Karl Popper

The studies of theoretical bias in evidence are these days developed by many clever psychologists, social psychologists, and philosophers. It therefore comes as a surprise to realize that most of the material one can find in the up-to -date literature repeats discoveries which are due to the heroes of the present sketch, namely Galileo Galilei, Sir Francis Bacon, and Robert Boyle; William Whewell, Pierre Duhem, and Karl Popper. We may try to raise scholarly standards by familiarizing ourselves with their ideas (...) and studying them with a little appreciation. (shrink)

Basic research or fundamental research is distinct from both pure and applied research, in that it is pure research with expected useful results. The existence of basic or fundamental research is problematic, at least for both inductivists and instrumentalists, but also for Popper. Assuming scientific research to be the search for explanatory conjectures and for refutations, and assuming technology to be the search of conjectures and some corroborations, we can easily place basic or fundamental research between science and technology as (...) a part of their overlap. As a bonus, the present view of basic or fundamental research as an overlap explains the specific hardship basic research workers encounter. (shrink)

Bacon's inductivist philosophy of science divides thinkers into the scientific and the prejudiced, using as a standard the up-to-date science textbook. Inductivists regard the history of science as progressing smoothly, from facts rather than from problems, to increasingly general theories, undisturbed by contending scientific schools. Conventionalists regard theories as pigeonholes for classifying facts; history of science is the development of increasingly simple theories, neither true nor false. Conventionalism is useless for reconstructing and weighing conflicts between schools, and overemphasizes science's internal (...) organic growth. For Popper, not for inductivists or conventionalists, the successful criticism of theories is the heart of science. Popper's view admits the existence of valuable errors and enables us to avoid being wise after the event, thereby improving our understanding of the history of science through reconstructions of the actual interplay of theories and facts. (shrink)

I. C. Jarvie interprets Popper's philosophy of science as a theory of the institution of science, explains how the social aspect of his theory developed, and suggests that an updated version of Popper's social theory should be used to study both scientific and nonscientific societies today. Although (1) Jarvie's description of the emergence of Popper's theory suffers because he takes no account Popper's research conducted before Logik der Forschung (1994), (2) his portrayal of Popper's framework overlooks important problems, and (3) (...) his program is by no means new, his essay throws light on the relation between Popper's philosophy of science, his social theory, and his social studies of science. (shrink)

Dr Chaudhury is concerned to defend what is responsible and hopeful in contemporary ecological thinking, but to avoid the trap of denying that any positive contribution can be made by western science and technology. Critical rationalists do not need to agree with her suggestions and recommendations in order to welcome her positioning of environmental issues alongside the traditional human and political debates about freedom. The Indian perspective that informs this book is particularly impressive and interesting. David Miller Professor Mahasweta Chaudhury (...) is Professor for Philosophy at Calcutta University in India. In the late sixties she studied at the London School of Economics under Karl Popper, John Watkins, Alan Musgrave and Imre Lakatos. (shrink)

The paper tries to defend the critical rationalism of Popper and Albert against criticisms brought forward by Janich/Kambartel/Mittelstrass in a series of articles entitled: Wissenschaftstheorie als Wissenschaftskritik, Aspekte 1972 - since published as a book. These authors try to overcome the trilemma of infinite regress, circular reasoning and axiomatic foundation which confronts any attempt to base scientific foundations on reasons: they claim that this trilemma is due to an "extremely limited concept of reasoning" which can be overcome by using the (...) notion of the 'defence' of a statement. Against this it is shown that the proposed solution is based on a mere an inadmissible shifting of the burden of proof in scientific reasoning. (shrink)

It is often claimed that the conclusion of a deductively valid argument is contained in its premises. Popper refuted this claim when he showed that an empirical theory can be expected always to have logical consequences that transcend the current understanding of the theory. This implies that no formalisation of an empirical theory will enable the derivation of all its logical consequences. I call this result ‘Popper-incompleteness.’ This result appears to be consistent with the view of deductive reasoning as a (...) process of unfurling the content of the premises; but I suggest that the result about validity impugns this theory of reasoning. (shrink)

Die Frage der Erhaltung der Parität bei der Wechselwirkung von Elementarteilchen, der Vorschlag ihrer Verletzung, die experimentelle Bestätigung dieses Vorschlags und die daraus sich ergebenden Folgerungen, die zur Formulierung der mathematischen Struktur der schwachen Wechselwirkungen führten, sind die wichtigsten Entwicklungen in der Elementarteilchenphysik während der Periode von 1953 bis 1958. Vorliegender Aufsatz versucht die rationale Rekonstruktion dieser Periode und des Forschungsprogrammes, welches als eines der progressivsten Programme der modernen Physik angesehen wird. Hierzu benutzen wir eine modifizierte Fassung von Poppers tetradischem (...) Schema als auch die Bemerkungen von Lakatos über gewisse Aspekte der Methodologie von Forschungsprogrammen. Es wird unterstrichen, daß die Dynamik der positiven Heuristik derart war, daß die theoretische Forschung fortgeführt werden konnte, trotz experimenteller Resultate, die nur als Gegenbeweise gegen die vorgeschlagene Struktur der schwachen Wechselwirkungen angesehen werden konnten. (shrink)

Popper is commonly considered as an analytical philosopher who focuses on epistemological and methodological aspects of scientific development, disregarding any social, cultural or political consideration. Against this popular image of Popper’s philosophy, I argue in this paper that Popper’s acco..

Popper emphasised both the problem-solving nature of human knowledge, and the need to criticise a scientific theory as strongly as possible. These aims seem to contradict each other, in that the former stresses the problems that motivate scientific theories while the one ignores the character of the problems that led to the formation of the theories against which the criticism is directed. A resolution is proposed in which problems as such are taken as prime in the search for knowledge, and (...) subject to discussion. This approach is then applied to the problem of induction. Popper set great stake to his solution of it, but others doubted its legitimacy, in ways that are clarified by changing the form of the induction problem itself. That change draws upon logic, which is the subject of another application: namely, in contrast to Popper’s adhesion to classical logic as the only welcome form (because of the maximal strength of criticism that it dispenses), can other logics be used without abandoning his philosophy of criticism? (shrink)