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Summary

Kripkenstein or Kripke's Wittgenstein is a fictional character customarily taken to be the person committed to the views of meaning, content, and rule-following presented in Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982). Kripkenstein first presents us with the skeptical challenge to explain what it is for expressions to have a particular meaning in a speaker's idiolect. Consider a word like '+' which is intuitively for applying the addition function or 'table' which is for talking about tables. Kripkenstein asks what makes it the case that in one's idiolect these words are indeed for doing these things. After all, we can assume that our history of past uses is entirely compatible with '+' being for applying the quaddition function (x quus y = x plus y, if x, y < 57, = 5 otherwise) or for talking about tabairs (a tabair = anything that is a table not found at the base of the Eiffel tower or a chair found there). He then presents a skeptical argument by considering a series of potential answers and showing that they don't work. For starters, he argues that the relevant fact can't consist in a speaker's having given herself instructions how to use the expression because instructions would have to be stated in language and that would merely push back the problem. Second, he argues that it can't consist in her being disposed to use the expression in certain ways (e. g. when using ‘+’ one is disposed to give the sum, or when using ‘table’ one is disposed to do so only in the presence of tables) because this fails to make sense of the fact that using it in those ways is correct. Finally, he argues that we can't invoke simplicity considerations to rule out quaddition-like candidates, nor by claiming that the relevant state is primitive. Having drawn the skeptical conclusion that nothing makes It the case that expressions have particular meanings in our idiolects, Kripkenstein presents a skeptical solution by claiming that we should construe attributions of meaning, content etc. in non-factualist terms by taking them to be justifiable or permissible when the person to whom we attribute meaning, content etc. behaves like we do.

Key works Kripkenstein's discussion of meaning, content, and rule-following is presented in Kripke 1982. Important early commentaries include Forbes 1983, Blackburn 1984, and Goldfarb 1985 which defend the dispositionalist answer, Lewis 1983 which discusses invoking simplicity considerations, and McDowell 1984 and McGinn 1984 which discuss taking the state to be primitive and the relation between Wittgenstein's and Kripkenstein's views. Important later commentaries include Boghossian 1989, Pettit 1990, and Wilson 1994. Many of these papers are collected in Miller & Wright 2002. Recent discussions include Hattiangadi 2007 and Ginsborg 2011.
Introductions  Boghossian 1989; the Introduction to Miller & Wright 2002
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  1. Saul Kripke.Arif Ahmed - 2007 - Bloomsbury Academic.
    Saul Kripke is one of the most important and original post-war analytic philosophers. His work has undeniably had a profound impact on the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. Yet his ideas are amongst the most challenging frequently encountered by students of philosophy. In this informative and accessible book, Arif Ahmed provides a clear and thorough account of Kripke's philosophy, his major works and ideas, providing an ideal guide to the important and complex thought of this key philosopher. (...)
  2. Kripke on Wittgenstein on Regulation.Virgil C. Aldrich - 1987 - Philosophy 62 (241):375 - 384.
    Kripke's own view of the 'inner life' as comprised of '"qualia"' that have no 'natural "external" manifestation' leads him into misinterpreting wittgenstein's denials on this count. so kripke gives wittgenstein's account a paradoxical and sceptical cast which misrepresents it, making it look as if it called for a sceptical solution and a 'warranted assertibility' theory of truth. but wittgenstein was making sport of the 'inner-outer' (subjective-objective) distinction with the rapier of his suggestion that psychological talk is not regulated by the (...)
  3. Gruesome Arithmetic: Kripke's Sceptic Replies.Barry G. Allen - 1989 - Dialogue 28 (2):257-264.
  4. Critical Notice: Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (4):103-9.
  5. Review of Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language[REVIEW]G. E. M. Anscombe - 1985 - Ethics 95:342-352.
  6. Rule-Following and A Priori Biconditionals - A Sea of Tears?Amrei Bahr & Markus Seidel - 2016 - In Simon Derpmann & David Schweikard (eds.), Philip Pettit: Five Themes from his Work. Springer. pp. 19-31.
  7. Reply to Mr Mounce.Gordon P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker - 1986 - Philosophical Investigations 9 (3):199-204.
  8. On Misunderstanding Wittgenstein: Kripke's Private Language Argument.Gordon P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker - 1984 - Synthese 58 (3):407-450.
  9. Kripke.Alexander Bird - 2009 - In Christopher Belshaw & Gary Kemp (eds.), 12 Modern Philosophers. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 153--72.
  10. Kripke's Case: Some Remarks on Rules, Their Interpretation and Application.Jes Bjarup - 1988 - Rechtstheorie 19:39-49.
  11. The Individual Strikes Back.Simon W. Blackburn - 1984 - Synthese 58 (March):281-302.
  12. The Status of Content.Paul A. Boghossian - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (2):157-84.
    A n irrealist conception of a given region of discourse is the view that no real properties answer to the central predicates of the region in question. Any such conception emerges, invariably, as the result of the interaction of two forces. An account of the meaning of the central predicates, along with a conception of the sorts of property the world may contain, conspire to show that, if the predicates of the region are taken to express properties, their extensions would (...)
  13. The Status of Content Revisited.Paul A. Boghossian - 1990 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (December):264-278.
  14. The Rule-Following Considerations.Paul A. Boghossian - 1989 - Mind 98 (392):507-49.
    I. Recent years have witnessed a great resurgence of interest in the writings of the later Wittgenstein, especially with those passages roughly, Philosophical Investigations p)I 38 — 242 and Remarks on the Foundations of mathematics, section VI that are concerned with the topic of rules. Much of the credit for all this excitement, unparalleled since the heyday of Wittgenstein scholarship in the early IIJ6os, must go to Saul Kripke's I4rittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. It is easy to explain why. (...)
  15. On Misinterpreting Kripke's Wittgenstein.Alex Byrne - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):339-343.
  16. The Community View.John V. Canfield - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):469-488.
  17. 'Kripke's Near Miss' and Some Other Considerations On Rule Following.Rodrigo Jungmann de Castro - 2008 - Princípios 15 (23):135-151.
    In his 1982 book Wittgenstein On Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke maintains that Wittgenstein´s rule following considerations land us with a skeptical argument about meaning. This essay contains a short exposition of Kripke´s argument. In addition, I hold, both on textual grounds and by an appeal to some select secondary literature, that Wittgenstein offered no such skeptical argument in the Philosophical Investigations . Although Wittgenstein certainly repudiates a view of meaning based on temporally located mental states, it does not (...)
  18. Solving Kripke/Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Paradox.Kai-Yuan Cheng - 2002 - Dissertation, City University of New York
    The rule-following paradox of Kripke's Wittgenstein posits that there is no fact of the matter about an individual that can determine whether he means one thing or another by a term, such as "+". The paradox thus renders the existence of meaning illusory. The objective of this thesis is to examine the paradox and try to offer a version of a dispositional account that can counteract Kripke's skeptics. ;Gaining insights from previous dispositionalist accounts of meaning and rule-following, including those of (...)
  19. The Sceptical Paradox and the Nature of the Self.Tony Cheng - 2016 - Philosophical Investigations 39 (1):3-14.
    In the present article, I attempt to relate Saul Kripke's “sceptical paradox” to some issues about the self; specifically, the relation between the self and its mental states and episodes. I start with a brief reconstruction of the paradox, and venture to argue that it relies crucially on a Cartesian model of the self: the sceptic regards the Wittgensteinian “infinite regress of interpretation” as the foundation of his challenge, and this is where he commits the crucial mistake. After the diagnosis, (...)
  20. Meaning, Mistake, and Miscalculation.Paul Coates - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (2):171-97.
    The issue of what distinguishes systems which have original intentionalityfrom those which do not has been brought into sharp focus by Saul Kripke inhis discussion of the sceptical paradox he attributes to Wittgenstein.In this paper I defend a sophisticated version of the dispositionalistaccount of meaning against the principal objection raised by Kripke in hisattack on dispositional views. I argue that the objection put by the sceptic,to the effect that the dispositionalist cannot give a satisfactory account ofnormativity and mistake, in fact (...)
  21. Kripke's Skeptical Paradox: Normativeness and Meaning.Paul Coates - 1986 - Mind 1986 (January):77-80.
  22. Kripke's Sceptical Paradox: Normativeness and Meaning.Paul Coates - 1986 - Mind 95 (377):77-80.
  23. On the Paradox Kripke Finds in Wittgenstein.A. Collins - 1992 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1):74-88.
  24. How Sceptical is Kripke's 'Sceptical Solution'.F. Davies - 1998 - Philsophia 26 (1-2):119-40.
  25. Kripke, Crusoe and Wittgenstein.S. Davies - 1988 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (1):52-66.
  26. "Kripke´s Near Miss" and Some Other Considerations On Rule Following.Rodrigo Jungmann de Castro - 2008 - Princípios 15 (23):135-151.
    In his 1982 book Wittgenstein On Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke maintains that Wittgenstein´s rule following considerations land us with a skeptical argument about meaning. This essay contains a short exposition of Kripke´s argument. In addition, I hold, both on textual grounds and by an appeal to some select secondary literature, that Wittgenstein offered no such skeptical argument in the Philosophical Investigations . Although Wittgenstein certainly repudiates a view of meaning based on temporally located mental states, it does not (...)
  27. Meaning Naturalism, Meaning Irrealism, and the Work of Language.Craig Stephen Delancey - 2007 - Synthese 154 (2):231-257.
    I defend the hypothesis that organisms that produce and recognize meaningful utterances tend to use simpler procedures, and should use the simplest procedures, to produce and recognize those utterances. This should be a basic principle of any naturalist theory of meaning, which must begin with the recognition that the production and understanding of meanings is work. One measure of such work is the minimal amount of space resources that must go into storing a procedure to produce or recognize a meaningful (...)
  28. Kripkenstein and Non-Reductionism About Meaning-Facts.Florian Demont - unknown
    In 1982 Saul A. Kripke proposed a reconstruction of the central insights of Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following. The reconstruction prominently featured a sceptical challenge which soon was recognised as a new and very radical form of scepticism. According to the challenge there is no fact of the matter which constitutes meaning. As there is no such fact, the first-person authority people intuitively seem to have concerning what they mean is also baseless. In response to the sceptic, many solutions have (...)
  29. Rules and Dispositions in Language Use.Florian Demont-Biaggi - 2014 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Human language is not arbitrary. But how is its use constrained? Are there rules or general human dispositions that govern it? Rules and Dispositions in Language Use explains how correct language use is indeed governed by both rules and general human dispositions. It does so by bringing together themes from Ludwig Wittgenstein and Noam Chomsky, which for many years have been thought to be incompatible. -/- Opening with a fresh discussion of Saul Kripke's work on rule-following and meaning, the question (...)
  30. Transcendentalism About Content.Michael Devitt - 1990 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (December):247-63.
  31. Transcending Transcendentalism.Michael Devitt & Georges Rey - 1991 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (June):87-100.
  32. On a Wittgensteinian Objection to Kripke's Dualism Argument.Richard Double - 1981 - Philosophy Research Archives 1414:171-181.
    In 'kripke's argument against the identity theory' michael levin argues that the private language argument can be used to undermine saul kripke's cartesian claim to be able to imagine mental states and brain states existing apart, and, thus, refute his argument for dualism. in this paper it is argued that levin's use of the private language argument relies implicitly upon the descriptivist theory of mental language, to which kripke has provided a plausible alternative, "viz"., the causal theory of reference. thus, (...)
  33. The Qua-Problem and Meaning Scepticism.Samuel Douglas - 2018 - Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 17:71–78.
    When considering potential solutions to meaning-scepticism, Kripke (1982) did not consider a causal-theoretic approach. Kusch (2006) has argued that this is due to the qua-problem. I consider Kusch’s criticism of Maddy (1984) and McGinn (1984) before offering a different way to solve the qua-problem, one that is not susceptible to sceptical attack. If this solution is successful, at least one barrier to using a causal theory to refute Kripke’s scepticism is removed.
  34. Words and the World: A Critique of Straight Solutions to Kripke’s Meaning Scepticism.Samuel Paul Douglas - unknown
    Research Doctorate - Doctor of Philosophy.
  35. Rule-Following and Realism.Gary Ebbs - 1997 - Harvard University Press.
    Through detailed and trenchant criticism of standard interpretations of some of the key arguments in analytical philosophy over the last sixty years, this book ...
  36. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.Richard Eldridge - 1984 - Review of Metaphysics 37 (4):859-861.
  37. The Normal and the Normative: Wittgenstein's Legacy, Kripke, and Cavell.Richard T. Eldridge - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (June):555-575.
  38. Rule-Following and the Ontology of the Mind.Michael Esfeld - unknown
    Rule-following has become a focus of philosophical interest since Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. The case which Kripke makes is an argument against reducing the description of the beliefs of a person to a description in naturalistic terms. However, it has also implications for the metaphysics of mind. I claim that, contrary to what one might except, Kripke’s case contains an argument in favour of materialism in ontology.
  39. Wittgenstein's Definition of Meaning as Use.W. A. F. - 1972 - Review of Metaphysics 26 (1):160-161.
  40. Saul Kripke.G. W. Fitch - 2004 - Acumen Publishing.
    Saul Kripke is one of the most original and creative philosophers writing today. His work has had a tremendous impact on the direction that philosophy has taken in the last thirty years and continues to dominate some of its most fundamental aspects. Given Kripke's importance it is perhaps surprising that there is no introduction to his philosophy available to the general student. This book fills that gap. As much of Kripke's work is highly technical, the book's central aim is to (...)
  41. Saul Kripke.G. W. Fitch - 2004 - Routledge.
    Saul Kripke is one of the most original and creative philosophers writing today. His work has had a tremendous impact on the direction that philosophy has taken in the last thirty years and continues to dominate some of its most fundamental aspects. Given Kripke's importance it is perhaps surprising that there is no introduction to his philosophy available to the general student. This book fills that gap. As much of Kripke's work is highly technical, the book's central aim is to (...)
  42. Philosophical Troubles, by Saul Kripke.Graeme Forbes - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):927-933.
  43. Scepticism and Semantic Knowledge.Graeme R. Forbes - 1983 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84:223-37.
  44. Kripke.Bryan Frances - 2011 - In Barry Lee (ed.), Key Thinkers in the Philosophy of Language. Continuum. pp. 249-267.
    This chapter introduces Kripke's work to advanced undergraduates, mainly focussing on his "A Puzzle About Belief" and "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language".
  45. A New Skeptical Solution.Christopher Gauker - 1995 - Acta Analytica 113 (14):113-129.
    Kripke's puzzle about rule-following is a form of the traditional problem of the nature of linguistic meaning. A skeptical solution explains not what meaning is but the role that talk of meaning plays in the linguistic community. Contrary to what some have claimed, the skeptical approach is not self-refuting. However, Kripke's own skeptical solution is inadequate. He has not adequately explained the conditions under which we are justified in attributing meanings or the utility of the practice of attributing meanings. An (...)
  46. Humpty Dumpty and the Night of the Triffids: Individualism and Rule-Following.Grant R. Gillett - 1995 - Synthese 105 (2):191-206.
  47. The Dispositionalist Solution to Wittgenstein's Problem About Understanding a Rule: Answering Kripke's Objection.Carl Ginet - 1992 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):53-73.
    The paper explicates a version of dispositionalism and defends it against Kripke's objections (in his "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language") that 1) it leaves out the normative aspect of a rule, 2) it cannot account for the directness of the knowledge one has of what one meant, and 3) regarding rules for computable functions of numbers, a) there are numbers beyond one's capacity to consider and b) there are people who are disposed to make systematic mistakes in computing values (...)
  48. Meaning, Understanding and Normativity.Hannah Ginsborg - 2012 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):127-146.
    I defend the normativity of meaning against recent objections by arguing for a new interpretation of the ‘ought’ relevant to meaning. Both critics and defenders of the normativity thesis have understood statements about how an expression ought to be used as either prescriptive (indicating that speakers have reason to use the expression in a certain way) or semantic (designating certain uses as correct in a sense explicable in terms of truth). I propose an alternative view of the ‘ought’ as conveying (...)
  49. Inside and Outside Language: Stroud's Nonreductionism About Meaning.Hannah Ginsborg - 2011 - In Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny & Wai-Hung Wong (eds.), The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Essays for Barry Stroud. Oxford University Press.
    I argue that Stroud's nonreductionism about meaning is insufficiently motivated. First, given that he rejects the assumption that grasp of an expression's meaning guides or instructs us in its use, he has no reason to accept Kripke's arguments against dispositionalism or related reductive views. Second, his argument that reductive views are impossible because they attempt to explain language “from outside” rests on an equivocation between two senses in which an explanation of language can be from outside language. I offer a (...)
  50. Primitive Normativity and Skepticism About Rules.Hannah Ginsborg - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (5):227-254.
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