Laozi

This paper presents the joint journeys, from the East to the West, of three emerging educators, who reflect on their lived experiences in an Asian educational context and their shaped identities through a connection between the motherland and the places to which they immigrated. They have grounded their identities in the inequities they experienced in Asian education and described their experiences through a cultural and social lens as Asian teachers studying in Canadian institutions. They story their lived experiences by using (...) a Photo-voice research method to elicit the narratives of their East-to-West transcultural journeys. The major finding is the reconstructed identity of each of the researchers. The data collected through ‘Photo-voice’ sheds light on the influence on teachers’ mindset of the Three Teachings or Religions—Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism — across Asia on teachers' mindset, which are seen to cause inequities among the marginalized. The purpose of this research is an attempt by the authors, who have immersed themselves in each other’s journeys, to discuss how they have reformed their educator identities in a Canadian educational context in which equity, diversity, and inclusion are acknowledged. (shrink)

That dao and being are correct as written about by Laozi and Heidegger respectively is exposed through eight focal points.

That dao and being are correct as written about by Laozi and Heidegger respectively is exposed through eight perspectives.

This paper argues that a sense of nature‘s mystery can inspire and inform ways of experiencing and engaging with natural places and creatures in a way that is deeply morally transformative. Focusing on Daoism, it is argued that engagement with natural places and creates can facilitate the cultivation of receptivity to a sense of nature‘s mystery in a way that gradually releases a person from stances and conceptions that are morally and ecologically objectionable. The paper closes by suggesting that a (...) capacity to cultivate receptivity to nature‘s mystery is contingent upon the concerns and convictions of our background moral and social culture. (shrink)

Critique of idealistic naturalism: methodological pollution in the main stream of American philosophy, by D. Riepe.--Ex nihilo nihil fit: philosophy's "starting point," by D. H. DeGrood.--An historical critique of empiricism, by J. E. Hansen.--Epilogue on Berkeley, by R. W. Sellars.--Mandala thinking, by A. Mackay.--An empirical conception of freedom, by E. D'Angelo.--Heidegger on the essence of truth, by M. Farber.--Minding as a material force, by H. L. Parsons.--The crisis of the 1890's and the shaping of twentieth century America, by R. B. (...) Carson.--Ideology, scientific philosophy, and Marxism, by J. Somerville.--Marx and critical scientific thought, by M. Marković.--Experimentalism extended to politics, by E. Guevara.--The unity of opposites: a dialectical principle, by V. J. McGill and W. T. Parry.--A need definition of "value," by R. Handy.--Alienation and social action, by A. Schaff.--Naturalism in the Tao of Confucius and Lao Tzu, by D. H.-F. Poe.--Bibliography (p. 260-269). (shrink)

“人法地，地法天，天法道，道法自然。”—Daodejing 25 “Ua mau ke ea o ka ‘āina i ka pono.” —Hawaiʻi State Motto Our home, planet Earth, is under threat from a host of environmental problems: global climate change, loss of biodiversity, and pollution of the air and waterways from industries. The reality of climate change affects all of us—it affects habitats and entire ecosystems, and raises other risks such as health and security risks, as well as food production risks. The Fifth Assessment Report from the Intergovernmental Panel (...) on Climate Change, unequivocally concludes that “[h]uman influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems.” I posit that this global crisis arises from the loss of our sense of place in the world, a loss of our rootedness in our natural world. At the heart of this loss of rootedness is a particular understanding of our place in the world. Our view and experience of the world has evolved from an experience of place to one of the world as space. The dynamic, lived experience of being in the world has been replaced by a quantifying and abstracted distance from the natural world around us. In this dissertation, I argue that we need to recover our sense of place in the world in order to address the root problem of the environmental crisis. In this endeavor, I will reflect on the problem of the loss of our sense of place by first examining the meaning of place, and how by recovering what place means, we can begin to redevelop our sense of place. My reflections on place are aided by the insights of humanistic geographers Yi-Fu Tuan, Tim Cresswell and Edward Relph as well as philosophers Martin Heidegger and Edward S. Casey. By recovering a sense of place, I will inquire into the possibility of finding an enduring ethics of the environment. I believe that the challenge of developing such an enduring ethics of the environment requires a way of thinking that is more capacious and inclusive, and that is built on dialogue. The philosopher J. Baird Callicott made a place for dialogue by bringing together environmental ethicists and philosophers of non-Western traditions in search of common ground for a more representative, global ethics of the environment. My dissertation contributes to this ongoing discourse by bringing together the Daoist and Hawaiian traditions in a dialogue on place, from which I glean a Daoist sense of place and a Hawaiian sense of place. Through a reflection on the Daoist sense of place—which emphasizes wu, a disposition of not overdoing by which our interactions with the world are undertaken for the sake of achieving harmony and equilibrium and the Hawaiian sense of place—which is centered on pono, the Hawaiian value of appropriateness that ensures that we act in a beneficial manner towards the land, I find common ground for my proposal for a Daoist and Hawaiian Ecological Ethics: weiziran and aloha ʻāina. (shrink)

This paper explores the compatibility between the Daoist art of emptying one’s heart-mind and the art of creating close relationships. The fact that a Daoist sage is characterized by an empty heart-mind makes him somewhat different from an average human being: since a full heart-mind is characteristic of the human condition, the sage transcends what makes us human. This could alienate him from others and make him incapable of developing close relationships. The research goal of this paper is to investigate (...) whether – in spite of being an unusual human being – a Daoist sage has the abilities necessary for creating close bonds with others. (shrink)

Although significant differences undoubtedly exist between Daoism and Kant’s philosophy, the two systems also have some noteworthy similarities. After calling attention to a few such parallels and sketching the outlines of Kant’s philosophy of religion, this article focuses on an often-neglected feature of the latter: the four guiding principles of what Kant calls an “invisible church”. Numerous passages from Lao Zi’s classic text, Dao-De-Jing, seem to uphold these same principles, thus suggesting that they can also be interpreted as core features (...) of a Daoist philosophy of life. A crucial difference, however, is that members of a Daoist church would focus on contentment, whereas Kantian churches modeled on Christianity would strive for perfection. The article therefore concludes by considering what a synthesis might look like, if a Kantian church were to be based on a Daoist interpretation of these four fundamental principles. (shrink)

In 1A:7 of the Mengzi, Mengzi tries to convince King Xuan of Qi that he is a “true” king. As a reading of Mengzi’s reasoning involved in his attempt at persuasion, David Nivison advances an inferential view, according to which Mengzi’s persuasion involves inferences. In this paper, I consider the assumptions underlying the objections raised against Nivison’s inferential view. I argue that these objections assume a contemporary Western view about the nature of logic and inferences. I propose an alternative characterisation (...) of the relevant sense of inference that, I believe, is more sensitive to the classical Chinese philosophical context and argue that certain insights can be derived from reading Mengzi in light of this alternative characterization of inferences. (shrink)

The theme of this paper is that while there are four seemingly contradictory classes of statements in the Dao de Jing regarding moral values and the Daoist sage, these statements can be interpreted to be consistent with each other. There are statements which seemingly state or imply that nothing at all can be said about the Dao; there are statements which seemingly state or imply that all value judgements are relative; there are statements which appear to attribute moral behaviour to (...) the Daoist sage and there are statements which appear to attribute amoral or immoral behaviour to the Daoist sage. A consistent interpretation of these different statements can be found first by qualifying the assertion that the Dao is not capable of description to the less absolute assertion that nothing absolutely true can be said about the Dao; second, by arguing that the statements that appear to make all values relative refer to the correlativity of concepts, not the equality of values. Moreover, since the statements that appear to attribute moral behaviour to the sage are, by virtue of their predominance in the text, well justified and that by virtue of their paucity in the text, it is plausible to seek an alternate interpretation for the statements that seem to attribute amoral or immoral behaviour to the sage. Finally, the way in which the sage can be seen as good without attributing goodness to the Dao is by distinguishing between the way the sage appears to the observer who is outside of the Dao and the way in which the sage appears to himself. This latter distinction takes the form of the sage as appearing to display the quality of goodness in itself but not goodness for itself. (shrink)

This module is a review of the guiding ideas of Lao Tzu’s ethics of wu wei and the Tao, an account of Lao Tzu’s prioritisation of the feminine as a basic moral principle, the problem of masculinity for practical rationality, his criticism of language, doctrines and oppressive politics. Finally, we shall evaluate the moral import of Lao Tzu’s teachings, and close with some reflections on the synergy between Taoist and Madhyamaka Buddhist thought, which rendered the latter so easily received in (...) Asia. (shrink)

Various esoteric traditions apply different modes of expression for the same metaphysical truths. We may name the two most known esoteric languages as ecstatic and scholastic. Early Daoist use of reverse symbolism as for metaphysical truths and its critical way of viewing formalist understanding of traditional teachings, common virtues and popular beliefs show that it applies an ecstatic language, which, being called shaṭḥ in Sufi terminology, has a detailed literature and technical description in Sufism. This article tries, after a short (...) survey of the concept of shaṭḥ in Sufism, to consider some early Daoist teachings such as wuwei, disparagement of moralism, and disparagement of rationality from an Eastern Sufi point of view regarding shaṭḥ to achieve a clearer insight into the gnostic aspects of the tradition, and to avoid certain possible misunderstanding of the teachings. (shrink)

In this chapter, I explicate several general views and arguments that bear on the notion and contemporary theories of human welfare, as found in two foundational Daoist texts, the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. Ideas drawn from the Daodejing include its objections to desire theories of human welfare and its distinction between natural and acquired desires. Insights drawn from the Zhuangzi include its arguments against the view that death is bad for the dead, its attempt to develop a workable theory of (...) well-being for those who are skeptical about such theories, and the prudential benefits of what I call "philosophical double-vision.". (shrink)

Times of prolonged conflict spur great minds to seek a lasting peace. Thus was the case of Warring States China, which saw the rise of the Hundred Schools of Thought, including the Doadejing and the Han Feizi, and Renaissance Italy, which produced Niccolò Machiavelli. Witnessing their respective societies fall prey to internal corruption and external aggression, all three thinkers sought ways to produce a strong, stable state that would allow both the leader and the populace to endure. Fortune and the (...) Dao: A Comparative Study of Machiavelli, the Daodejing, and the Han Feizi demonstrates where the shortcomings of each theory lie, with emphasis on the similarities among Machiavelli, Laozi, and Han Feizi. Jason P. Blahuta ultimately argues that if Machiavelli’s philosophy, the most comprehensive of the three theories, were supplemented by aspects of the Daodejing, the revision would potentially overcome the deficiencies of the original. (shrink)

This paper relocates the philosophical discourse on the Thing (das Ding) to the world of classical Daoism. In doing so, it explores the bond between the One, the Thing and its signifier before discussing how the Thing unveils itself to the world while receiving the gift of nothingness from Dao. It furthermore contends that the two most prominent discussions of the Thing in the Western tradition--those by Heidegger and Lacan--while philosophically valuable in their own right, fail to provide the degree (...) of profundity seen via a Daoist reading. What will become apparent is that the Thing qua the One serves to delineate the cosmological and human realms of reality, negating any inclination one might have of it as being anything but mystical. (shrink)

The concepts dao and de in the Daodejing may be evoked to support a distinctive and plausible account of environmental holism. Dao refers to the totality of particulars, including the relations that hold between them, and the respective roles and functions of each within the whole. De refers to the distinctiveness of each particular, realized meaningfully only within the context of its interdependence with others, and its situatedness within the whole. Together, dao and de provide support for an ethical holism (...) that avoids sacrificing individuals for the sake of the whole. The integrity and stability of the whole are important not because the whole is an end-in-itself but because those conditions assist in preserving the well-being of the constituent parts. In other words, the ethical holism supported in the Daodejing does not present individuals and wholes in mutually exclusive terms, but sees them in symbiotic relation, allowing for events to be mutually beneficial, or mutually obstructive, to both. In addition, two other Daoist concepts, wuwei (non-action) and ziran (spontaneity), provide further support for this construction of holism. If the distinctiveness of particular individuals is valued, then unilateral or reductive norms which obliterate such individuality are inappropriate. In this regard, the methodology of wuwei allows for the idea of individuals developing spontaneously in relation to others. According to this view of holism,individuals manifest and realize their integrity in relation to others in the environmental context, achieving an outcome that is maximally co-possible within those limits, rather than one that is maximally beneficial only for particular individuals. (shrink)

: The role of vagueness in the Laozi is explored by investigating its connection with "process." First, a hermeneutic methodology is developed and adopted, derived from Peirce's notion of "abduction." Second, this notion is analyzed, and several distinctive characteristics, or "traces," of vagueness are identified. Third, evidence of these traces in the text of the Laozi is collected, with comments on their significance in the Daoist context.

Parmenides expelled nonbeing from the realm of knowledge and forbade us to think or talk about it. But still there has been a long tradition of nay-sayings throughout the history of Western and Eastern philosophy. Are those philosophers talking about the same nonbeing or nothing? If not, how do their concepts of nothing differ from each other? Could there be different types of nothing? Surveying the traditional classifications of nothing or nonbeing in the East and West have led me to (...) develop a typology of nothing that consists of three main types: 1) privative nothing, commonly known as absence; 2) negative nothing, the altogether not or absolute nothing; and finally 3) original nothing, the nothing that is equivalent to being. I will test my threefold typology of nothing by comparing the similarities and differences between the conceptions of nothing in Heidegger, Daoism and Buddhism. With this study, I hope that I will clarify some confusion in the understanding of nothing in Heidegger, Daoism and Buddhism, and shed light on the central philosophical issue of “what there is not”. (shrink)

Each chapter of this concise volume focuses on a single work or philosopher, and includes a short history of each one as well as a description of their ...

In Daoist philosophy, the self is understood as an individual interdependent with others, and situated within a broader environment. Within this framework, the concept ziran is frequently understood in terms of naturalness or nature while wuwei is explained in terms of non-oppressive government. In many existing accounts, little is done to connect these two key Daoist concepts. Here, I suggest that wuwei and ziran are correlated, ethical, concepts. Together, they provide a unifying ethical framework for understanding the philosophy of the (...) Daodejing. I explore the meaning of ziran as self-so-ness or, in human terms, as pertaining to an individual’s spontaneity. The appropriate response to the spontaneity of individuals is to avoid, insofar as possible, imposing or using restrictive norms and methods, that is, wuwei. According to this view, ziran and wuwei offer an account of ethics that attends to core notions of interdependent selfhood, including mutuality, relationality, interdependence, symbiosis, and responsiveness. (shrink)

The term “dao” (道) has been playing the theoretically paradigmatic role in almost all East Asian philosophies, religions, and cultures. The meanings of the term “dao” in the Dao De Jing and other ancient East Asian texts have remained hermeneutically problematic up to this point in time. This article argues that one of the main causes of this hermeneutical problematic is the failure to establish a theoretically formal typology of the “dao.” It further suggests that a hermeneutically disciplined reading of (...) the 76 uses of the term “dao” in the Dao De Jing accomplishes two important goals: (1) it demonstrates that a typological approach may enhance an understanding of the Laoian Dao, and (2) it provides some good data to begin reconstructing such a theoretically formal dao-typology. (shrink)

Scholars have detected hostility to technology in Daoist thought. But is this a problem with any machine or only some applications of some machines by some people? I show that the problem is not with machines per se but with the people who introduce them, or more exactly with their knowledge. It is not knowledge as such that causes the disorder Laozi and Zhuangzi associate with machines; it is confused, disordered knowledge—superficial, inadequate, unsubtle, and artless. In other words the problem (...) is not with machines but with the ethics of engineering and the government of technology. The Daoist argument does not devalue machines or knowledge of them; instead, it sets a new goal, defining an alternative ideal—alternative to techniques held hostage to despotic ideas about efficiency and profit. (shrink)

The theme of this paper is that while there are four seemingly contradictory classes of statements in the Tao de Ching regarding moral values and the Taoist sage, these statements can be interpreted to be consistent with each other. There are statements which seemingly state or imply that nothing at all can be said about the Tao; there are statements which seemingly state or imply that all value judgements are relative; there are statements which appear to attribute moral behaviour to (...) the Taoist sage and there are statements which appear to attribute amoral or immoral behaviour to the Taoist sage. A consistent interpretation of these different statements can be found first by qualifying the assertion that the Tao is not capable of description to the less absolute assertion that nothing absolutely true can be said about the Tao; second, by arguing that the statements that appear to make all values relative refer to the correlativity of concepts, not the equality of values. Moreover, since the statements that appear to attribute moral behaviour to the sage are, by virtue of their predominance in the text, well justified and that by virtue of their paucity in the text, it is plausible to seek an alternate interpretation for the statements that seem to attribute amoral or immoral behaviour to the sage. Finally, the way in which the sage can be seen as good without attributing goodness to the Tao is by distinguishing between the way the sage appears to the observer who is outside of the Tao and the way in which the sage appears to himself. This latter distinction takes the form of the sage as appearing to display the quality of goodness in itself but not goodness for itself. (shrink)