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  1. added 2019-08-27
    Patterns, Noise, and Beliefs.Lajos Ludovic Brons - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (1):19-51.
    In “Real Patterns” Daniel Dennett developed an argument about the reality of beliefs on the basis of an analogy with patterns and noise. Here I develop Dennett’s analogy into an argument for descriptivism, the view that belief reports do no specify belief contents but merely describe what someone believes, and show that this view is also supported by empirical evidence. No description can do justice to the richness and specificity or “noisiness” of what someone believes, and the same belief can (...)
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  2. added 2019-07-13
    Puzzling Pierre and Intentional Identity.Alexander Sandgren - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):861-875.
    This paper concerns Kripke’s puzzle about belief. I have two goals in this paper. The first is to argue that two leading approaches to Kripke’s puzzle, those of Lewis and Chalmers, are inadequate as they stand. Both approaches require the world to supply an object that the relevant intentional attitudes pick out. The problem is that there are cases which, I argue, exhibit the very same puzzling phenomenon in which the world does not supply an object in the required way. (...)
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  3. added 2019-05-21
    The Reference Book.John Hawthorne & David Manley - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    This book critically examines some widespread views about the semantic phenomenon of reference and the cognitive phenomenon of singular thought. It begins with a defense of the view that neither is tied to a special relation of causal or epistemic acquaintance. It then challenges the alleged semantic rift between definite and indefinite descriptions on the one hand, and names and demonstratives on the other—a division that has been motivated in part by appeals to considerations of acquaintance. Drawing on recent work (...)
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  4. added 2018-08-17
    Names, Sense and Kripke’s Puzzle.Tim Crane - 1992 - From the Logical Point of View 2:11-26.
    Frege introduced the distinction between sense and reference to account for the information conveyed by identity statements. We can put the point like this: if the meaning of a term is exhausted by what it stands for, then how can 'a =a' and 'a =b' differ in meaning? Yet it seems they do, for someone who understands all the terms involved would not necessarily judge that a =b even though they judged that a =a. It seems that 'a =b' just (...)
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  5. added 2018-07-25
    Anti-Individualism, Materialism, Naturalism.Tomas Hribek - 2007 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (3):283-302.
    This paper starts from the familiar premise that psychological anti-individualism is incompatible with materialism. It attempts to state more clearly what this incompatibility consists in, and — rather than arguing in detail for any particular resolution — to inquire whether this incompatibility admits any resolution. However, the paper does offer a conditional argument concerning the possibility that the incompatibility is genuine and cannot be resolved. Provided that anti-individualism and materialism cannot be squared, and anti-individualism is correct, it follows that materialism (...)
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  6. added 2018-02-18
    Key Thinkers in the Philosophy of Language.Barry Lee (ed.) - 2011 - Continuum.
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  7. added 2017-09-05
    Direct and Indirect Belief.Curtis Brown - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):289-316.
    Belief states are only contingently connected with the objects of belief. Burge's examples show that the same belief state can be associated with different objects of belief. Kripke's puzzle shows that the same object of belief can be associated with different belief states. Nevertheless, belief states can best be characterized by a subset of the propositions one believes, namely those one directly or immediately believes. The rest of the things one believes are believed indirectly, by virtue of one's direct beliefs. (...)
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  8. added 2017-02-14
    1 Introducing the Puzzle.Quassim Cassam - 2011 - In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press. pp. 18.
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  9. added 2017-02-13
    2 The Puzzle of Coaction.Daniel M. Wegner & Betsy Sparrow - 2007 - In Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context. MIT Press. pp. 17.
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  10. added 2017-02-13
    The Puzzle of Scientific Method.S. Haack - 1997 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 51 (202):495-505.
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  11. added 2017-02-13
    La Fin, les Moyens, Un Puzzle Aristotélicien de C. Natale.Anne Marie Roviello - 1987 - Revue de Philosophie Ancienne 4.
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  12. added 2017-02-12
    The Puzzle of Peter.Julian Baggini - 2000 - The Philosophers' Magazine 10:51-53.
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  13. added 2017-02-11
    Disquotation and Proper Names: Brandom on Kripke's Puzzle.Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz - 2005 - Logique Et Analyse 48 (192):159-168.
  14. added 2017-02-11
    An "Apparent Movement" Puzzle.H. Schlosberg - 1936 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 19 (4):524.
  15. added 2017-02-09
    Freedom: An Illustrative Puzzle.Austin E. Duncan-Jones - 1938 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 39:99 - 120.
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  16. added 2017-02-08
    Brandom's Solution of Kripke's Puzzle.Carlo Penco - 1998 - [Papers on Line - Teaching Material].
    Brandom's "solution" of Kripke's puzzle in Making it Explicit [573-583] is to be read on the background of four main ideas, plus his general concern on inferential role semantics. I will give some hints about these basic presuppositions, because, once they have been accepted, Kripke's puzzle seems to have no more appeal (at least from Brandom's point of view). If already acquainted with Brandom's general ideas, you may skip part I and go directly to part II.
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  17. added 2017-02-08
    The Divestiture Puzzle Dissolved.Roger A. Shiner - 1990 - Analysis 50 (3):205 - 210.
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  18. added 2017-02-08
    A Puzzle Concerning Divestiture.Steven M. Cahn - 1987 - Analysis 47 (3):175 - 176.
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  19. added 2017-02-07
    A Puzzle About Ineffable Propositions.Agustín Rayo - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):289 - 295.
    I will argue for localism about credal assignments: the view that credal assignments are well-defined only relative to suitably constrained sets of possibilities. I will motivate the position by suggesting that it is the best way of addressing a puzzle devised by Roger White.
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  20. added 2017-02-07
    The Lawn Mowing Puzzle.Jeremy Gwiazda - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (3):629-629.
    In this brief paper, I present a puzzle for consideration.
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  21. added 2017-02-07
    A Puzzle About Necessary Being.Leon Pearl - 1990 - Philosophy 65 (252):229 - 231.
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  22. added 2017-02-06
    Pierre and Circumspection in Belief-Formation.Laurence Goldstein - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):653-655.
    In a well-known story constructed by Saul Kripke , Pierre, a rational but monolingual Frenchman who has never visited England, acquires, on the evidence of many magazine pictures of London, the belief that London is beautiful. He is happy to declare ‘Londres est jolie’. Pierre eventually moves to England and settles in one of the seedier areas of London, travelling only to comparably shabby neighbourhoods. He learns English by immersion, though he does not realize that ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ are co-referential. (...)
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  23. added 2017-02-03
    Belief About the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content.Neil Feit - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Mental content and the problem of De Se belief -- Cognitive attitudes and content -- The doctrine of propositions -- The problem of De Se belief -- The property theory of content -- In favor of the property theory -- Perry's messy shopper and the argument from explanation -- Lewis's case of the two Gods -- Arguments from internalism and physicalism -- An inference to the best explanation -- Alternatives to the property theory -- The triadic view of belief -- (...)
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  24. added 2017-02-01
    A WCO and ACD Puzzle.Jason Merchant http://homeuchicagoedu/~merchant/publicationshtml - manuscript
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  25. added 2017-02-01
    A Puzzle About Responses and Congruence of Meaning.Patrick Suppes - 1984 - Synthese 58 (1):39 - 50.
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  26. added 2017-01-29
    De Re Belief and Cumming's Puzzle.James R. Shaw - 2015 - Analytic Philosophy 56 (1):45-74.
    Cumming (2008) uses a puzzle about belief ascription to argue against a Millian semantics, and in favor of a semantics on which names are assigned denotations relative to a shiftable variable assignment. I use Cumming's puzzle to showcase the virtues of a rival, broadly Stalnakerian, treatment of attitude ascriptions that safeguards Millianism. I begin by arguing that Cumming's solution seems unable to account for substitutivity data that helps constitute the very puzzle he uses to motivate his account. Once the substitutivity (...)
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  27. added 2017-01-24
    What's the Meaning of “This”? A Puzzle About Demonstrative Belief.Gregory Mcculloch - 1991 - Philosophical Books 32 (3):169-171.
  28. added 2017-01-22
    A Pragmatic Solution to Ostertag’s Puzzle.Philip Atkins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):359-365.
    Gary Ostertag has presented a new puzzle for Russellianism about belief reports. He argues that Russellians do not have the resources to solve this puzzle in terms of pragmatic phenomena. I argue to the contrary that the puzzle can be solved according to Nathan Salmon’s pragmatic account of belief reports, provided that the account is properly understood. Specifically, the puzzle can be solved so long as Salmon’s guises are not identified with sentences.
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  29. added 2017-01-22
    Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs.Neil Feit - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):29 - 55.
    The author presents and defends a general view about belief. and certain attributions of belief, with the intention of providing a solution to Saul Kripke’s puzzle about belief. According to the position developed in the paper, there are two senses in which one could be said to have contradictory beliefs. Just one of these senses threatens the rationality of the believer; but Kripke’s puzzle concerns only the other one. The general solution is then extended to certain variants of Kripke’s original (...)
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  30. added 2017-01-22
    Kripke’s Puzzle and Belief ‘Under’ a Name.Alan McMichael - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):105 - 125.
    Recently Saul Kripke has drawn attention to a puzzle about belief and proper names, a puzzle of which philosophers have been aware for a long time, but which has never been completely resolved. Kripke gives a new, bilingual illustration of the puzzle:1 Pierre, while living in his native France, learns much about the city of London, which he calls ‘Londres,’ and comes to believe something which he would express in French with the words, ‘Londres est jolie.’ Using standard principle of (...)
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  31. added 2017-01-21
    [Online Version Only].JeeLoo Liu - unknown
    Kripke's puzzle is an old and familiar story. It was put forward in Kripke's 'A puzzle about Belief.'[1979] But even today it still has such a charm that people are drawn to it time and time again. In this paper I shall use his puzzle as the stepping stone for developing a new description theory of proper names. Kripke tries to defend his direct reference theory against the charge that it cannot explain the role of proper names in an epistemic (...)
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  32. added 2017-01-21
    Is Kripke's Puzzle Really a Puzzle?J. Angelo Corlett - 1989 - Theoria 55 (2):95-113.
    In his famous essay, "A Puzzle About Belief," Saul Kripke poses a puzzle regarding belief. In this paper I shall first describe Kripke's puzzle. Second, I shall introduce and examine five positions one might take in attempting to solve Kripke's Puzzle. In so doing, I shall show why each of these attempts fails to solve Kripke's Puzzle. The significance of this analysis is that if Kripke's Puzzle remains unresolved, then (as Kripke himself claims) the normal apparatus for belief ascription needs (...)
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  33. added 2017-01-21
    Kripke's Belief Puzzle.Igal Kvart - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):287-325.
    This article offers a resolution of Kripke’s well-known belief puzzle.
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  34. added 2017-01-20
    Two Solutions to Kripke's Puzzle About Belief.Jesse Steinberg - manuscript
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  35. added 2017-01-19
    Kripke's Principle of Disquotation and the Epistemology of Belief Ascription.Andreas Kemmerling - 2006 - Facta Philosophica 8 (1-2):119-143.
    among philosophers and therefore a short reminder will do. Pierre was a normal speaker of French, before he moved to London and learnt English without ever using any dictionary or similar devices. During his time in France he had heard about London, and because of what he..
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  36. added 2017-01-19
    Kripke's Puzzle About Belief.Carlo Penco - 1998 - teaching material.
    A traditional argument is often used against Mill's theory of names (the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent). Mill's theory implies transparency of proper names (coreferring proper names are substitutable salva veritate); but examples like Frege's and Quine's show that proper names are not transparent in belief contexts. This could be thought to be a reductio ad absurdum of Mill's theory. In " A puzzle about Belief" (1979; 1988) Kripke builds up an argument which aims to show (...)
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  37. added 2017-01-18
    Linguistic Competence and Kripke's Puzzle.Patricia Hanna - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):171-189.
    In "A Puzzle About Belief" (_Meaning and Use, A. Margalit (ed.), D. Reidel (1979), pp. 239-283), Saul Kripke argues that linguistic moves to all appearances normal in reporting the beliefs of others can be shown to generate paradox. In this paper, I argue that the supposed paradox is one in appearance only, and that the appearance rests on a covert vacillation in Kripke's paper between two conceptions of linguistic understanding, a weak, or 'minimal' one, and a 'strong' one. Only the (...)
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  38. added 2017-01-18
    Belief and Intentionality.Alberto Voltolini - 1987 - Topoi 6 (September):121-131.
  39. added 2017-01-17
    A Neo-Hintikkan Solution to Kripke’s Puzzle.Peter Alward - 2005 - In Kent A. Peacock & Andrew D. Irvine (eds.), Mistakes of Reason: Essays in Honour of John Woods. University of Toronto Press. pp. 93-108.
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  40. added 2017-01-15
    Keeping Track of Individuals: Brandom’s Analysis of Kripke’s Puzzle and the Content of Belief.Carlo Penco - 2005 - Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):177-201.
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  41. added 2017-01-15
    Kripke’s Belief Puzzle.Igal Kvart - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:369-412.
    This article offers a resolution of Kripke’s well-known belief puzzle.
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  42. added 2017-01-14
    Keeping Track of Pierre's Mind. A Davidsonian Solution to Kripke's Puzzle About Belief.Filip Buekens - 1994 - In Ulla Wessels & Georg Meggle (eds.), Analyomen / Analyomen: Proceedings of the 1st Conference "Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy". De Gruyter. pp. 434-443.
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  43. added 2016-12-08
    A Puzzle About Disbelief.Gary Ostertag - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (11):573 - 593.
    According to the naive theory of belief reports, our intuition that “Lois believes that Kent flies” is false results from our mistakenly identifying what this sentence implicates, which is false, with what it says, which is true. Whatever the merits of this proposal, it is here argued that the naive theory’s analysis of negative belief reports—sentences such as “Lois doesn't believe that Kent flies”—gives rise to equally problematic clashes with intuition, but that in this case no “pragmatic” explanation is available. (...)
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  44. added 2016-12-08
    A Test for Theories of Belief Ascription.B. Frances - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):116-125.
    These days the two most popular approaches to belief ascription are Millianism and Contextualism. The former approach is inconsistent with the existence of ordinary Frege cases, such as Lois believing that Superman flies while failing to believe that Clark Kent flies. The Millian holds that the only truth-conditionally relevant aspect of a proper name is its referent or extension. Contextualism, as I will define it for the purposes of this essay, includes all theories according to which ascriptions of the form (...)
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  45. added 2016-12-08
    The Import of the Puzzle About Belief.David Sosa - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (3):373 - 402.
    Relocating Kripke's puzzle about belief, this paper investigates i) in what the puzzle consists, exactly; ii) the method used in its construction; and iii) relations between meaning and rationality. Essential to Kripke's puzzle is a normative notion of contradictory belief. Different positions about the meaning of names yield different views of what constitutes the attribution of contradictory belief; and Kripke's puzzle unwittingly _imports a Millian assumption. Accordingly, the puzzle about belief is not independent of positions about the meaning of names.
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  46. added 2016-12-08
    The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs.Mark Crimmins & John Perry - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (12):685.
    Beliefs are concrete particulars containing ideas of properties and notions of things, which also are concrete. The claim made in a belief report is that the agent has a belief (i) whose content is a specific singular proposition, and (ii) which involves certain of the agent's notions and ideas in a certain way. No words in the report stand for the notions and ideas, so they are unarticulated constituents of the report's content (like the relevant place in "it's raining"). The (...)
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  47. added 2016-02-06
    Compositionality and Believing That.Tony Cheng - 2016 - Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 15:60-76.
    This paper is about compositionality, belief reports, and related issues. I begin by introducing Putnam’s proposal for understanding compositionality, namely that the sense of a sentence is a function of the sense of its parts and of its logical structure (section 1). Both Church and Sellars think that Putnam’s move is superfluous or unnecessary since there is no relevant puzzle to begin with (section 2). I will urge that Putnam is right in thinking that there is indeed a puzzle with (...)
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  48. added 2016-01-06
    De Re Belief.David Kaplan - 2013 - In Richard Hull (ed.), Presidential Addresses of The American Philosophical Association 1981–1990. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 25-37.
  49. added 2015-12-29
    A Proposed Solution to a Puzzle About Belief.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1981 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):501-510.
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  50. added 2015-09-05
    Is a Logic for Belief Sentences Possible?Karen Green - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (1):29 - 55.
    In this paper I distinguish normative and descriptive reasons for attempting to construct a logic for belief sentences, and argue that because the interpretation of the content of an attribution of belief is context sensitive and ambiguous, no simple logic is adequate.
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