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Summary

Kripkenstein or Kripke's Wittgenstein is a fictional character customarily taken to be the person committed to the views of meaning, content, and rule-following presented in Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982). Kripkenstein first presents us with the skeptical challenge to explain what it is for expressions to have a particular meaning in a speaker's idiolect. Consider a word like '+' which is intuitively for applying the addition function or 'table' which is for talking about tables. Kripkenstein asks what makes it the case that in one's idiolect these words are indeed for doing these things. After all, we can assume that our history of past uses is entirely compatible with '+' being for applying the quaddition function (x quus y = x plus y, if x, y < 57, = 5 otherwise) or for talking about tabairs (a tabair = anything that is a table not found at the base of the Eiffel tower or a chair found there). He then presents a skeptical argument by considering a series of potential answers and showing that they don't work. For starters, he argues that the relevant fact can't consist in a speaker's having given herself instructions how to use the expression because instructions would have to be stated in language and that would merely push back the problem. Second, he argues that it can't consist in her being disposed to use the expression in certain ways (e. g. when using ‘+’ one is disposed to give the sum, or when using ‘table’ one is disposed to do so only in the presence of tables) because this fails to make sense of the fact that using it in those ways is correct. Finally, he argues that we can't invoke simplicity considerations to rule out quaddition-like candidates, nor by claiming that the relevant state is primitive. Having drawn the skeptical conclusion that nothing makes It the case that expressions have particular meanings in our idiolects, Kripkenstein presents a skeptical solution by claiming that we should construe attributions of meaning, content etc. in non-factualist terms by taking them to be justifiable or permissible when the person to whom we attribute meaning, content etc. behaves like we do.

Key works Kripkenstein's discussion of meaning, content, and rule-following is presented in Kripke 1982. Important early commentaries include Forbes 1983, Blackburn 1984, and Goldfarb 1985 which defend the dispositionalist answer, Lewis 1983 which discusses invoking simplicity considerations, and McDowell 1984 and McGinn 1984 which discuss taking the state to be primitive and the relation between Wittgenstein's and Kripkenstein's views. Important later commentaries include Boghossian 1989, Pettit 1990, and Wilson 1994. Many of these papers are collected in Miller & Wright 2002. Recent discussions include Hattiangadi 2007 and Ginsborg 2011.
Introductions  Boghossian 1989; the Introduction to Miller & Wright 2002
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205 found
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1 — 50 / 205
  1. added 2018-08-12
    Meaning Relativism and Subjective Idealism.Andrea Guardo - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    An objection put forward by, among others, John McDowell to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s relativist view of semantic discourse goes roughly as follows: relativism about semantic discourse entails global relativism, which in turn entails subjective idealism, which we can reasonably assume to be false. I show that even though relativism about semantic discourse does entail a form of global relativism, the relativism in question does not entail anything like subjective idealism. This particular kind of relativism holds that which character, in Kaplan’s sense, (...)
  2. added 2018-07-25
    Magritte Meets Kripkenstein.Tomas Hribek - 1997 - Umění/Art 45 (3-4):240-258.
  3. added 2018-04-09
    The Goodman-Kripke Paradox.Robert Kowalenko - 2003 - Dissertation, King's College London
    The Kripke/Wittgenstein paradox and Goodman’s riddle of induction can be construed as problems of multiple redescription, where the relevant sceptical challenge is to provide factual grounds justifying the description we favour. A choice of description or predicate, in turn, is tantamount to the choice of a curve over a set of data, a choice apparently governed by implicitly operating constraints on the relevant space of possibilities. Armed with this analysis of the two paradoxes, several realist solutions of Kripke’s paradox are (...)
  4. added 2018-03-12
    Seguire una regola.Andrea Guardo - 2018 - Milano-Udine: Mimesis.
  5. added 2018-03-04
    Hoffman on Kripke’s Wittgenstein.George Rudebusch - 1986 - Philosophy Research Archives 12:177-182.
    Paul Hoffman argues that Kripke’s Wittgenstein fails in his solution to his own sceptical paradox. I argue that Hoffman fails to see the importance for Kripke’s Wittgenstein of the distinction between agreement in fact and judged agreement. Hoffman is right that no solution to the sceptical paradox can be based on agreement in fact, but the solution of Kripke’s Wittgenstein depends upon judged agreement. An interpretation is given: by ‘judged agreement’ Kripke’s Wittgenstein does not mean understanding oneself to judge agreement (...)
  6. added 2018-02-17
    Simplicity and Elegance in Millikan’s Account of Productivity: Reply to Martinez.Brian Leahy - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):503-516.
    This paper responds to a problem, raised by Martinez, for Millikan’s explanation of the interpretability of novel signs in terms of mapping functions. I argue that Martinez’s critique is a logically weakened version of Kripke’s skeptical argument about rule following. Responding to Martinez requires two things. First, we must correctly understand the role of simplicity and elegance in choosing the correct mapping function for a signaling system. Second, we need to understand that mapping functions are descriptions of the features that (...)
  7. added 2018-02-17
    Wilson on Kripke's Wittgenstein.Michael Kremer - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):571-584.
    George Wilson has recently defended Kripke's well-known interpretation of Wittgenstein against the criticisms of John McDowell. Wilson claims that these criticisms rest on misunderstandings of Kripke and that, when correctly understood, Kripke's interpretation stands up to them well. In particular, Wilson defends Kripke's Wittgenstein against the charge of "non-factualism" about meaning. However, Wilson has not appreciated the full significance of McDowell's criticism. I use a brief exploration of Kripke's analogy between Wittgenstein and Hume to put this significance in sharp relief. (...)
  8. added 2018-02-04
    Yet Another Skeptical Solution.Andrea Guardo - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-13.
    After a brief discussion of the rule-following paradox and of Kripkenstein’s skeptical solution, I put forward my own skeptical solution to the paradox, which revolves around the idea that communication does not require meaning.
  9. added 2017-12-24
    A Plea for the Metaphysics of Meaning.Alexis Burgess & Brett Sherman - 2014 - In Alexis Burgess & Brett Sherman (eds.), Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning. Oxford University Press.
  10. added 2017-10-01
    The Qua-Problem and Meaning Scepticism.Samuel Douglas - 2018 - Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 17:71–78.
    When considering potential solutions to meaning-scepticism, Kripke (1982) did not consider a causal-theoretic approach. Kusch (2006) has argued that this is due to the qua-problem. I consider Kusch’s criticism of Maddy (1984) and McGinn (1984) before offering a different way to solve the qua-problem, one that is not susceptible to sceptical attack. If this solution is successful, at least one barrier to using a causal theory to refute Kripke’s scepticism is removed.
  11. added 2017-09-15
    Kripke on Wittgenstein on Regulation.Virgil C. Aldrich - 1987 - Philosophy 62 (241):375 - 384.
    Kripke's own view of the 'inner life' as comprised of '"qualia"' that have no 'natural "external" manifestation' leads him into misinterpreting wittgenstein's denials on this count. so kripke gives wittgenstein's account a paradoxical and sceptical cast which misrepresents it, making it look as if it called for a sceptical solution and a 'warranted assertibility' theory of truth. but wittgenstein was making sport of the 'inner-outer' (subjective-objective) distinction with the rapier of his suggestion that psychological talk is not regulated by the (...)
  12. added 2017-02-12
    A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules.M. Kusch & K. Vermeir - 2008 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 70 (3):616.
  13. added 2017-02-11
    Saul Kripke: Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1. [REVIEW]Stephen Yablo - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (4):221-229.
  14. added 2017-02-03
    Review of G. W. Fitch, Saul Kripke and Christopher Hughes, Kripke. [REVIEW]David Robb - 2006 - Philosophical Books 47:165-8.
  15. added 2017-02-02
    Wittgenstein and the Life of Signs.Jim Hopkins - 2004 - In Max Kölbel & Bernhard Weiss (eds.), Wittgenstein's Lasting Significance. Routledge.
    Both Wittgenstein's account of following a rule and his private language argument turn on the notion of interpretation.
  16. added 2017-01-30
    Rule-Following, Meaning Constitution, and Enaction.Patrizio Lo Presti - 2015 - Human Affairs 25 (1):110-120.
    The paper submits a criticism of the standard formulation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox. According to the standard formulation, influenced by Kripke, the paradox invites us to consider what mental or behavioral items could constitute meaning. The author proposes instead an enactivist understanding of the paradox. On this account there is no essential gap between mental items and behavioral patterns such that the paradox enforces a choice between meaning being constituted either internally ‘in mind,’ or externally ‘in behavior.’ The paper begins (...)
  17. added 2017-01-30
    Exposition of Two Forms of Semantic Skepticism: Wittgenstein’s Paradox of Rule Following and Kripke’s Semantic Paradox.Ken Shigeta - 2014 - Filozofija I Društvo 25 (1):127-143.
  18. added 2017-01-30
    Saul Kripke.G. W. Fitch - 2004 - Routledge.
    Saul Kripke is one of the most original and creative philosophers writing today. His work has had a tremendous impact on the direction that philosophy has taken in the last thirty years and continues to dominate some of its most fundamental aspects. Given Kripke's importance it is perhaps surprising that there is no introduction to his philosophy available to the general student. This book fills that gap. As much of Kripke's work is highly technical, the book's central aim is to (...)
  19. added 2017-01-30
    Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule-Following Paradox.Scott Soames - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):313-348.
  20. added 2017-01-29
    Philosophical Troubles, by Saul Kripke.Graeme Forbes - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):927-933.
  21. added 2017-01-29
    Essay Sixteen. Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule-Following Paradox.Scott Soames - 2009 - In Philosophical Essays, Volume 2: The Philosophical Significance of Language. Princeton University Press. pp. 416-456.
  22. added 2017-01-29
    Essay Fifteen. Skepticism About Meaning: Indeterminacy, Normativity, and the Rule-Following Paradox.Scott Soames - 2009 - In Philosophical Essays, Volume 2: The Philosophical Significance of Language. Princeton University Press. pp. 385-415.
  23. added 2017-01-29
    Über Das Kripke-Schema Und Abzählbare Teilmengen.Peter Schuster & JÚlia Zappe - 2008 - Logique Et Analyse 51.
  24. added 2017-01-28
    A Perspective on the Philosophy of Saul Kripke.David Henry Helman - 1983 - Dissertation, Harvard University
    Various critiques of philosophy have focused on the failure of its practitioners to come to any sort of consensus. The thesis attempts to account for this phenomenon in recent philosophy of language by seeing Kripke, Quine, Austin, and Wittgenstein as taking as their data different aspects and descriptional levels of our linguistic practices. On this view, Kripke has made a positive philosophical contribution by finding localized structures in certain semantic areas . His essentialism, while defensible, primarily shows us the lack (...)
  25. added 2017-01-27
    Kripke's Case: Some Remarks on Rules, Their Interpretation and Application.Jes Bjarup - 1988 - Rechtstheorie 19:39-49.
  26. added 2017-01-25
    About Kripke's Schema and Countable Subsets.Peters Schuster & Julia Zappe - 2008 - Logique Et Analyse 204:317-329.
  27. added 2017-01-23
    Incarnating Kripke's Skepticism About Meaning.Eisuke Sakakibara - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):277-291.
    Although Kripke’s skepticism leads to the conclusion that meaning does not exist, his argument relies upon the supposition that more than one interpretation of words is consistent with linguistic evidence. Relying solely on metaphors, he assumes that there is a multiplicity of possible interpretations without providing any strict proof. In his book The Taming of the True, Neil Tennant pointed out that there are serious obstacles to this thesis and concluded that the skeptic’s nonstandard interpretations are “will o’ wisps.” In (...)
  28. added 2017-01-23
    Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.Richard Eldridge - 1984 - Review of Metaphysics 37 (4):859-861.
  29. added 2017-01-23
    Wittgenstein. Understanding and Meaning.R. S. - 1981 - Review of Metaphysics 34 (4):776-778.
  30. added 2017-01-23
    Wittgenstein's Definition of Meaning as Use.W. A. F. - 1972 - Review of Metaphysics 26 (1):160-161.
  31. added 2017-01-22
    Computationalism and the Kripke-Wittgenstein Paradox.Nenad Mi??Evi? - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:215 - 229.
  32. added 2017-01-22
    Wittgenstein and Derrida on Meaning.Mark Rowlands - 1993 - Behavior and Philosophy 20:37 - 47.
  33. added 2017-01-20
    Saul Kripke.G. W. Fitch - 2004 - Acumen Publishing.
    Saul Kripke is one of the most original and creative philosophers writing today. His work has had a tremendous impact on the direction that philosophy has taken in the last thirty years and continues to dominate some of its most fundamental aspects. Given Kripke's importance it is perhaps surprising that there is no introduction to his philosophy available to the general student. This book fills that gap. As much of Kripke's work is highly technical, the book's central aim is to (...)
  34. added 2017-01-19
    Some Paradoxes in Kripke's Interpretation of Wittgenstein.Patricia H. Werhane - 1987 - Synthese 73 (2):253 - 273.
    Kripke's skeptical interpretation of Wittgenstein's project in the Philosophical Investigations attributes to Wittgenstein a radical skepticism about the objectivity of rules and thus the meanings of words and the existence of language as well as a skepticism about the truth conditions underlying our alleged facts about the world. Kripke then contends that Wittgenstein solves this skeptical paradox by committing himself to what I shall call a Communitarian View of language. There are a number of difficulties with Kripke's interpretation of the (...)
  35. added 2017-01-18
    Wittgenstein on Meaning and Life.David Kishik - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (1):111-128.
    This is a paper about the way language meshes with life. It focuses on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work, and compares it with Leo Tolstoy and Saint Augustine’s confessions. My aim is to better understand in this way what it means to have meaning in language, as well as meaning in life.
  36. added 2017-01-18
    A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules: Defending Kripke's Wittgenstein – Martin Kusch.Jussi Haukioja - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):688–690.
  37. added 2017-01-18
    Rule-Following and Externalism.Alexander Miller - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):127-140.
    John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's "sceptical paradox" about rule-following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule-following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow.
  38. added 2017-01-18
    Horwich, Meaning and Kripke's Wittgenstein.Alexander Miller - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):161-174.
    Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'use-theoretic' account of meaning actually falls prey to that sceptical (...)
  39. added 2017-01-18
    The Skeptic and the Hoverfly (a Teleo-Computational View of Rule-Following).Nenad Miscevic - 1996 - Acta Analytica 17 (16):171-187.
  40. added 2017-01-18
    Following a Rule.H. O. Mounce - 1986 - Philosophical Investigations 9 (July):187-198.
  41. added 2017-01-18
    The Normal and the Normative: Wittgenstein's Legacy, Kripke, and Cavell.Richard Eldridge - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (June):555-575.
  42. added 2017-01-18
    Kripke and Wittgenstein: Intention Without Paradox.Paul K. Moser & Kevin Flannery - 1985 - Heythrop Journal 26 (3):310–318.
  43. added 2017-01-18
    Kripke on Wittgenstein on Rules.Warren Goldfarb - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (9):471-488.
  44. added 2017-01-17
    On a Wittgensteinian Objection to Kripke's Dualism Argument.Richard Double - 1981 - Philosophy Research Archives 1414:171-181.
    In 'kripke's argument against the identity theory' michael levin argues that the private language argument can be used to undermine saul kripke's cartesian claim to be able to imagine mental states and brain states existing apart, and, thus, refute his argument for dualism. in this paper it is argued that levin's use of the private language argument relies implicitly upon the descriptivist theory of mental language, to which kripke has provided a plausible alternative, "viz"., the causal theory of reference. thus, (...)
  45. added 2017-01-16
    The Real Nature of Kripke's Paradox.C. C. Pfisterer - 2000 - .
  46. added 2017-01-16
    Skepticism About Meaning: Indeterminacy, Normativity, and the Rule-Following Paradox.Scott Soames - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (sup1):211-249.
  47. added 2017-01-16
    Kripke on Wittgenstein on Rules.Warren Goldfarb - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (9):471.
  48. added 2017-01-15
    Saul Wittgenstein’s Skeptical Paradox.Ronald Suter - 1986 - Philosophy Research Archives 12:183-193.
    Saul Kripke is struck by a skeptical argument which he says is neither Wittgenstein’s nor his own. I call this new skeptic “Saul Wittgenstein”. SW’s conclusion is that there is no such thing as following a rule. My first aim is to show that Kripke misunderstands the Investigations when he says it offers a “skeptical solution” to SW’s paradox. Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy commits him to a dissolution of the paradox. I show next that LW’s writing contains an implicit dissolution (...)
  49. added 2017-01-14
    Words and the World: A Critique of Straight Solutions to Kripke’s Meaning Scepticism.Samuel Paul Douglas - unknown
    Research Doctorate - Doctor of Philosophy.
  50. added 2017-01-14
    Kripke’s Thought-Paradox and the 5th Antinomy.Graham Priest - 2015 - In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Verlag.
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