rationality of Valuing Oneself: A Critique of Kant on Self-Respect.Cynthia A. Stark - 1997 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 35 (1):65-82.
    The Rationality of Valuing Oneself: A Critique of Kant on Self-Respect CYNTHIA A. STARK IN RECENT DECADES several philosophers have examined the notion of self- respect and illustrated its moral importance. Thomas E. Hill Jr., for instance, argues that the failure to properly value one's moral rights, which is exhibited by such characters as the Deferential Wife and the Uncle Tom, is a violation of a duty to oneself.' Robin Dillon shows the connection between self-respect and moral goods such as (...)
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  30. added 2015-08-22
    Duties to and Regarding Others.Robert N. Johnson - 2010 - In Lara Denis (ed.), Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press.
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  31. added 2015-07-14
    Dignity.Aurel Kolnai - 1976 - Philosophy 51 (197):251 - 271.
    Why, however, should it be necessarily wrong to discuss the nebulous in a businesslike manner?
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  32. added 2015-07-12
    Accessing the Moral Law Through Feeling.Owen Ware - 2015 - Kantian Review 20 (2):301-311.
    In this article I offer a critical commentary on Jeanine Grenberg’s claim that, by the time of the second Critique, Kant was committed to the view that we only access the moral law’s validity through the feeling of respect. The issue turns on how we understand Kant’s assertion that our consciousness of the moral law is a ‘fact of reason’. Grenberg argues that all facts must be forced, and anything forced must be felt. I defend an alternative interpretation, according to (...)
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  33. added 2015-07-02
    Some Considerations on the Feeling of Respect for the Moral Law.Johnny Antonio Dávila - 2011 - Discusiones Filosóficas 12 (18):145 - 154.
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  34. added 2015-07-02
    The Fact of Reason and the Feeling of Respect.Fldvia Carvalho Chagas - 2008 - In Valerio Hrsg V. Rohden, Ricardo Terra & Guido Almeida (eds.), Recht Und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. pp. 83.
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  35. added 2015-06-29
    Was bedeutet „Ehrfurcht“ in Albert Schweitzers Verantwortungsethik? Eine Begriffsanalyse im Vergleich mit Schwantje, Kant, Goethe und Nietzsche.Heike Baranzke - 2012 - Synthesis Philosophica 27 (1):7-29.
    Aufgrund der Tatsache, dass Albert Schweitzer seine Ethik der Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben auf Anorganisches wie auf die Gesellschaft und die Welt im Ganzen beziehen kann, nimmt der Beitrag anstelle des Gegenstandsbereichs den Begriff der Ehrfurcht in den Blick. Immanuel Kants und Johann Wolfgang von Goethes Konzeptionen säkularer Ehrfurcht weisen den Weg zu Schweitzers Ehrfurcht als einer Verschränkung des ethischen Selbst- und Weltverhältnisses des menschlichen Subjekts als Ergebnis einer konsequent reflektierten Selbstkultivierung zur Verantwortungsbereitschaft. Mit Nietzsche verweigert sich Schweitzer jeglicher normativen (...)
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  36. added 2014-11-30
    Respect for the Law and the Use of Dynamical Terms in Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation.Melissa Zinkin - 2006 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 88 (1):31-53.
    Kant's discussion of the feeling of respect presents a puzzle regarding both the precise nature of this feeling and its role in his moral theory as an incentive that motivates us to follow the moral law. If it is a feeling that motivates us to follow the law, this would contradict Kant's view that moral obligation is based on reason alone. I argue that Kant has an account of respect as feeling that is nevertheless not separate from the use of (...)
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  37. added 2014-07-06
    Reflective Judgment and the Problem of Assessing Virtue in Kant.Rudolf A. Makkreel - 2002 - Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (2-3):205-220.
  38. added 2014-07-02
    Reason, Value, and Respect: Kantian Themes From the Philosophy of Thomas E. Hill, Jr.Mark Timmons (ed.) - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    In thirteen specially written essays, leading philosophers explore Kantian themes in moral and political philosophy that are prominent in the work of Thomas E. Hill, Jr., such as respect and self-respect, practical reason, conscience, and duty. In conclusion Hill offers an overview of his work and responses to the preceding essays.
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  39. added 2014-07-01
    Love in Vain.Robert N. Johnson - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (S1):45-50.
    Kant famously argued in the Groundwork that our fundamental moral obligation is simply to respect the humanity in persons. However, his fuller view, found in the Metaphysic of Morals, is that the humanity in persons not only demands our respect, but also our love. Neither of these demands, of course, requires that we feel anything for others, and Kant is much more specific here about what constitutes respect between persons. But in elaborating this position he also claims that these demands (...)
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  40. added 2014-06-17
    A New Look at Kantian Respect for Persons.Ernesto V. Garcia - 2012 - Kant Yearbook 4 (1).
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  41. added 2014-06-17
    Anthropology From a Metaphysical Point of View.Jeanine Grenberg - 1999 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (1):91-115.
    I argue that there can be, on Kant's account, a significant motivational role for feeling in moral action. I first discuss and reject Andrews Reath's claim that Kant is forced to disallow a motivational role for feeling because of his rejection of moral sense theory. I then consider and reject the more general challenge that allowing a role for the influence of feeling on the faculty of desire undermines Kant's commitment to a morality free from anthropological considerations. I conclude by (...)
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  42. added 2014-06-14
    Kant's Empirical Psychology.Patrick R. Frierson - 2014 - Cambridge University Press.
    Throughout his life, Kant was concerned with questions about empirical psychology. He aimed to develop an empirical account of human beings, and his lectures and writings on the topic are recognizable today as properly 'psychological' treatments of human thought and behavior. In this book Patrick R. Frierson uses close analysis of relevant texts, including unpublished lectures and notes, to study Kant's account. He shows in detail how Kant explains human action, choice, and thought in empirical terms, and how a better (...)
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  43. added 2014-06-10
    Respect for the Moral Law: The Emotional Side of Reason.Janelle DeWitt - 2014 - Philosophy 89 (1):31-62.
    Respect, as Kant describes it, has a duality of nature that seems to embody a contradiction – i.e., it is both a moral motive and a feeling, where these are thought to be mutually exclusive. Most solutions involve eliminating one of the two natures, but unfortunately, this also destroys what is unique about respect. So instead, I question the non-cognitive theory of emotion giving rise to the contradiction. In its place, I develop the cognitive theory implicit in Kant's work, one (...)
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  44. added 2014-06-10
    Dignity, Contractualism and Consequentialism.David Cummiskey - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (4):383-408.
    Kantian respect for persons is based on the special status and dignity of humanity. There are, however, at least three distinct kinds of interpretation of the principle of respect for the dignity of persons: the contractualist conception, the substantive conception and the direct conception. Contractualist theories are the most common and familiar interpretation. The contractualist assumes that some form of consent or agreement is the crucial factor that is required by respect for persons. The substantive conceptions of dignity, on the (...)
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  45. added 2014-06-10
    Kant's Respect-for-Persons Principle.Carl F. Cranor - 1980 - International Studies in Philosophy 12 (2):19-39.
  46. added 2014-05-04
    Respect de la loi, respect de la personne: Kant.Robert Theis - 2005 - Revue Philosophique De Louvain 103 (3):331-346.
    This paper will attempt to reconstruct two Kantian approaches to the notion of 'respect': 1. respect in relation to the concept of law as well as respect for the law; 2. respect for the person. This reconstruction will be followed by an analysis of the significance of this twofold approach. The author will try to show that, in the end, it is through respect for the person that the necessity of, and hence respect for, the law is established. In other (...)
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  47. added 2014-05-04
    Kant's Respect for Persons.Andreas Teuber - 1983 - Political Theory 11 (3):369-392.
  48. added 2014-04-27
    Once Again: What is the 'First Proposition'in Kant's Groundwork? Some Refinements, a New Proposal, and a Reply to Henry Allison.Dieter Schönecker - 2012 - Kantian Review 17 (2):281-296.
    Discussing the concept of duty in Groundwork 1, Kant refers to a ‘second proposition’ and a ‘third proposition’, the latter being a ‘Folgerung aus beiden vorigen’. However, Kant does not identify what the ‘first proposition’ is. In this paper, I will argue that the first proposition is this: An action from duty is an action from respect for the moral law. I defend this claim against a critique put forward by Allison according to which ‘respect’ is a concept that is (...)
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  49. added 2014-04-13
    "The Kingdom of Ends as a Social Philosophy": Review: Kneller & Axinn , Autonomy and Community: Readings in Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy. [REVIEW]Catriona McKinnon - 2000 - Kantian Review 4:138-148.
  50. added 2014-04-02
    Throwing Oneself Away: Kant on the Forfeiture of Respect.Aaron Bunch - 2014 - Kantian Review 19 (1):71-91.
    Surprisingly often Kant asserts that it is possible to behave in such a degrading way that one ‘throws oneself away’ and turns oneself ‘into a thing’, as a result of which others may treat one ‘as they please’. Rather than dismiss these claims out of hand, I argue that they force us to reconsider what is meant and required by ‘respect for humanity’. I argue that to ‘throw away’ humanity is not to lose or extinguish it, but rather to refuse (...)
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