Large Cardinals

We construct, assuming that there is no inner model with a Woodin cardinal but without any large cardinal assumption, a model Kc which is iterable for set length iterations, which is universal with respect to all weasels with which it can be compared, and is universal with respect to set sized premice.

In this paper, two theorems concerning measurable limits of strong cardinals and supercompactness are proven. This generalizes earlier work, both individual and joint with Shelah.

Using an idea developed in joint work with Shelah, we show how to redefine Laver's notion of forcing making a supercompact cardinal $\kappa$ indestructible under $\kappa$-directed closed forcing to give a new proof of the Kimchi-Magidor Theorem in which every compact cardinal in the universe satisfies certain indestructibility properties. Specifically, we show that if K is the class of supercompact cardinals in the ground model, then it is possible to force and construct a generic extension in which the only strongly (...) compact cardinals are the elements of K or their measurable limit points, every $\kappa \in K$ is a supercompact cardinal indestructible under $\kappa$-directed closed forcing, and every $\kappa$ a measurable limit point of K is a strongly compact cardinal indestructible under $\kappa$-directed closed forcing not changing $\wp$. We then derive as a corollary a model for the existence of a strongly compact cardinal $\kappa$ which is not $\kappa^+$ supercompact but which is indestructible under $\kappa$-directed closed forcing not changing $\wp and remains non-$\kappa^+$ supercompact after such a forcing has been done. (shrink)

The Overgeneration Argument is a prominent objection against the model-theoretic account of logical consequence for second-order languages. In previous work we have offered a reconstruction of this argument which locates its source in the conflict between the neutrality of second-order logic and its alleged entanglement with mathematics. Some cases of this conflict concern small large cardinals. In this article, we show that in these cases the conflict can be resolved by moving from a set-theoretic implementation of the model-theoretic account to (...) one which uses higher-order resources. (shrink)

In this paper I present two new arguments against the possibility of an omniscient being. My new arguments invoke considerations of cardinality and resemble several arguments originally presented by Patrick Grim. Like Grim, I give reasons to believe that there must be more objects in the universe than there are beliefs. However, my arguments will rely on certain mereological claims, namely that Classical Extensional Mereology is necessarily true of the part-whole relation. My first argument is an instance of a problem (...) first noted by Gideon Rosen and requires an additional assumption about the mereological structure of certain beliefs. That assumption is that an omniscient being’s beliefs are mereological simples. However, this assumption is dropped when I present my second argument. Thus, I hope to show that if Classical Extensional Mereology is true of the part-whole relation, there cannot be an omniscient being. (shrink)

This article introduces a new reflection principle. It is based on the idea that whatever is true in all entities of some kind is also true in a set-sized collection of them. Unlike standard reflection principles, it does not re-interpret parameters or predicates. This allows it to be both consistent in all higher-order languages and remarkably strong. For example, I show that in the language of second-order set theory with predicates for a satisfaction relation, it is consistent relative to the (...) existence of a 2-extendible cardinal (Theorem 7.12) and implies the existence of a proper class of 1-extendible cardinals (Theorem 7.9). (shrink)

In this article, a possible generalization of the Löb’s theorem is considered. Main result is: let κ be an inaccessible cardinal, then ¬Con( ZFC +∃κ) .

The paper investigates inaccessible set axioms and their consistency strength in constructive set theory. In ZFC inaccessible sets are of the form Vκ where κ is a strongly inaccessible cardinal and Vκ denotes the κth level of the von Neumann hierarchy. Inaccessible sets figure prominently in category theory as Grothendieck universes and are related to universes in type theory. The objective of this paper is to show that the consistency strength of inaccessible set axioms heavily depend on the context in (...) which they are embedded. The context here will be the theory CZF− of constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory but without -Induction . Let INAC be the statement that for every set there is an inaccessible set containing it. CZF−+INAC is a mathematically rich theory in which one can easily formalize Bishop style constructive mathematics and a great deal of category theory. CZF−+INAC also has a realizability interpretation in type theory which gives its theorems a direct computational meaning. The main result presented here is that the proof theoretic ordinal of CZF−+INAC is a small ordinal known as the Feferman–Schütte ordinal Γ0. (shrink)

In connection with his interest in selfdistributive algebra, Richard Laver established two deep results with potential applications in low-dimen\-sional topology, namely the existence of what is now known as the Laver tables and the well-foundedness of the standard ordering of positive braids. Here we present these results and discuss the way they could be used in topological applications.

A pervasive thought in contemporary philosophy of mathematics is that in order to justify reflection principles, one must hold universism: the view that there is a single universe of pure sets. I challenge this kind of reasoning by contrasting universism with a Zermelian form of multiversism. I argue that if extant justifications of reflection principles using notions of richness are acceptable for the universist, then the Zermelian can use similar justifications. However, I note that for some forms of richness argument, (...) the status of reflection principles as axioms is left open for the Zermelian. (shrink)

Are there any things that are such that any things whatsoever are among them. I argue that there are not. My thesis follows from these three premises: (1) There are two or more things; (2) for any things, there is a unique thing that corresponds to those things; (3) for any two or more things, there are fewer of them than there are pluralities of them.

In set theory, a maximality principle is a principle that asserts some maximality property of the universe of sets or some part thereof. Set theorists have formulated a variety of maximality principles in order to settle statements left undecided by current standard set theory. In addition, philosophers of mathematics have explored maximality principles whilst attempting to prove categoricity theorems for set theory or providing criteria for selecting foundational theories. This article reviews recent work concerned with the formulation, investigation and justification (...) of maximality principles. (shrink)

This book is an exploration of philosophical questions about infinity. Graham Oppy examines how the infinite lurks everywhere, both in science and in our ordinary thoughts about the world. He also analyses the many puzzles and paradoxes that follow in the train of the infinite. Even simple notions, such as counting, adding and maximising present serious difficulties. Other topics examined include the nature of space and time, infinities in physical science, infinities in theories of probability and decision, the nature of (...) part/whole relations, mathematical theories of the infinite, and infinite regression and principles of sufficient reason. (shrink)

Maddy gave a semi-formal account of restrictiveness by defining a formal notion based on a class of interpretations and explaining how to handle false positives and false negatives. Recently, Hamkins pointed out some structural issues with Maddy's definition. We look at Maddy's formal definitions from the point of view of an abstract interpretation relation. We consider various candidates for this interpretation relation, including one that is close to Maddy's original notion, but fixes the issues raised by Hamkins. Our work brings (...) to light additional structural issues that we also discuss. (shrink)

The dream solution of the continuum hypothesis would be a solution by which we settle the continuum hypothesis on the basis of a newly discovered fundamental principle of set theory, a missing axiom, widely regarded as true. Such a dream solution would indeed be a solution, since we would all accept the new axiom along with its consequences. In this article, however, I argue that such a dream solution to $\mathrm {CH}$ is unattainable.

The interaction between large cardinals, determinacy of two-person perfect information games, and inner model theory has been a singularly powerful driving force in modern set theory during the last three decades. For the outsider the intellectual excitement is often tempered by the somewhat daunting technicalities, and the seeming length of study needed to understand the flow of ideas. The purpose of this article is to try and give a short, albeit rather rough, guide to the broad lines of development.

The paper begins with an examination of Gödel's views on absolute undecidability and related topics in set theory. These views are sharpened and assessed in light of recent developments. It is argued that a convincing case can be made for axioms that settle many of the questions undecided by the standard axioms and that in a precise sense the program for large cardinals is a complete success “below” CH. It is also argued that there are reasonable scenarios for settling CH (...) and that there is not currently a convincing case to the effect that a given statement is absolutely undecidable. (shrink)

We show that either of the following hypotheses imply that there is an inner model with a proper class of strong cardinals and a proper class of Woodin cardinals. 1) There is a countably closed cardinal k ≥ N₃ such that □k and □(k) fail. 2) There is a cardinal k such that k is weakly compact in the generic extension by Col(k, k⁺). Of special interest is 1) with k = N₃ since it follows from PFA by theorems of (...) Todorcevic and Velickovic. Our main new technical result, which is due to the first author, is a weak covering theorem for the model obtained by stacking mice over $K^c ||k.$. (shrink)

We produce counterexamples to the unique and cofinal branches hypotheses, assuming (slightly less than) the existence of a cardinal which is strong past a Woodin cardinal.

We summarize the known methods of producing a non-supercompact strongly compact cardinal and describe some new variants. Our Main Theorem shows how to apply these methods to many cardinals simultaneously and exactly control which cardinals are supercompact and which are only strongly compact in a forcing extension. Depending upon the method, the surviving non-supercompact strongly compact cardinals can be strong cardinals, have trivial Mitchell rank or even contain a club disjoint from the set of measurable cardinals. These results improve and (...) unify Theorems 1 and 2 of [5], due to the first author. (shrink)

Can a supercompact cardinal κ be Laver indestructible when there is a level-by-level agreement between strong compactness and supercompactness? In this article, we show that if there is a sufficiently large cardinal above κ, then no, it cannot. Conversely, if one weakens the requirement either by demanding less indestructibility, such as requiring only indestructibility by stratified posets, or less level-by-level agreement, such as requiring it only on measure one sets, then yes, it can.

We show how the forcing of [5] can be iterated so as to get a model containing supercompact cardinals in which every measurable cardinal δ is δ + supercompact. We then apply this iteration to prove three additional theorems concerning the structure of the class of supercompact cardinals.

We extend earlier work (both individual and joint with Shelah) and prove three theorems about the class of measurable limits of compact cardinals, where a compact cardinal is one which is either strongly compact or supercompact. In particular, we construct two models in which every measurable limit of compact cardinals below the least supercompact limit of supercompact cardinals possesses non-trivial degrees of supercompactness. In one of these models, every measurable limit of compact cardinals is a limit of supercompact cardinals and (...) also a limit of strongly compact cardinals having no non-trivial degree of supercompactness. We also show that it is consistent for the least supercompact cardinal κ to be a limit of strongly compact cardinals and be so that every measurable limit of compact cardinals below κ has a non-trivial degree of supercompactness. In this model, the only compact cardinals below κ with a non-trivial degree of supercompactness are the measurable limits of compact cardinals. (shrink)

Using work of Devlin and Schindler in conjunction with work on Prikry forcing in a choiceless context done by the author, we show that two choiceless cardinal patterns have consistency strength of at least one Woodin cardinal.

Part of the ambiguity lies in the various points of view from which this question might be considered. The crudest di erence lies between the point of view of the working mathematician and that of the logician concerned with the foundations of mathematics. Now some of my fellow mathematical logicians might protest this distinction, since they consider themselves to be just more of those \working mathematicians". Certainly, modern logic has established itself as a very respectable branch of mathematics, and there (...) are quite a few highly technical journals in logic, such as The Journal of Sym-. (shrink)

We show the consistency, relative to a supercompact cardinal, of the least measurable cardinal being both strongly compact and fully Laver indestructible. We also show the consistency, relative to a supercompact cardinal, of the least strongly compact cardinal being somewhat supercompact yet not completely supercompact and having both its strong compactness and degree of supercompactness fully Laver indestructible.

This paper discusses an argument for the reality of the classical mathematical continuum. An inference to the best explanation type of argument is used to defend the idea that real numbers exist even when they cannot be constructively specified as with the "indefinable numbers".

Applying Woodin's non-stationary tower notion of forcing, I prove that the existence of a supercompact cardinal κ in V and a Ramsey dilator in some small forcing extension V[G] implies the existence in V of a measurable dilator of size κ, measurable by κ-complete measures.

We prove that a combinatorial consequence of the negation of the PCF conjecture for intervals, involving free subsets relative to set mappings, is not implied by even the strongest known large cardinal axiom.

We use a reverse Easton forcing iteration to obtain a universe with a definable well-order, while preserving the GCH and proper classes of a variety of very large cardinals. This is achieved by coding using the principle ◊ $_{k^ - }^* $ at a proper class of cardinals k. By choosing the cardinals at which coding occurs sufficiently sparsely, we are able to lift the embeddings witnessing the large cardinal properties without having to meet any non-trivial master conditions.

The motivation for this paper is the following: In [4] I showed that it is inconsistent with ZFC that the Maximality Principle for directed closed forcings holds at unboundedly many regular cardinals κ (even only allowing κ itself as a parameter in the Maximality Principle for < κ -closed forcings each time). So the question is whether it is consistent to have this principle at unboundedly many regular cardinals or at every regular cardinal below some large cardinal κ (instead of (...) ∞), and if so. how strong it is. It turns out that it is consistent in many cases, but the consistency strength is quite high. (shrink)

Since then we have been engaged in the development of such results of greater relevance to mathematical practice. In January, 1997 we presented some new results of this kind involving what we call “jump free” classes of finite functions. This Jump Free Theorem is treated in section 2.

Normal mathematical culture is overwhelmingly concerned with finite structures, finitely generated structures, discrete structures (countably infinite), continuous and piecewise continuous functions between complete separable metric spaces, with lesser consideration of pointwise limits of sequences of such functions, and Borel measurable functions between complete separable metric spaces.

The space CS(R) has a unique “Borel structure” in the following sense. Note that there is a natural mapping from R¥ onto CS(R}; namely, taking ranges. We can combine this with any Borel bijection from R onto R¥ in order to get a “preferred” surjection F:R ® CS(R).

We introduce insertion domains that support the placement of new, higher, vertices into finite trees. We prove that every nonincreasing insertion domain has an element with simple structural properties in the style of classical Ramsey theory. This result is proved using standard large cardinal axioms that go well beyond the usual axioms for mathematics. We also establish that this result cannot be proved without these large cardinal axioms. We also introduce insertion rules that specify the placement of new, higher, vertices (...) into finite trees. We prove that every insertion rule greedily generates a tree with these same structural properties; and every decreasing insertion rule generates (or admits) a tree with these same structural properties. It is also necessary and sufficient to use the same large cardinals (in the precise sense of Corollary D.25). The results suggest new areas of research in discrete mathematics called "Ramsey tree theory" and "greedy Ramsey theory" which demonstrably require more than the usual axioms for mathematics. (shrink)

“Small” large cardinal notions in the language of ZFC are those large cardinal notions that are consistent with V = L. Besides their original formulation in classical set theory, we have a variety of analogue notions in systems of admissible set theory, admissible recursion theory, constructive set theory, constructive type theory, explicit mathematics and recursive ordinal notations (as used in proof theory). On the face of it, it is surprising that such distinctively set-theoretical notions have analogues in such disaparate and (...) relatively constructive contexts. There must be an underlying reason why that is possible (and, incidentally, why “large” large cardinal notions have not led to comparable analogues). My long term aim is to develop a common language in which such notions can be expressed and can be interpreted both in their original classical form and in their analogue form in each of these special constructive and semi-constructive cases. This is a program in progress. What is done here, to begin with, is to show how that can be done to a considerable extent in the settings of classical and admissible set theory (and thence, admissible recursion theory). The approach taken here is to expand the language of set theory to allow us to talk about (possibly partial) operations applicable both to sets and to operations and to formulate the large cardinal notions in question in terms of operational closure conditions; at the same time only minimal existence axioms are posited for sets. The resulting system, called Operational Set Theory, is a partial adaptation to the set-theoretical framework of the explicit mathematics framework Feferman (1975). The.. (shrink)

We can look at this model theoretically as follows. By the linearly ordered predicate calculus, we simply mean ordinary predicate calculus with equality and a special binary relation symbol <. It is required that in all interpretations, < be a linear ordering on the domain. Thus we have the usual completeness theorem provided we add the axioms that assert that < is a linear ordering.

In 1995 we gave a new simple principle of combinatorial set theory and showed that it implies the existence of a nontrivial elementary embedding from a rank into itself, and follows from the existence of a nontrivial elementary embedding from V into M, where M contains the rank at the first fixed point above the critical point. We then gave a “diamondization” of this principle, and proved its relative consistency by means of a standard forcing argument.