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  1. Property Identities and Modal Arguments.Derek Ball - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.
    Physicalists about the mind are committed to claims about property identities. Following Kripke's well-known discussion, modal arguments have emerged as major threats to such claims. This paper argues that modal arguments can be resisted by adopting a counterpart theoretic account of modal claims, and in particular modal claims involving properties. Thus physicalists have a powerful motive to adopt non-Kripkean accounts of the metaphysics of modality and the semantics of modal expressions.
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  2. Kripke's Pains.R. L. Barnette - 1977 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):3-14.
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  3. Kripke's Cartesian Argument.Steven R. Bayne - 1988 - Philosophia 18 (July):265-270.
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  4. The Origins of Modal Error.George Bealer - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):11-42.
    Modal intuitions are the primary source of modal knowledge but also of modal error. According to the theory of modal error in this paper, modal intuitions retain their evidential force in spite of their fallibility, and erroneous modal intuitions are in principle identifiable and eliminable by subjecting our intuitions to a priori dialectic. After an inventory of standard sources of modal error, two further sources are examined in detail. The first source - namely, the failure to distinguish between metaphysical possibility (...)
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  5. Mental Properties.George Bealer - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):185-208.
    It is argued that, because of scientific essentialism, two currently popular arguments against the mind-body identity thesis -- the multiple-realizability argument and the Nagel-Jackson knowledge argument -- are unsatisfactory as they stand and that their problems are incurable. It is then argued that a refutation of the identity thesis in its full generality can be achieved by weaving together two traditional Cartesian arguments -- the modal argument and the certainty argument. This argument establishes, not just the falsity of the identity (...)
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  6. Précis of "E-physicalism-a physicalist theory of phenomenal consciousness".Reinaldo Bernal Velasquez, Pierre Jacob, Maximilian Kistler, David Papineau & Jérôme Dokic - 2013 - Ideas Y Valores 62 (152):268-297.
    El libro "E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness" presenta una teoría en el área de la metafísica de la conciencia fenomenal. Está basada en las convicciones de que la experiencia subjetiva -en el sentido de Nagel - es un fenómeno real, y de que alguna variante del fisicalismo debe ser verdadera.
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  7. E-Physicalism. A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.Reinaldo J. Bernal - 2012 - Ontos Verlag.
    This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels “e-physicalism”. Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that consciousness has an internal character. Thirdly, he discusses HOT theories, the unity of consciousness, and holds that the “explanatory gap” is not ontological but epistemological. Fourthly, he argues that consciousness is not a supervenient but an emergent property, not reducible and endowed with (...)
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  8. Bayne on Kripke.Alex Blum - 1989 - Philosophia 19 (4):455-456.
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  9. Kripke's Refutation of Materialism.J.-B. Blumenfeld - 1975 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):151-6.
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  10. Undefeated Dualism.Tomas Bogardus - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):445-466.
    In the standard thought experiments, dualism strikes many philosophers as true, including many non-dualists. This ‘striking’ generates prima facie justification: in the absence of defeaters, we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be, i.e. we ought to be dualists. In this paper, I examine several proposed undercutting defeaters for our dualist intuitions. I argue that each proposal fails, since each rests on a false assumption, or requires empirical evidence that it lacks, or overgenerates defeaters. By the (...)
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  11. Kripke's Critique of the Mind-Body Identity Theory.Mašan Bogdanovski - 1996 - Theoria 39 (1):23-38.
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  12. Il Genio Compreso: La Filosofia di Saul Kripke.Andrea Borghini (ed.) - 2010 - Carocci.
  13. Materialism Without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not Entail.Richard Boyd - 1980 - In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol 1. pp. 1--67.
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  14. Possibility and Imagination.Alex Byrne - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):125–144.
  15. The Inconceivable Popularity of Conceivability Arguments.Douglas I. Campbell, Jack Copeland & Zhuo-Ran Deng - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):223-240.
    Famous examples of conceivability arguments include (i) Descartes’ argument for mind-body dualism, (ii) Kripke's ‘modal argument’ against psychophysical identity theory, (iii) Chalmers’ ‘zombie argument’ against materialism, and (iv) modal versions of the ontological argument for theism. In this paper, we show that for any such conceivability argument, C, there is a corresponding ‘mirror argument’, M. M is deductively valid and has a conclusion that contradicts C's conclusion. Hence, a proponent of C—henceforth, a ‘conceivabilist’—can be warranted in holding that C's premises (...)
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  16. Kripke and Materialism.James D. Carney - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (April):279-282.
  17. Modern Materialism and Essentialism.James D. Carney & P. von Bretzel - 1973 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):78-81.
  18. In Defence of Antecedent Physicalism.Daniel Cohnitz - 2012 - In A. Newen & R. van Riel (eds.), Introduction to the Philosophy of John Perry. CSLI.
  19. Por Qué la Aposterioridad No (Basta, Según Kripke, Ni) Basta (Why Aposteriority is Not (Enough According to Kripke, nor is) Enough).de Sa Dan López - 2006 - Theoria 21 (3):245-255.
    Es conocido que Kripke argumentó que la ilusión de contingencia en el caso de la conciencia no puede explicarse del modo en que se explica en el resto de casos familiares de enunciados necesarios a posteriori. En un artículo reciente, Pérez Otero (2002) argumenta que hay una explicación alternativa, en términos de mera aposterioridad. Argumento en contra de la corrección exegética y de la verdad de esta tesis.Kripke famously argued that the illusion of contingency cannot be explained away, in the (...)
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  20. On a Wittgensteinian Objection to Kripke's Dualism Argument.Richard Double - 1981 - Philosophy Research Archives 1414:171-181.
    In 'kripke's argument against the identity theory' michael levin argues that the private language argument can be used to undermine saul kripke's cartesian claim to be able to imagine mental states and brain states existing apart, and, thus, refute his argument for dualism. in this paper it is argued that levin's use of the private language argument relies implicitly upon the descriptivist theory of mental language, to which kripke has provided a plausible alternative, "viz"., the causal theory of reference. thus, (...)
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  21. The Inconclusiveness of Kripke's Argument Against the Identity Theory.Richard Double - 1976 - Auslegung 3 (June):156-65.
  22. Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Grounded.Guy Dove & Andreas Elpidorou - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (5):580-611.
    The Phenomenal Concept Strategy offers the physicalist perhaps the most promising means of explaining why the connection between mental facts and physical facts appears to be contingent even though it is not. In this article, we show that the large body of evidence suggesting that our concepts are often embodied and grounded in sensorimotor systems speaks against standard forms of the PCS. We argue, nevertheless, that it is possible to formulate a novel version of the PCS that is thoroughly in (...)
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  23. Será Procedente o Argumento de Kripke Contra a Teoria da Identidade Tipo-Tipo?Domingos Faria - 2014 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 70 (1):112-131.
    Resumo O meu objetivo neste artigo é examinar criticamente o argumento de Kripke contra a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo. Assumindo a tese da necessidade da identidade, bem como a tese da designação rígida, Kripke sustenta que se a dor é idêntica à estimulação das fibras C, então a dor é necessariamente idêntica à estimulação das fibras C. No entanto, precisamente porque a proposição expressa pela frase “a dor não é idêntica à estimulação das fibras C” é uma possibilidade metafísica, Kripke (...)
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  24. Identity, Necessity, and Events.Fred Feldman - 1980 - In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol.
  25. Kripke on the Identity Theory.Fred Feldman - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (October):665-76.
  26. Kripke's Argument Against Materialism.Fred Feldman - 1973 - Philosophical Studies 24 (November):416-19.
  27. Conceivability and Possibility.Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
    The capacity to represent things to ourselves as possible plays a crucial role both in everyday thinking and in philosophical reasoning; this volume offers much-needed philosophical illumination of conceivability, possibility, and the relations between them.
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  28. A Kripkean Objection to Kripke's Arguments Against the Identity-Theories.Olav Gjelsvik - 1988 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 30 (December):435-50.
  29. A Kripkean Objection to Kripke's Argument Against Identity-Theories.Olav Gjelsvik - 1987 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):435 – 450.
    This paper analyses and criticizes S. Kripke's celebrated argument against materialist identity?theories. While criticisms of Kripke in the literature attack one or more of his premisses, an attempt is made here to show that Kripke's conclusion is unjustified even if his premisses are accepted. Kripke's premisses have sufficient independent plausibility to make this strategy interesting. Having stated Kripke's argument, it is pointed out that Kripke must assume that the contents of the Cartesian intuitions are clear and of a kind suited (...)
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  30. Kripke's Modal Argument is Challenged by His Implausible Conception of Introspection.Alexander Heinzel & Georg Northoff - 2009 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):13-31.
    Kripke presented one of the most influential modal arguments against psycho-physical identities. His argument as exemplied by the identity of pain and its respective neural correlates will be analysed in detail. It shall be argued that his reasoning relies on an implausible conception of introspection implying an implausible conception of mental phenomena such as pain. His account does not consider possible interaction of pain and attention as well as the interaction of pain with other psychological factors. Theoretical and empirical evidences (...)
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  31. Why Cartesian Intuitions Are Compatible with the Identity Thesis.Christopher S. Hill - 1981 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December):254-65.
  32. Kripke's Argument Against Materialism.Eli Hirsch - 2009 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
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  33. Metaphysical Necessity and Conceptual Truth.Eli Hirsch - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):243-256.
  34. Qualia, Kripkean Arguments, and Subjectivity.Emmett L. Holman - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:411-29.
    The subjectivity of consciousness is widely regarded as a major stumbling block for materialist theories of mind. In this paper I show how Kripkean arguments against identity theories , and in particular a Kripkean argument against qualia-material property identity developed by Frank Jackson are a way of highlighting this problem. As such, Kripkean arguments are akin to recent discussions of subjectivity by Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson . I then consider some recent attempts to refute Kripkean arguments or otherwise show (...)
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  35. A Note on Physicalism and Heat.Frank Jackson - 1980 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (1):26-34.
  36. Kripke and the Mind-Body Problem.Dale Jacquette - 1987 - Dialectica 41 (4):293-300.
    SummaryMind‐body identity theories are standardly supposed to be logically contingent. Kripke defends a quasi‐Cartesian property dualism by observing that bodies and minds or mental and neurophysiological events or event‐types can always be assigned distinct rigid designators. The concept of rigid designation implies that possibly nonidentical rigidly designated bodies and minds are necessarily and therefore actually nonidentical. But Kripke's argument does not refute materialist reductions that affirm the actual identity of minds and bodies while admitting only the possible nonidentity of ncwigidly (...)
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  37. Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
  38. Identity and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1971 - In Milton K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York University Press. pp. 135-164.
    are synthetic a priori judgements possible?" In both cases, i~thas usually been t'aken for granted in fife one case by Kant that synthetic a priori judgements were possible, and in the other case in contemporary,'d-". philosophical literature that contingent statements of identity are ppss. ible. I do not intend to deal with the Kantian question except to mention:ssj~".
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  39. Theoretical Identification and the Mind-Body Problem.Jarrett Leplin - 1979 - Philosophia 8 (October):673-88.
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  40. Tortuous Dualism.Michael E. Levin - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):313-22.
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  41. Kripke's Argument Against the Identity Thesis.Michael E. Levin - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (March):149-67.
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  42. Phenomenal States (Revised Version).Brian Loar - 2004 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives. MIT Press. pp. 219.
  43. Phenomenal States II.Brian Loar - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.
  44. Phenomenal States (Second Version). In (N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Güzeldere, Eds).Brian Loar - 1997 - In Owen J. Flanagan, Ned Block & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press.
  45. Kripke's Conceivability Argument Reconsidered.Pascal Ludwig - manuscript
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  46. Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 1987 - MIT Press.
    In this book, William Lycan reviews the diverse philosophical views on consciousness--including those of Kripke, Block, Campbell, Sellars, and Casteneda--and ..
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  47. Functionalism and Essence.William G. Lycan - 1987 - In Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  48. Kripke and the Materialists.William G. Lycan - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (October):677-89.
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  49. Kripke on Heat and Sensations of Heat.Norman Malcolm - 1980 - Philosophical Investigations 3 (1):12-20.
  50. Rigid Designators and Mind-Brain Identity.Grover Maxwell - 1979 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:9.
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