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  1. added 2020-04-24
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Vol. 2,.Barbara Baum Levenbook - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
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  2. added 2020-04-21
    The Nature and Value of Vagueness in the Law.Hrafn Asgeirsson - 2020 - Oxford: Hart Publishing.
    Sample chapter from H. Asgeirsson, The Nature and Value of Vagueness in the Law (Hart Publishing, 2020), in which I present and partially defend a version of what has come to be called the communicative-content theory of law. Book abstract: Lawmaking is – paradigmatically – a type of speech act: people make law by saying things. It is natural to think, therefore, that the content of the law is determined by what lawmakers communicate. However, what they communicate is sometimes vague (...)
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  3. added 2020-03-13
    Attitude and the Normativity of Law.Jeffrey Kaplan - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (5):469-493.
    Though legal positivism remains popular, HLA Hart’s version has fallen somewhat by the wayside. This is because, according to many, the central task of a theory of law is to explain the so-called ‘normativity of law’. Hart’s theory, it is thought, is not up to the task. Some have suggested modifying the theory accordingly. This paper argues that both Hart’s theory and the normativity of law have been misunderstood. First, a popular modification of Hart’s theory is considered and rejected. It (...)
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  4. added 2020-03-08
    Interpreting the Claim of Legitimate Authority: An Analysis of Joseph Raz's Objection Against Incorporating Moral Norms Into Law.Ramiro Ávila Peres - forthcoming - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy.
    From a critical review of the literature, we analyze the incompatibility between the possibility of incorporating moral principles to the law and its authoritative nature, as argued by exclusive positivists, such as J. Raz. After presenting his argument in second section, we argue in the third section that it is incompatible with commonly accepted (even by Raz) premises of the theory of legal interpretation, or else it would lead to contradiction - unless one presupposes, within the premises, a strong version (...)
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  5. added 2020-02-21
    There Are No Easy Counterexamples to Legal Anti-Positivism.Emad H. Atiq - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (1).
    Legal anti-positivism is widely believed to be a general theory of law that generates far too many false negatives. If anti-positivism is true, certain rules bearing all the hallmarks of legality are not in fact legal. This impression, fostered by both positivists and anti-positivists, stems from an overly narrow conception of the kinds of moral facts that ground legal facts: roughly, facts about what is morally optimific—morally best or morally justified or morally obligatory given our social practices. A less restrictive (...)
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  6. added 2020-02-12
    Of Layers and Lawyers.Michael Schmitz - forthcoming - In Miguel Garcia, Rachael Mellin & Raimo Tuomela (eds.), Social Ontology, Normativity and Philosophy of Law. Berlin: De Gruyter.
    How can the law be characterized in a theory of collective intentionality that treats collective intentionality as essentially layered and tries to understand these layers in terms of the structure and the format of the representations involved? And can such a theory of collective intentionality open up new perspectives on the law and shed new light on traditional questions of legal philosophy? As a philosopher of collective intentionality who is new to legal philosophy, I want to begin exploring these questions (...)
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  7. added 2020-02-11
    An Institutional Theory of Law: New Approaches to Legal Positivism.M. J. Detmold - 1988 - Ethics 98 (2):395-396.
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  8. added 2020-01-14
    Die Radbruchsche Formel: Eine Untersuchung der Rechtsphilosophie Gustav Radbruchs.Hidehiko Adachi - 2005 - Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
    Gustav Radbruch, ein bekannter Rechtsphilosoph des Wertrelativismus, kam erst nach 1945 zu der Behauptung: Sowohl unerträglich ungerechte Gesetze als auch das Gleichheitsprinzip verleugnende Gesetze können keine Verbindlichkeit in Anspruch nehmen. Es ist nach wie vor umstritten, ob diese Behauptung, die später als die Radbruchsche Formel bezeichnet wurde, mit seiner wertrelativistischen Theorie vor 1945 kompatibel ist. -/- Viele Autoren verneinen diese Frage und vertreten die Umbruchthese. Einige Autoren stellen die Entwicklungsthese auf, die als eine Abschwächung der Umbruchthese verstanden werden kann. Dagegen (...)
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  9. added 2019-11-20
    Introducción a la Metafísica.Samuele Chilovi - forthcoming - In D. Lagier & G. Lariguet (eds.), Filosofía para Juristas. Una Introducción.
  10. added 2019-11-06
    Grounding-Based Formulations of Legal Positivism.Samuele Chilovi - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    The goal of this paper is to provide an accurate grounding-based formulation of positivism in the philosophy of law. I start off by discussing some simple formulations, based on the ideas that social facts are always either full or partial grounds of legal facts. I then raise a number of objections against these definitions: the full grounding proposal rules out possibilities that are compatible with positivism; the partial grounding proposal fails, on its own, to vindicate the distinctive role that is (...)
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  11. added 2019-08-28
    Hobbes’s Third Jurisprudence: Legal Pragmatism and the Dualist Menace.Benjamin L. S. Nelson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 33 (1).
    This paper explores the possibility that Hobbesian jurisprudence is best understood as a ‘third way’ in legal theory, irreducible to classical natural law or legal positivism. I sketch two potential ‘third theories’ of law -- legal pragmatism and legal dualism -- and argue that, when considered in its broadest sense, Leviathan is best viewed as an example of legal pragmatism. I consider whether this legal pragmatist interpretation can be sustained in the examination of Leviathan’s treatment of civil law, and argue (...)
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  12. added 2019-08-24
    Law and Violence: Chirstoph Menke in Dialogue.Christoph Menke - 2018 - Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
  13. added 2019-06-23
    Law is an Institution an Artifact and a Practice.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2018 - In Luka Burazin, Kenneth Einar Himma & Corrado Roversi (eds.), Law as an Artifact. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 177-191.
    I have argued that law is a genre of institutionalized abstract artifact, meaning that laws are purposive products of human creation designed to signal norms of behavior with respect to them. Its institutional nature is seen in the fact that it is a system of artificial statuses that convey deontic powers to status holders understood in their institutional roles. Following Searle in explaining institutions, however, is also to see the institution as the 'continuing possibility of a practice.' Hence there is (...)
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  14. added 2019-06-07
    The descriptive definition of the concept `legal norm' proposed by Hans Kelsen, II.Harald Ofstad - 1950 - Theoria 16 (3):211.
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  15. added 2019-06-06
    La prueba de los hechos, una discusión jurídica y epistemológica.Román Rodríguez Salón - 2010 - Dikaiosyne 25 (13):123-144.
    El interés por el razonamiento judicial se inicia con el rechazo tanto de una concepción mecanicista de la aplicación del derecho, como de posturas irracionalistas. La aplicación del derecho no puede reducirse a la remisión a ciertos enunciados jurídicos y a unos hechos “brutos”, es por ello que, a la hora de analizar la aplicación del derecho, las nociones de razonamiento o justifi cación deben ocupar un lugar tan central como el principio de legalidad. No hay aplicación del derecho sin (...)
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  16. added 2019-06-06
    Essentially Ambiguous Concepts and the Fuller-Hart-Dworkin Debate.Wibren Van der Burg - 2009 - Archiv für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie 95 (3):305-326.
    Concepts such as law, religion or morality may refer both to a practice and to a doctrine. My thesis is that we should not regard these as separate phenomena, but as two partly incompatible models of the same phenomenon. Law, religion and morality are therefore essentially ambiguous concepts. An EAC is a concept which refers to a dynamic phenomenon that may only be described and modeled in at least two different ways that are each essentially incomplete and which are partly (...)
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  17. added 2019-06-06
    Legal Self-Efficacy and Managers' Use of Law.Fredrik Jörgensen & Jan Svanberg - 2009 - Archiv für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie 95 (1):79-101.
    This study demonstrates that legal effectiveness may depend on how an individual perceives him/herself as a competent user of law. The hypotheses tested in this study are that the self-perceptions of people may be more important for legal effectiveness than are the objective factors such as law enforcement agencies and the effectiveness of commercial legislation. The effectiveness concept was tested on survey data collected from 246 managers in Northwest Russia. The result is that the subjective self-perceptions are a stronger determinant (...)
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  18. added 2019-06-06
    Sobre la lógica de las lagunas en el derecho.José Juan Moreso, Pablo E. Navarro & María Cristina Redondo - 2001 - Critica 33 (99):47-73.
    En "Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps", Raz señala que las lagunas jurídicas existen sólo cuando el derecho habla con voz incierta o cuando habla con muchas voces, pero que no hay lagunas cuando el derecho guarda silencio. En este último caso habría reglas de clausura, analíticamente verdaderas, que impiden la ocurrencia de esas lagunas. Según Raz, si hay una laguna en un sistema jurídico, entonces no es verdadero ni falso que exista una razón concluyente para ejecutar cierta acción. Así, una (...)
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  19. added 2019-06-06
    What Legal Positivism Isn’T.W. J. Waluchow - 1998 - Cogito 12 (2):109-115.
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  20. added 2019-06-06
    Lógicas normativas y la reconstrucción deI razonamiento jurídico.Roberto J. Vernengo - 1992 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 7 (1-3):1115-1124.
    Legal discourse is, admittedly, a rational message. As such, it presupposes some kind of logical structure. Nevertheless, legal theorist are not agreement as concerns the adequate logic law requires. A proposal to develop a specific logic, called “idiomatic legal logic”, is discussed as regards its consequences for an understanding of the rationality of law. Further, linguistic models adopted for the explanation of legal concepts are also considered, inasmuch as they imply that law is somehow isomorphic with Iinguistic structures.
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  21. added 2019-06-06
    Positivismo y neopositivismo.José María Atencia - 1991 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 25:143.
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  22. added 2019-06-06
    The Internal Aspect of Law: Rethinking Hart’s Contribution to Legal Positivism.G. Randolph Mayes - 1989 - Social Theory and Practice 15 (2):231-255.
  23. added 2019-06-06
    Juicios de valor, positivismo jurídico y relativismo moral.Javier Esquivel - 1981 - Critica 13 (37):3-28.
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  24. added 2019-06-06
    Notas Al Vocabulario Juridico Latino. [REVIEW]P. B. R. Forbes - 1948 - The Classical Review 62 (3-4):163-164.
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  25. added 2019-06-05
    The Temporality of Normativity.Carlo Invernizzi Accetti - 2016 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 42 (1):25-43.
    This article proposes an interpretation of the status of the Grundnorm in Hans Kelsen’s legal theory which addresses the broader philosophical problem of the ultimate foundation of normativity. It begins by reviewing the main objections that have been raised against Kelsen’s theory, pointing out that most of these can be met by a ‘transcendental’ interpretation of the Grundnorm as a condition of possibility for legal cognition. It then argues that in order to solve the problem of the ultimate foundation for (...)
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  26. added 2019-05-06
    Let’s Skill All the Lawyers: Shakespearean Lessons on the Nature of Law.Harold Lloyd - 2010 - Vera Lex 11 (1/2):38-80.
    Shakespeare's works present intriguing explorations of law and legal theory. They help demonstrate the flaws in command-theory positivism, natural law theory and prediction theory accounts of the law. This is a simultaneously-published abbreviated version of a longer article published in Acta Iuridica Olomucensia in 2010.
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  27. added 2019-05-02
    Legal Positivism and Deontic Detachment.Robert Mullins - 2018 - Ratio Juris 31 (1):4-8.
    I consider a puzzle that arises when the logical principle known as “deontic detachment” is applied to the law. It is not possible to accept the principle of deontic detachment in a legal setting while also accepting that the so-called “social facts thesis” applies to all legal propositions. According to the social facts thesis, the existence and content of law is determined by the attitudes or practices of legal officials. Abandoning deontic detachment is not an appropriate solution to the problem—the (...)
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  28. added 2019-03-08
    Three Concepts of Law: The Ambiguous Legacy of H.L.A. Hart.Brian Slattery - 1998 - Saskatchewan Law Review 61:323-39.
    The law presents itself as a body of meaning, open to discovery, interpretation, application, criticism, development and change. But what sort of meaning does the law possess? Legal theory provides three sorts of answers. The first portrays the law as a mode of communication through which law-makers convey certain standards or norms to the larger community. The law's meaning is that imparted by its authors. On this view, law is a vehicle, conveying a message from a speaker to an intended (...)
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  29. added 2019-03-08
    Law's Meaning.Brian Slattery - 1996 - Osgoode Hall Law Journal 34:553-81.
    It is often thought that the meaning of a legal provision must reside in the minds of its authors or its interpreters, or a combination of the two. Indeed, the point may seem so obvious that it scarcely needs any justification. Is there any sense, then, in the claim sometimes made by judges that a law has a meaning of its own, one that is distinct from the intentions of authors and interpreters alike? At first sight, the claim appears extravagant (...)
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  30. added 2019-02-06
    Law-Determination as Grounding: A Common Grounding Framework for Jurisprudence.Samuele Chilovi & George Pavlakos - 2019 - Legal Theory 25 (1):53-76.
    Law being a derivative feature of reality, it exists in virtue of more fundamental things, upon which it depends. This raises the question of what is the relation of dependence that holds between law and its more basic determinants. The primary aim of this paper is to argue that grounding is that relation. We first make a positive case for this claim, and then we defend it from the potential objection that the relevant relation is rather rational determination (Greenberg 2004, (...)
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  31. added 2019-02-03
    What is the Incoherence Objection to Legal Entrapment?Daniel Hill, Stephen K. McLeod & Attila Tanyi - manuscript
    Some legal theorists say that legal entrapment to commit a crime is incoherent. So far, there is no satisfactorily precise statement of this objection in the literature: it is obscure even as to the type of incoherence that is purportedly involved. (Perhaps consequently, substantial assessment of the objection is also absent.) We aim to provide a new statement of the objection that is more precise and more rigorous than its predecessors. We argue that the best form of the objection asserts (...)
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  32. added 2018-12-19
    Empirismo y derechos humanos. Unas reflexiones a partir de la Filosofía del Derecho de K. Olivecrona.Oscar Vergara - 2017 - Persona y Derecho 75 (2017/1):7 - 29.
    Resumen: Tomado en serio, el empirismo parece abocar a la negación de los derechos humanos; al menos entendidos como expresión de la naturaleza humana. Bajo esta óptica, K. Olivecrona rechaza explícitamente todo Derecho natural, por considerarlo una noción metafísica. En cambio, cuando describe el Derecho positivo, se encuentra con que éste parece asegurar un determinado orden de valores. Olivecrona, además de describir este dato, en diversos escritos asume dichos valores e incluso los defiende. Esta última postura no es muy coherente (...)
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  33. added 2018-12-19
    Entre El Miedo y la Fe. El Positivismo Jurídico Ante la Noción de Fuerza Obligatoria Del Derecho.Oscar Vergara - 2015 - Una Filosofía Del Derecho En Acción. Homenaje Al Profesor Andrés Ollero:179 - 194.
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  34. added 2018-12-13
    Ciencia jurídica y sistemas normativos. Dos comentarios a la teoría de la ciencia jurídica de C.E. Alchourrón y E. Bulygin.Oscar Vergara - 2015 - Anuario Filosofía Del Derecho:253 - 278.
    Este trabajo tiene por objeto analizar la noción de ciencia jurídica de los profesores Carlos E. Alchourrón y Eugenio Bulygin. Ésta parte del presupuesto de que la ciencia jurídica no está autorizada a crear nuevo Derecho, sino que sólo puede aspirar legítimamente a representarlo de alguna manera. Eso no significa que la suya sea una actividad meramente especulativa, en el sentido etimológico del término. Esto es, la ciencia jurídica no se limita a reflejar, como en un espejo, el Derecho tal (...)
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  35. added 2018-12-13
    Olivecrona: Realismo e idealismo: Algunas reflexiones sobre la cuestión capital de la Filosofía del Derecho.Oscar Vergara - 2013 - Revista En Cultura de la Legalidad (5):248 - 263.
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  36. added 2018-12-13
    Introducción.Oscar Vergara - 2009 - Teorías Del Sistema Jurídico:1- 3.
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  37. added 2018-12-13
    Sistemas jurídicos y sistemas normativos en el pensamiento de C. E. Alchourrón y E. Bulygin.Oscar Vergara - 2009 - Teorías Del Sistema Jurídico:225 - 305.
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  38. added 2018-12-13
    El sistema jurídico en la teoría pura del Derecho.Oscar Vergara - 2009 - In Teorías del Sistema Jurídico. Alolote (Granada), Spain: pp. 49-130.
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  39. added 2018-12-13
    Epílogo.Oscar Vergara - 2009 - Teorías Del Sistema Jurídico:307 - 325.
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  40. added 2018-12-13
    El destinatario de las normas jurídicas en la tradición positivista. Un estudio en torno a R. von Jhering.Oscar Vergara - 2007 - Legal Theory:220 - 231.
    Una de las tesis que tradicionalmente han sido defendidas por la tradición del positivismo jurídico es la tesis coactiva, según la cual el derecho consiste en un conjunto de normas coactivas, en el sentido de impuestas por medio de la fuerza. Pero, sin abandonar esta corriente, ha habido históricamente diversas maneras de entender las relaciones entre derecho y fuerza. Si, pues, hasta comienzos del s. XX era opinión común la idea de que el derecho constituía un conjunto de mandatos o (...)
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  41. added 2018-12-06
    Nachwort: Voegelins "Neue Wissenschaft" Im Lichte von Kelsens Kritik.Eckhart Arnold (ed.) - 2004 - Heusenstamm, Germany: Ontos Verlag.
    This is a comment on Hans Kelsen's Review of Voegelin's "New Science of Politics". After locating Kelsens review in the historical and biographical context, I examine the main points of Kelsen's criticism of Voegelin: 1. Voegelin's misunderstanding of Weber's idea of value free science 2. Voegelin's anti-democratic "theory of representation" 3. Voegelins polemical characterization of modernity as Gnosticism. My conclusion is that most of Kelsen's criticism really hits the mark and that Voegelin's New Science of Politics is a political theory (...)
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  42. added 2018-12-03
    Zwyczaje i obyczaje w filozofii prawa Herberta L. A. Harta.Michał Zabdyr-Jamróz - 2015 - Diametros 45:144-164.
    The purpose of this paper is to provide an analytical framework – derived from the Herbert L.A. Hart’s philosophy of law – for the study of the phenomenon of habit and custom from the perspective of normativity. Its starting point is the Hart’s concept of “internal aspect of rules” as a necessary criterion for the rule’s normative character. The internal aspect exists in two forms: the “recognition” based on specific rules, and “acceptance”. The concept of acceptance reveals a difference between (...)
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  43. added 2018-09-25
    Punishment and the Subordination of Law to Morality.John H. Bogart - 1987 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7 (3):421-443.
    Arguments over criminalization and decriminalization often focus on the moral status of conduct, which is thought to be especially important to determining the appropriate legal status of the conduct. If the conduct is not thought to be immoral (or seriously immoral}, that is enough to show that it does not properly fall within the realm of control of the criminal law. Arguments relying on such a strategy may be termed moralized arguments. This article focuses on a crucial element of that (...)
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  44. added 2018-09-20
    Issues with the Judicial System: A Philosophical and Psychological Approach.Manish Nagireddy - manuscript
    What factors affect judicial decision-making? The legal system is of utmost importance because of its impact on our lives. Judges appear to have the most power among any social workers seeing as the precedents set in their decisions are tantamount to written law. Nevertheless, judges may be subject to certain biases, moral and cognitive alike, which influence their rulings. Looking into how morality and cognitive biases affect judges may also reveal how we as individuals handle combining morals with ethics- as (...)
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  45. added 2018-06-01
    The Social Basis of Ultimate Legal Rules: Hayek Meets Hart.Mikołaj Barczentewicz - 2018 - In Peter J. Boettke, Jayme Lemke & Virgil Storr (eds.), Exploring the Political Economy & Social Philosophy of F.A. Hayek.
    The bulk of the legal literature that either builds on or criticizes Hayek focuses on Hayek’s work specifically devoted to law, in particular to the rule of law and to the common law. I aim to show that there is jurisprudentially valuable insight to be gained by reflecting on Hayek’s other work. I provide here a sketch of a synthesis of Hayek’s thought with the current standard framework in general theory (philosophy) of law, that of H. L. A. Hart. I (...)
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  46. added 2018-06-01
    The Illuminati Problem and Rules of Recognition.Mikołaj Barczentewicz - 2018 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 38 (3):500-527.
    How to distinguish law from non-legal but systematic and rule-guided practices of legal officials? This issue features prominently in the debate on ‘positive originalism’ in US constitutional law, and in similar fundamental controversies in other legal orders. I take it as a question about content and constitution of ultimate rules of recognition. Legal philosophers have been too quick in dealing with this problem. I argue that there is more space to claim that non-officials have a constitutive relationship with the content (...)
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  47. added 2018-06-01
    The Limits of Natural Law Originalism.Mikołaj Barczentewicz - 2018 - Notre Dame Law Review Online 93:115-130.
    In “Enduring Originalism,” Jeffrey Pojanowski and Kevin C. Walsh outline how originalism in constitutional interpretation can be grounded in modern natural law theory as developed by John Finnis. Their argument to that effect is powerful and constitutes a welcome addition both to natural law theory and to originalist theory. However, the authors chose to present their account as a superior alternative to, or modification of, “positive” (“original-law”) originalism of Stephen Sachs and William Baude. It is that aspect of the paper (...)
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  48. added 2018-05-10
    Hegel and a Third Theory of Law.William E. Conklin - 2016 - The Owl of Minerva 48 (1/2):57-74.
    Kenneth Westphal, in his “Hegel, Natural Law & Moral Constructivism,” offers an argument to the effect that Hegel elaborated a theory of natural law. Westphal contrasts such a natural law with positivism. Such a contrast holds out an either-or prospect: either Hegel is a legal positivist or he is a natural law thinker. I ask whether it is possible that Hegel elaborated a third theory of law other than that of positivism or of natural law. In addressing this possibility, I (...)
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  49. added 2018-05-10
    Lon Fuller's Legal Structuralism.William Conklin - 2012 - In Bjarne Melkevik (ed.), Standing Tall Hommages a Csaba Varga. Budapest: Pazmany Press. pp. 97-121.
    Anglo-American general jurisprudence remains preoccupied with the relationship of legality to morality. This has especially been so in the re-reading of Lon Fuller’s theory of an implied morality in any law. More often than not, Fuller has been said to distinguish between the identity of a discrete rule and something called ‘morality’. In this reading of Fuller, however, insufficient attention to what is signified by ‘morality’. Such an implied morality has been understood in terms of deontological duties, the Good life, (...)
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  50. added 2018-05-10
    Invisible Author of Legal Authority.William E. Conklin - 1996 - Law and Critique 7 (2):173-192.
    The thrust of this paper addresses how the notion of an author relates to the authority of a law. Drawing from the legal thought of Hobbes, Bentham, and John Austin, the Paper offers a sense of the author as a distinct institutional source of the state. The Paper then addresses the more difficult legal theories in this context: those of HLA Hart, Ronald Dworkin and Hans Kelsen. The clue to the latter as well as the earlier theorists is a presupposed (...)
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