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  1. Belief and Possibility.Ferenc Altrichter - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):364-382.
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  2. 6. A Neo-Hintikkan Solution to Kripke’s Puzzle.Peter Alward - 2005 - In Kent A. Peacock & Andrew D. Irvine (eds.), Mistakes of Reason: Essays in Honour of John Woods. University of Toronto Press. pp. 93-108.
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  3. A Pragmatic Solution to Ostertag's Puzzle.Philip Atkins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):359-365.
    Gary Ostertag has presented a new puzzle for Russellianism about belief reports. He argues that Russellians do not have the resources to solve this puzzle in terms of pragmatic phenomena. I argue to the contrary that the puzzle can be solved according to Nathan Salmon’s pragmatic account of belief reports, provided that the account is properly understood. Specifically, the puzzle can be solved so long as Salmon’s guises are not identified with sentences.
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  4. Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs?Kent Bach - 1997 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):215-241.
    The traditional puzzles about belief reports puzzles rest on a certain seemingly innocuous assumption, that 'that'-clauses specify belief contents. The main theories of belief reports also rest on this "Specification Assumption", that for a belief report of the form 'A believes that p' to be true,' the proposition that p must be among the things A believes. I use Kripke's Paderewski case to call the Specification Assumption into question. Giving up that assumption offers prospects for an intuitively more plausible approach (...)
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  5. The Puzzle of Peter.Julian Baggini - 2000 - The Philosophers' Magazine 10:51-53.
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  6. Understanding Belief Reports.David M. Braun - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):555-595.
    In this paper, I defend a well-known theory of belief reports from an important objection. The theory is Russellianism, sometimes also called `neo-Russellianism', `Millianism', `the direct reference theory', `the "Fido"-Fido theory', or `the naive theory'. The objection concernssubstitution of co-referring names in belief sentences. Russellianism implies that any two belief sentences, that differ only in containing distinct co-referring names, express the same proposition (in any given context). Since `Hesperus' and `Phosphorus' both refer to the planet Venus, this view implies that (...)
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  7. Keeping Track of Pierre's Mind. A Davidsonian Solution to Kripke's Puzzle About Belief.Filip Buekens - 1994 - In Ulla Wessels & Georg Meggle (eds.), Analyomen / Analyomen: Proceedings of the 1st Conference "Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy". De Gruyter. pp. 434-443.
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  8. A Puzzle Concerning Divestiture.Steven M. Cahn - 1987 - Analysis 47 (3):175 - 176.
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  9. 1 Introducing the Puzzle.Quassim Cassam - 2011 - In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press. pp. 18.
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  10. Compositionality and Believing That.Tony Cheng - 2016 - Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 15:60-76.
    This paper is about compositionality, belief reports, and related issues. I begin by introducing Putnam’s proposal for understanding compositionality, namely that the sense of a sentence is a function of the sense of its parts and of its logical structure (section 1). Both Church and Sellars think that Putnam’s move is superfluous or unnecessary since there is no relevant puzzle to begin with (section 2). I will urge that Putnam is right in thinking that there is indeed a puzzle with (...)
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  11. Is Kripke's Puzzle Really a Puzzle?J. Angelo Corlett - 1989 - Theoria 55 (2):95-113.
    In his famous essay, "A Puzzle About Belief," Saul Kripke poses a puzzle regarding belief. In this paper I shall first describe Kripke's puzzle. Second, I shall introduce and examine five positions one might take in attempting to solve Kripke's Puzzle. In so doing, I shall show why each of these attempts fails to solve Kripke's Puzzle. The significance of this analysis is that if Kripke's Puzzle remains unresolved, then (as Kripke himself claims) the normal apparatus for belief ascription needs (...)
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  12. A Solution for Russellians to a Puzzle About Belief.Sean Crawford - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):223-29.
  13. The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs.Mark Crimmins & John Perry - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (12):685.
    Beliefs are concrete particulars containing ideas of properties and notions of things, which also are concrete. The claim made in a belief report is that the agent has a belief (i) whose content is a specific singular proposition, and (ii) which involves certain of the agent's notions and ideas in a certain way. No words in the report stand for the notions and ideas, so they are unarticulated constituents of the report's content (like the relevant place in "it's raining"). The (...)
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  14. Freedom: An Illustrative Puzzle.E. Duncan-Jones Austin - 1938 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 39:99 - 120.
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  15. Belief About the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content.Neil Feit - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Mental content and the problem of De Se belief -- Cognitive attitudes and content -- The doctrine of propositions -- The problem of De Se belief -- The property theory of content -- In favor of the property theory -- Perry's messy shopper and the argument from explanation -- Lewis's case of the two Gods -- Arguments from internalism and physicalism -- An inference to the best explanation -- Alternatives to the property theory -- The triadic view of belief -- (...)
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  16. Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs.Neil Feit - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):29 - 55.
    The author presents and defends a general view about belief. and certain attributions of belief, with the intention of providing a solution to Saul Kripke’s puzzle about belief. According to the position developed in the paper, there are two senses in which one could be said to have contradictory beliefs. Just one of these senses threatens the rationality of the believer; but Kripke’s puzzle concerns only the other one. The general solution is then extended to certain variants of Kripke’s original (...)
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  17. De Lingua Belief.Robert Fiengo & Robert May - 2006 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    It is beliefs of this sort--de linguabeliefs--that Robert Fiengo and Robert May explore in this book.
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  18. Names and Expressions.Robert Fiengo & Robert May - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (8):377-409.
  19. Semantic Relationism.Kit Fine - 2007 - Blackwell.
    Introducing a new and ambitious position in the field, Kit Fine’s _Semantic Relationism_ is a major contribution to the philosophy of language. Written by one of today’s most respected philosophers Argues for a fundamentally new approach to the study of representation in language and thought Proposes that there may be representational relationships between expressions or elements of thought that are not grounded in the intrinsic representational features of the expressions or elements themselves Forms part of the prestigious new _Blackwell/Brown Lectures (...)
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  20. I. A Puzzle.Freedom Fission - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 2:58.
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  21. Donnellan on a Puzzle About Belief.Graeme Forbes - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):169 - 180.
    Keith Donnellan has advanced an interpretation of Kripke's well-known "Puzzle About Belief" according to which the puzzle concerns the true nature of beliefs. In this paper I argue that the puzzle merely concerns problems that others can have in "reporting" a confused individual's beliefs. I conclude that a new-Fregean account of belief- ascription is best- equipped to solve the puzzle.
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  22. A Test for Theories of Belief Ascription.B. Frances - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):116-125.
    These days the two most popular approaches to belief ascription are Millianism and Contextualism. The former approach is inconsistent with the existence of ordinary Frege cases, such as Lois believing that Superman flies while failing to believe that Clark Kent flies. The Millian holds that the only truth-conditionally relevant aspect of a proper name is its referent or extension. Contextualism, as I will define it for the purposes of this essay, includes all theories according to which ascriptions of the form (...)
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  23. Disquotation and Substitutivity.Bryan Frances - 2000 - Mind 109 (435):519-25.
    Millianism is reasonable; that is, it is reasonable to think that all there is to the semantic value of a proper name is its referent. But Millianism appears to be undermined by the falsehood of Substitutivity, the principle that interchanging coreferential proper names in an intentional context cannot change the truth value of the resulting belief report. Mary might be perfectly rational in assenting to ‘Twain was a great writer’ as well as ‘Clemens was not a great writer’. Her confusion (...)
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  24. Contradictory Belief and Epistemic Closure Principles.Bryan Frances - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (2):203–226.
    Kripke’s puzzle has puts pressure on the intuitive idea that one can believe that Superman can fly without believing that Clark Kent can fly. If this idea is wrong then many theories of belief and belief ascription are built from faulty data. I argue that part of the proper analysis of Kripke’s puzzle refutes the closure principles that show up in many important arguments in epistemology, e.g., if S is rational and knows that P and that P entails Q, then (...)
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  25. Defending Millian Theories.Bryan Frances - 1998 - Mind 107 (428):703-728.
    In this article I offer a three-pronged defense of Millian theories, all of which share the rough idea that all there is to a proper name is its referent, so it has no additional sense. I first give what I believe to be the first correct analysis of Kripke’s puzzle and its anti-Fregean lessons. The main lesson is that the Fregean’s arguments against Millianism and for the existence of semantically relevant senses (that is, individuative elements of propositions or belief contents (...)
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  26. Arguing for Frege's Fundamental Principle.Bryan Frances - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (3):341–346.
    Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief demonstrates the lack of soundness of the traditional argument for the Fregean fundamental principle that the sentences 'S believes that a is F' and 'S believes that b is F' can differ in truth value even if a = b. This principle is a crucial premise in the traditional Fregean argument for the existence of semantically relevant senses, individuative elements of beliefs that are sensitive to our varying conceptions of what the beliefs are about. Joseph (...)
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  27. Putnam on Kripke's Puzzle.Richard Garrett - 1991 - Erkenntnis 34 (3):271 - 286.
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  28. Pierre and Circumspection in Belief-Formation.Laurence Goldstein - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):653-655.
    In a well-known story constructed by Saul Kripke , Pierre, a rational but monolingual Frenchman who has never visited England, acquires, on the evidence of many magazine pictures of London, the belief that London is beautiful. He is happy to declare ‘Londres est jolie’. Pierre eventually moves to England and settles in one of the seedier areas of London, travelling only to comparably shabby neighbourhoods. He learns English by immersion, though he does not realize that ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ are co-referential. (...)
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  29. Is a Logic for Belief Sentences Possible?Karen Green - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (1):29 - 55.
    In this paper I distinguish normative and descriptive reasons for attempting to construct a logic for belief sentences, and argue that because the interpretation of the content of an attribution of belief is context sensitive and ambiguous, no simple logic is adequate.
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  30. The Lawn Mowing Puzzle.Jeremy Gwiazda - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (3):629-629.
    In this brief paper, I present a puzzle for consideration.
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  31. The Puzzle of Scientific Method.S. Haack - 1997 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 51 (202):495-505.
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  32. Linguistic Competence and Kripke's Puzzle.Patricia Hanna - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):171-189.
    In "A Puzzle About Belief" (_Meaning and Use, A. Margalit (ed.), D. Reidel (1979), pp. 239-283), Saul Kripke argues that linguistic moves to all appearances normal in reporting the beliefs of others can be shown to generate paradox. In this paper, I argue that the supposed paradox is one in appearance only, and that the appearance rests on a covert vacillation in Kripke's paper between two conceptions of linguistic understanding, a weak, or 'minimal' one, and a 'strong' one. Only the (...)
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  33. A WCO and ACD Puzzle.Jason Merchant http://homeuchicagoedu/~merchant/publicationshtml - manuscript
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  34. Brandom on Kripke's Puzzle.Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz - 2005 - Logique Et Analyse 189:159-168.
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  35. Disquotation and Proper Names: Brandom on Kripke's Puzzle.Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz - 2005 - Logique Et Analyse 48 (192):159-168.
  36. Paradoxes About Belief.Jesper Kallestrup - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):107-117.
    Referentialism is the view that all there is to the meaning of a singular term is its referent. Referentialism entails Substitutivity, i.e., that co-referring terms are intersubstitutable salva veritate . Frege's Paradox shows that Referentialism is inconsistent given two principles: Disquotation says that if S assents to 'P', then S believes that P, and Consistency says that if S believes that P and that not-P, then S is not fully rational. Kripke's strategy was to save Substitutivity by showing that those (...)
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  37. De Re Belief.David Kaplan - 2013 - In Richard Hull (ed.), Presidential Addresses of The American Philosophical Association 1981–1990. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 25-37.
  38. Kripke's Principle of Disquotation and the Epistemology of Belief Ascription.Andreas Kemmerling - 2006 - Facta Philosophica 8 (1-2):119-143.
    among philosophers and therefore a short reminder will do. Pierre was a normal speaker of French, before he moved to London and learnt English without ever using any dictionary or similar devices. During his time in France he had heard about London, and because of what he..
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  39. A Puzzle About Belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.
  40. Kripke's Belief Puzzle.Igal Kvart - 1987 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):287-325.
    This article offers a resolution of Kripke’s well-known belief puzzle.
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  41. Kripke’s Belief Puzzle.Igal Kvart - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:369-412.
    This article offers a resolution of Kripke’s well-known belief puzzle.
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  42. Key Thinkers in the Philosophy of Language.Barry Lee (ed.) - forthcoming - Continuum.
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  43. What Puzzling Pierre Does Not Believe.David Lewis - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):283 – 289.
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  44. [Online Version Only].JeeLoo Liu - unknown
    Kripke's puzzle is an old and familiar story. It was put forward in Kripke's 'A puzzle about Belief.'[1979] But even today it still has such a charm that people are drawn to it time and time again. In this paper I shall use his puzzle as the stepping stone for developing a new description theory of proper names. Kripke tries to defend his direct reference theory against the charge that it cannot explain the role of proper names in an epistemic (...)
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  45. What Powers Kripke's Puzzle?David Lumsden - 1984 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65 (2):189.
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  46. A Proposed Solution to a Puzzle About Belief.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1981 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):501-510.
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  47. Meaning and Use.A. Margalit (ed.) - 1979 - Reidel.
    This book contains a collection of papers presented at the Second Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter and is dedicated to the late Yehoshua Bar-Hillel.
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  48. What's the Meaning of “This”? A Puzzle About Demonstrative Belief.Gregory Mcculloch - 1991 - Philosophical Books 32 (3):169-171.
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  49. Lewis on What Puzzling Pierre Does Not Believe.Michael McGlone - manuscript
    In “What Puzzling Pierre Does not Believe”, Lewis ([4], 412‐4) argues that the sentences (1) Pierre believes that London is pretty and (2) Pierre believes that London is not pretty both truly describe Kripke’s well‐known situation involving puzzling Pierre ([3]). Lewis also argues that this situation is not one according to which Pierre believes either the proposition (actually) expressed by (3) London is pretty or the proposition (actually) expressed by (4) London is not pretty. These claims, Lewis suggests, provide a (...)
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  50. Understanding Kripke's Puzzles About Belief.Michael McGlone - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):487-514.
    In his famous 1979 article 'A Puzzle About Belief' Saul Kripke presents two puzzles regarding belief attribution, and he uses them to cast doubt on classical substitution arguments against the Millian view that a proper name has a 'denotation' (or reference) but no 'connotation' (or sense). In this article, I present Kripke's puzzles in what I take to be their most revealing form, discuss their relevance to the abovementioned arguments, briefly survey the ways in which philosophers have responded to these (...)
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