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Summary

Knowability is the concept that figures in epistemic theories true---for instance semantic anti-realism claims, necessarily, every truth is knowable in principle.  Michael Dummett argues for the position along the following lines.  Given that meaning is fully manifestable in use and that grasp of meaning involves knowing truth conditions, the fully competent user of the language is in principle able to recognize that a proposition is true when it is.   The most important alleged consequence of the position is that classical logic is not unrestrictedly valid.  For the unrestricted principle of excluded middle together with semantic anti-realism (and some modest auxiliary assumptions) entails strong decidability---i.e., that, unrestrictedly, every proposition or it’s negation is knowable in principle.  And that conclusion is false, not known apriori, and unacceptably immodest. Therefore, exclusively classical principles are false, not known apriori and unacceptably immodest. 

Most recent discussion centers around  Fitch’s paradox of knowability.  The paradox threatens to collapse semantic anti-realism into an implausible idealism----the theory that, necessarily, every truth is (at some time) known.  Since an important selling point of moderate anti-realism is that it distances itself from naïve idealism, the collapse is unwelcome to the anti-realist.  But the paradox is not just a problem for anti-realists, because the result threatens to erase the very logical distinction between semantic anti-realism and naïve idealism. Even those of us who have not been seduced by anti-realism may still want to distinguish it from (and treat it as logically weaker than) idealism.  

Key works

Influential variations on the thesis that truth is an epistemic notion are articulated in Berkeley & Turbayne 1907, Dummett 1975, Kant 1991, Peirce 1940, Putnam 1981, and Tennant 1997, et. al. The connections between anti-realism and a rejection of classical logic are found in Dummett 1975, Wright 1992, Tennant 1997, and Salerno 2000.   The first publication of Fitch's paradox is Fitch 1963.  The result there was conveyed anonymously to Fitch in a pair of referee reports in 1945, which were later published in Church 2009.  An overview of the key points of debate regarding Fitch’s paradox is found in Brogaard & Salerno 2010.  Two volumes of essays, which center around the key points of contention in that debate are Salerno 2008 and Salerno 2010.  The only monograph on the paradox is L. Kvanvig 2006.  The last of chapter of Williamson 2000 also has exerted much influence on recent discussion.

Introductions Brogaard & Salerno 2010 Salerno 2010
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233 found
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  1. Knowability and Singular Thought.Ezra J. Cook - manuscript
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  2. The Paradox of Knowability and Epistemic Theories of Truth.Boris Rähme - manuscript
    The article suggests a reading of the term ‘epistemic account of truth’ which runs contrary to a widespread consensus with regard to what epistemic accounts are meant to provide, namely a definition of truth in epistemic terms. Section 1. introduces a variety of possible epistemic accounts that differ with regard to the strength of the epistemic constraints they impose on truth. Section 2. introduces the paradox of knowability and presents a slightly reconstructed version of a related argument brought forward by (...)
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  3. Modal Epistemology.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - manuscript
    Some central epistemological notions are expressed by sentential operators O that entail the possibility of knowledge in the sense that 'Op' entails 'It is possible to know that p'. We call these modal-epistemological notions. Using apriority and being in a position to know as case studies, we argue that the logics of modal epistemological notions are extremely weak. In particular, their logics are not normal and do not include any closure principles.
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  4. Knowability and the Capacity to Know.Author unknown - manuscript
    (PDF of penultimate draft; please don’t quote from or cite this version.) Forthcoming in Synthese. Generalizations of Fitch’s paradox of knowability motivate the thesis that in saying that a truth is knowable, or that it could be known, we do not mean that it is possible that it is known. Instead, I argue, claims about knowability express capacities to know. The paper concludes by explaining the requisite sense of “capacity” at work here, and by showing how the paradox of knowability (...)
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  5. Knowability Relative to Information.Peter Hawke & Franz Berto - forthcoming - Mind.
    We present a formal semantics for epistemic logic, capturing the notion of knowability relative to information (KRI). Like Dretske, we move from the platitude that what an agent can know depends on her (empirical) information. We treat operators of the form K_AB (‘B is knowable on the basis of information A’) as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a topic- or aboutness- preservation constraint. Variable strictness models the non-monotonicity of knowledge acquisition while allowing knowledge to be intrinsically stable. Aboutness-preservation models (...)
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  6. Anti-Realism and Modal-Epistemic Collapse: Reply to Marton.Jan Heylen - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-12.
    Marton argues that that it follows from the standard antirealist theory of truth, which states that truth and possible knowledge are equivalent, that knowing possibilities is equivalent to the possibility of knowing, whereas these notions should be distinct. Moreover, he argues that the usual strategies of dealing with the Church–Fitch paradox of knowability are either not able to deal with his modal-epistemic collapse result or they only do so at a high price. Against this, I argue that Marton’s paper does (...)
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  7. Counterfactual Knowledge, Factivity, and the Overgeneration of Knowledge.Jan Heylen - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    Antirealists who hold the knowability thesis, namely that all truths are knowable, have been put on the defensive by the Church-Fitch paradox of knowability. Rejecting the non-factivity of the concept of knowability used in that paradox, Edgington has adopted a factive notion of knowability, according to which only actual truths are knowable. She has used this new notion to reformulate the knowability thesis. The result has been argued to be immune against the Church-Fitch paradox, but it has encountered several other (...)
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  8. Epistemic Logic and Epistemology.Wesley H. Holliday - forthcoming - In Sven Ove Hansson Vincent F. Hendricks (ed.), Handbook of Formal Philosophy. Springer.
    This chapter provides a brief introduction to propositional epistemic logic and its applications to epistemology. No previous exposure to epistemic logic is assumed. Epistemic-logical topics discussed include the language and semantics of basic epistemic logic, multi-agent epistemic logic, combined epistemic-doxastic logic, and a glimpse of dynamic epistemic logic. Epistemological topics discussed include Moore-paradoxical phenomena, the surprise exam paradox, logical omniscience and epistemic closure, formalized theories of knowledge, debates about higher-order knowledge, and issues of knowability raised by Fitch’s paradox. The references (...)
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  9. How Common Knowledge Is Possible.Daniel Immerman - forthcoming - Mind:fzaa090.
    The two of us commonly know a proposition just in case we both know it, we both know that we both know it, we both know that we both know that we both know it, and so on. In a recent paper titled ‘Uncommon Knowledge’, Harvey Lederman argues against the possibility of common knowledge. His argument rests on the empirical claim that there are minor individual variations in how we perceive things. This motivates a principle about perception: when two people (...)
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  10. Introduction to Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability: Themes From the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington.Lee Walters - 2021 - In Lee Walters & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability: Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington. Oxford University press.
    Dorothy Edgington’s work has been at the centre of a range of ongoing debates in philosophical logic, philosophy of mind and language, metaphysics, and epistemology. This work has focused, although by no means exclusively, on the overlapping areas of conditionals, probability, and paradox. In what follows, I briefly sketch some themes from these three areas relevant to Dorothy’s work, highlighting how some of Dorothy’s work and some of the contributions of this volume fit in to these debates.
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  11. Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability: Themes From the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington.Lee Walters & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2021 - Oxford University press.
    A festschrift for Dorothy Edgington, containing contributions from Cleo Condoravdi, Dorothy Edgington, Kit Fine, Alan Hájek, John Hawthorne, Sabine Iatridou, Nick Jones, Rosanna Keefe, Angelika Kratzer, David Over, Daniel Rothschild, Robert Stalnaker, Scott Sturgeon, and Timothy Williamson.
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  12. Factive Knowability and the Problem of Possible Omniscience.Jan Heylen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):65-87.
    Famously, the Church–Fitch paradox of knowability is a deductive argument from the thesis that all truths are knowable to the conclusion that all truths are known. In this argument, knowability is analyzed in terms of having the possibility to know. Several philosophers have objected to this analysis, because it turns knowability into a nonfactive notion. In addition, they claim that, if the knowability thesis is reformulated with the help of factive concepts of knowability, then omniscience can be avoided. In this (...)
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  13. Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles.Weng Kin San - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (1):5-29.
    Fitch’s Paradox shows that if every truth is knowable, then every truth is known. Standard diagnoses identify the factivity/negative infallibility of the knowledge operator and Moorean contradictions as the root source of the result. This paper generalises Fitch’s result to show that such diagnoses are mistaken. In place of factivity/negative infallibility, the weaker assumption of any ‘level-bridging principle’ suffices. A consequence is that the result holds for some logics in which the “Moorean contradiction” commonly thought to underlie the result is (...)
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  14. Noson Yanofsky 403p (2013) द्वारा 'कारण की बाहरी सीमा' की समीक्षा Review of 'The Outer Limits of Reason' by Noson Yanofsky (संशोधित 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In पृथ्वी पर नर्क में आपका स्वागत है: शिशुओं, जलवायु परिवर्तन, बिटकॉइन, कार्टेल, चीन, लोकतंत्र, विविधता, समानता, हैकर्स, मानव अधिकार, इस्लाम, उदारवाद, समृद्धि, वेब, अराजकता, भुखमरी, बीमारी, हिंसा, कृत्रिम बुद्धिमत्ता, युद्ध. Las Vegas, NV, USA: Reality Press. pp. 221-238.
    मैं Wittgenstein और विकासवादी मनोविज्ञान के एक एकीकृत परिप्रेक्ष्य से Noson Yanofsky द्वारा 'कारण की बाहरी सीमा' की एक विस्तृत समीक्षा दे. मैं संकेत मिलता है कि भाषा और गणित में विरोधाभास के रूप में इस तरह के मुद्दों के साथ कठिनाई, अपूर्णता, अनिर्णयीयता, computability, मस्तिष्क और कंप्यूटर आदि के रूप में ब्रह्मांड, सभी विफलता से उठता है उचित में भाषा के हमारे उपयोग को ध्यान से देखने के लिए संदर्भ और इसलिए कैसे भाषा काम करता है के मुद्दों से (...)
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  15. Wolpert, Chaitin e Wittgenstein sull'impossibilità, l'incompletezza, il paradosso bugiardo, il teismo, i limiti del calcolo, un principio di incertezza meccanica non quantistica e l'universo come computer, il teorema finale della Teoria della Macchina di Turing (rivisto 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In Benvenuti all'inferno sulla Terra: Bambini, Cambiamenti climatici, Bitcoin, Cartelli, Cina, Democrazia, Diversità, Disgenetica, Uguaglianza, Pirati Informatici, Diritti umani, Islam, Liberalismo, Prosperità, Web, Caos, Fame, Malattia, Violenza, Intellige. Las Vegas, NV, USA: Reality Press. pp. 177-181.
    Ho letto molte recenti discussioni sui limiti del calcolo e dell'universo come computer, sperando di trovare alcuni commenti sull'incredibile lavoro del fisico polimatematico e del teorista delle decisioni David Wolpert, ma non ho trovato una sola citazione e quindi presento questo brevissimo riassunto. Wolpert si dimostrò una straordinaria impossibilità o incompletezza teoremi (1992-2008-see arxiv dot org) sui limiti dell'inferenza (calcolo) che sono così generali che sono indipendenti dal dispositivo che fa il calcolo, e anche indipendenti dalle leggi della fisica, in (...)
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  16. The Mind as a Sponge, its Cognitive Artifacts, and Being in the 21st Century.Ho Manh Tung - 2020 - OSF Preprints 2020 (10).
    In this essay, I discuss the analogy of the mind as a sponge, the issues of cognitive artifacts, and being a mind in the 21st century.
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  17. Is ‘Knowing That P’ Identical with ‘Knowing That “P” Is True’?Changsheng Lai - 2019 - Philosophia:1-18.
    It is epistemological orthodoxy that the object of propositional knowledge is the truth of propositions. This traditional view is based on what I call the ‘KT-schema’, viz, ‘S knows that p, iff, S knows that “p” is true’. The purpose of this paper is to reject the KT-schema. By showing the paradoxical upshot of the KT-schema and providing counterexamples to the KT-schema, this paper argues that ‘knowing that p’ is more than ‘knowing that “p” is true’. Consequently, we shall rethink (...)
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  18. Disappearing Diamonds: Fitch-Like Results in Bimodal Logic.Weng Kin San - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (6):1003-1016.
    Augment the propositional language with two modal operators: □ and ■. Define ⧫ to be the dual of ■, i.e. ⧫=¬■¬. Whenever (X) is of the form φ → ψ, let (X⧫) be φ→⧫ψ . (X⧫) can be thought of as the modally qualified counterpart of (X)—for instance, under the metaphysical interpretation of ⧫, where (X) says φ implies ψ, (X⧫) says φ implies possibly ψ. This paper shows that for various interesting instances of (X), fairly weak assumptions suffice for (...)
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  19. Counterfactual Knowability Revisited.Julian J. Schlöder - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-15.
    Anti-realism is plagued by Fitch’s paradox: the remarkable result that if one accepts that all truths are knowable, minimal assumptions about the nature of knowledge entail that every truth is known. Dorothy Edgington suggests to address this problem by understanding p is knowable to be a counterfactual claim, but her proposal must contend with a forceful objection by Timothy Williamson. I revisit Edgington’s basic idea and find that Williamson’s objection is obviated by a refined understanding of counterfactual knowability that is (...)
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  20. Soul Space.Tine Wilde - 2019 - Amsterdam, NL: Wopublications.
    SOUL SPACE is a poetic photo book about the ways in which God is manifest as a hidden travel advisor. Challenging the existing religious communities, Soul Space announces the birth of the eMigrant - an electronic Deity that will alter our world in an unprecedented manner. -/- Soul Space combines philosophy and photography in an inquiry into religious experience. The book covers the first part of a trilogy aiming to study and elaborate three different perspectives on the nature of God. (...)
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  21. Factivity, Consistency and Knowability.James Chase & Penelope Rush - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):899-918.
    One diagnosis of Fitch’s paradox of knowability is that it hinges on the factivity of knowledge: that which is known is true. Yet the apparent role of factivity and non-factive analogues in related paradoxes of justified belief can be shown to depend on familiar consistency and positive introspection principles. Rejecting arguments that the paradox hangs on an implausible consistency principle, this paper argues instead that the Fitch phenomenon is generated both in epistemic logic and logics of justification by the interaction (...)
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  22. Knowledge, Time, and Paradox: Introducing Sequential Epistemic Logic.Wesley Holliday - 2018 - In Hans van Ditmarsch & Gabriel Sandu (eds.), Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game Theoretical Semantics. Springer. pp. 363-394.
    Epistemic logic in the tradition of Hintikka provides, as one of its many applications, a toolkit for the precise analysis of certain epistemological problems. In recent years, dynamic epistemic logic has expanded this toolkit. Dynamic epistemic logic has been used in analyses of well-known epistemic “paradoxes”, such as the Paradox of the Surprise Examination and Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability, and related epistemic phenomena, such as what Hintikka called the “anti-performatory effect” of Moorean announcements. In this paper, we explore a variation (...)
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  23. Knowledge, Time, and Paradox: Introducing Sequential Epistemic Logic.Wesley Holliday - 2018 - In Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game-Theoretical Semantics. Springer Verlag.
    Epistemic logic in the tradition of Hintikka provides, as one of its many applications, a toolkit for the precise analysis of certain epistemological problems. In recent years, dynamic epistemic logic has expanded this toolkit. Dynamic epistemic logic has been used in analyses of well-known epistemic “paradoxes”, such as the Paradox of the Surprise Examination and Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability, and related epistemic phenomena, such as what Hintikka called the “anti-performatory effect” of Moorean announcements. In this paper, we explore a variation (...)
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  24. The Typing Approach to Church-Fitch's Knowability Paradox and its Revenge Form.Jiri Raclavsky - 2018 - Prolegomena 17 (1):31-49.
    Williamson, Linsky, Paseau and others proposed a solution to Church- Fitch's knowability paradox that is based on typing knowledge; however, it received some criticism. Carrara and Fassio objected that the approach has no paradox-independent motivation, it is thus ad hoc. In the first part of the paper, I dismiss such criticism by carefully stating typing approach principles that are based on non-circular formation of propositions and intensional operators operating on them. In the second part of the paper, I demonstrate that (...)
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  25. Hope, Knowledge, and Blindspots.Jordan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2):531-543.
    Roy Sorensen introduced the concept of an epistemic blindspot in the 1980s. A proposition is an epistemic blindspot for some individual at some time if and only if that proposition is consistent but unknowable by that individual at that time. In the first half of this paper, I extend Sorensen work on blindspots by arguing that there exist blindspots that essentially involve hopes. In the second half, I show how such blindspots can contribute to and impair different pursuits of self-understanding. (...)
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  26. Russellian Typing Knowledge and Fitch's Paradox of Knowability.Jiri Raclavsky - 2017 - In Jean-Yves Beziau, Alexandre Costa-Leite & Itala M. Loffredo D’Ottaviano (eds.), Aftermath of the Logical Paradise. Campinas, São Paulo, Brazílie: pp. 401-423.
    It is already known that Fitch's paradox of knowability can be solved by typing knowledge. I differentiate two kinds of such typing, Tarskian and Russellian, and focus on the latter which is framed within the ramified theory of types. My main aim is to other a defence of the approach against recently raised criticism. The key justification is provided by the Vicious Circle Principle which governs the very formation of propositions and thus also intensional operators, including the operator of knowledge.
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  27. What Do Paraconsistent, Undecidable, Random, Computable and Incomplete Mean? A Review of Godel's Way: Exploits Into an Undecidable World by Gregory Chaitin, Francisco A Doria , Newton C.A. Da Costa 160p (2012).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 3rd Ed 686p(2017).
    In ‘Godel’s Way’ three eminent scientists discuss issues such as undecidability, incompleteness, randomness, computability and paraconsistency. I approach these issues from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint that there are two basic issues which have completely different solutions. There are the scientific or empirical issues, which are facts about the world that need to be investigated observationally and philosophical issues as to how language can be used intelligibly (which include certain questions in mathematics and logic), which need to be decided by looking at (...)
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  28. On a New Tentative Solution to Fitch’s Paradox.Alessandro Giordani - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):597-611.
    In a recent paper, Alexander argues that relaxing the requirement that sound knowers know their own soundness might provide a solution to Fitch’s paradox and introduces a suitable axiomatic system where the paradox is avoided. In this paper an analysis of this solution is proposed according to which the effective move for solving the paradox depends on the axiomatic treatment of the ontic modality rather than the limitations imposed on the epistemic one. It is then shown that, once the ontic (...)
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  29. Questions, Topics and Restricted Closure.Peter Hawke - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2759-2784.
    Single-premise epistemic closure is the principle that: if one is in an evidential position to know that P where P entails Q, then one is in an evidential position to know that Q. In this paper, I defend the viability of opposition to closure. A key task for such an opponent is to precisely formulate a restricted closure principle that remains true to the motivations for abandoning unrestricted closure but does not endorse particularly egregious instances of closure violation. I focus (...)
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  30. A Proof‐Theoretic Account of the Miners Paradox.Ansten Klev - 2016 - Theoria 82 (4):351-369.
    By maintaining that a conditional sentence can be taken to express the validity of a rule of inference, we offer a solution to the Miners Paradox that leaves both modus ponens and disjunction elimination intact. The solution draws on Sundholm's recently proposed account of Fitch's Paradox.
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  31. The Fitch-Church Paradox and First Order Modal Logic.Carlo Proietti - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (1):87-104.
    Reformulation strategies for solving Fitch’s paradox of knowability date back to Edgington. Their core assumption is that the formula \, from which the paradox originates, does not correctly express the intended meaning of the verification thesis, which should concern possible knowledge of actual truths, and therefore the contradiction does not represent a logical refutation of verificationism. Supporters of these solutions claim that can be reformulated in a way that blocks the derivation of the paradox. Unfortunately, these reformulation proposals come with (...)
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  32. Science Generates Limit Paradoxes.Eric Dietrich & Chris Fields - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (4):409-432.
    The sciences occasionally generate discoveries that undermine their own assumptions. Two such discoveries are characterized here: the discovery of apophenia by cognitive psychology and the discovery that physical systems cannot be locally bounded within quantum theory. It is shown that such discoveries have a common structure and that this common structure is an instance of Priest’s well-known Inclosure Schema. This demonstrates that science itself is dialetheic: it generates limit paradoxes. How science proceeds despite this fact is briefly discussed, as is (...)
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  33. Fitch’s Paradox and the Existence of an Omniscient Being.Jason Megill - 2015 - In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), God, Truth, and Other Enigmas. De Gruyter. pp. 77-88.
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  34. The Semantics of Empirical Unverifiability.Igor Sedlár - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (3):358-377.
    Pavel Cmorej has argued that the existence of unverifiable and unfalsifiable empirical propositions follows from certain plausible assumptions concerning the notions of possibility and verification. Cmorej proves, it the context of a bi-modal alethic-epistemic axiom system AM4, that (1) p and it is not verified that p is unverifiable; (2) p or it is falsified that p is unfalsifiable; (3) every unverifiable p is logically equivalent to p and it is not verifiable that p; (4) every unverifiable p entails that (...)
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  35. Kant, the Paradox of Knowability, and the Meaning of ‘Experience’.Andrew Stephenson - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    It is often claimed that anti-realism is a form of transcendental idealism or that Kant is an anti-realist. It is also often claimed that anti-realists are committed to some form of knowability principle and that such principles have problematic consequences. It is therefore natural to ask whether Kant is so committed, and if he is, whether this leads him into difficulties. I argue that a standard reading of Kant does indeed have him committed to the claim that all empirical truths (...)
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  36. Truth, Demonstration and Knowledge. A Classical Solution to the Paradox of Knowability.Elia Zardini - 2015 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 30 (3):365-392.
    After introducing semantic anti-realism and the paradox of knowability, the paper offers a reconstruction of the anti-realist argument from the theory of understanding. The proposed reconstruction validates an unrestricted principle to the effect that truth requires the existence of a certain kind of “demonstration”. The paper shows that the principle fails to imply the problematic instances of the original unrestricted knowability principle but that the overall view still has unrestricted epistemic consequences. Appealing precisely to the paradox of knowability, the paper (...)
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  37. The Knowability Paradox in the Light of a Logic for Pragmatics.Massimiliano Carrara & Daniele Chiffi - 2014 - In R. Ciuni, H. Wansing & C. Willkommen (eds.), Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic (Proceedings of Trends in Logic XI). Berlin: Springer. pp. 47-58.
    The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument showing that if all truths are knowable in principle, then all truths are, in fact, known. Many strategies have been suggested in order to avoid the paradoxical conclusion. A family of solutions –ncalled logical revision – has been proposed to solve the paradox, revising the logic underneath, with an intuitionistic revision included. In this paper, we focus on so-called revisionary solutions to the paradox – solutions that put the blame on the underlying logic. (...)
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  38. Two Reformulations of the Verificationist Thesis in Epistemic Temporal Logic That Avoid Fitch’s Paradox.Alexandru Dragomir - 2014 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (1):44-62.
    1) We will begin by offering a short introduction to Epistemic Logic and presenting Fitch’s paradox in an epistemic‑modal logic. (2) Then, we will proceed to presenting three Epistemic Temporal logical frameworks creat‑ ed by Hoshi (2009) : TPAL (Temporal Public Announcement Logic), TAPAL (Temporal Arbitrary Public Announcement Logic) and TPAL+P ! (Temporal Public Announcement Logic with Labeled Past Operators). We will show how Hoshi stated the Verificationist Thesis in the language of TAPAL and analyze his argument on why this (...)
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  39. Erratum To: Knowability as Potential Knowledge.André Fuhrmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1649-1649.
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  40. Knowability as Potential Knowledge.André Fuhrmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1627-1648.
    The thesis that every truth is knowable is usually glossed by decomposing knowability into possibility and knowledge. Under elementary assumptions about possibility and knowledge, considered as modal operators, the thesis collapses the distinction between truth and knowledge (as shown by the so-called Fitch-argument). We show that there is a more plausible interpretation of knowability—one that does not decompose the notion in the usual way—to which the Fitch-argument does not apply. We call this the potential knowledge-interpretation of knowability. We compare our (...)
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  41. On the Factivity of Implicit Intersubjective Knowledge.Alessandro Giordani - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1909-1923.
    The concept of knowledge can be modelled in epistemic modal logic and, if modelled by using a standard modal operator, it is subject to the problem of logical omniscience. The classical solution to this problem is to distinguish between implicit and explicit knowledge and to construe the knowledge operator as capturing the concept of implicit knowledge. In addition, since a proposition is said to be implicitly known just in case it is derivable from the set of propositions that are explicitly (...)
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  42. Antirealism and Truths Never Known.Michael Hand - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (3):113-134.
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  43. Chalmers' Blueprint of the World.Panu Raatikainen - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (1):113-128.
    A critical notice of David J. Chalmers, Constructing the World (Oxford University Press,2012).
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  44. The Knowability Argument and the Syntactic Type-Theoretic Approach.Lucas Rosenblatt - 2014 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 29 (2):201-221.
    Some attempts have been made to block the Knowability Paradox and other modal paradoxes by adopting a type-theoretic framework in which knowledge and necessity are regarded as typed predicates. The main problem with this approach is that when these notions are simultaneously treated as predicates, a new kind of paradox appears. I claim that avoiding this paradox either by weakening the Knowability Principle or by introducing types for both predicates is rather messy and unattractive. I also consider the prospect of (...)
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  45. Time and Knowability in Evolutionary Processes.Elliott Sober and Mike Steel - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):558-579,.
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  46. An Axiomatic Version of Fitch’s Paradox.Samuel Alexander - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2015-2020.
    A variation of Fitch’s paradox is given, where no special rules of inference are assumed, only axioms. These axioms follow from the familiar assumptions which involve rules of inference. We show (by constructing a model) that by allowing that possibly the knower doesn’t know his own soundness (while still requiring he be sound), Fitch’s paradox is avoided. Provided one is willing to admit that sound knowers may be ignorant of their own soundness, this might offer a way out of the (...)
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  47. Discovering Knowability: A Semantic Analysis.Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3349-3376.
    In this paper, we provide a semantic analysis of the well-known knowability paradox stemming from the Church–Fitch observation that the meaningful knowability principle /all truths are knowable/, when expressed as a bi-modal principle F --> K♢F, yields an unacceptable omniscience property /all truths are known/. We offer an alternative semantic proof of this fact independent of the Church–Fitch argument. This shows that the knowability paradox is not intrinsically related to the Church–Fitch proof, nor to the Moore sentence upon which it (...)
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  48. Some Remarks on Restricting the Knowability Principle.Martin Fischer - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):63-88.
    The Fitch paradox poses a serious challenge for anti-realism. This paper investigates the option for an anti-realist to answer the challenge by restricting the knowability principle. Based on a critical discussion of Dummett's and Tennant's suggestions for a restriction desiderata for a principled solution are developed. In the second part of the paper a different restriction is proposed. The proposal uses the notion of uniform formulas and diagnoses the problem arising in the case of Moore sentences in the different status (...)
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  49. Intuitionistic Semantics for Fitch's Paradox.Doukas Kapantaïs - 2013 - In Vassilios Karakostas & Dennis Dieks (eds.), Epsa11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 29--39.
    I argue that if one applies the standard intuitionistic criterion for truth to Kp in (p) (p&Kp), one avoids Fitch’s paradox, but with disastrous consequences having to do with the expressive resources of one’s semantics. On the other hand, if one conceives of Kp as a function recording what happens in the actual world, one gets a double benefit. First, the semantics become tolerably expressive. Second, and because of the same move, the paradox can be blocked. (The solution I provide (...)
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  50. Fitchův paradox poznatelnosti a rozvětvená teorie typů [Fitch's Paradox of Knowability and Ramified Theory of Types].Jiri Raclavsky - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20:144-165.
    It is already known that Fitch’s knowability paradox can be solved by typing knowledge within ramified theory of types. One of the aims of this paper is to provide a greater defence of the approach against recently raised criticism. My second goal is to make a sufficient support for an assumption which is needed for this particular application of typing knowledge but which is not inherent to ramified theory of types as such.
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