Knowledge How

Edited by John Bengson (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
About this topic
Summary People know many facts, for instance, that Antarctica is a continent, that the cello is a string instrument, or that swimming is a sport. This is often called ‘knowledge that’, since it is knowledge that such and such is true. There is also 'knowledge how': for example, Ann Bancroft knows how to traverse Antarctica, Yo-Yo Ma knows how to play the cello, and I know how to swim. What is knowledge how? How is it related to knowledge that, or to other epistemic achievements (e.g., understanding, intelligence, rationality)? What is the role of knowledge how in action and practical achievement? These and other questions about knowledge how have received diverse answers. The answers are relevant to a wide range of debates in philosophy and other fields (e.g., cognitive science).
Key works

Gilbert Ryle's original paper on knowledge how is Ryle 1946; Ryle elaborates in chapter two of Ryle 1949. Both works argue against the 'intellectualist' view that understands knowledge how in terms of knowledge that. Fodor 1968 contains a now-classic response to Ryle's argument. Stanley & Willlamson 2001 present what is widely regarded as an important linguistic argument for intellectualism. A recent collection of essays is Bengson & Moffett 2011.

Introductions Fantl 2012 and Bengson 2013 provide overviews of some of the main philosophical issues. Fantl 2008 surveys recent developments. Bengson & Moffett 2011 trace philosophical work on knowledge how from Ryle's original treatment to contemporary discussion, outlining central themes and noting a wide range of debates in philosophy and cognitive science in which knowledge how has been claimed to play a central role.
Related

Contents
332 found
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  1. Social Epistemology and Knowing-How.Yuri Cath - forthcoming - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter examines some key developments in discussions of the social dimensions of knowing-how, focusing on work on the social function of the concept of knowing-how, testimony, demonstrating one's knowledge to other people, and epistemic injustice. I show how a conception of knowing-how as a form of 'downstream knowledge' can help to unify various phenomena discussed within this literature, and I also consider how these ideas might connect with issues concerning wisdom, moral knowledge, and moral testimony.
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  2. Expanding the Client's Perspective.Yuri Cath - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
    Hawley introduced the idea of the client's perspective on knowledge, which she used to illuminate knowing-how and cases of epistemic injustice involving knowing-how. In this paper, I explore how Hawley's idea might be used to illuminate not only knowing-how, but other forms of knowledge that, like knowing-how, are often claimed to be distinct from mere knowing-that, focusing on the case studies of moral understanding and ‘what it is like’-knowledge.
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  3. Beyond Intuitive Know-How.Cheng-Hung Tsai - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-14.
    According to Dreyfusian anti-intellectualism, know-how or expertise cannot be explained in terms of know-that and its cognates but only in terms of intuition. Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus do not exclude know-that and its cognates in explaining skilled action. However, they think that know-that and its cognates (such as calculative deliberation and perspectival deliberation) only operate either below or above the level of expertise. In agreement with some critics of Dreyfus and Dreyfus, in this paper, I argue that know-that and (...)
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  4. Gradable know-how.Xiaoxing Zhang - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The gradation of know-how is a prominent challenge to intellectualism. Know-how is prima facie gradable, whereas know-that is not, so the former is unlikely to be a species of the latter. Recently, Pavese refuted this challenge by explaining the gradation of know-how as concerning either the quantity or the quality of practical answers one knows to a question. Know-how per se remains absolute. This paper argues, however, that in addition to the quantity and quality of practical answers, know-how also differs (...)
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  5. Epistemology in the Mencius.Waldemar Brys - 2023 - In Yang Xiao & Kim-Chong Chong (eds.), Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Mencius. Cham: Springer. pp. 491-514.
    This chapter examines Mencius’s views on knowledge and how they might contribute to contemporary debates in epistemology. For this purpose, I focus on three features that I take to be characteristic (although not exhaustive) of Mencian epistemology: first, Mencius’s views on knowing things; second, the role that wisdom or intellectual virtue plays in acquiring knowledge; and third, Mencius’s views on “knowing-to”, a kind of knowledge conceptually distinct from knowing-that and knowing-how. I argue that the views we find in the Mencius (...)
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  6. The puzzle of learning by doing and the gradability of knowledge‐how.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):619-637.
    Much of our know-how is acquired through practice: we learn how to cook by cooking, how to write by writing, and how to dance by dancing. As Aristotle argues, however, this kind of learning is puzzling, since engaging in it seems to require possession of the very knowledge one seeks to obtain. After showing how a version of the puzzle arises from a set of attractive principles, I argue that the best solution is to hold that knowledge-how comes in degrees, (...)
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  7. Unconscious Intelligence in the Skilled Control of Expert Action.Spencer Ivy - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (3):59-83.
    What occurs in the mind of an expert who is performing at their very best? In this paper, I survey the history of debate concerning this question. I suggest that expertise is neither solely a mastery of the automatic nor solely a mastery of intelligence in skilled action control. Experts are also capable of performing automatic actions intelligently. Following this, I argue that unconscious-thought theory (UTT) is a powerful tool in coming to understand the role of executive, intelligent action control (...)
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  8. Wisdom: A Skill Theory.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2023 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    What is wisdom? What does a wise person know? Can a wise person know how to act and live well without knowing the whys and wherefores of his own action? How is wisdom acquired? This Element addresses questions regarding the nature and acquisition of wisdom by developing and defending a skill theory of wisdom. Specifically, this theory argues that if a person S is wise, then (i) S knows that overall attitude success contributes to or constitutes well-being; (ii) S knows (...)
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  9. Practical knowledge without practical expertise: the social cognitive extension via outsourcing.Xiaoxing Zhang - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1255-1275.
    Practical knowledge is discussed in close relation to practical expertise. For both anti-intellectualists and intellectualists, the knowledge of how to φ is widely assumed to entail the practical expertise in φ-ing. This paper refutes this assumption. I argue that non-experts can know how to φ via other experts’ knowledge of φ-ing. Know-how can be ‘outsourced’. I defend the outsourceability of know-how, and I refute the objections that reduce outsourced know-how to the knowledge of how to ask for help, of how (...)
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  10. Extending knowledge-how.Gloria Andrada - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (Online first):1-17.
    This paper examines what it takes for a state of knowledge-how to be extended (i.e. partly constituted by entities external to the organism) within an anti-intellectualist approach to knowledge- how. I begin by examining an account of extended knowledge- how developed by Carter, J. Adam, and Boleslaw Czarnecki. 2016 [“Extended Knowledge-How.” Erkenntnis 81 (2): 259–273], and argue that it fails to properly distinguish between cognitive outsourcing and extended knowing-how. I then introduce a solution to this problem which rests on the (...)
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  11. Extending knowledge-how.Gloria Andrada - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (2):197-213.
    This paper examines what it takes for a state of knowledge-how to be extended (i.e. partly constituted by entities external to the organism) within an anti-intellectualist approach to knowledge-how. I begin by examining an account of extended knowledge-how developed by Carter, J. Adam, and Boleslaw Czarnecki. 2016 [“Extended Knowledge-How.” Erkenntnis 81 (2): 259–273], and argue that it fails to properly distinguish between cognitive outsourcing and extended knowing-how. I then introduce a solution to this problem which rests on the distribution of (...)
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  12. Pratibhā, intuition, and practical knowledge.Nilanjan Das - 2022 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 31 (4):630-656.
    In Sanskrit philosophy, the closest analogue of intuition is pratibhā. Here, I will focus on the theory of pratibhā offered by the Sanskrit grammarian Bhartṛhari (fifth century CE). On this account, states of pratibhā play two distinct psychological roles. First, they serve as sources of linguistic understanding. They are the states by means of which linguistically competent agents effortlessly understand the meaning of novel sentences. Second, states of pratibhā serve as sources of practical knowledge. On the basis of such states, (...)
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  13. A Abordagem Ecológica das Habilidades e a Epistemologia dos eixos.Carvalho Eros - 2022 - In Plinio J. Smith & Nara Figueiredo (eds.), A epistemologia dos eixos: uma introdução e debate sobre as certezas de Wittgenstein. Porto Alegre: Editora Fênix. pp. 101-123.
    In this paper, I argue that hinge propositions are ways of acting that constitute abilities or skills. My starting point is Moyal-Sharrock's account of hinge propositions. However, Moyal-Sharrock's account leaves gaps to be filled, as it does not offer a unified explanation of the origin of our ungrounded grounds. Her account also lacks resources to respond to the issue of demarcation, since it does not provide a criterion for distinguishing ways of acting that can legitimately fulfill the role of ungrounded (...)
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  14. Collective Practical Knowledge is a Fragmented Interrogative Capacity.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):180-199.
    What does it take for a group of people to know how to do something? An account of collective practical knowledge ought to be compatible with the linguistic evidence about the semantics for collective knowledge-how ascriptions, be able to explain the practicality of collective knowledge, be able to explain both the connection between individual and collective know-how and the possibility of a group knowing how to do something none of its members know, and be applicable to a suitably wide range (...)
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  15. Does knowledge intellectualism have a Gettier problem?Keith Raymond Harris - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (59):149-159.
    Knowledge intellectualism is the view that knowledge-how requires propositional knowledge. Knowledge intellectualism has a Gettier problem, or so many of its critics allege. The essence of this problem is that knowledge-how is compatible with epistemic luck in a way that ordinary propositional knowledge is not. Hence, knowledge-how can allegedly be had in the absence of knowledge-that, a fact inconsistent with knowledge intellectualism. -/- This paper develops two responses to this challenge to knowledge intellectualism. First, it is not clear that propositional (...)
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  16. An Intellectualist Dilemma.Matthew Mosdell - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):139-147.
    Lewis Carroll's famous puzzle leads to an explanatory challenge: what must we know to grasp the logical necessity of deductive arguments? This paper argues that intellectualism lacks a philosophically satisfying explanation to that puzzle.
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  17. Acting on knowledge-how.Timothy Williamson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6).
    The paper explains how to integrate the knowledge-first approach to epistemology with the intellectualist thesis that knowing-how is a kind of knowing-that, with emphasis on their role in practical reasoning. One component of this integration is a belief-based account of desire.
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  18. Ryle on knowing how: Some clarifications and corrections.Stefan Brandt - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):152-167.
    I argue for an account of know-how as a capacity for practical judgment—a view I derive from Gilbert Ryle. I begin by offering an interpretation of Ryle and by correcting a number of widespread misconceptions about his views in the current debate. I then identify some problems with Ryle's account and finally present my own view which, I argue, retains Ryle's insights while avoiding his mistakes.
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  19. The Shared Know-how in Linguistic Bodies.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2021 - Filosofia Unisinos 22 (1):94-101.
    The authors of *Linguistic Bodies* appeal to shared know-how to explain the social and participatory interactions upon which linguistic skills and agency rest. However, some issues lurk around the notion of shared know-how and require attention and clarification. In particular, one issue concerns the agent behind the shared know-how, a second one concerns whether shared know-how can be reducible to individual know-how or not. In this paper, I sustain that there is no single answer to the first issue; depending on (...)
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  20. The Priority of the Epistemic.Parker Crutchfield & Scott Scheall - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):726-737.
    Epistemic burdens – the nature and extent of our ignorance (that and how) with respect to various courses of action – serve to determine our incentive structures. Courses of action that seem to bear impossibly heavy epistemic burdens are typically not counted as options in an actor’s menu, while courses of action that seem to bear comparatively heavy epistemic burdens are systematically discounted in an actor’s menu relative to options that appear less epistemically burdensome. That ignorance serves to determine what (...)
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  21. Hat sizes and craniometry: Professional know-how and scientific knowledge.Peter Cryle - 2021 - History of the Human Sciences 34 (2):46-65.
    This article examines the relation between commercial activity and knowledge-making, looking at hatmakers in order to open up a more general question about the overlap between the knowledge practices of 19th-century science and those of everyday commercial culture of the time. Phrenology also claims attention here, since it can be said to have occupied an intermediate position between science and commerce. From time to time during the first half of the century, phrenologists attended to hatmakers in the hope of gleaning (...)
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  22. Knowing how as a philosophical hybrid.Chad Gonnerman, Kaija Mortensen & Jacob Robbins - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11323-11354.
    Our view is that the folk concept of knowing how is more complicated than many epistemologists assume. We present four studies that go some way towards supporting our view—that the folk concept of knowledge-how is a philosophical hybrid, comprising both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist features. One upshot is, if we are going to award a presumptive status to philosophical theories of know-how that best accord with the folk concept, it ought to go to those that combine intellectualist and anti-intellectualist elements.
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  23. Meno, Know-How: Oh No, What Now?Stephen Kearns - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):421-434.
    ABSTRACT A version of Meno’s paradox applies to intellectualism about knowledge-how. If one does not know that p, one does not know that w is a way of working out that p. According to intellectualists, the latter such knowledge constitutes knowledge how to work out that p. One thus knows how to work out that p only if one already knows that p. But if this is right, nobody can work anything out.
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  24. Work's Role in Learning How.Matthew Mosdell - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):506-519.
    An influential version of intellectualism about knowledge how holds that acquiring facts is necessary and sufficient for learning how to do things. I argue that such a view is incompatible with learning to do things through effort and practice, which suggests that intellectualists don’t have a coherent way to explain the role of work in our acquisition of knowledge how. By way of an alternative, I argue that work serves to establish patterns of thinking that coordinate propositional truths with powers (...)
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  25. The Intelligence of Virtue and Skill.Will Small - 2021 - Journal of Value Inquiry 55 (2):229-249.
    Julia Annas proposes to shed light on the intelligence of virtue through an analogy with the intelligence of practical skills. To do so, she first aims to distinguish genuine skills and skillful actions from mere habits and routine behaviour: like skills, habits are acquired through habituation and issue in action immediately (i.e. unmediated by reasoning about what to do), but the routine behaviour in which habit issues is mindless and unintelligent, and cannot serve to establish or illuminate the intelligence of (...)
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  26. Replies to Commentators on The Skillfulness of Virtue. [REVIEW]Matt Stichter - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2):611-623.
    First, let me start by thanking all of my commentators for doing a careful reading of my book, providing me with lots of though-provoking responses, and on top of all of that for the significant time commitment in being a part of this symposium. I’m very grateful for all the support! Let me add a further note of thanks to Noell Birondo for taking on the role of editor in bringing all of these wonderful contributions together in this issue of (...)
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  27. Knowledge-How Attribution in English and Japanese.Shun Tsugita, Yu Izumi & Masaharu Mizumoto - 2021 - In Karyn L. Lai (ed.), Knowers and Knowledge in East-West Philosophy: Epistemology Extended. Springer Nature. pp. 63-90.
    This chapter presents two cross-linguistic studies of knowledge-how attributions that compare English and Japanese speakers. The first study investigates the felicity judgements of ordinary people about knowledge-how sentences, where we find a large difference in judgements about the sentences in which a person lacks an ability to perform a certain action but is nevertheless attributed the relevant knowledge of how to perform that action. The second study investigates the frequency of the natural occurrences of knowing-how constructions in English and Japanese (...)
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  28. Anscombe und »Knowledge How« – Zum Zusammenhang von Form und Vermögen bei der Bestimmung absichtlichen Handelns.Fabian Börchers - 2020 - Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 45 (3).
    In a short passage towards the end of her book ›Intention‹ Elizabeth Anscombe briefly discusses the topic of »practical knowledge« in the sense of knowledge-how. I interpret this passage within the context of the general argument of Intention. I argue that although this passage seems to be only loosely connected to the main topic of the book and to Anscombe’s own understanding of the term »practical knowledge«, it contains a central insight: the thought that practical knowledge in Anscombe’s understanding of (...)
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  29. Sintonizando com o mundo: uma abordagem ecológica das habilidades sensoriomotoras.Eros Carvalho - 2020 - In Giovanni Rolla & Gerson Araújo Neto (eds.), Ciência e Conhecimento. Teresina: pp. 81-108.
    In this chapter, I put forward and sustain an articulation of the notion of bodily skill based on ecological psychology, and I show how it is relevant for the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about skillful coping and also for the debate about whether know-how is reducible or not to propositional knowledge. The right metaphor to understand bodily skills is not the computer metaphor but the radio metaphor. These skills result from a process of organism attunement to its environment.
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  30. Know How and Skill: The Puzzles of Priority and Equivalence.Yuri Cath - 2020 - In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise. New York: Routledge.
    This chapter explores the relationship between knowing-how and skill, as well other success-in-action notions like dispositions and abilities. I offer a new view of knowledge-how which combines elements of both intellectualism and Ryleanism. According to this view, knowing how to perform an action is both a kind of knowing-that (in accord with intellectualism) and a complex multi-track dispositional state (in accord with Ryle’s view of knowing-how). I argue that this new view—what I call practical attitude intellectualism—offers an attractive set of (...)
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  31. Seumas Miller on Knowing-How and Joint Abilities.Yuri Cath - 2020 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 9:14-21.
    A critical discussion of Seumas Miller's view on knowing-how and joint abilities.
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  32. Knowing How to Know That.Benjamin Elzinga - 2020 - Erkenntnis:1-15.
    Many virtue-based approaches to propositional knowledge begin with the ability and achievement intuitions. In this paper, I rely on this pair of intuitions to explore the relationship between knowing how and knowing that. On the view that emerges, propositional knowledge is a kind of success through cognitive know how. Rather than simply equating know how with ability, I reveal deeper connections between both kinds of knowledge by focusing on the role of self-regulation.
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  33. It just feels right: an account of expert intuition.Ellen Fridland & Matt Stichter - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1327-1346.
    One of the hallmarks of virtue is reliably acting well. Such reliable success presupposes that an agent is able to recognize the morally salient features of a situation, and the appropriate response to those features and is motivated to act on this knowledge without internal conflict. Furthermore, it is often claimed that the virtuous person can do this in a spontaneous or intuitive manner. While these claims represent an ideal of what it is to have a virtue, it is less (...)
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  34. Transmitting Understanding and Know-How.Stephen Grimm - 2020 - In Stephen Hetherington & Nicholas D. Smith (eds.), What the Ancients Offer to Contemporary Epistemology. New York, USA: Routledge.
    Among contemporary epistemologists and scholars of ancient philosophy, one often hears that transmitting propositional knowledge by testimony is usually easy and straightforward, but transmitting understanding and know-how by testimony is usually difficult or simply impossible. Further provocative conclusions are then sometimes drawn from these claims: for instance, that know-how and understanding are not types of propositional knowledge. In contrast, I argue that transmitting propositional knowledge is sometimes easy and sometimes hard, just as transmitting know how and understanding is sometimes easy (...)
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  35. Gilbert Ryle’s adverbialism.Gabrielle Benette Jackson - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (2):318-335.
    Gilbert Ryle famously wrote that practical knowledge (knowing how) is distinct from propositional knowledge (knowing that). This claim continues to have broad philosophical appeal, and yet there are many unsettled questions surrounding Ryle’s basic proposal. In this article, I return to his original work in order to perform some intellectual archeology. I offer an interpretation of Ryle’s concept of action that I call ‘adverbialism’. Actions are constituted by bodily behaviours performed in a certain mode, style or manner. I present various (...)
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  36. Concepts and Action. Know-how and Beyond.David Löwenstein - 2020 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schröder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion. New Essays. London, Ontario, Kanada: Routledge. pp. 181-198.
    Which role do concepts play in a person's actions? Do concepts underwrite the very idea of agency in somebody's acting? Or is the appeal to concepts in action a problematic form of over-intellectualization which obstructs a proper picture of genuine agency? Within the large and complicated terrain of these questions, the debate about know-how has been of special interest in recent years. In this paper, I shall try to spell out what know-how can tell us about the role of concepts (...)
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  37. Believing the Incomprehensible God.James Dominic Rooney - 2020 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 94:111-122.
    There has been recent epistemological interest as to whether knowledge is “transmitted” by testimony from the testifier to the hearer, where a hearer acquires knowledge “second-hand.” Yet there is a related area in epistemology of testimony which raises a distinct epistemological problem: the relation of understanding to testimony. In what follows, I am interested in one facet of this relation: whether/how a hearer can receive testimonial knowledge without fully understanding the content of the testimony? I use Thomas Aquinas to motivate (...)
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  38. Practical Knowledge and Habits of Mind.Will Small - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 54 (2):377-397.
    Education aims at more than supplying learners with information, or knowledge of facts. Even when the transmission of information is at stake, abilities relevant to using that information are among the things that teachers aim, or ought to aim, to inculcate. We may think that abilities for critical reflection on knowledge, and critical thinking more generally, are central to what teachers should cultivate in their students. Moreover, we may hope that students acquire not merely the ability to (e.g.) think critically, (...)
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  39. Dario Maestripieri. Literature’s Contribution to Scientific Knowledge: How Novels Explored New Ideas about Human Nature.Dirk Vanderbeke - 2020 - Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture 4 (2):163-168.
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  40. Knowledge-How and Its Exercises.Hannes Worthmann - 2020 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schröder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion. Routledge. pp. 199-214.
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  41. ‘Know-how as Competence: A Rylean Responsibilist Account’, by David Löwenstein. [REVIEW]Yuri Cath - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):633-634.
    Volume 97, Issue 3, September 2019, Page 633-634.
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  42. Intellectualizing know how.Benjamin Elzinga - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-20.
    Following Gilbert Ryle’s arguments, many philosophers took it for granted that someone knows how to do something just in case they have the ability to do it. Within the last couple decades, new intellectualists have challenged this longstanding anti-intellectualist assumption. Their central contention is that mere abilities aren’t on the same rational, epistemic level as know how. My goal is to intellectualize know how without over-intellectualizing it. Intelligent behavior is characteristically flexible or responsive to novelty, and the distinctive feature of (...)
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  43. Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):86-104.
    The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of propositional knowledge, and anti-intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of ability. In this paper, I explore a compromise position—the interrogative capacity view—which claims that knowing how to do something is a certain kind of ability to generate answers to the question of how to do it. This view combines the intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how (...)
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  44. Group Knowledge, Questions, and the Division of Epistemic Labour.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    Discussions of group knowledge typically focus on whether a group’s knowledge that p reduces to group members’ knowledge that p. Drawing on the cumulative reading of collective knowledge ascriptions and considerations about the importance of the division of epistemic labour, I argue what I call the Fragmented Knowledge account, which allows for more complex relations between individual and collective knowledge. According to this account, a group can know an answer to a question in virtue of members of the group knowing (...)
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  45. What's the point of knowing how?Joshua Habgood‐Coote - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):693-708.
    Why is it useful to talk and think about knowledge-how? Using Edward Craig’s discussion of the function of the concepts of knowledge and knowledge-how as a jumping off point, this paper argues that considering this question can offer us new angles on the debate about knowledge-how. We consider two candidate functions for the concept of knowledge-how: pooling capacities, and mutual reliance. Craig makes the case for pooling capacities, which connects knowledge-how to our need to pool practical capacities. I argue that (...)
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  46. Knowledge-how and false belief.Keith Harris - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1845-1861.
    According to a prominent account of knowledge-how, knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge. A related view has it that to know how to perform an action is for it to seem to one that a way to perform that action is in fact a way to do so. According to a further view, knowledge-how is a species of objectual knowledge. Each of these intellectualist views has significant virtues including, notably, the ability to account for the seemingly epistemic dimensions of (...)
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  47. ›Wissen, dass‹ und ›Wissen, wie‹.David Löwenstein - 2019 - In Martin Grajner & Guido Melchior (eds.), Handbuch Erkenntnistheorie. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler. pp. 116-121.
    This is an introduction to the debate about Know-how.
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  48. Knowing how, basic actions, and ways of doing things.Kevin Lynch - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (8):956-977.
    This paper investigates whether we can know how to do basic actions, from the perspective according to which knowing how to do something requires knowledge of a way to do it. A key argument from this perspective against basic know-how is examined and is found to be unsound, involving the false premise that there are no ways of doing basic actions. However, a new argument along similar lines is then developed, which contends that there are no ways of doing basic (...)
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  49. Modeling practical thinking.Matthew Mosdell - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (4):445-464.
    Intellectualists about knowledge how argue that knowing how to do something is knowing the content of a proposition (i.e, a fact). An important component of this view is the idea that propositional knowledge is translated into behavior when it is presented to the mind in a peculiarly practical way. Until recently, however, intellectualists have not said much about what it means for propositional knowledge to be entertained under thought's practical guise. Carlotta Pavese fills this gap in the intellectualist view by (...)
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  50. Testimonial Knowledge-How.Andrew Peet - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):895-912.
    There is an emerging skepticism about the existence of testimonial knowledge-how :387–404, 2010; Poston in Noûs 50:865–878, 2016; Carter and Pritchard in Philos Phenomenol Res 91:181–199, 2015a). This is unsurprising since a number of influential approaches to knowledge-how struggle to accommodate testimonial knowledge-how. Nonetheless, this scepticism is misguided. This paper establishes that there are cases of easy testimonial knowledge-how. It is structured as follows: first, a case is presented in which an agent acquires knowledge-how simply by accepting a speaker’s testimony. (...)
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