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Summary

Knowability is the concept that figures in epistemic theories true---for instance semantic anti-realism claims, necessarily, every truth is knowable in principle.  Michael Dummett argues for the position along the following lines.  Given that meaning is fully manifestable in use and that grasp of meaning involves knowing truth conditions, the fully competent user of the language is in principle able to recognize that a proposition is true when it is.   The most important alleged consequence of the position is that classical logic is not unrestrictedly valid.  For the unrestricted principle of excluded middle together with semantic anti-realism (and some modest auxiliary assumptions) entails strong decidability---i.e., that, unrestrictedly, every proposition or it’s negation is knowable in principle.  And that conclusion is false, not known apriori, and unacceptably immodest. Therefore, exclusively classical principles are false, not known apriori and unacceptably immodest. 

Most recent discussion centers around  Fitch’s paradox of knowability.  The paradox threatens to collapse semantic anti-realism into an implausible idealism----the theory that, necessarily, every truth is (at some time) known.  Since an important selling point of moderate anti-realism is that it distances itself from naïve idealism, the collapse is unwelcome to the anti-realist.  But the paradox is not just a problem for anti-realists, because the result threatens to erase the very logical distinction between semantic anti-realism and naïve idealism. Even those of us who have not been seduced by anti-realism may still want to distinguish it from (and treat it as logically weaker than) idealism.  

Key works

Influential variations on the thesis that truth is an epistemic notion are articulated in Berkeley & Turbayne 1907, Dummett 1975, Kant 1991, Peirce 1940, Putnam 1981, and Tennant 1997, et. al. The connections between anti-realism and a rejection of classical logic are found in Dummett 1975, Wright 1992, Tennant 1997, and Salerno 2000.   The first publication of Fitch's paradox is Fitch 1963.  The result there was conveyed anonymously to Fitch in a pair of referee reports in 1945, which were later published in Church 2009.  An overview of the key points of debate regarding Fitch’s paradox is found in Brogaard & Salerno 2010.  Two volumes of essays, which center around the key points of contention in that debate are Salerno 2008 and Salerno 2010.  The only monograph on the paradox is L. Kvanvig 2006.  The last of chapter of Williamson 2000 also has exerted much influence on recent discussion.

Introductions Brogaard & Salerno 2010 Salerno 2010
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224 found
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1 — 50 / 224
  1. added 2020-05-23
    Wahrheit Und Wissbarkeit. Eine Auflösung der„Paradoxie der Wissbarkeit“.Thorsten Sander - 2008 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 62 (1):73-96.
    Die Arbeit ist ein Versuch, die Paradoxie der Wißbarkeit aufzulösen, indem gezeigt wird, daß zumindest Anti-Realisten, die zum logischen Revisionismus tendieren, die scheinbar absurde Konklusion ... akzeptieren sollten. Dazu wird zunächst in Abschnitt 1 gezeigt, daß die prima facie unproblematische These ... insofern sonderbar ist, als alle möglichen Instanzen normale oder performative Widersprüche darstellen. Auf dieser Grundlage wird in Abschnitt 3 ein retorsives Argument für das Prinzip ... entwickelt. Um den Einwand zu entkräften, daß im Zweifelsfall nicht die These ... (...)
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  2. added 2020-03-10
    Knowledge, Time, and Paradox: Introducing Sequential Epistemic Logic.Wesley Holliday - 2018 - In Hans van Ditmarsch & Gabriel Sandu (eds.), Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game Theoretical Semantics. Springer.
    Epistemic logic in the tradition of Hintikka provides, as one of its many applications, a toolkit for the precise analysis of certain epistemological problems. In recent years, dynamic epistemic logic has expanded this toolkit. Dynamic epistemic logic has been used in analyses of well-known epistemic “paradoxes”, such as the Paradox of the Surprise Examination and Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability, and related epistemic phenomena, such as what Hintikka called the “anti-performatory effect” of Moorean announcements. In this paper, we explore a variation (...)
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  3. added 2020-02-23
    Knowability and the Capacity to Know.Author unknown - manuscript
    (PDF of penultimate draft; please don’t quote from or cite this version.) Forthcoming in Synthese. Generalizations of Fitch’s paradox of knowability motivate the thesis that in saying that a truth is knowable, or that it could be known, we do not mean that it is possible that it is known. Instead, I argue, claims about knowability express capacities to know. The paper concludes by explaining the requisite sense of “capacity” at work here, and by showing how the paradox of knowability (...)
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  4. added 2020-01-31
    Two Reformulations of the Verificationist Thesis in Epistemic Temporal Logic That Avoid Fitch’s Paradox.Alexandru Dragomir - 2014 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (1):44-62.
    1) We will begin by offering a short introduction to Epistemic Logic and presenting Fitch’s paradox in an epistemic‑modal logic. (2) Then, we will proceed to presenting three Epistemic Temporal logical frameworks creat‑ ed by Hoshi (2009) : TPAL (Temporal Public Announcement Logic), TAPAL (Temporal Arbitrary Public Announcement Logic) and TPAL+P ! (Temporal Public Announcement Logic with Labeled Past Operators). We will show how Hoshi stated the Verificationist Thesis in the language of TAPAL and analyze his argument on why this (...)
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  5. added 2019-12-28
    Soul Space.Tine Wilde - 2019 - Amsterdam, NL: Wopublications.
    SOUL SPACE is a poetic photo book about the ways in which God is manifest as a hidden travel advisor. Challenging the existing religious communities, Soul Space announces the birth of the eMigrant - an electronic Deity that will alter our world in an unprecedented manner. -/- Soul Space combines philosophy and photography in an inquiry into religious experience. The book covers the first part of a trilogy aiming to study and elaborate three different perspectives on the nature of God. (...)
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  6. added 2019-11-20
    Questions, Topics and Restricted Closure.Peter Hawke - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2759-2784.
    Single-premise epistemic closure is the principle that: if one is in an evidential position to know that P where P entails Q, then one is in an evidential position to know that Q. In this paper, I defend the viability of opposition to closure. A key task for such an opponent is to precisely formulate a restricted closure principle that remains true to the motivations for abandoning unrestricted closure but does not endorse particularly egregious instances of closure violation. I focus (...)
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  7. added 2019-10-25
    Is ‘Knowing That P’ Identical with ‘Knowing That “P” Is True’?Changsheng Lai - 2019 - Philosophia:1-18.
    It is epistemological orthodoxy that the object of propositional knowledge is the truth of propositions. This traditional view is based on what I call the ‘KT-schema’, viz, ‘S knows that p, iff, S knows that “p” is true’. The purpose of this paper is to reject the KT-schema. By showing the paradoxical upshot of the KT-schema and providing counterexamples to the KT-schema, this paper argues that ‘knowing that p’ is more than ‘knowing that “p” is true’. Consequently, we shall rethink (...)
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  8. added 2019-09-20
    Fitch and Intuitionistic Knowability.Philip Percival - 1990 - Analysis 50 (3):182.
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  9. added 2019-09-13
    The Typing Approach to Church-Fitch's Knowability Paradox and its Revenge Form.Jiri Raclavsky - 2018 - Prolegomena 17 (1):31-49.
    Williamson, Linsky, Paseau and others proposed a solution to Church- Fitch's knowability paradox that is based on typing knowledge; however, it received some criticism. Carrara and Fassio objected that the approach has no paradox-independent motivation, it is thus ad hoc. In the first part of the paper, I dismiss such criticism by carefully stating typing approach principles that are based on non-circular formation of propositions and intensional operators operating on them. In the second part of the paper, I demonstrate that (...)
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  10. added 2019-09-13
    Russellian Typing Knowledge and Fitch's Paradox of Knowability.Jiri Raclavsky - 2017 - In Jean-Yves Beziau, Alexandre Costa-Leite & Itala M. Loffredo D’Ottaviano (eds.), Aftermath of the Logical Paradise. Campinas, São Paulo, Brazílie: pp. 401-423.
    It is already known that Fitch's paradox of knowability can be solved by typing knowledge. I differentiate two kinds of such typing, Tarskian and Russellian, and focus on the latter which is framed within the ramified theory of types. My main aim is to other a defence of the approach against recently raised criticism. The key justification is provided by the Vicious Circle Principle which governs the very formation of propositions and thus also intensional operators, including the operator of knowledge.
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  11. added 2019-08-31
    Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles.Weng Kin San - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (1):5-29.
    Fitch’s Paradox shows that if every truth is knowable, then every truth is known. Standard diagnoses identify the factivity/negative infallibility of the knowledge operator and Moorean contradictions as the root source of the result. This paper generalises Fitch’s result to show that such diagnoses are mistaken. In place of factivity/negative infallibility, the weaker assumption of any ‘level-bridging principle’ suffices. A consequence is that the result holds for some logics in which the “Moorean contradiction” commonly thought to underlie the result is (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-06
    Fitch's factives.J. J. MacIntosh - 1984 - Analysis 44 (4):153.
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  13. added 2019-06-05
    On the Factivity of Implicit Intersubjective Knowledge.Alessandro Giordani - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1909-1923.
    The concept of knowledge can be modelled in epistemic modal logic and, if modelled by using a standard modal operator, it is subject to the problem of logical omniscience. The classical solution to this problem is to distinguish between implicit and explicit knowledge and to construe the knowledge operator as capturing the concept of implicit knowledge. In addition, since a proposition is said to be implicitly known just in case it is derivable from the set of propositions that are explicitly (...)
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  14. added 2019-06-05
    The Knowability Argument and the Syntactic Type-Theoretic Approach.Lucas Rosenblatt - 2014 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 29 (2):201-221.
    Some attempts have been made to block the Knowability Paradox and other modal paradoxes by adopting a type-theoretic framework in which knowledge and necessity are regarded as typed predicates. The main problem with this approach is that when these notions are simultaneously treated as predicates, a new kind of paradox appears. I claim that avoiding this paradox either by weakening the Knowability Principle or by introducing types for both predicates is rather messy and unattractive. I also consider the prospect of (...)
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  15. added 2019-05-13
    Modal Epistemology.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - manuscript
    Some central epistemological notions are expressed by sentential operators O that entail the possibility of knowledge in the sense that 'Op' entails 'It is possible to know that p'. We call these modal-epistemological notions. Using apriority and being in a position to know as case studies, we argue that the logics of modal epistemological notions are extremely weak. In particular, their logics are not normal and do not include any closure principles.
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  16. added 2019-03-09
    Three Epistemic Paralogisms, One Logic of Utterances.Fabien Schang - 2010 - In P.-E. Bour & M. Rebuschi & L. Rollet (ed.), Construction. Festschrift for Gerhard Heinzmann. pp. 407-416.
    Assuming that a paralogism is an unintentionally invalid reasoning, we give an exampli.
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  17. added 2019-03-09
    Philosophie des modalités épistémiques (la logique assertorique revisitée).Fabien Schang - 2007 - Dissertation, Nancy Université
    The relevance of any logical analysis lies in its ability to solve paradoxes and trace conceptual troubles back; with this respect, the task of epistemic logic is to handle paradoxes in connection with the concept of knowledge. Epistemic logic is currently introduced as the logical analysis of crucial concepts within epistemology, namely: knowledge, belief, truth, and justification. An alternative approach will be advanced here in order to enlighten such a discourse, as centred upon the word assertion and displayed in terms (...)
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  18. added 2019-02-09
    Disappearing Diamonds: Fitch-Like Results in Bimodal Logic.Weng San - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (6):1003-1016.
    Augment the propositional language with two modal operators: □ and ■. Define ⧫ to be the dual of ■, i.e. ⧫=¬■¬. Whenever (X) is of the form φ → ψ, let (X⧫) be φ→⧫ψ . (X⧫) can be thought of as the modally qualified counterpart of (X)—for instance, under the metaphysical interpretation of ⧫, where (X) says φ implies ψ, (X⧫) says φ implies possibly ψ. This paper shows that for various interesting instances of (X), fairly weak assumptions suffice for (...)
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  19. added 2019-01-17
    Counterfactual Knowability Revisited.Julian J. Schlöder - 2019 - Synthese:1-15.
    Anti-realism is plagued by Fitch’s paradox: the remarkable result that if one accepts that all truths are knowable, minimal assumptions about the nature of knowledge entail that every truth is known. Dorothy Edgington suggests to address this problem by understanding p is knowable to be a counterfactual claim, but her proposal must contend with a forceful objection by Timothy Williamson. I revisit Edgington’s basic idea and find that Williamson’s objection is obviated by a refined understanding of counterfactual knowability that is (...)
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  20. added 2018-11-26
    Factive Knowability and the Problem of Possible Omniscience.Jan Heylen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):65-87.
    Famously, the Church–Fitch paradox of knowability is a deductive argument from the thesis that all truths are knowable to the conclusion that all truths are known. In this argument, knowability is analyzed in terms of having the possibility to know. Several philosophers have objected to this analysis, because it turns knowability into a nonfactive notion. In addition, they claim that, if the knowability thesis is reformulated with the help of factive concepts of knowability, then omniscience can be avoided. In this (...)
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  21. added 2018-09-06
    Science Generates Limit Paradoxes.Eric Dietrich & Chris Fields - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (4):409-432.
    The sciences occasionally generate discoveries that undermine their own assumptions. Two such discoveries are characterized here: the discovery of apophenia by cognitive psychology and the discovery that physical systems cannot be locally bounded within quantum theory. It is shown that such discoveries have a common structure and that this common structure is an instance of Priest’s well-known Inclosure Schema. This demonstrates that science itself is dialetheic: it generates limit paradoxes. How science proceeds despite this fact is briefly discussed, as is (...)
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  22. added 2018-08-19
    Knowability Relative to Information.Peter Hawke & Franz Berto - forthcoming - Mind.
    We present a formal semantics for epistemic logic, capturing the notion of knowability relative to information (KRI). Like Dretske, we move from the platitude that what an agent can know depends on her (empirical) information. We treat operators of the form K_AB (‘B is knowable on the basis of information A’) as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a topic- or aboutness- preservation constraint. Variable strictness models the non-monotonicity of knowledge acquisition while allowing knowledge to be intrinsically stable. Aboutness-preservation models (...)
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  23. added 2018-02-17
    Williamson’s Woes.Neil Tennant - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):9-23.
    This is a reply to Timothy Williamson ’s paper ‘Tennant’s Troubles’. It defends against Williamson ’s objections the anti-realist’s knowability principle based on the author’s ‘local’ restriction strategy involving Cartesian propositions, set out in The Taming of the True. Williamson ’s purported Fitchian reductio, involving the unknown number of books on his table, is analyzed in detail and shown to be fallacious. Williamson ’s attempt to cause problems for the anti-realist by means of a supposed rigid designator generates a contradiction (...)
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  24. added 2018-02-17
    Distributed Knowability and Fitch’s Paradox.Rafał Palczewski - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (3):455-478.
    Recently predominant forms of anti-realism claim that all truths are knowable. We argue that in a logical explanation of the notion of knowability more attention should be paid to its epistemic part. Especially very useful in such explanation are notions of group knowledge. In this paper we examine mainly the notion of distributed knowability and show its effectiveness in the case of Fitch's paradox. Proposed approach raised some philosophical questions to which we try to find responses. We also show how (...)
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  25. added 2018-02-17
    Fitch’s Paradox and Probabilistic Antirealism.Igor Douven - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):149-182.
    Fitch's paradox shows, from fairly innocent-looking assumptions, that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable truths. This is generally thought to deliver a blow to antirealist positions that imply that all truths are knowable. The present paper argues that a probabilistic version of antirealism escapes Fitch's result while still offering all that antirealists should care for.
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  26. added 2017-10-14
    What Do Paraconsistent, Undecidable, Random, Computable and Incomplete Mean? A Review of Godel's Way: Exploits Into an Undecidable World by Gregory Chaitin, Francisco A Doria , Newton C.A. Da Costa 160p (2012).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 3rd Ed 686p(2017).
    In ‘Godel’s Way’ three eminent scientists discuss issues such as undecidability, incompleteness, randomness, computability and paraconsistency. I approach these issues from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint that there are two basic issues which have completely different solutions. There are the scientific or empirical issues, which are facts about the world that need to be investigated observationally and philosophical issues as to how language can be used intelligibly (which include certain questions in mathematics and logic), which need to be decided by looking at (...)
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  27. added 2017-09-03
    Fitch's Paradox and the Problem of Shared Content.Thorsten Sander - 2006 - Abstracta 3 (1):74-86.
    According to the “paradox of knowability”, the moderate thesis that all truths are knowable – ... – implies the seemingly preposterous claim that all truths are actually known – ... –, i.e. that we are omniscient. If Fitch’s argument were successful, it would amount to a knockdown rebuttal of anti-realism by reductio. In the paper I defend the nowadays rather neglected strategy of intuitionistic revisionism. Employing only intuitionistically acceptable rules of inference, the conclusion of the argument is, firstly, not ..., (...)
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  28. added 2017-02-14
    Formal Problems About Knowledge.Roy Sorensen - 2002 - In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 539.
    In ”Formal Problems about Knowledge,” Roy Sorensen examines epistemological issues that have logical aspects. He uses Fitch's proof for unknowables and the surprise test paradox to illustrate the hopes of the modal logicians who developed epistemic logic, and he considers the epistemology of proof with the help of the knower paradox. One solution to this paradox is that knowledge is not closed under deduction. Sorensen reviews the broader history of this maneuver along with the relevant alternatives model of knowledge which (...)
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  29. added 2017-02-08
    Remarks On the Unknowable.Harvey M. Friedman - unknown
    The kind of unknowability I will discuss concerns the count of certain natural finite sets of objects. Even the situation with regard to our present strong formal systems is rather unclear. One can just profitably focus on that, putting aside issues of general unknowability.
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  30. added 2017-02-08
    ``Unknowable Truths and Omniscience: A Reply to Kvanvig&Quot.Charles Taliaferro - 1993 - Journal of the American Academy of Religion 61:553-566.
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  31. added 2017-01-29
    Frederic Fitch and Epistemic Blindspotting.Osbert Jian Kang - 1990 - Dissertation, University of Calgary (Canada)
    This thesis investigates the problem of epistemic blindspotting initiated by Frederic Fitch's Theorem 5 which says: if there is some true proposition which nobody knows to be true, then there is a true proposition which nobody can know to be true. An epistemic blindspot is defined as a proposition which, though true, cannot be known . ;Fitch did not consider the factors of time and agency in his proof, and he indicated that a more detailed treatment should take those factors (...)
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  32. added 2017-01-25
    Knowability Principle and Disjunction Property.Pierdaniele Giaretta & Giuseppe Spolaore - 2010 - Logique Et Analyse 53 (209):9-23.
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  33. added 2017-01-25
    A Minimal Logical System for Computable Concepts and Effective Knowability.M. Freund - 1994 - Logique Et Analyse 34 (4):339-66.
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  34. added 2017-01-25
    More Than Metaphors: Masculine-Gendered Names and the Knowability of God.Lynne C. Boughton - 1994 - The Thomist 58 (2):283-316.
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  35. added 2017-01-22
    Gregory W. Fitch, 1948-2007.Theodore Guleserian - 2007 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 81 (2):172 -.
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  36. added 2017-01-22
    F.B. Fitch 1908-1987.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1988 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 61 (3):551 - 553.
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  37. added 2017-01-21
    ``On Knowledge of the Unknowable&Quot.Timothy Williamson - 1987 - Analysis 47 (3):154-158.
    If it is an unknown truth that p, it is an unknowable truth that it is an unknown truth that p. It follows, by classical logic, that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known. This hardish fact makes life difficult for the verificationist who wishes to assert that all truths are knowable, but to deny that all truths are known. He might try rejecting classical logic. Dorothy Edgington has recently suggested a different way out. She admits that (...)
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  38. added 2017-01-20
    An Argument Concerning the Unknowable.Leon Horsten - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):240-242.
    Williamson has forcefully argued that Fitch's argument shows that the domain of the unknowable is non-empty. And he exhorts us to make more inroads into the land of the unknowable. Concluding his discussion of Fitch's argument, he writes: " Once we acknowledge that [the domain of the unknowable] is non-empty, we can explore more effectively its extent. … We are only beginning to understand the deeper limits of our knowledge. " I shall formulate and evaluate a new argument concerning the (...)
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  39. added 2017-01-20
    On Knowledge of the Unknowable.Timothy Williamson - 1987 - Analysis 47 (3):154-158.
    If it is an unknown truth that p, it is an unknowable truth that it is an unknown truth that p . It follows, by classical logic, that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known. This hardish fact makes life difficult for the verificationist who wishes to assert that all truths are knowable, but to deny that all truths are known. He might try rejecting classical logic . Dorothy Edgington has recently suggested a different way out . (...)
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  40. added 2017-01-19
    Restricting Factiveness.Fredrik Stjernberg - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):29 - 48.
    In discussions of Fitch’s paradox, it is usually assumed without further argument that knowledge is factive, that if a subject knows that p, then p is true. It is argued that this common assumption is not as well-founded as it should be, and that there in fact are certain reasons to be suspicious of the unrestricted version of the factiveness claim. There are two kinds of reason for this suspicion. One is that unrestricted factiveness leads to paradoxes and unexpected results, (...)
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  41. added 2017-01-19
    Is Tennant Selling Truth Short?Jim Edwards - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):152–158.
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  42. added 2017-01-18
    Is Whatever Exists Knowable and Nameable?Roy W. Perrett - 1999 - Philosophy East and West 49 (4):401-414.
    Naiyāyikas are fond of a slogan, which often appears as a kind of motto in their texts: "Whatever exists is knowable and nameable." What does this mean? Is it true? The first part of this essay offers a brief explication of this important Nyāya thesis; the second part argues that, given certain plausible assumptions, the thesis is demonstrably false.
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  43. added 2017-01-17
    Unknowable Truths.Paul Humphreys - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):543-555.
    This paper addresses a solution due to Michael Fara to the Church/Fitch paradox of knowability. Fara’s solution has significant interest but the paradox can beresurrected within his approach by considering a slightly more complex sentence. The issue of what counts as an epistemological capability for enhanced agents is then discussed with some emphasis on the developmental heritage of agents and their ability to transcend conceptual frameworks.
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  44. added 2017-01-16
    Truth, Demonstration and Knowledge. A Classical Solution to the Paradox of Knowability.Elia Zardini - 2015 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 30 (3):365-392.
    After introducing semantic anti-realism and the paradox of knowability, the paper offers a reconstruction of the anti-realist argument from the theory of understanding. The proposed reconstruction validates an unrestricted principle to the effect that truth requires the existence of a certain kind of “demonstration”. The paper shows that the principle fails to imply the problematic instances of the original unrestricted knowability principle but that the overall view still has unrestricted epistemic consequences. Appealing precisely to the paradox of knowability, the paper (...)
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  45. added 2017-01-15
    Knights, Knaves and Unknowable Truths.Roy T. Cook - 2006 - Analysis 66 (1):10-16.
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  46. added 2017-01-15
    A Principled Solution to Fitch’s Paradox.Igor Douven - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (1):47-69.
    To save antirealism from Fitch's Paradox, Tennant has proposed to restrict the scope of the antirealist principle that all truths are knowable to truths that can be consistently assumed to be known. Although the proposal solves the paradox, it has been accused of doing so in an ad hoc manner. This paper argues that, first, for all Tennant has shown, the accusation is just; second, a restriction of the antirealist principle apparently weaker than Tennat's yields a non-ad hoc solution to (...)
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  47. added 2017-01-15
    Clues to the Paradoxes of Knowability: Reply to Dummett and Tennant.B. Brogaard & J. Salerno - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):143-150.
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  48. added 2017-01-15
    An Extension of “Fitch's Rules”.David F. Siemens - 1961 - Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 7 (11-14):199-204.
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  49. added 2017-01-14
    On a New Tentative Solution to Fitch’s Paradox.Alessandro Giordani - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):597-611.
    In a recent paper, Alexander argues that relaxing the requirement that sound knowers know their own soundness might provide a solution to Fitch’s paradox and introduces a suitable axiomatic system where the paradox is avoided. In this paper an analysis of this solution is proposed according to which the effective move for solving the paradox depends on the axiomatic treatment of the ontic modality rather than the limitations imposed on the epistemic one. It is then shown that, once the ontic (...)
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  50. added 2017-01-14
    The Fitch-Church Paradox and First Order Modal Logic.Carlo Proietti - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (1):87-104.
    Reformulation strategies for solving Fitch’s paradox of knowability date back to Edgington. Their core assumption is that the formula \, from which the paradox originates, does not correctly express the intended meaning of the verification thesis, which should concern possible knowledge of actual truths, and therefore the contradiction does not represent a logical refutation of verificationism. Supporters of these solutions claim that can be reformulated in a way that blocks the derivation of the paradox. Unfortunately, these reformulation proposals come with (...)
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