Karl Popper

Most philosophers of science maintain Confirmationism's central tenet, namely, that scientific theories are probabilistically confirmed by experimental successes. Against this dominant conception of experimental science, Popper's well-known, anti-inductivistic Falsificationism has stood, virtually alone, since 1934. Indeed, it is Popper who tells us that it was he who killed Logical Positivism. It is also pretty well-known that Popper blames Wittgenstein for much that is wrong with Logical Positivism, just as he despises Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinian philosophers for abdicating philosophy's true mission. What (...) is not well-known, however, especially because Popper neglected to tell us in 1934, is that Wittgenstein is very much an ally. It was Wittgenstein who rejected induction in the strongest possible terms as early as 1922, and it was Wittgenstein who similarly rejected Confirmationism approximately four years prior to Popper. The aims of this paper are to illuminate the substantial agreements between Popper and Wittgenstein and, by doing so, to clarify their important disagreement regarding the status of “strictly universal,” scientific theories. (shrink)

Book review of Jeremy Shearmur and Geoffrey Stokes (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Popper. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. x + 394 pp. Hardback ISBN 978-0-521-85645-4. GBP 84.99.

În această lucrare argumentez faptul că, în ciuda criticilor teoriei falsificabilității propuse de Karl Popper pentru demarcarea între știință și ne-știință, în principal pseudoștiință, acest criteriu este încă foarte util, și perfect valabil după perfecționarea lui de către Popper și adepții lui. Mai mult, chiar și în versiunea sa inițială, considerată de Lakatos ca ”dogmatică”, Popper nu a afirmat că această metodologie este un criteriu absolut de demarcare: un singur contra-exemplu nu este suficient pentru a falsifica o teorie; mai mult, (...) o teorie poate fi salvată în mod legitim de falsificare prin introducerea unei ipoteze auxiliare. În comparație cu teoria lui Kuhn a revoluțiilor, de care el însuși s-a dezis ulterior transformând-o într-o teorie a ”micro-revoluțiilor”, consider că metodologia de demarcare a lui Popper, împreună cu dezvoltarea ulterioară propusă de acesta, inclusiv coroborarea și verosimilitudinea, deși imperfectă, nu numai că este valabilă și azi, dar este încă cea mai bună metodologie de demarcare. Pentru argumentare, m-am folosit de principalele lucrări ale lui Popper care tratează această problemă, și a principalilor săi critici și susținători. După o scurtă prezentare a lui Karl Popper, și o introducere în problema demarcației și metodologia falsificabilității, trec în revistă principalele critici aduse și argumentele susținătorilor săi, accentuând pe ideea că Popper nu a pus niciodată semnul egalității între falsificare și respingere. În final prezint propriile concluzii în această problemă. (shrink)

Explains Popper's views on natural and social science, ranging in Part I from metaphysical considerations to his interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics, and in Part II from the errors of historicism and holism to the roles of theoretical models, institutions, traditions and history.

Karl Popper: Philosophy of Science Karl Popper was one of the most influential philosophers of science of the 20th century. He made significant contributions to debates concerning general scientific methodology and theory choice, the demarcation of science from non-science, the nature of probability and quantum mechanics, and the methodology of the social sciences. His … Continue reading Popper, Karl: Philosophy of Science →.

I analyze the historical background and philosophical considerations of Karl Bühler and his student Karl Popper regarding the crisis of psychology. They share certain Kantian questions and methods for reflection on the state of the art in psychology. Part 1 outlines Bühler’s diagnosis and therapy for the crisis in psychology as he perceived it, leading to his famous theory of language. I also show how the Kantian features of Bühler’s approach help to deal with objections to his crisis diagnosis and (...) to aspects of his linguistic theory. Part 2 turns to Popper’s dissertation, completed in 1928 under Bühler. I analyze Popper’s disapproval of Schlick’s physicalism in psychology, as well as Popper’s attempt to extend Bühler’s Kantian strategy to the domain of the psychology of thinking. In conclusion, I indicate how these approaches to the crisis in psychology differ from Thomas Kuhn’s notions of crisis and revolution, which are still all too popular in current philosophical discussions of psychology. (shrink)

Karl Popper: Philosophy of Science Karl Popper was one of the most influential philosophers of science of the 20th century. He made significant contributions to debates concerning general scientific methodology and theory choice, the demarcation of science from non-science, the nature of probability and quantum mechanics, and the methodology of the social sciences. His … Continue reading Popper, Karl: Philosophy of Science →.

The work of Karl Popper has had extraordinary influence across the fields of scientific and social thought. Widely regarded as one of the greatest philosophers of science of the twentieth century, he was also a highly influential social and political philosopher, a proponent and defender of the "open society". "Popper's Legacy" examines Popper in the round, analysing in particular his moral and psychological insights. Once Popper's scientific legacy is couched in political and moral terms, it becomes apparent that his concern (...) for individual autonomy does not come at the expense of institutional guidelines and social conventions. Instead, these guidelines turn out to be essential sanctions for individual freedom. Popper envisions the conduct of the scientific community as paralleling the conduct of any democratically established community. Critical rationality guides the words and actions of all participants and leadership can be replaced without violence. In presenting a critical overview, "Popper's Legacy" reveals the debt many intellectual movements - such as Marxism, feminism, and postmodernism - still owe to Popper. (shrink)

In a career spanning sixty years, Sir Karl Popper has made some of the most important contributions to the twentieth century discussion of science and rationality. _The Myth of the Framework_ is a new collection of some of Popper's most important material on this subject. Sir Karl discusses such issues as the aims of science, the role that it plays in our civilization, the moral responsibility of the scientist, the structure of history, and the perennial choice between reason and revolution. (...) In doing so, he attacks intellectual fashions that exagerrate what science and rationality have done, as well as intellectual fashions that denigrate what science and rationality can do. Scientific knowledge, according to Popper, is one of the most rational and creative of human achievements, but it is also inherently fallible and subject to revision. In place of intellectual fashions, Popper offers his own critical rationalism - a view that he regards both as a theory of knowlege and as an attitude towards human life, human morals and democracy. Published in cooperation with the Central European University. (shrink)

Few philosophers in this century have had either Karl Popper's range or his influence, inside and outside philosophy. This collection of essays by fifteen distinguished philosophers, several of whom have been closely associated with Popper and his work, provides a timely assessment of Popper's contributions in a number of key areas: the methodology and philosophy of science; probability and determinism; quantum theory; biology; the theory of evolution; and the theory and practice of politics. The volume offers the specialist and the (...) general reader alike fresh insights into the life and work of one of the twentieth century's most original thinkers. (shrink)

Peter Munz, a former student of both Popper and Wittgenstein, begins his comparison of the two great twentieth-century philosophers, by explaining that since the demise of positivism there have emerged, broadly speaking, two philosophical options: Wittgenstein, with the absolute relativism of his theory that meaning is a function of language games and that social configurations are determinants of knowledge; and Popper’s evolutionary epistemology – conscious knowledge is a special case of the relationship which exists between all living beings and their (...) environments. Professor Munz examines and rejects the Wittgensteinian position. Instead, _Our Knowledge of the Growth of Knowledge_, first published in 1985, elaborates the potentially fruitful link between Popper’s critical rationalism and Neo-Darwinism. Read in the light of the latter, Popper’s philosophy leads to the transformation of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism into ‘Hypothetical Realism’, whilst the emphasis on the biological orientation of Popper’s thought helps to illumine some difficulties in Popper’s ‘falsificationism’. (shrink)

Peter Munz, a former student of both Popper and Wittgenstein, begins his comparison of the two great twentieth-century philosophers, by explaining that since the demise of positivism there have emerged, broadly speaking, two philosophical options: Wittgenstein, with the absolute relativism of his theory that meaning is a function of language games and that social configurations are determinants of knowledge; and Popper’s evolutionary epistemology – conscious knowledge is a special case of the relationship which exists between all living beings and their (...) environments. Professor Munz examines and rejects the Wittgensteinian position. Instead, _Our Knowledge of the Growth of Knowledge_, first published in 1985, elaborates the potentially fruitful link between Popper’s critical rationalism and Neo-Darwinism. Read in the light of the latter, Popper’s philosophy leads to the transformation of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism into ‘Hypothetical Realism’, whilst the emphasis on the biological orientation of Popper’s thought helps to illumine some difficulties in Popper’s ‘falsificationism’. (shrink)

Karl Popper is a philosopher of knowledge and politics, rationality and freedom. His ideas have won acceptance and provoked controversy among an academic as well as a more general audience. This book aims to broaden our understanding of Popper's philosophy. It is one of the few studies to present his work as an evolving "system of ideas", and to take account of the full range of his writings. The book discusses Popper's early philosophy of politics, science and social science, as (...) well as his later philosophy, which offers an evolutionary account of human nature and the growth of knowledge. Contrary to many earlier interpretations, Stokes argues that we should look to Popper's political values to understand the unity of his work and the evolution of his theory of knowledge and general philosophy. The chapters in this book examine Popper's arguments, and offer critical analysis of the achievements and shortcomings of his philosophy. In particular, Stokes considers the problems of rationality, politics and ethics in the context of debates between the Frankfurt School of critical theory and critical rationalism. The book will be of interest to second-year undergraduates and above in the fields of philosophy and critical theory. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to present Popper's account of objectivity. To this end, we follow the general chronology of his thought, however our emphasis in our critical exposition is on his confrontation with particular problems in the philosophy of science and the picture of objectivity that results. Popper identifies science as the locus of objectivity. For Popper all knowledge begins as common-sense knowledge and is inherently self-critical. Science is characterized by the refinement of the critical process initiated by (...) human interaction with the world. Thus science is common-sense "Writ Large." Consequently, according to Popper, a thesis is objective to the extent that it's susceptible to intersubjective criticism characteristic of scientific methodology. Therefore, the focus of our account of Popper's treatment of objectivity is his writings in the philosophy of science that directly address issues of scientific methodology. ;Specifically, we treat of the problem of demarcation, the falsifiability of probability statements, Popper's identification of the method of conjecture and refutation with Neo-Darwinian evolution, and lastly the problem of convention in scientific methodology. The dissertation concludes with a general sketch of the picture of objectivity that results from our critical exposition, and a consideration of both possible criticisms of our account and a prospectus of some areas of possible future research. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to determine several points of reference regarding the way in which Karl Popper built up his philosophical discourse. I locate two specific ways in which Popper interpreted and used ideas belonging to other philosophers. Thus I distinguish in Popper between a projective hermeneutics and an ideological hermeneutics . In so doing I also highlight the considerable asymmetry between a representationalist hermeneutics, and a projective and, respectively, an ideological one. Whereas in the first case the (...) interpreter wishes to unveil a truth about the philosophical text, in the other two he is rather expressing a desire to talk about himself, his own beliefs and convic¬tions, or about the beliefs of his community of reference. (shrink)

This dissertation describes and assesses Karl Popper's commonsense realism. The evaluation focuses upon his arguments against nonrealism in modern physics rather than his purely philosophical arguments. Motivated by a few central concepts, Popper presented a detailed critique of the orthodox interpretation of physics. He created a "quantum mechanics without an observer" based upon an "epistemology without a subject." ;Popper believed that certain philosophical presuppositions were necessary for progressive and objective science. He claimed that a "serious crisis exists in modern physics" (...) due to the suspension of realism. Popper subsequently presented an elaborate reinterpretation of quantum theory in attempt to reinstate a realistic and objectivist conceptual framework. He also supported the EPR thought experiment which he was convinced demonstrated the incompleteness of quantum theory and the subsequent unnecessary nonrealistic interpretation. ;Important presuppositions and contraints of Popper's realism not explicit in his purely philosophical work are manifested in his philosophical physics. The EPR test proposal crystallized his argument against positivism in physics. Thus, in light of the recent testing of the EPR paradox, I evaluate Popper's philosophical presuppositions and inquire whether classical realism needs revision. ;The dissertation's goal is this assessment of Popper's concepts underlying his attack upon modern physics. Rather than an abstract analysis of his concepts, I assess them in the context of the current quantum theoretical debates and recent testing of the EPR proposal. ;The dissertation is in the "history of ideas" style. I describe Popper's general philosophy of science, the challenge to his realism by modern physics and the Copenhagen Interpretation, Popper's realistic reinterpretation of quantum theory and the inadequacies of this project . I then evaluate his commonsense realism on the basis of his presuppositions of his project. I conclude that Popper's constraints were norms derived from classical science and were overly dependent upon intuitive, traditional notions. These constraints then can be incompatible with counter-intuitive notions of contemporary theoretical science. I also suggest that Popper's ontological dichotomies are biased by classical notions. (shrink)