Knowledge

This Chapter studies legislative initiatives around sustainable finance deriving from the Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth (also called ‘Sustainable Finance Action Plan’, ‘Action Plan’ henceforth), published by the European Commission (‘Commission’) in 2018 (Communication 2018/97). I evaluate various instruments proposed in the Action Plan, using a reflexive law approach coupled with insights from business ethics and epistemology (De Bruin, 2013, 2015). I point to the challenges such an approach encounters, and offer suggestions how to address them. Reflexive law approaches to (...) legislation (Farber 1994, Hess 1999, Orts 1994, Farmer & Teubner 1994) acknowledge the limits of law as an instrument to realize social or political goals, and stress the need to encourage self-reflection and transparency among stakeholders through procedural rather than ‘command-and-control’ legislation. Typical reflexive law instruments involve disclosure, reporting, and labelling. Examining the Action Plan, I show that the main legislative instruments it puts forward are reflexive. I use empirical and theoretical work that challenges the effectiveness of some of these instruments. Drawing on recent work from behavioural economics I suggest that these problems may be overcome once we integrate more fully in reflexive law what it means for people ‘reflectively’ to recruit evidence and gather knowledge, and once we appreciate the value knowledge has over and above mere belief. My argument here is not so much to the effect that more interventionist regulatory tools are needed (they are dearly needed, but that is not the point here). Rather I argue that once a regulator opts for a reflexive law approach, a richer notion of information should be deployed. I call this ‘epistemic’ instead of ‘reflexive’ law. The Chapter gives some background information about the Action Plan, introduces the core ideas of reflexive law, shows how the Action Plan is reflexive law par excellence, considers the challenges, and offers a few modest suggestions. (shrink)

What makes political freedom valuable to us? Two well-known arguments are that freedom contributes to our desire satisfaction and to our personal responsibility. Here, Boudewijn de Bruin argues that freedom is valuable when it is accompanied by knowledge. He offers an original and systematic account of the relationship between freedom and knowledge and defends two original normative ideals of known freedom and acknowledged freedom. -/- By combining psychological perspectives on choice and philosophical views on the value of knowledge, he shows (...) how known freedom is crucial to satisfy our desires and assume responsibility. Known freedom is compromised when salespeople deploy consumer-obfuscation, or when news outlets use contextual framing techniques to steer the way their audiences process information. Conversely, carefully developed consumer protection and information disclosure regulation can foster known freedom. Acknowledged freedom, from ethical and economic perspectives, offers protection and makes our freedoms more stable. It embodies an ideal of mutual recognition that underlies informed consent and the ethics of communication, and can also contribute to a flourishing corporate culture. -/- This book integrates and extends cutting-edge research from philosophy, economics, psychology, and law to reorient debates on privacy, neuromarketing, sustainable finance, corporate culture, consumer protection, media violence, and freedom of speech. -/- An original account of the relation between freedom and knowledge, integrating cutting-edge research from philosophy, economics, psychology, and law; defends the ideals of known and acknowledged freedom; offers new perspectives on debates surrounding privacy, corporate culture, consumer protection, freedom of speech, and more -/- Introduction: Why Freedom is Not Enough 1:From Choice Overload to Discrimination: Arguments for Freedom 2:From Brainwashing to Neuromarketing: Freedom of Belief 3:From the Value of Knowledge to Skills and Stereotypes: The Individual Ideal of Known Freedom 4:From Common Knowledge to the Ethics of Communication: The Social Ideal of Acknowledged Freedom 5:Sustainable Finance and Responsible Investors 6:Ethics Management and Informed Stakeholders 7:Freedom of Speech and Consumer Autonomy 8:Liberal Privacy and Legal Protection Conclusion: How Freedom Can Be Sufficient . (shrink)

In this paper I will compare two competing accounts of assertion: the knowledge account and the justified belief account. When it comes to the evidence that is typically used to assess accounts of assertion – including the evidence from lottery propositions, the evidence from Moore’s paradoxical propositions and the evidence from conversational patterns – I will argue that the justified belief account has at least as much explanatory power as its rival. I will argue, finally, that a close look at (...) the ways in which assertions can be challenged and retracted reveals a certain advantage for the justified belief account. The paper will touch upon a number of further topics along the way, including the logical interaction between knowledge and justified belief, the nature of defeat, and the hypothesis that knowledge and justified belief are normatively coincident goals. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an argument for rejecting Sarah Moss's recent account of legal proof. Moss's account is attractive in a number of ways. It provides a new version of a knowledge-based theory of legal proof that elegantly resolves a number of puzzles about mere statistical evidence in the law. Moreover, the account promises to have attractive implications for social and moral philosophy, in particular about the impermissibility of racial profiling and other harmful kinds of statistical generalisation. In this (...) paper, I show that Moss's account of legal proof crucially depends on a moral norm called the rule of consideration. I argue that we have a number of reasons to be sceptical of this rule. Once we reject the rule, it is not clear that Moss's account of legal proof is either plausible or attractive. (shrink)

En el trabajo se exponen algunas ideas generales acerca de la interrelación entre valoración y conocimiento, así como el análisis de determinadas formas concretas en que se realiza la acción del factor valorativo sobre la ciencia y su desarrollo. Se fundamenta la tesis de que todo conocimiento, cualquiera que sea la forma en que este se presente, posee un contenido valorativo, cuya dosis depende del carácter de la relación que guarda su objeto con los intereses, necesidades y fines del sujeto (...) cognoscente. La presencia de este componente valorativo en el conocimiento no conduce necesariamente a una reproducción desfigurada de la realidad, como muchas veces se afirma; ella ciertamente puede obstaculizar dicho conocimiento, pero puede también estimularlo. Se expresa que el papel de los factores valorativos en el proceso cognoscitivo tampoco debe sobreestimarse en menosprecio de la importancia de su contenido objetivo. Por último, se muestra que es precisamente a través del sujeto del conocimiento que se realiza el condicionamiento valorativo de la ciencia y su desarrollo. (shrink)

En el trabajo se exponen algunas ideas generales acerca de la interrelación entre valoración y conocimiento, así como el análisis de determinadas formas concretas en que se realiza la acción del factor valorativo sobre la ciencia y su desarrollo. Se fundamenta la tesis de que todo conocimiento, cualquiera que sea la forma en que este se presente, posee un contenido valorativo, cuya dosis depende del carácter de la relación que guarda su objeto con los intereses, necesidades y fines del sujeto (...) cognoscente. La presencia de este componente valorativo en el conocimiento no conduce necesariamente a una reproducción desfigurada de la realidad, como muchas veces se afirma; ella ciertamente puede obstaculizar dicho conocimiento, pero puede también estimularlo. Se expresa que el papel de los factores valorativos en el proceso cognoscitivo tampoco debe sobreestimarse en menosprecio de la importancia de su contenido objetivo. Por último, se muestra que es precisamente a través del sujeto del conocimiento que se realiza el condicionamiento valorativo de la ciencia y su desarrollo. (shrink)

Does pre-voting group deliberation increase majority competence? To address this question, we develop a probabilistic model of opinion formation and deliberation. Two new jury theorems, one pre-deliberation and one post-deliberation, suggest that deliberation is beneficial. Successful deliberation mitigates three voting failures: (1) overcounting widespread evidence, (2) neglecting evidential inequality, and (3) neglecting evidential complementarity. Simulations and theoretic arguments confirm this. But there are five systematic exceptions where deliberation reduces majority competence, always by increasing failure (1). Our analysis recommends deliberation that (...) is 'participatory', 'even', but possibly 'unequal', i.e., that involves substantive sharing, privileges no evidences, but possibly privileges some persons. (shrink)

Can there be knowledge and rational belief in the absence of a rational degree of confidence? Yes, and cases of "mistuned knowledge" demonstrate this. In this paper we leverage this normative possibility in support of advancing our understanding of the metaphysical relation between belief and credence. It is generally assumed that a Lockean metaphysics of belief that reduces outright belief to degrees of confidence would immediately effect a unification of coarse-grained epistemology of belief with fine-grained epistemology of confidence. Scott Sturgeon (...) has suggested that the unification is effected by understanding the relation between outright belief and confidence as an instance of the determinable-determinate relation. But determination of belief by confidence would not by itself yield the result that norms for confidence carry over to norms for outright belief unless belief and high confidence are token identical. We argue that this token-identity thesis is incompatible with the neglected phenomenon of “mistuned knowledge”—knowledge and rational belief in the absence of rational confidence. We contend that there are genuine cases of mistuned knowledge and that, therefore, epistemological unification must forego token identity of belief and high confidence. We show how partial epistemological unification can be secured given determination of outright belief by degrees of confidence even without token-identity. Finally, we suggest a direction for the pursuit of thoroughgoing epistemological unification. (shrink)

Epistemic absolutism holds that knowledge‐that is ungradable, while epistemic gradualism argues the opposite. This paper purports to remodel the gradualism/absolutism debate. The current model initiated by Stephen Hetherington fails to capture the genuine divergence between the two views, which makes the debate equivocal, and the gradualist side lacks appeal. I propose that the remodeled debate should focus on whether knowledge‐that is a ‘threshold concept’ or a ‘spectrum concept’. That is, whether there is a threshold distinguishing knowledge from non‐knowledge. The reconstructed (...) model enjoys significant advantages as it enables the debate to be more balanced and philosophically interesting. (shrink)

A vast range of our everyday experiences seem to involve an immediate consciousness of value. We hear the rudeness of someone making offensive comments. In seeing someone risking her life to save another, we recognize her bravery. When we witness a person shouting at an innocent child, we feel the unfairness of this action. If, in learning of a close friend’s success, envy arises in us, we experience our own emotional response as wrong. How are these values apprehended? The three (...) most common answers provided by contemporary philosophy explain the consciousness of value in terms of judgment, emotion, or perception. An alternative view endorsed mainly by authors inspired by the phenomenological tradition argues that values are apprehended by an intentional feeling. In this model, it is by virtue of a feeling that objects are presented as being in different degrees and nuances fair or unfair, boring or funny, good or bad. This paper offers an account of this model of feeling and its basic features, and defends it over alternative models. To this end, the paper discusses different versions of the model circulating in current research which until now have developed in parallel rather than in mutual exchange. The paper also applies the proposed account to the moral domain and examines how a feeling of values is presupposed by several moral experiences. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the legitimacy of using the term “to know” in morality and I develop an approach based on Kantian morality. In my analysis, I take the notion “to know” in the sense that Timothy Williamson does. That is to say, I regard it in opposition to the perspectives that claim “knowledge is jus-tified true belief”. Therefore, in the first part, I briefly introduce “knowledge first epistemology”. In the second part, I build a perspective pointing to the (...) strong correlation between acting and knowing. After that, I provide an analysis of Kantian morality in connection with my discussion. I show how Kant argues for a lawful certainty in morality that allows us to use the verb “know” (in the sense that is evaluated in the first part of this paper). In the next part, I comment on the un-analyzability of knowing in the practical sphere with reference to free will. In my conclusion, upon a general review of the paper, I introduce very briefly an alternative epistemology from Islamic thought regarding the theoreti-cal and practical sphere distinctions. (shrink)

This is an editorial introduction to a special issue of Acta Analytica on epistemic luck.

In the present context of valuing the knowledge of historically subordinated peoples, the risk of epistemic extractivism emerges as a new element that concerns the field of research. Specifically with regard to the investigation of subjectivities in Terreiros de Candomblé, this danger also appears, effectively. By understanding the ways in which the Terreiros are structured as spaces of resistance, how the processes of subjectivation are experienced and what is the importance of knowledge in these processes, this article aims to present (...) elements that support a proposal of thought and research enterreirados as one of the paths possible to circumvent the signaled risk and we discussed some elements of an ethos of research buried in the spaces of the Terreiro communities. (shrink)

This paper advances a unified theory of skillful and intentional action. According to our theory, the distinguishing feature of both skillful and intentional actions is that they are guided by the agent’s knowledge of the means of performing the task at hand. This theory leads naturally to an intellectualist view of skills, according to which skills are propositional knowledge states. We show that this view enjoys a number of explanatory advantages over more familiar dispositional accounts of skills.

Review of Epistemology: 50 Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Thought Experiments by Kevin McCain (Routledge, 2021).

IMAGO TEXT 2020 ABSTRACTS -/- (German abstract below) The text presents a structural analysis and a logical theory of creativity. It argues that creativity emerges from the translation between two forms of precision, thus from the ubiquitous transformation between incompatible forms of thought and articulation. This transformation allows for unexpected surpluses and innovations, in conjunction with fallacies, waste and noise. Common myths and misconceptions – i.e. about creativity as a force in dire supply - are debunked, as are mistaken strategies (...) for creativity-enhancement. Instead, suggestions are offered as to how educational institutions can channel and enable ubiquitous energies – instead of investing much resources and effort into their suppression. -/- Der Text präsentiert eine strukturelle Analyse und eine logische Theorie der Kreativität. Er argumentiert, dass Kreativität aus der Übersetzung zwischen zwei Formen der Präzision hervorgeht, aus der allgegenwärtigen Transformation zwischen unvereinbaren Formen des Denkens und der Artikulation, was zu Überschuß und produktiven Abweichungen wie auch Abfall und Fehlschlüssen führt. Verbreitete Mythen und Missverständnisse – etwa zu Kreativität als Mangelware – werden diskutiert sowie Strategien zur Kreativitätsförderung. Es geht um Vorschläge, wie pädagogische Institutionen die stets vorhandenen kreativen Energien kanalisieren und ermöglichen können, anstatt sie mit viel Aufwand zu unterdrücken. (shrink)

Structural analogies connect Williamson’s epistemology and action theory: for example, action is the direction-of-fit mirror image of knowledge, and knowledge stands to belief as action stands to intention. These structural analogies, for Williamson, are meant to illuminate more generally how ‘mirrors’ reversing direction of fit should be understood as connecting the spectrum of our cognitive and practically oriented mental states. This paper has two central aims, one negative and the other positive. The negative aim is to highlight some intractable problems (...) with Williamson’s preferred analogical picture, which links the cognitive and the practical through the nexus of direction-of-fit mirroring. The positive aim of the paper is to propose a better alternative. In particular, we show that an achievement-theoretic proposal captures what is in common across the range of attitudes that exhibit the kind of structure that knowledge-belief, action-desire/intention do, while at the same time avoiding the problems shown to face Williamson’s proposed picture. Moreover, we draw attention to several key theoretical benefits of embracing our proposed achievement-theoretic picture, including some of the key benefits of the knowledge-first programme that Williamson’s own analogies were designed to secure. (shrink)

Theological anthropology has tended to view human flourishing as consisting in the loving communion of ourselveswith God. Recently, Natalia Marandiuc has brought the tools of attachment theory to theological anthropology to argue that a self is not inherent to human persons but rather is co-created through our loving relationships with one another and with God. In this paper I argue for the introduction of narrative, particularly as understood through the work of Eleonore Stump, to Marandiuc’s account as a practical means (...) by which healing love might be communicated, particularly through Scriptural narratives. In evidence of narrative’s usefulness, I offer a brief exegesis of the Gospel of John’s account of the Woman at the well. This synthesis fills a gap in our understanding of the self’s flourishing by not only adopting a model demonstrating its emergence but also by providing a method by which the model can be applied. (shrink)

Plakias has recently argued that there is nothing wrong with publishing defences of philosophical claims which we don’t believe and also nothing wrong with concealing our lack of belief, because an author’s lack of belief is irrelevant to the merit of a published work. Fleisher has refined this account by limiting the permissibility of publishing without belief to what he calls ‘advocacy role cases’. I argue that such lack of belief is irrelevant only if it is the result of an (...) inexplicable incredulity or the result of a metaphilosophical or epistemic stance that is unrelated to the specific claim. However, in many real life cases, including Fleisher’s advocacy role cases, our doubts regarding the claims we defend arise from reasons that have something to do with the insufficiency of the philosophical evidence supporting the claim, and publishing an unconditional defence of a claim without revealing our doubts is impermissible as it involves withholding philosophically-relevant reasons. Plakias has also argued that discouraging philosophers from publishing claims they don’t believe would be unfair to junior philosophers with unsettled views. I propose that we should change our academic practices that pressure philosophers to publish articles that pretend to be defences of settled views. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to present Lisa Shabel's interpretive proposal that relates algebra to symbolic constructions. This briefly covers the problem of the status of algebra and how some of the interpretations given relate it to the numerical calculation. Subsequently, by the hand of Shabel and with an eye on the mathematical practice of Cristian Wolff, the ways of proceeding algebraically in the eighteenth century will be identified and then analyze the two meanings of the term “magnitude”. Finally, (...) algebra is related to a construction in accordance with the a priori concepts, certain rules and which it has its referent. Such a type of construction defines what Kant understands by symbolic construction. (shrink)

Much of the recent work on epistemology of inquiry defends two related theses. First, inquiry into a question rationally prohibits believing an answer to that question. Second, knowledge is the aim of inquiry. I develop a series of cases which indicate that inquiry is not as narrow as these views suggest. These cases can be accommodated if we take a broader approach and understand inquiry as aiming at epistemic improvement, described more generally. This approach captures a wider range of inquiring (...) phenomena because it accounts for forms of epistemic improvement that fall short of, or go beyond, coming to know the answer to a question. (shrink)

Rosenkranz devised two bimodal epistemic logics: an idealized one and a realistic one. The former is shown to be sound with respect to a class of neighborhood frames called i-frames. Rosenkranz designed a specific i-frame able to invalidate a series of undesired formulas, proving that these are not theorems of the idealized logic. Nonetheless, an unwanted formula and an unwanted rule of inference are not invalidated. Invalidating the former guarantees the distinction between the two modal operators characteristic of the logic, (...) while invalidating the latter is crucial in order to deal with the problem of logical omniscience. In this paper, I present an i-frame able to invalidate all the undesired formulas already invalidated by Rosenkranz, together with the missing formula and rule of inference. (shrink)

First, it’s very important to rule out that the entire text below, especially topic 4, shows an evolutionary process of man, in topic number 1, we present thinkers Jean Piaget and Erik Erikson, both psychoanalysts, and focused on cognitive development, but with works that show a development of different angles, complementing each other, in the first we can see the influence of the external formation of the child according to the internal formation, whereas the second presents us the inverse, the (...) internal adapting to the external, we can see both as one, complementing each other. After this we enter further into the philosophical field, briefly presenting some historical and philosophical periods, focusing on the man of each epoch, then finally we had the meeting of philosophy in education, at this point we talk about the ideal formation of man, according to types of teachings, and how important or destructive they are to man, and education must know how to balance them to shape contemporary virtuous man. At the end, in topic 5, we polished the virtuous man from the thought of Friedrich Nietsche, showing his conception of herd man and superman quickly, and introducing them into the discussion of educational extremes. (shrink)

This issue of COGNITIVE SYSTEMS RESEARCH features seven articles originated from selected works submitted to EBICC 2015 – Tenth International Brazilian Meeting on Cognitive Science, and orally presented at the event, which took place in the city of São Paulo, Brazil on December 2015. These papers provide a glimpse of the wide spectrum of aspects of cognitive science, always present in the several editions of the meeting since its inception in 1995. Organized by the Brazilian Society of Cognitive Science, this (...) interdisciplinary event brought together researchers in the fields of Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind. The extended and updated versions of the selected works are highlighted as follows. (shrink)

The expression ‘aware of the fact that’ is a commonplace, not at all a philosopher’s term of art. We often criticize, excuse, admonish, and inform each other by relying on expressions of the form ‘S is (not) aware of the fact that p’ and such uses presuppose the existence of a state of awareness that one can be in or fail to be in with regard to some fact. Here lies the phenomenon of factual awareness. It is conventional in epistemology (...) to treat ‘S is aware of the fact that p’ as either expressing the same thought as ‘S knows that p’ or at least entailing it. As it happens with conventional philosophical views, learning of their failure is often both surprising and theoretically fruitful. This book provides a comprehensive case against the view that factual awareness just is knowledge or even essentially related to knowledge: factual awareness is not identical to, and it does not entail, knowing, being in a position to know, or being capable of knowing. This book provides a systematic exploration of the relation between knowledge and factual awareness, arguing that knowledge is but one species of factual awareness and that we can understand the possession of objective reasons, the normativity of knowledge, and the nature of knowledge in terms of factual awareness. In this way, the state of factual awareness is, structurally and substantively, a more basic type of state than knowledge. If correct, this undermines a number of ways in which knowledge has been regarded as ‘first’ in recent epistemology. (shrink)

That knowledge is factive, that is, that knowledge that p requires that p, has for a long time typically been treated as a truism. Recently, however, some authors have raised doubts about and arguments against this claim. In a recent paper in this journal, Michael Shaffer presents new arguments against the denial of the factivity of knowledge. This article discusses one of Shaffer’s objections: the one from “inconsistency and explosion”. I discuss two potential replies to Shaffer’s problem: dialetheism plus paraconsistency (...) and epistemic pluralism. This is not to be understood so much as a criticism of Shaffer’s view but rather as a request to develop his very promising objection from inconsistency and explosion further. (shrink)

The world is in a state of crisis. Global problems that threaten our future include: the climate crisis; the destruction of natural habitats, catastrophic loss of wild life, and mass extinction of species; lethal modern war; the spread of modern armaments; the menace of nuclear weapons; pollution of earth, sea and air; rapid rise in the human population; increasing antibiotic resistance; the degradation of democratic politics, brought about in part by the internet. It is not just that universities around the (...) world have failed to help humanity solve these global problems; even worse, they have made the genesis of these problems possible. Modern science and technology, developed in universities, have made possible modern industry and agriculture, modern hygiene and medicine, modern power production and travel, modern armaments, which in turn make possible much that is good, all the great benefits of the modern world, but also all the global crises that now threaten our future. What has gone wrong? The fault lies with the whole conception of inquiry built into universities around the world. The basic idea is to help promote human welfare by, in the first instance, acquiring scientific knowledge and technological know-how. First, knowledge is to be acquired; once acquired, it can be applied to help solve social problems, and promote human welfare. But this basic idea is an intellectual disaster. Judged from the standpoint of promoting human welfare, it is profoundly and damagingly irrational, in a structural way. As a result of being restricted to the tasks of acquiring and applying knowledge, universities are prevented from doing what they most need to do to help humanity solve global problems, namely, engage actively with the public to promote action designed to solve global problems. We need urgently to bring about a revolution in universities around the world, wherever possible, so that their central task becomes to help humanity learn how to solve the climate crisis and other problems of living, local and global, so that we may make progress towards a good, civilized world. Almost every branch and aspect of the university needs to change. (shrink)

The crisis of our times is science without wisdom. It is the outcome of an astonishingly successful tradition of scientific and technological research pursued within the context of an academic inquiry that is profoundly and damagingly irrational, in a structural way, when judged from the standpoint of helping humanity make progress towards a wise, enlightened world. This damaging irrationality of academia goes back to the 18th century Enlightenment. The philosophes of the French Enlightenment, in implementing the profound idea that we (...) might learn from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards an enlightened world, made three gross blunders – and it is these blunders, still uncorrected, that are built into academia today, and result in its current dysfunctional character. We urgently need to correct these blunders and transform academia, so that it becomes rationally, effectively and actively engaged in helping humanity discover what to do to solve the global problems that threaten our future, and thus make progress towards a good, enlightened world. (shrink)

A core presumption of object oriented ontology and other speculative realisms is that there is a world independent of the mind that can be successfully inquired and should take center stage in our reflections again. A profound case for this realist presumption is found in Meillassoux’s After Finitude. He aims to secure our access to reality as it is in itself by refuting correlationism according to which we cannot escape reality as it is thought by us. He presents three arguments: (...) ancestrality, facticity and mathematization. On the first argument correlationism fails because it cannot render scientific statements about an universe anterior to us meaningful. I address the worry that he might not take this to be a real argument against correlationism and argue that it in any case fails. On the second argument correlationism is flawed since it remains committed to absolute possibilities. I argue that this argument is untenable as well. On his third argument correlationism fails because science reveals a mathematically describable reality indifferent to our existence. I argue that the almost perfect mathematization of nature can actually be cashed out as an argument for correlationism. I conclude by proposing an alternative way of showing that mathematics is the language of the absolute understood as a radical contingent hyperchaos. (shrink)

This paper considers some puzzling knowledge ascriptions and argues that they present prima facie counterexamples to credence, belief, and justification conditions on knowledge, as well as to many of the standard meta-semantic assumptions about the context-sensitivity of ‘know’. It argues that these ascriptions provide new evidence in favor of contextualist theories of knowledge—in particular those that take the interpretation of ‘know’ to be sensitive to the mechanisms of constraint.

Theoretical models are widely held as sources of knowledge of reality. Imagination is vital to their development and to the generation of plausible hypotheses about reality. But how can imagination, which is typically held to be completely free, effectively instruct us about reality? In this paper I argue that the key to answering this question is in constrained uses of imagination. More specifically, I identify make-believe as the right notion of imagination at work in modelling. I propose the first overarching (...) taxonomy of types of constraints on scientific imagination that enables knowledge of reality. And I identify two main kinds of knowledge enabled by models, knowledge of the imaginary scenario specified by models and knowledge of reality. (shrink)

Since their formulation by Keith DeRose, the so-called bank cases have played a major role in the discussion about whether knowledge depends on practical factors. According to the proponents of pragmatic encroachment, the proper conclusion to be drawn from the bank cases and similar examples is that knowledge of a proposition p does not supervene on one’s evidence for or against p. In my view, this conclusion is ill-founded. The reason is that the bank cases and similar examples suffer from (...) an ambiguity concerning the known proposition — an ambiguity that has so far been overlooked. When this ambiguity is made explicit, it becomes clear that the conclusion does not follow. (shrink)

In mathematics, any form of probabilistic proof obtained through the application of a probabilistic method is not considered as a legitimate way of gaining mathematical knowledge. In a series of papers, Don Fallis has defended the thesis that there are no epistemic reasons justifying mathematicians’ rejection of probabilistic proofs. This paper identifies such an epistemic reason. More specifically, it is argued here that if one adopts a conception of mathematical knowledge in which an epistemic subject can know a mathematical proposition (...) based solely on a probabilistic proof, one is then forced to admit that such an epistemic subject can know several lottery propositions based solely on probabilistic evidence. Insofar as knowledge of lottery propositions on the basis of probabilistic evidence alone is denied by the vast majority of epistemologists, it is concluded that this constitutes an epistemic reason for rejecting probabilistic proofs as a means of acquiring mathematical knowledge. (shrink)

Se o sentido e a finalidade da razão como instrumento de conhecimento converge para a possibilidade de discernimento envolvendo o verdadeiro e o falso, o que se impõe ao seu exercício não é senão um método que consiste na aplicação de determinados preceitos destinados tanto ao entendimento como à vontade, cuja contradição caracteriza o fundamento metafísico do erro, segundo Descartes que, conforme assinala o referido artigo, recorre a uma dúvida que, na investigação dos fundamentos absolutos, encerra uma radicalidade que tende (...) a se deter nas fronteiras do próprio ato de duvidar, que implica na experiência do Cogito e traz a prova ontológica da existência de Deus como única condição capaz de assegurar a realidade do mundo. (shrink)

Correlating it to contemporary society, the article in question beckons with the reading of the idols of the cave [Bacon], holding specifically that the question involves the nature of the individual, whose trend can prevail only to adapt the framework of your perspective content resulting from the endoculturação, converging, in short, to the borders of dogma, as highlighted by the emergence of materialistic scientism, in the name of progress, establishing the techno-scientific belief in the assumptions, proposing the credibility of the (...) referential framework of science and technical division of conditionalities as determinants of social change, characterized because, as a false notion, as evidenced by the consequences. (shrink)

Article in question holds in epistemological implications of the revolution copernicana of Immanuel Kant, whose perspective, emerging of borders that inter-related rationalism of Leibniz, empiricism Hume and science positive physical-mathematics Newton, introduces the horizon of idealism transcendental, establish the correlation fundamental involving the subject and object of knowledge.

O artigo em questão se detém no método baconiano, que emerge através do Novum Organum (ou Verdadeiras Indicações acerca da Interpretação da Natureza) e acena com a pretensão de possibilitar o verdadeiro progresso da ciência, que demanda, em suma, a erradicação das predisposições para o erro, dos preconceitos e das noções falsas que impedem o acesso à verdade, dos “ídolos”, enfim, segundo a leitura de Bacon, que propõe o controle científico sobre a natureza como fator determinante da harmonia e do (...) bem-estar dos homens, conforme o ideal exposto no trabalho intitulado Nova Atlântida, que converge para caracterizar o saber como uma construção coletiva, desenhando um horizonte que se impõe ao processo formativo-educacional, à medida que estabelece uma relação envolvendo conhecimento e poder que guarda raízes nas fronteiras da experiência, em cuja perspectiva a investigação em referência dialoga com a metodologia freinetiana, que sublinha a articulação entre teoria e prática e assinala o papel que cumpre o trabalho em uma aprendizagem que traz como fundamento a ação. (shrink)

Se a leitura da epistemologia clássica e a perspectiva dos adeptos do “empirismo lógico” assinalam que a ciência demanda a exclusão de tudo aquilo que não se impõe ao horizonte que envolve a dedutibilidade analítica e a verificabilidade, Karl Popper defende que mais do que saber quando e em que condição uma teoria dialoga com a verdade a relevância não acena senão para a demarcação entre ciência e não ciência, particularmente no tocante às fronteiras que abrangem a ciência que carrega (...) autenticidade [que emerge através da construção de Newton, submetida ao aperfeiçoamento e à correção de Einstein] e as ideologias [marxismo e psicanálise], tornando-se imprescindível a busca de uma resposta para a questão referente ao critério capaz de estabelecer o estatuto científico de um universo teórico ou de um enunciado. (shrink)

U ovom radu analizira se rešenje skeptičkog paradoksa koje pruža teorija relevantnih alternativa. Ispituju se i upoređuju dve verzije ovog rešenja: nekontekstualistič- ka čiji je tvorac i zastupnik Fred Drecke, i kontekstualistička koju zastupaju autori poput Kita Dirouza i Stjuarta Koena. Uporednom analizom nekontekstualističkog i kontekstuali- stičkog rešenja, dolazi se do zaključka da, iako oba rešenja imaju i povoljne i nepovoljne implikacije, Dreckeova teorija relevantnih alternativa nudi uverljivije objašnjenje, a zatim i rešenje skeptičkog paradoksa.

Detendo-se na questão do simbólico, que, precedendo e excedendo a razão, se impõe como fundamento da condição de uma existência que não tende a dialogar senão com a possibilidade, o artigo em questão investiga a sua emergência através das formas que se inter-relacionam na constitutividade da realidade (a saber, a linguagem, o mito, a religião), recorrendo à noção do sistema proposto pela leitura de Ernst Cassirer, que instaura um processo que do pertencimento à espécie animal à fala, do mythos ao (...) lógos, acena com a experiência da autoconstrução humana, convergindo para possibilitar, em suma, antes do que o conhecimento do Ser, a sua criação. (shrink)

Perfazendo a primeira filosofia existencial trágica, a doutrina de Schopenhauer atribui a origem do caráter simultaneamente trágico, absurdo e doloroso da existência ao querer viver, implicando um pessimismo que impõe à felicidade uma condição negativa, à medida que o sofrimento emerge como o fundamento de toda a vida, constituindo-se o prazer estético uma possibilidade quanto à superação da dor e do tédio, conforme assinala o artigo cujo trabalho mostra a correlação envolvendo a perspectiva da metafí­sica da vontade e o pensamento (...) de Nietzsche que, detendo-se no niilismo como um acontecimento que expressa a negação da vida e converge para a sua própria superação, sobrepõe ao dualismo metafí­sico o princí­pio da unidade-múltipla através da construção da sua metafisica de artista, que supõe um movimento da consciência ética para o pathos artí­stico. (shrink)

Perfazendo a primeira filosofia existencial trágica, a doutrina de Schopenhauer atribui a origem do caráter simultaneamente trágico, absurdo e doloroso da existência ao querer viver, implicando um pessimismo que impõe à felicidade uma condição negativa, à medida que o sofrimento emerge como o fundamento de toda a vida, constituindo-se o prazer estético uma possibilidade quanto à superação da dor e do tédio, conforme assinala o artigo cujo trabalho mostra a correlação envolvendo a perspectiva da metafísica da vontade e o pensamento (...) de Nietzsche que, detendo-se no niilismo como um acontecimento que expressa a negação da vida e converge para a sua própria superação, sobrepõe ao dualismo metafísico o princípio da unidade-múltipla através da construção da sua metafisica de artista, que supõe um movimento da consciência ética para o pathos artístico. (shrink)

Correlacionando-a à sociedade contemporânea, o artigo em questão acena com a leitura dos ídolos da caverna [Bacon], detendo-se especificamente na questão que envolve a natureza do indivíduo, cuja tendência não se impõe senão para adaptar ao arcabouço de sua perspectiva o conteúdo resultante do processo de endoculturação, convergindo, em suma, para as fronteiras da dogmatização, conforme assinala a emergência do cientificismo materialista que, em nome do progresso, institui a crença nos pressupostos tecnocientíficos, propondo a credibilização das referencialidades do arcabouço da (...) ciência e da circunscrição da técnica como condicionalidades determinantes da emancipação social, caracterizando-se, pois, como uma falsa noção, tal como atestam as suas consequências. (shrink)

The thesis identifies two strands in Rorty’s philosophy. One is an orientation towards practice in opposition to the traditional philosophical emphasis on theoretical knowledge. The other is Rorty’s anti-representationalist conception of knowledge. Rorty argues that these strands are mutually supporting, while the author argues they are incompatible. The nominal aim of Rorty’s anti-representationalism is to overcome many traditional dualisms of theoretical philosophy, such as subject and object, mind and world, and theory and practice. The thesis argues that anti-representationalism does not (...) and cannot achieve this aim, since what is required to overcome these dualisms is the recognition of the practical basis of knowledge, with which anti-representationalism is incompatible. The author agrees with much of Rorty’s critique of foundationalist epistemology, but argues in opposition to Rorty that anti-representationalism does not follow necessarily from this critique. Where Rorty locates the error of traditional epistemology in the very notion that knowledge and language can represent the world, the author argues that this idea is benign. The fundamental problem is the desire to anchor our conceptual scheme to an external structure independently of human practice — but this idea can be rejected without abandoning the notion of representation. The thesis also looks to explain why Rorty takes anti-representationalism to follow naturally from a rejection of foundationalism. The motivation is located in Rorty’s fundamental metaphysical orientation, which is naturalistic. Anti-representationalism is the product of the wish to promote a naturalistic worldview without succumbing to scientism. In this way Rorty hopes to unite the manifest and scientific images of man. The author argues that this cannot be done from within a naturalistic metaphysics. (shrink)

This is an early, alternative version of the paper that became Shieber 2013, “Toward a truly social epistemology: Babbage, the division of mental labor, and the possibility of socially distributed warrant,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86(2), pp. 266-294. This paper differs from the later paper in a few notable respects. In this earlier paper – written in 2008-9 – I use Hutchins to illustrate the phenomenon of socially distributed cognitive processes, rather than Babbage, and I discuss the attributes of such (...) cognitive processes in greater detail. (shrink)

Most current work in epistemology deals with the evaluation and justification of information already acquired. In this book, Jaakko Hintikka instead discusses the more important problem of how knowledge is acquired in the first place. His model of information-seeking is the old Socratic method of questioning, which has been generalized and brought up-to-date through the logical theory of questions and answers that he has developed. Hintikka also argues that philosophers' quest for a definition of knowledge is ill-conceived and that the (...) entire notion of knowledge should be replaced by the concept of information. He offers an analysis of the different meanings of the concept of information and of their interrelations. The result is a new and illuminating approach to the field of epistemology. (shrink)