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  1. Duty and Inclination.Audrey L. Anton - 2006 - Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):199-207.
  2. Was bedeutet „Ehrfurcht“ in Albert Schweitzers Verantwortungsethik? Eine Begriffsanalyse im Vergleich mit Schwantje, Kant, Goethe und Nietzsche.Heike Baranzke - 2012 - Synthesis Philosophica 53 (1):7-29.
    Aufgrund der Tatsache, dass Albert Schweitzer seine Ethik der Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben auf Anorganisches wie auf die Gesellschaft und die Welt im Ganzen beziehen kann, nimmt der Beitrag anstelle des Gegenstandsbereichs den Begriff der Ehrfurcht in den Blick. Immanuel Kants und Johann Wolfgang von Goethes Konzeptionen säkularer Ehrfurcht weisen den Weg zu Schweitzers Ehrfurcht als einer Verschränkung des ethischen Selbst- und Weltverhältnisses des menschlichen Subjekts als Ergebnis einer konsequent reflektierten Selbstkultivierung zur Verantwortungsbereitschaft. Mit Nietzsche verweigert sich Schweitzer jeglicher normativen (...)
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  3. Love and Respect in the Doctrine of Virtue.Marcia Baron - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (S1):29-44.
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  4. A Commentary of Kant's Critique of Practical Reason.Lewis White Beck - 1960 - University of Chicago Press.
  5. Kant on Respect, Dignity, and the Duty of Respect.Monika Betzler - 2008 - In Kant's Ethics of Virtue. Walter de Gruyter.
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  6. Physiology and the Controlling of Affects in Kant's Philosophy.Maria Borges - 2008 - Kantian Review 13 (2):46-66.
    Kant is categorical about the relation between virtue and the controlling of inclinations:Since virtue is based on inner freedom it contains a positive command to a human being, namely to bring all his capacities and inclinations under his reason's control and so to rule over himself. Virtue presupposes apathy, in the sense of absence of affects. Kant revives the stoic ideal of tranquilitas as a necessary condition for virtue: ‘The true strength of virtue is a tranquil mind’ . In the (...)
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  7. Throwing Oneself Away: Kant on the Forfeiture of Respect.Aaron Bunch - 2014 - Kantian Review 19 (1):71-91.
    Surprisingly often Kant asserts that it is possible to behave in such a degrading way that one ‘throws oneself away’ and turns oneself ‘into a thing’, as a result of which others may treat one ‘as they please’. Rather than dismiss these claims out of hand, I argue that they force us to reconsider what is meant and required by ‘respect for humanity’. I argue that to ‘throw away’ humanity is not to lose or extinguish it, but rather to refuse (...)
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  8. The Fact of Reason and the Feeling of Respect.Fldvia Carvalho Chagas - 2008 - In Valerio Hrsg V. Rohden, Ricardo Terra & Guido Almeida (eds.), Recht Und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. pp. 83.
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  9. Kant's Respect-for-Persons Principle.Carl F. Cranor - 1980 - International Studies in Philosophy 12 (2):19-39.
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  10. Dignity, Contractualism and Consequentialism.David Cummiskey - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (4):383-408.
    Kantian respect for persons is based on the special status and dignity of humanity. There are, however, at least three distinct kinds of interpretation of the principle of respect for the dignity of persons: the contractualist conception, the substantive conception and the direct conception. Contractualist theories are the most common and familiar interpretation. The contractualist assumes that some form of consent or agreement is the crucial factor that is required by respect for persons. The substantive conceptions of dignity, on the (...)
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  11. Kant on Respect, Dignity, and the Duty of Respect.Stephen Darwall - 2008 - In Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant's Ethics of Virtues. De Gruyter.
  12. Some Considerations on the Feeling of Respect for the Moral Law.Johnny Antonio Dávila - 2011 - Discusiones Filosóficas 12 (18):145 - 154.
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  13. Respect for the Moral Law: The Emotional Side of Reason.Janelle DeWitt - 2014 - Philosophy 89 (1):31-62.
    Respect, as Kant describes it, has a duality of nature that seems to embody a contradiction – i.e., it is both a moral motive and a feeling, where these are thought to be mutually exclusive. Most solutions involve eliminating one of the two natures, but unfortunately, this also destroys what is unique about respect. So instead, I question the non-cognitive theory of emotion giving rise to the contradiction. In its place, I develop the cognitive theory implicit in Kant's work, one (...)
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  14. Respect as a Moral Emotion: A Phenomenological Approach.John J. Drummond - 2006 - Husserl Studies 22 (1):1-27.
  15. Understanding Kant’s Duty of Respect as a Duty of Virtue.Melissa Seymour Fahmy - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (6):723-740.
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  16. Kant's Empirical Psychology.Patrick R. Frierson - 2014 - Cambridge University Press.
    Throughout his life, Kant was concerned with questions about empirical psychology. He aimed to develop an empirical account of human beings, and his lectures and writings on the topic are recognizable today as properly 'psychological' treatments of human thought and behavior. In this book Patrick R. Frierson uses close analysis of relevant texts, including unpublished lectures and notes, to study Kant's account. He shows in detail how Kant explains human action, choice, and thought in empirical terms, and how a better (...)
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  17. A New Look at Kantian Respect for Persons.Ernesto V. Garcia - 2012 - Kant Yearbook 4 (1).
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  18. Rational Feelings and Moral Agency.Ido Geiger - 2011 - Kantian Review 16 (2):283-308.
    Kant's conception of moral agency is often charged with attributing no role to feelings. I suggest that respect is the effective force driving moral action. I then argue that four additional types of rational feelings are necessary conditions of moral agency: The affective inner life of moral agents deliberating how to act and reflecting on their deeds is rich and complex . To act morally we must turn our affective moral perception towards the ends of moral action: the welfare of (...)
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  19. Immanuel Kant on the Moral Feeling of Respect.Ina Goy - 2010 - In Pablo Muchnik (ed.), Rethinking Kant. Current Trends in North American Kantian Scholarship. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 156-179.
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  20. Immanuel Kant über das moralische Gefühl der Achtung.Ina Goy - 2007 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 61 (3):337 - 360.
    Die Abhandlung „Immanuel Kant über das moralische Gefühl der Achtung“ legt nach einer Einführung in den historischen und werkgeschichtlichen Hintergrund wesentliche systematische Züge des moralischen Gefühls der Achtung dar. Es wird gezeigt, dass das apriorische Gefühl der Achtung einerseits von allen anderen empirischen Gefühlen unterschieden, dennoch aber ein Gefühl ist und in seiner spezifischen Sonderstellung drei bedeutende moralphilosophische Funktionen übernehmen kann: eine evaluative, eine kausale und eine bildende Funktion. Kants These, dass es im strengen Sinn nur ein rein moralisches Gefühl (...)
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  21. Anthropology From a Metaphysical Point of View.Jeanine Grenberg - 1999 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (1):91-115.
    I argue that there can be, on Kant's account, a significant motivational role for feeling in moral action. I first discuss and reject Andrews Reath's claim that Kant is forced to disallow a motivational role for feeling because of his rejection of moral sense theory. I then consider and reject the more general challenge that allowing a role for the influence of feeling on the faculty of desire undermines Kant's commitment to a morality free from anthropological considerations. I conclude by (...)
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  22. Schopenhauer, Kant and Compassion.Paul Guyer - 2012 - Kantian Review 17 (3):403-429.
    Schopenhauer presents his moral philosophy as diametrically opposed to that of Kant: for him, pure practical reason is an illusion and morality can arise only from the feeling of compassion, while for Kant it cannot be based on such a feeling and can be based only on pure practical reason. But the difference is not as great as Schopenhauer makes it seem, because for him compassion is supposed to arise from metaphysical insight into the unity of all being, thus from (...)
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  23. Respect-Worthiness and Dignity.Carol Hay - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (4):587-612.
    In this paper I consider the possibility that failing to fulfill the Kantian obligation to protect one’s rational nature might actually vitiate future instances of this obligation. I respond to this dilemma by defending a novel interpretation of Kant’s views on the relation between the value we have and the respect we are owed. I argue, contra the received view among Kant scholars, that the feature in virtue of which someone has unconditional and incomparable value is not the same feature (...)
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  24. The Obligation to Resist Oppression.Carol Hay - 2011 - Journal of Social Philosophy 42 (1):21-45.
    In this paper I argue that, in addition to having an obligation to resist the oppression of others, people have an obligation to themselves to resist their own oppression. This obligation to oneself, I argue, is grounded in a Kantian duty of self-respect.
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  25. Kant on the Moral Triebfeder.Larry Herrera - 2000 - Kant-Studien 91 (4):395-410.
  26. Respect, Pluralism, and Justice: Kantian Perspectives.Thomas E. Hill - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
    Respect, Pluralism, and Justice is a series of essays which sketches a broadly Kantian framework for moral deliberation, and then uses it to address important social and political issues. Hill shows how Kantian theory can be developed to deal with questions about cultural diversity, punishment, political violence, responsibility for the consequences of wrongdoing, and state coercion in a pluralistic society.
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  27. Duties to and Regarding Others.Robert N. Johnson - 2010 - In Lara Denis (ed.), Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press.
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  28. Love in Vain.Robert N. Johnson - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (S1):45-50.
    Kant famously argued in the Groundwork that our fundamental moral obligation is simply to respect the humanity in persons. However, his fuller view, found in the Metaphysic of Morals, is that the humanity in persons not only demands our respect, but also our love. Neither of these demands, of course, requires that we feel anything for others, and Kant is much more specific here about what constitutes respect between persons. But in elaborating this position he also claims that these demands (...)
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  29. Dignity.Aurel Kolnai - 1976 - Philosophy 51 (197):251 - 271.
    Why, however, should it be necessarily wrong to discuss the nebulous in a businesslike manner?
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  30. Dignity and the Phenomenology of Recognition-Respect.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - In J. J. Drummond & S. Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Emotional Experiences: Ethical and Social Significance. London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 121-136.
    What is dignity? My starting point is that dignity is one of those philosophical primitives that admit of no informative analysis. Nonetheless, I suggest, dignity might yield to indirect illumination when we consider the kind of experience we have (or rather find it fitting to have) in its presence. This experience, I claim, is what is sometimes known as recognition-respect. Through an examination of a neglected aspect of the phenomenology of recognition-respect, I argue that the possession of inner consciousness is (...)
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  31. The Phenomenology of Kantian Respect for Persons.Uriah Kriegel & Mark Timmons - forthcoming - In R. Dean & O. Sensen (eds.), Respect.
    Emotions can be understood generally from two different perspectives: (i) a third-person perspective that specifies their distinctive functional role within our overall cognitive economy and (ii) a first-person perspective that attempts to capture their distinctive phenomenal character, the subjective quality of experiencing them. One emotion that is of central importance in many ethical systems is respect (in the sense of respect for persons or so-called recognition-respect). However, discussions of respect in analytic moral philosophy have tended to focus almost entirely on (...)
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  32. Love, That Indispensable Supplement: Irigaray and Kant on Love and Respect.Marguerite La Caze - 2005 - Hypatia 20 (3):92-114.
    Is love essential to ethical life, or merely a supplement? In Kant's view, respect and love, as duties, are in tension with each other because love involves drawing closer and respect involves drawing away. By contrast, Irigaray says that love and respect do not conflict because love as passion must also involve distancing and we have a responsibility to love. I argue that love, understood as passion and based on respect, is essential to ethics.
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  33. Love, That Indispensable Supplement: Irigaray and Kant on Love and Respect.Marguerite La Caze - 2005 - Hypatia 20 (3):92-114.
    Is love essential to ethical life, or merely a supplement? In Kant’s view, respect and love, as duties, are in tension with each other because love involves drawing closer and respect involves drawing away. By contrast, Irigaray says that love and respect do not conflict because love as passion must also involve distancing and we have a responsibility to love. I argue that love, understood as passion and based on respect, is essential to ethics.
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  34. Toward a Serresian Reconceptualization of Kantian Respect.Bryan Lueck - 2008 - Philosophy Today 52 (1):52-59.
    According to Immanuel Kant, moral experience is made possible by respect, an absolutely unique feeling in which the sensible and the intelligible are given immediately together. This paper argues that Kant's moral philosophy underemphasizes the role of this sensibility at the heart of moral experience and that a more rigorous conception of respect, grounded in Michel Serres's concepts of the parasite, the excluded/included third, and noise would yield a moral philosophy more consistent with Kant's own basic insights.
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  35. Reflective Judgment and the Problem of Assessing Virtue in Kant.Rudolf A. Makkreel - 2002 - Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (2-3):205-220.
  36. Motivation and Moral Choice in Kant’s Theory of Rational Agency.Richard McCarty - 1994 - Kant-Studien 85 (1):15-31.
  37. Kantian Moral Motivation and the Feeling of Respect.Richard R. McCarty - 1993 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (3):421-435.
  38. "The Kingdom of Ends as a Social Philosophy": Review: Kneller & Axinn , Autonomy and Community: Readings in Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy. [REVIEW]Catriona McKinnon - 2000 - Kantian Review 4:138-148.
  39. The Sublime.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2018 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This Element considers Kant's account of the sublime in the context of his predecessors both in the Anglophone and German rationalist traditions. Since Kant says with evident endorsement that 'we call sublime that which is absolutely great' and nothing in nature can in fact be absolutely great, Kant concludes that strictly speaking what is sublime can only be the human calling to perfect our rational capacity according to the standard of virtue that is thought through the moral law. The Element (...)
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  40. Love, Respect, and Individuals: Murdoch as a Guide to Kantian Ethics.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1844-1863.
    I reconsider the relation between love and respect in Kantian ethics, taking as my guide Iris Murdoch's view of love as the fundamental moral attitude and a kind of attention to individuals. It is widely supposed that Kantian ethics disregards individuals, since we don't respect individuals but the universal quality of personhood they instantiate. We need not draw this conclusion if we recognise that Kant and Murdoch share a view about the centrality of love to virtue. We can then see (...)
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  41. Practical Reason and Respect for Persons.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (1):53-79.
    My project is to reconsider the Kantian conception of practical reason. Some Kantians think that practical reasoning must be more active than theoretical reasoning, on the putative grounds that such reasoning need not contend with what is there anyway, independently of its exercise. Behind that claim stands the thesis that practical reason is essentially efficacious. I accept the efficacy principle, but deny that it underwrites this inference about practical reason. My inquiry takes place against the background of recent Kantian metaethical (...)
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  42. The Moral Source of the Kantian Sublime.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2012 - In Timothy Costelloe (ed.), The Sublime: From Antiquity to the Present (pp. 37-49). Cambridge University Press.
    A crucial feature of Kant's critical-period writing on the sublime is its grounding in moral psychology. Whereas in the pre-critical writings, the sublime is viewed as an inherently exhausting state of mind, in the critical-period writings it is presented as one that gains strength the more it is sustained. I account for this in terms of Kantian moral psychology, and explain that, for Kant, sound moral disposition is conceived as a sublime state of mind.
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  43. How God Could Assign Us a Purpose Without Disrespect: Reply to Salles.Thaddeus Metz - 2013 - Quadranti - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia Contemporanea 1 (1):99-112.
    In one of the most widely read texts on what makes a life meaningful, composed more than 50 years ago, Kurt Baier presents an intriguing argument against the view that meaning in life would come by fulfilling a purpose God has assigned us. Baier contends that God could not avoid degrading us were He to assign us a purpose, which would mean that God, as a morally ideal being by definition, would not do so. Defenders of God-centred accounts of meaning (...)
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  44. Respect for Persons and Perfectionist Politics.Thaddeus Metz - 2001 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (4):417–442.
    Can a state seek to promote a thick conception of the good (such as fostering a kind of meaning or excellence in people's lives) without treating its citizens disrespectfully? The predominant answer among friends of the principle of respect for persons is "no." The most powerful Kantian objection to non-liberalism or perfectionism is the claim that citizens who do not share the state's conception of the good would be wronged in that the state would treat a certain way of life (...)
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  45. On the Alleged Vacuity of Kant's Concept of Evil.Pablo F. Muchnik - 2006 - Kant-Studien 97 (4):430-451.
    In recent years, there has been a growing interest in Kant's doctrine of radical evil, arising from as diverse quarters as philosophy, psychoanalysis and the social sciences. This interest has contributed to the revival of the notion of evil, which had been displaced from the center of philosophical discussion in the 20th century. A common trait in the recent literature is that it takes the relevance of the use of the concept of evil for granted. Yet, before understanding what Kant (...)
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  46. Did Kant Respect Persons?Michael Neumann - 2000 - Res Publica 6 (3):285-299.
    The illusion that Kant respects persons comes from ascribing contemporary meanings to purely technical terms within his second formulation of the categorical imperative, “[A]ct so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only”. When we realize that “humanity” means rational nature and “person” means the supersensible self (homo noumenon), we find that we are to respect, not human selves in all their diversity (homo phaenomenon), (...)
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  47. Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility. Respect for the Moral Law and the Influence of Inclination.Andrews Reath - 1989 - Kant-Studien 80 (1-4):284-302.
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  48. Why Must We Threat Humanity with Respect? Evaluating the Regress Argument.Michael Ridge - 2005 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (1):57-73.
    -- Immanuel Kant (Kant 1990, p. 46/429) The idea that our most basic duty is to treat each other with respect is one of the Enlightenment’s greatest legacies and Kant is often thought to be one of its most powerful defenders. If Kant’s project were successful then the lofty notion that humanity is always worthy of respect would be vindicated by pure practical reason. Further, this way of defending the ideal is supposed to reflect our autonomy, insofar as it is (...)
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  49. Reseña de Jeanine Grenberg, "Kant's Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account", Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013.Paula Satne - 2015 - Con-Textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):309-322.
  50. Once Again: What is the 'First Proposition'in Kant's Groundwork? Some Refinements, a New Proposal, and a Reply to Henry Allison.Dieter Schönecker - 2012 - Kantian Review 17 (2):281-296.
    Discussing the concept of duty in Groundwork 1, Kant refers to a ‘second proposition’ and a ‘third proposition’, the latter being a ‘Folgerung aus beiden vorigen’. However, Kant does not identify what the ‘first proposition’ is. In this paper, I will argue that the first proposition is this: An action from duty is an action from respect for the moral law. I defend this claim against a critique put forward by Allison according to which ‘respect’ is a concept that is (...)
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