Knowledge How

Edited by John Bengson (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
About this topic
Summary People know many facts, for instance, that Antarctica is a continent, that the cello is a string instrument, or that swimming is a sport. This is often called ‘knowledge that’, since it is knowledge that such and such is true. There is also 'knowledge how': for example, Ann Bancroft knows how to traverse Antarctica, Yo-Yo Ma knows how to play the cello, and I know how to swim. What is knowledge how? How is it related to knowledge that, or to other epistemic achievements (e.g., understanding, intelligence, rationality)? What is the role of knowledge how in action and practical achievement? These and other questions about knowledge how have received diverse answers. The answers are relevant to a wide range of debates in philosophy and other fields (e.g., cognitive science).
Key works

Gilbert Ryle's original paper on knowledge how is Ryle 1945; Ryle elaborates in chapter two of Ryle 1949. Both works argue against the 'intellectualist' view that understands knowledge how in terms of knowledge that. Fodor 1968 contains a now-classic response to Ryle's argument. Willlamson 2001 present what is widely regarded as an important linguistic argument for intellectualism. A recent collection of essays is Bengson & Moffett 2011.

Introductions Fantl 2012 and Bengson 2013 provide overviews of some of the main philosophical issues. Fantl 2008 surveys recent developments. Bengson & Moffett 2011 trace philosophical work on knowledge how from Ryle's original treatment to contemporary discussion, outlining central themes and noting a wide range of debates in philosophy and cognitive science in which knowledge how has been claimed to play a central role.
Related categories

268 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 268
  1. added 2019-01-19
    Knowing How, Basic Actions, and Ways of Doing Things.Kevin Lynch - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
    This paper investigates whether we can know how to do basic actions, from the perspective according to which knowing how to do something requires knowledge of a way to do it. A key argument from this perspective against basic know-how is examined and is found to be unsound, involving the false premise that there are no ways of doing basic actions. However, a new argument along similar lines is then developed, which contends that there are no ways of doing basic (...)
  2. added 2019-01-07
    Subject-Specific Intellectualism: Re-Examining Know How and Ability.Kevin Wallbridge - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    Intellectualists claim that knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing, for some w, that w is a way to do that thing. However, standard accounts fail to account for the way that knowing how sometimes seems to require ability. I argue that the way to make sense of this situation is via a ‘subject-specific’ intellectualism according to which knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing that w is a way for some relevant person to (...)
  3. added 2019-01-03
    Overcoming Intellectualism About Knowledge and Understanding: A Unified Approach.Eros Carvalho - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (1):7-26.
    In this paper I defend a unified approach to knowledge and understanding. Both are achievements due to cognitive abilities or skills. The difference between them is a difference of aspects. Knowledge emphasizes the successful aspect of an achievement and the exclusion of epistemic luck, whereas understanding emphasizes the agent's contribution in bringing about an achievement through the exercise of one's cognitive skills. Knowledge and understanding cannot be separated. I argue against the claim that understanding is distinct from knowledge because the (...)
  4. added 2018-12-20
    A Logic of Goal-Directed Knowing How.Yanjing Wang - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4419-4439.
    In this paper, we propose a decidable single-agent modal logic for reasoning about goal-directed “knowing how”, based on ideas from linguistics, philosophy, modal logic, and automated planning in AI. We first define a modal language to express “I know how to guarantee \ given \” with a semantics based not on standard epistemic models but on labeled transition systems that represent the agent’s knowledge of his own abilities. The semantics is inspired by conformant planning in AI. A sound and complete (...)
  5. added 2018-12-19
    What's the Point of Knowing How?Joshua Habgood-Coote - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    Why is it useful to talk and think about knowledge-how? Using Edward Craig’s discussion of the function of the concepts of knowledge and knowledge-how as a jumping off point, this paper argues that considering this question can offer us new angles on the debate about knowledge-how. We consider two candidate functions for the concept of knowledge-how: pooling capacities, and mutual reliance. Craig makes the case for pooling capacities, which connects knowledge-how to our need to pool practical capacities. I argue that (...)
  6. added 2018-12-18
    Introduction.Gregor Damschen - 2009 - In Gregor Damschen, Karsten Stueber & Robert Schnepf (eds.), Debating Dispositions. Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Mind. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter.
    Introduction to Debating Dispositions. Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Mind, ed. by Gregor Damschen, Robert Schnepf, and Karsten R. Stueber, Berlin/New York: de Gruyter 2009.
  7. added 2018-12-16
    Ist Wissen-Dass Eine Unterart von Wissen-Wie?Gregor Damschen - 2005 - In O. Neumaier, Clemens Sedmak & Michael Zichy (eds.), Philosophische Perspektiven. Beiträge zum VII. Internationalen Kongress der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Philosophie. Frankfurt a.M./Lancaster: Ontos. pp. 290-295.
    Is knowledge-that a species of knowledge-how? - How is knowledge-how related to knowledge-that? Three possible answers are: (A1) intellectualism: knowledge-how is a subspecies of knowledge-that. (A2) Rylean account: knowledge-how and knowledge-that are completely distinct. (A3) anti-intellectualism: knowledge-that is a subspecies of knowledge-how. In this essay I present a new anti-intellectualist reductio argument that shows that answer A3 is true: knowledge-that is a subspecies of knowledge-how.
  8. added 2018-11-29
    A Practical Guide to Intellectualism.Yuri Cath - 2008 - Dissertation, Australian National University
    In this thesis I examine the view—known as intellectualism—that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that, or propositional knowledge. I examine issues concerning both the status of this view of knowledge-how and the philosophical implications if it is true. The ability hypothesis is an important position in the philosophy of mind that appeals to Gilbert Ryle’s famous idea that there is a fundamental distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. This position appears to be inconsistent with the truth of intellectualism. However, I demonstrate (...)
  9. added 2018-11-13
    Understanding: Not Know-How.Emily Sullivan - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):221-240.
    There is considerable agreement among epistemologists that certain abilities are constitutive of understanding-why. These abilities include: constructing explanations, drawing conclusions, and answering questions. This agreement has led epistemologists to conclude that understanding is a kind of know-how. However, in this paper, I argue that the abilities constitutive of understanding are the same kind of cognitive abilities that we find in ordinary cases of knowledge-that and not the kind of practical abilities associated with know-how. I argue for this by disambiguating between (...)
  10. added 2018-09-07
    Mechanisms of Mind-Body Interaction and Optimal Performance.Yi-Yuan Tang & Brian Bruya - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
    Based on recent findings, we propose a framework for a relationship among attention, effort and optimal performance. Optimal performance often refers to an effortless and automatic, flow-like state of performance. Mindfulness regulates the focus of attention to optimal focus on the core component of the action, avoiding too much attention that could be detrimental for elite performance. Balanced attention is a trained state that can optimize any particular attentional activity on the dual-process spectrum.
  11. added 2018-09-03
    The Limits of Stanley and Williamson’s Attack on Ryle's View About Know-How.Juan Camilo Espejo-Serna - 2018 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):59-88.
    The purpose of this paper is to discuss Stanley and Williamson’s take on Ryle’s argument against know-how being know-that. For this, I provide an initial consideration of the possibility of isolating Ryle’s argument from his overall philosophical outlook and Stanley and Williamson’s purpose in their discussion of Ryle. I then examine in detail Stanley and Williamson’s reconstruction of Ryle’s argument with the specific aim of showing where they have introduced extraneous elements: I examine what they take to bes additional assumptions (...)
  12. added 2018-08-14
    A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Ted Poston - 2018 - Bloomsbury Academic.
    We know facts, but we also know how to do things. To know a fact is to know that a proposition is true. But does knowing how to ride a bike amount to knowledge of propositions? This is a challenging question and one that deeply divides the contemporary landscape. A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How introduces, outlines, and critically evaluates various contemporary debates surrounding the nature of knowledge-how. Carter and Poston show that situating the debate over the nature of knowledge-how in (...)
  13. added 2018-05-19
    Practical Knowledge.Michael Schmitz - 2013 - Was Sollen Wir Glauben? Was Dürfen Wir Tun?, Sektionsbeiträge der GAP. 8.
    The contribution deals with knowledge of what to do, and how, where, when and why to do it, as it is found in a multitude of plans, rules, procedures, maxims, and other instructions. It is argued that while this knowledge is conceptual and propositional, it is still irreducible to theoretical knowledge of what is the case and why it is the case. It is knowledge of goals, of ends and means, rather than of facts. It is knowledge-to that is irreducibly (...)
  14. added 2018-05-13
    Can Knowing-How Skepticism Exist?Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2006 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy.
  15. added 2018-03-22
    Saber-cómo disposicional vs. saber-que proposicional.Gregor Damschen - 2011 - Universitas Philosophica 28 (57):189-212.
    Is knowledge-how a hidden knowledge-that, and therefore also a relation between an epistemic subject and a proposition? What is the connection between knowledge-how and knowledge-that? I will deal with both questions in the course of my paper. In the first part, I argue that the term ‘knowledge-how’ is an ambiguous term in a semantic pragmatic sense, blending two distinct meanings: ‘knowledge-how’ in the sense of knowledge-that, and ‘knowledge-how’ in the sense of an ability. In the second part of my paper, (...)
  16. added 2018-03-21
    Know-How and Gradability.Carlotta Pavese - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):345-383.
    Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees. On the other hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when we say that one knows in part how to do something, or that one knows how to do something better than somebody else. When coupled with absolutism, the gradability of ascriptions of know-how can be used to mount a powerful argument against intellectualism about know-how—the view (...)
  17. added 2018-03-13
    On How to Defend or Disprove the Universality Thesis.Cheng-Hung Tsai & Chinfa Lien - 2018 - In Masaharu Mizumoto, Stephen Stich & Eric McCready (eds.), Epistemology for the Rest of the World. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 267-278.
  18. added 2018-03-07
    Regresse und Routinen. Repliken auf Brandt und Jung.David Löwenstein - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (1):110-113.
    This paper responds to comments and criticisms by Stefan Brandt and Eva-Maria Jung, directed at the book "Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account".
  19. added 2018-03-07
    Précis zu Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (1):95-99.
    This is a précis of my book "Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account".
  20. added 2018-03-07
    Ryle on the Explanatory Role of Knowledge How.Will Small - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (5).
    Contemporary discussions of knowledge how typically focus on the question whether or not knowing how to do ϕ consists in propositional knowledge, and divide the field between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists. This way of framing the issue is said to derive from Gilbert Ryle. I argue that this is a misreading of Ryle, whose primary interest in discussing knowledge how was not epistemological but rather action-theoretical, whose argument against intellectualism has for this reason been misunderstood and underestimated, and whose positive view (...)
  21. added 2018-02-17
    Tacit Knowledge and Its Antonyms.Tim Thornton - 2013 - Philosophia Scientiæ 17 (3):93-106.
    Harry Collins’s Tacit and Explicit Knowledge characterises tacit knowledge through a number of antonyms: explicit, explicable, and then explicable via elaboration, transformation, mechanization and explanation and, most fundamentally, what can be communicated via “strings”. But his account blurs the distinction between knowledge and what knowledge can be of and has a number of counter-intuitive consequences. This is the result of his adoption of strings themselves rather than the use of words or signs as the mark of what is explicit and, (...)
  22. added 2018-02-17
    Knowing.Jason Stanley - 2011 - Noûs 45 (2):207-238.
  23. added 2018-02-17
    Vocational Education, Knowing How and Intelligence Concepts.Christopher Winch - 2010 - Philosophy of Education 44 (4):551-567.
    Debates about the nature of practical knowledge and its relationship with declarative knowledge have, over the last ten years, been lively. Relatively little has, however, been written about the educational implications of these debates, particularly about the educational implications of the two broad families of positions known respectively as ‘Intellectualism’ and ‘Anti-intellectualism’. Neither has much appeared in the literature about what Ryle called ‘intelligence epithets’ or evaluative elaborations on attributions of know how. Yet the use of intelligence epithets is a (...)
  24. added 2018-02-17
    Testimony and Knowing How.Katherine Hawley - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):397-404.
    Much of what we learn from talking and listening does not qualify as testimonial knowledge: we can learn a great deal from other people without simply accepting what they say as being true. In this article, I examine the ways in which we acquire skills or knowledge how from our interactions with other people, and I discuss whether there is a useful notion of testimonial knowledge how.Keywords: Knowledge how; Practical knowledge; Tacit knowledge; Testimony; Skills; Assertion.
  25. added 2018-02-17
    Review: Engstrom, Stephen, The Form of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Imperative[REVIEW]Andrews Reath - 2009 - Ethics 120 (1):170-175.
  26. added 2018-02-17
    On Amnesia and Knowing-How.David Bzdak - 2008 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 12 (1):36-47.
    In this paper, I argue that Stanley and Williamson’s 2001 account of knowledge-how as a species of knowledge-that is wrong. They argue that a claim such as “Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle” is true if and only if Hannah has some relevant knowledge-that. I challenge their claim by considering the case of a famous amnesic patient named Henry M. who is capable of acquiring and retaining new knowledge-how but who is incapable of acquiring and retaining new knowledge-that. In (...)
  27. added 2018-02-13
    Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:00-00.
    The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of propositional knowledge, and anti-intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of ability. In this paper, I explore a compromise position—the interrogative capacity view—which claims that knowing how to do something is a certain kind of ability to generate answers to the question of how to do it. This view combines the intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how (...)
  28. added 2018-01-09
    The Generality Problem for Intellectualism.Joshua Habgood‐Coote - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (3):242-262.
    According to Intellectualism knowing how to V is a matter of knowing a suitable proposition about a way of V-ing. In this paper, I consider the question of which ways of acting might figure in the propositions which Intellectualists claim constitute the object of knowledge-how. I argue that Intellectualists face a version of the Generality Problem – familiar from discussions of Reliabilism – since not all ways of V-ing are such that knowledge about them suffices for knowledge-how. I consider various (...)
  29. added 2018-01-06
    Truth in Practical Knowledge.Robert W. Schmidt - 1983 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 57:197-204.
  30. added 2017-12-02
    Modeling Practical Thinking.Matthew Mosdell - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    Intellectualists about knowledge how argue that knowing how to do something is knowing the content of a proposition (i.e, a fact). An important component of this view is the idea that propositional knowledge is translated into behavior when it is presented to the mind in a peculiarly practical way. Until recently, however, intellectualists have not said much about what it means for propositional knowledge to be entertained under thought's practical guise. Carlotta Pavese fills this gap in the intellectualist view by (...)
  31. added 2017-10-31
    A Dispositional Account of Practical Knowledge.Constantin Jan - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2309-2329.
    Is knowledge-how, or “practical” knowledge, a species of knowledge-that, or “theoretical” knowledge? There is no comfortable position to take in the debate around this question. On the one hand, there are counterexamples against the anti-intellectualist thesis that practical knowledge is best analysed as an ability. They show that having an ability to ϕ is not necessary for knowing how to ϕ. On the other hand, the intellectualist analysis of practical knowledge as a subspecies of theoretical knowledge is threatened by its (...)
  32. added 2017-10-17
    Intellectual Skill and the Rylean Regress.Brian James Weatherson - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):370-386.
    Intelligent activity requires the use of various intellectual skills. While these skills are connected to knowledge, they should not be identified with knowledge. There are realistic examples where the skills in question come apart from knowledge. That is, there are realistic cases of knowledge without skill, and of skill without knowledge. Whether a person is intelligent depends, in part, on whether they have these skills. Whether a particular action is intelligent depends, in part, on whether it was produced by an (...)
  33. added 2017-09-02
    Keeping It Implicit: A Defense of Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge.Tuomo Tiisala - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4):653-73.
    This paper defends Michel Foucault’s notion of archaeology of knowledge against the influential and putatively devastating criticism by Dreyfus and Rabinow that Foucault’s archaeological project is based on an incoherent conception of the rules of the discursive practices it purports to study. I argue first that Foucault’s considered view of these rules as simultaneously implicit and historically efficacious corresponds to a general requirement for the normative structure of a discursive practice. Then I argue that Foucault is entitled to that view (...)
  34. added 2017-08-07
    Know How and Acts of Faith.Paulina Sliwa - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 246-263.
    My topic in this paper is the nature of faith. Much of the discussion concerning the nature of faith proceeds by focussing on the relationship between faith and belief. In this paper, I explore a different approach. I suggest that we approach the question of what faith involves by focussing on the relationship between faith and action. When we have faith, we generally manifest it in how we act; we perform acts of faith: we share our secrets, rely on other’s (...)
  35. added 2017-06-03
    Intellectualism and Testimony.Yuri Cath - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):1-9.
    Knowledge-how often appears to be more difficult to transmit by testimony than knowledge-that and knowledge-wh. Some philosophers have argued that this difference provides us with an important objection to intellectualism—the view that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. This article defends intellectualism against these testimony-based objections.
  36. added 2017-05-22
    Knowledge-How is the Norm of Intention.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1703-1727.
    It is a widely shared intuition that there is a close connection between knowledge-how and intentional action. In this paper, I explore one aspect of this connection: the normative connection between intending to do something and knowing how to do it. I argue for a norm connecting knowledge-how and intending in a way that parallels the knowledge norms of assertion, belief, and practical reasoning, which I call the knowledge-how norm of Intention. I argue that this norm can appeal to support (...)
  37. added 2017-04-20
    Self-Regulation and Knowledge How.Elzinga Benjamin - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):119-140.
    In the 1940s, Gilbert Ryle argued for anti-intellectualism about know how. More recently, new intellectualists have challenged the canonical status of Ryle's arguments, and in the ensuing debate Ryleans appear to be on their back foot. However, contributors on both sides of the debate tend to ignore or misconstrue Ryle's own positive account of know how. In this paper, I develop two aspects of Ryle's positive account that have been overlooked. For Ryle, S knows how to Φ iff (1) S (...)
  38. added 2017-04-19
    Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
    What does it mean to know how to do something? This book develops a comprehensive account of know-how, a crucial epistemic goal for all who care about getting things right, not only with respect to the facts, but also with respect to practice. It proposes a novel interpretation of the seminal work of Gilbert Ryle, according to which know-how is a competence, a complex ability to do well in an activity in virtue of guidance by an understanding of what it (...)
  39. added 2017-04-10
    Knowledge in Practice.David Carr - 1981 - American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1):53 - 61.
  40. added 2017-04-06
    Knowing-How, Showing, and Epistemic Norms.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3597-3620.
    In this paper I consider the prospects for an epistemic norm which relates knowledge-how to showing in a way that parallels the knowledge norm of assertion. In the first part of the paper I show that this epistemic norm can be motivated by conversational evidence, and that it fits in with a plausible picture of the function of knowledge. In the second part of the paper I present a dilemma for this norm. If we understand showing in a broad sense (...)
  41. added 2017-03-16
    Dispositional Knowledge-How Vs. Propositional Knowledge-That.Gregor Damschen - 2011 - Universitas Philosophica 28 (57):189-212.
    Is knowledge-how a hidden knowledge-that, and therefore also a relation between an epistemic subject and a proposition? What is the connection between knowledge-how and knowledge-that? I will deal with both questions in the course of my paper. In the first part, I argue that the term ‘knowledge-how’ is an ambiguous term in a semantic pragmatic sense, blending two distinct meanings: ‘knowledge-how’ in the sense of knowledge-that, and ‘knowledge-how’ in the sense of an ability. In the second part of my paper, (...)
  42. added 2017-03-10
    The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Jesús Navarro - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):662-685.
    Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. If this thesis is correct, then we should expect the defeasibility conditions for knowledge-how and knowledge-that to be uniform—viz., that the mechanisms of epistemic defeat which undermine propositional knowledge will be equally capable of imperilling knowledge-how. The goal of this paper is twofold: first, against intellectualism, we will show that knowledge-how is in fact resilient to being undermined by (...)
  43. added 2017-03-01
    Knowledge-How: Interrogatives and Free Relatives.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):183-201.
    It has been widely accepted since Stanley and Williamson (2001) that the only linguistically acceptable semantic treatments for sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V’ involve treating the wh-complement ‘how to V’ as an interrogative phrase, denoting a set of propositions. Recently a number of authors have suggested that the ‘how to V’ phrase denotes not a proposition, but an object. This view points toward a prima facie plausible non-propositional semantics for knowledge-how, which treats ‘how to V’ as (...)
  44. added 2017-01-01
    Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind and Action.J. Bengson M. A. Moffett (ed.) - 2011
  45. added 2016-12-30
    Part Two: Philosophical Considerations-4 Practical Expertise.Julia Annas - 2012 - Philosophical Inquiry 36 (1-2):101.
  46. added 2016-12-30
    Practical Expertise.Julia Annas - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 101.
  47. added 2016-12-12
    “Know How” and “Know That”.Peter Schulz - 2001 - Semiotics:371-382.
  48. added 2016-12-08
    On Stephen Engstrom, The Form of Practical Knowledge.Carla Bagnoli - 2011 - Iris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 3 (6):191-203.
  49. added 2016-12-08
    Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action.John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Knowledge how to do things is a pervasive and central element of everyday life. Yet it raises many difficult questions that must be answered by philosophers and cognitive scientists aspiring to understand human cognition and agency. What is the connection between knowing how and knowing that? Is knowledge how simply a type of ability or disposition to act? Is there an irreducibly practical form of knowledge? What is the role of the intellect in intelligent action? This volume contains fifteen state (...)
  50. added 2016-12-08
    Technological Know-How From Rules of Thumb.Per Norström - 2011 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 15 (2):96-109.
    Rules of thumb are simple instructions, used to guide actions toward a specific result, without need of advanced knowledge. Knowing adequate rules of thumb is a common form of technological knowledge. It differs both from science-based and intuitive (or tacit) technological knowledge, although it may have its origin in experience, scientific knowledge, trial and error, or a combination thereof. One of the major advantages of rules of thumb is the ease with which they can be learned. One of their major (...)
1 — 50 / 268