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  1. added 2020-03-20
    Ver con los dos sistemas de pensamiento: una revisión de "Ver las cosas como son: una teoría de la percepción" (Seeing Things As They Are: a Theory of Perception) de John Searle (2015).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In Comprender las Conexiones entre Ciencia, Filosofía, Psicología, Religión, Política, Economía, Historia y Literatura Artículos y reseñas 2006-2019. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 65-104.
    Como tantas veces en filosofía, el título no sólo establece la línea de batalla, sino que expone los prejuicios y errores del autor, ya que si podemos o no dar sentido al juego de idiomas 'Ver las cosas como son' y si es posible tener una 'teoría filosófica' de percepción' (que sólo puede ser sobre cómo funciona el lenguaje de la percepción), a diferencia de uno científico, que es una teoría sobre cómo funciona el cerebro, son exactamente los problemas. Este (...)
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  2. added 2020-03-17
    Unconscious Inference Theories of Cognitive Acheivement.Kirk Ludwig & Wade Munroe - 2020 - In Anders Nes & Timothy Chan (eds.), Inference and Consciousness. New York: Routledge. pp. 15-39.
    This chapter argues that the only tenable unconscious inferences theories of cognitive achievement are ones that employ a theory internal technical notion of representation, but that once we give cash-value definitions of the relevant notions of representation and inference, there is little left of the ordinary notion of representation. We suggest that the real value of talk of unconscious inferences lies in (a) their heuristic utility in helping us to make fruitful predictions, such as about illusions, and (b) their providing (...)
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  3. added 2019-09-28
    Foundation for a Realist Ontology of Cognitive Processes.David Kasmier, David Limbaugh & Barry Smith - 2019 - In Proceedings of the International Conference on Biomedical Ontology (ICBO), University at Buffalo, NY.
    What follows is a first step towards an ontology of conscious mental processes. We provide a theoretical foundation and characterization of conscious mental processes based on a realist theory of intentionality and using BFO as our top-level ontology. We distinguish three components of intentional mental process: character, directedness, and objective referent, and describe several features of the process character and directedness significant to defining and classifying mental processes. We arrive at the definition of representational mental process as a process that (...)
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  4. added 2019-09-19
    Being Realist About Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind.Matteo Colombo, Lee Elkin & Stephan Hartmann - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Some naturalistic philosophers of mind subscribing to the predictive processing theory of mind have adopted a realist attitude towards the results of Bayesian cognitive science. In this paper, we argue that this realist attitude is unwarranted. The Bayesian research program in cognitive science does not possess special epistemic virtues over alternative approaches for explaining mental phenomena involving uncertainty. In particular, the Bayesian approach is not simpler, more unifying, or more rational than alternatives. It is also contentious that the Bayesian approach (...)
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  5. added 2019-08-16
    Experiential Explanation.Sara Aronowitz & Tania Lombrozo - forthcoming - Topics in Cognitive Science.
    People often answer why-questions with what we call experiential explanations: narratives or stories with temporal structure and concrete details. In contrast, on most theories of the epistemic function of explanation, explanations should be abstractive: structured by general relationships and lacking extraneous details. We suggest that abstractive and experiential explanations differ not only in level of abstraction, but also in structure, and that each form of explanation contributes to the epistemic goals of individual learners and of science. In particular, experiential explanations (...)
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  6. added 2019-06-06
    Personal Maturity: The Existential Dimension. [REVIEW]O. S. C. - 1981 - Review of Metaphysics 35 (1):113-114.
    Boelen's recent book provides a systematic investigation and tightly woven discussion of the question, "What does it mean to be mature?" The reader soon learns that the author's interest in this question is motivated by concerns other than those found in the standard textbooks of developmental psychology. Indeed the ensuing discussion unfolds as a continuing critique of the psychobiological concept of maturity. This is the case, the author informs us, not because the traditional scientific treatments of the issue are research-oriented, (...)
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  7. added 2019-04-29
    Explanation in Computational Psychology: Language, Perception and Level 1.5.Christopher Peacocke - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (2):101-123.
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  8. added 2019-03-18
    The Architecture of Mind as a Network of Networks of Natural Computational Processes.Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic - 2016 - Philosophies 1 (1):111--125.
    In discussions regarding models of cognition, the very mention of “computationalism” often incites reactions against the insufficiency of the Turing machine model, its abstractness, determinism, the lack of naturalist foundations, triviality and the absence of clarity. None of those objections, however, concerns models based on natural computation or computing nature, where the model of computation is broader than symbol manipulation or conventional models of computation. Computing nature consists of physical structures that form layered computational architecture, with computation processes ranging from (...)
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  9. added 2019-02-22
    Model-Based Cognitive Neuroscience: Multifield Mechanistic Integration in Practice.Mark Povich - 2019 - Theory & Psychology 5 (29):640–656.
    Autonomist accounts of cognitive science suggest that cognitive model building and theory construction (can or should) proceed independently of findings in neuroscience. Common functionalist justifications of autonomy rely on there being relatively few constraints between neural structure and cognitive function (e.g., Weiskopf, 2011). In contrast, an integrative mechanistic perspective stresses the mutual constraining of structure and function (e.g., Piccinini & Craver, 2011; Povich, 2015). In this paper, I show how model-based cognitive neuroscience (MBCN) epitomizes the integrative mechanistic perspective and concentrates (...)
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  10. added 2019-01-26
    How Could a Rational Analysis Model Explain?Samuli Reijula - 2017 - COGSCI 2017: 39th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society,.
    Rational analysis is an influential but contested account of how probabilistic modeling can be used to construct non-mechanistic but self-standing explanatory models of the mind. In this paper, I disentangle and assess several possible explanatory contributions which could be attributed to rational analysis. Although existing models suffer from evidential problems that question their explanatory power, I argue that rational analysis modeling can complement mechanistic theorizing by providing models of environmental affordances.
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  11. added 2018-11-16
    Lost Feeling of Ownership of One’s Mental States: The Importance of Situating Patient R.B.'s Pathology in the Context of Contemporary Theory and Empiricism.Stan Klein - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):490-493.
    In her re-analysis of the evidence presented in Klein and Nichols (2012) to support their argument that patient R.B. temporarily lost possessory custody of consciously apprehended objects (in this case, objects that normally would be non-inferentially taken as episodic memory), Professor Roache concludes Klein and Nichols's claims are untenable. I argue that Professor Roache is incorrect in her re-interpretation, and that this is due, in part, to lack of sufficient familiarity with psychological theory on memory as well as clinical literature (...)
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  12. added 2018-08-28
    Computational Cognitive Neuroscience.Carlos Zednik - forthcoming - In Mark Sprevak & Matteo Colombo (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. Routledge.
    This chapter provides an overview of the basic research strategies and analytic techniques deployed in computational cognitive neuroscience. On the one hand, “top-down” strategies are used to infer, from formal characterizations of behavior and cognition, the computational properties of underlying neural mechanisms. On the other hand, “bottom-up” research strategies are used to identify neural mechanisms and to reconstruct their computational capacities. Both of these strategies rely on experimental techniques familiar from other branches of neuroscience, including functional magnetic resonance imaging, single-cell (...)
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  13. added 2018-07-18
    The Self in the Age of Cognitive Science: Decoupling the Self From the Personal Level.Robert D. Rupert - 2018 - Philosophic Exchange 2018.
    Philosophers of mind commonly draw a distinction between the personal level – the distinctive realm of conscious experience and reasoned deliberation – and the subpersonal level, the domain of mindless mechanism and brute cause and effect. Moreover, they tend to view cognitive science through the lens of this distinction. Facts about the personal level are given a priori, by introspection, or by common sense; the job of cognitive science is merely to investigate the mechanistic basis of these facts. I argue (...)
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  14. added 2018-07-01
    Interdyscyplinarne Perspektywy Rozwoju, Integracji I Zastosowań Ontologii Poznawczych.Joanna Hastings, Gwen A. Frishkoff, Barry Smith, Mark Jensen, Russell A. Poldrack, Jane Lomax, Anita Bandrowski, Fahim Imam, Jessica A. Turner & Maryann E. Martone - 2016 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 7 (3):101-117.
    We discuss recent progress in the development of cognitive ontologies and summarize three challenges in the coordinated development and application of these resources. Challenge 1 is to adopt a standardized definition for cognitive processes. We describe three possibilities and recommend one that is consistent with the standard view in cognitive and biomedical sciences. Challenge 2 is harmonization. Gaps and conflicts in representation must be resolved so that these resources can be combined for mark-up and interpretation of multi-modal data. Finally, Challenge (...)
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  15. added 2018-06-19
    Phenomenology and Naturalism in Autopoietic and Radical Enactivism: Exploring Sense-Making and Continuity From the Top Down.Hayden Kee - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    Radical and autopoietic enactivists disagree concerning how to understand the concept of sense-making in enactivist discourse and the extent of its distribution within the organic domain. I situate this debate within a broader conflict of commitments to naturalism on the part of radical enactivists, and to phenomenology on the part of autopoietic enactivists. I argue that autopoietic enactivists are in part responsible for the obscurity of the notion of sense-making by attributing it univocally to sentient and non-sentient beings and following (...)
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  16. added 2018-06-01
    Making the Tacit Explicit.Stephen Turner - 2012 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 42 (4):385-402.
    Tacit knowledge is both a ubiquitous and puzzling notion, related to the idea of hidden assumptions. The puzzle is partly a result of the conflict between the idea that assumptions are in the mind and the apparent audience-relativity of the "fact" of possessing an assumption or of the tacit knowledge that is articulated. If we think of making the tacit explicit as constructing a certain kind of inference repairing explanation for a particular audience "on the fly" we come closer to (...)
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  17. added 2018-02-17
    Vison.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
  18. added 2018-02-16
    The Collaborative Emergence of Group Cognition: Commentary on Paul E. Smaldino, “The Cultural Evolution of Emergent Group-Level Traits”.John Sutton - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (3):277-78.
    We extend Smaldino’s approach to collaboration and social organization in cultural evolution to include cognition. By showing how recent work on emergent group-level cognition can be incorporated within Smaldino’s framework, we extend that framework’s scope to encompass collaborative memory, decision-making, and intelligent action. We argue that beneficial effects arise only in certain forms of cognitive interdependence, in surprisingly fragile conditions.
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  19. added 2018-01-18
    Mechanisms in Cognitive Science.Carlos Zednik - 2017 - In Phyllis McKay Illari & Stuart Glennan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy. London: Routledge. pp. 389-400.
    This chapter subsumes David Marr’s levels of analysis account of explanation in cognitive science under the framework of mechanistic explanation: Answering the questions that define each one of Marr’s three levels is tantamount to describing the component parts and operations of mechanisms, as well as their organization, behavior, and environmental context. By explicating these questions and showing how they are answered in several different cognitive science research programs, this chapter resolves some of the ambiguities that remain in Marr’s account, and (...)
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  20. added 2018-01-15
    What Levels of Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences?Giuseppe Boccignone & Roberto Cordeschi (eds.) - 2015 - Frontiers Media SA.
    Complex systems are to be seen as typically having multiple levels of organization. For instance, in the behavioural and cognitive sciences, there has been a long lasting trend, promoted by the seminal work of David Marr, putting focus on three distinct levels of analysis: the computational level, accounting for the What and Why issues, the algorithmic and the implementational levels specifying the How problem. However, the tremendous developments in neuroscience knowledge about processes at different scales of organization together with the (...)
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  21. added 2018-01-15
    Predictive Brains: Forethought and the Levels of Explanation.Giuseppe Boccignone & Roberto Cordeschi - 2012 - Frontiers in Psychology 3.
    Is any unified theory of brain function possible? Following a line of thought dat- ing back to the early cybernetics (see, e.g., Cordeschi, 2002), Clark (in press) has proposed the action-oriented Hierarchical Predictive Coding (HPC) as the account to be pursued in the effort of gain- ing the “Grand Unified Theory of the Mind”—or “painting the big picture,” as Edelman (2012) put it. Such line of thought is indeed appealing, but to be effectively pursued it should be confronted with experimental (...)
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  22. added 2017-10-31
    Neural correlates without reduction: the case of the critical period.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):1-13.
    Researchers in the cognitive sciences often seek neural correlates of psychological constructs. In this paper, I argue that even when these correlates are discovered, they do not always lead to reductive outcomes. To this end, I examine the psychological construct of a critical period and briefly describe research identifying its neural correlates. Although the critical period is correlated with certain neural mechanisms, this does not imply that there is a reductionist relationship between this psychological construct and its neural correlates. Instead, (...)
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  23. added 2017-10-29
    Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Development, Integration and Application of Cognitive Ontologies.Janna Hastings, Gwen Alexandra Frishkoff, Barry Smith, Mark Jensen, Russell Poldrack, Jessica Turner, Jane Lomax, Anita Bandrowski, Fahim Imam, Jessica A. Turner & Maryann E. Martone - 2014 - Frontiers in Neuroinformatics 8 (62):1-7.
    We discuss recent progress in the development of cognitive ontologies and summarize three challenges in the coordinated development and application of these resources. Challenge 1 is to adopt a standardized definition for cognitive processes. We describe three possibilities and recommend one that is consistent with the standard view in cognitive and biomedical sciences. Challenge 2 is harmonization. Gaps and conflicts in representation must be resolved so that these resources can be combined for mark-up and interpretation of multi-modal data. Finally, Challenge (...)
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  24. added 2017-09-18
    Still Autonomous After All.Andrew Knoll - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (1):7-27.
    Recent mechanistic philosophers :1287–1321, 2016) have argued that the cognitive sciences are not autonomous from neuroscience proper. I clarify two senses of autonomy–metaphysical and epistemic—and argue that cognitive science is still autonomous in both senses. Moreover, mechanistic explanation of cognitive phenomena is not therefore an alternative to the view that cognitive science is autonomous of neuroscience. If anything, it’s a way of characterizing just how cognitive processes are implemented by neural mechanisms.
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  25. added 2017-07-17
    Evaluating Methods of Correcting for Multiple Comparisons Implemented in SPM12 in Social Neuroscience fMRI Studies: An Example From Moral Psychology.Hyemin Han & Andrea L. Glenn - 2018 - Social Neuroscience 13 (3):257-267.
    In fMRI research, the goal of correcting for multiple comparisons is to identify areas of activity that reflect true effects, and thus would be expected to replicate in future studies. Finding an appropriate balance between trying to minimize false positives (Type I error) while not being too stringent and omitting true effects (Type II error) can be challenging. Furthermore, the advantages and disadvantages of these types of errors may differ for different areas of study. In many areas of social neuroscience (...)
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  26. added 2017-03-15
    (March 2017) Gabriel Vacariu, "Similarities Between Adam Frank’s Ideas (2016 or 2017?) (“Minding Matter - The Closer You Look, the More the Materialist Position in Physics Appears to Rest on Shaky Metaphysical Ground” ) and My Ideas (2005, 2008)".Gabriel Vacariu - March 2017 - Dissertation, Bucharest University
    A friend of my sent me the address where this paper has been posted by Adam Frank. Reading it, I realized that more than 90% of the main ideas of this paper (about the mind-brain problem, quantum mechanics (microparticles-wave relationship, Schrodinger equation, probabilities, “perceiving subject in physics”, the idea about consciousness and Nagel, etc. etc.) are UNBELIEVABLE similar to my ideas from my paper 2005 or my book 2008!!!
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  27. added 2017-02-16
    Personal-Subpersonal: The Problems of Inter-Level Relations.Liza Skidelsky - 2006 - ProtoSociology 22:120-139.
    Although the personal-subpersonal distinction was first proposed in 1969 by D. Dennett, it has been approximately in the last ten years that it has received in­creasing attention and has became a widely used distinction particularly in the philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology literature. While the distinction is ubiquitous there are a few recent proposals about the relationship between the levels, namely, inter alia, the mixed horizontal explanation, the semantic view of computation, and interaction without reduction. In this paper I (...)
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  28. added 2017-02-14
    Existencia Personal Y Libertad.Juan A. García González - 2009 - Anuario Filosófico 42 (2).
  29. added 2017-02-14
    Comment: Levels of Explanation and Variable Choice.James F. Woodward - 2008 - In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 216.
  30. added 2017-02-14
    Yo E Identidad Personal.Manuel Garcia Serrano - 1996 - Theoria 11 (26):163-189.
  31. added 2017-02-13
    Personal Narratives as the Highest Level of Cognitive Integration.Jacob B. Hirsh, Raymond A. Mar & Jordan B. Peterson - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):216-217.
  32. added 2017-02-13
    The Personal.As Political - 1994 - In Alison M. Jaggar (ed.), Living with Contradictions: Controversies in Feminist Social Ethics. Westview Press. pp. 473.
  33. added 2017-02-12
    El Acompañamiento Personal a Adolescentes y Jóvenes.Antonio Jiménez Ortiz - 2005 - Critica 55 (921):65-69.
  34. added 2017-02-12
    La Amistad y El Saber Personal.Juan Fernando Sellés - 2005 - Sapientia 60 (218):381-394.
  35. added 2017-02-12
    Yo E Identidad Personal.Manuel García Serrano - 1996 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 11 (2):163-189.
  36. added 2017-02-11
    La Amistad y El Saber Personal.Juan Fernando Selles - 2006 - Sapientia 60 (218):381-393.
  37. added 2017-02-11
    On Levels of Cognitive Modeling.Ron Sun, L. Andrew Coward & Michael J. Zenzen - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):613-637.
  38. added 2017-02-09
    Personal Being: A Theory for Individual Psychology.Jody Palmour - 1986 - Review of Metaphysics 39 (4):768-770.
    Harré brilliantly develops and systematizes insights from contemporary social science and analytic philosophy to establish the primacy of socio-political factors and ethical practices in shaping psychological structures and the beliefs people hold about what it means to be oneself. Psychology must acknowledge the primacy of collective practices, beliefs and talk in the construction of the sense of self, but also the possibility of people genuinely individuating themselves. The accomplishment of truly personal being can change the collective practices giving rise to (...)
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  39. added 2017-02-02
    Objectivity, Intentionality, and Levels of Explanation.Ulrich Müller & Jeremy I. M. Carpendale - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):55-56.
    Notwithstanding many similarities between Thelen et al.'s and Piaget's accounts of the A-not-B error, we argue that, in contrast to Piaget, they do not explicitly address the issue of objectivity. We suggest that this omission is partly due to the fact that Thelen et al. and Piaget's accounts are pitched at different levels of explanation.
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  40. added 2017-01-24
    Levels of Explanation.Mark Snyderman - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (2):348-348.
  41. added 2017-01-21
    Levels of Explanation Vindicated.Víctor M. Verdejo & Daniel Quesada - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (1):77-88.
    Marr’s celebrated contribution to cognitive science (Marr 1982, chap. 1) was the introduction of (at least) three levels of description/explanation. However, most contemporary research has relegated the distinction between levels to a rather dispensable remark. Ignoring such an important contribution comes at a price, or so we shall argue. In the present paper, first we review Marr’s main points and motivations regarding levels of explanation. Second, we examine two cases in which the distinction between levels has been neglected when considering (...)
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  42. added 2017-01-18
    The Personal/Sub‐Personal Distinction: An Introduction.Matthew Elton - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):2 – 5.
    I claim that consciousness, just as thought or action, is only to be found at the personal level of explanation. Dennett's account is often taken to be at odds with this view, as it is seen as explicating consciousness in terms of sub‐personal processes. Against this reading, and especially as it is developed by John McDowell, I argue that Dennett's work is best understood as maintaining a sharp personal/sub‐personal distinction. To see this, however, we need to understand better what content (...)
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  43. added 2017-01-16
    VII.—The Psychology of Levels of Will.Margaret Masterman [M. M. Braithwaite] - 1947 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 48 (1):75-110.
  44. added 2017-01-15
    Moving From Levels & Reduction to Dimensions & Constraints.David Danks - unknown
    Arguments, claims, and discussions about the “level of description” of a theory are ubiquitous in cognitive science. Such talk is typically expressed more precisely in terms of the granularity of the theory, or in terms of Marr’s three levels. I argue that these ways of understanding levels of description are insufficient to capture the range of different types of theoretical commitments that one can have in cognitive science. When we understand these commitments as points in a multi-dimensional space, we find (...)
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  45. added 2017-01-03
    Unbelievable Similarities Between Georg Northoff's Ideas (Canada, 2011-2014) and Gabriel Vacariu's Ideas (2005-2008).Gabriel Vacariu - manuscript
    Many ideas from Georg Nortoff’s works (published one paper in 2010, mainly his book in 2011, other papers in 2012, 2103, 2014, especially those related to Kant’s philosophy and the notion of the “observer”, the mind-brain problem, default mode network, the self, the mental states and their “correspondence” to the brain) are surprisingly very similar to my ideas published in my article from 2002, 2005 and my book from 2008. In two papers from 2002 (also my paper from 2005 and (...)
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  46. added 2016-12-08
    How Do Narratives and Brains Mutually Influence Each Other? Taking Both the ‘Neuroscientific Turn’ and the ‘Narrative Turn’ in Explaining Bio-Political Orders.Machiel Keestra - manuscript
    Introduction: the neuroscientific turn in political science The observation that brains and political orders are interdependent is almost trivial. Obviously, political orders require brain processes in order to emerge and to remain in place, as these processes enable action and cognition. Conversely, every since Aristotle coined man as “by nature a political animal” (Aristotle, Pol.: 1252a 3; cf. Eth. Nic.: 1097b 11), this also suggests that the political engagements of this animal has likely consequences for its natural development, including the (...)
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  47. added 2016-12-08
    Beyond Persons: Extending the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction to Non-Rational Animals and Artificial Agents.Manuel de Pinedo-Garcia & Jason Noble - 2008 - Biology and Philosophy 23 (1):87-100.
    The distinction between personal level explanations and subpersonal ones has been subject to much debate in philosophy. We understand it as one between explanations that focus on an agent’s interaction with its environment, and explanations that focus on the physical or computational enabling conditions of such an interaction. The distinction, understood this way, is necessary for a complete account of any agent, rational or not, biological or artificial. In particular, we review some recent research in Artificial Life that pretends to (...)
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  48. added 2016-10-18
    Mechanisms and Explanatory Realization Relations.Thomas W. Polger - 2010 - Synthese 177 (2):193 - 212.
    My topic is the confluence of two recently active philosophical research programs. One research program concerns the metaphysics of realization. The other research program concerns scientific explanation in terms of mechanisms. In this paper I introduce a distinction between descriptive and explanatory approaches to realization. I then use this distinction to argue that a well-known account of realization, due to Carl Gillett, is incompatible with a well-known account of mechanistic explanation, due to Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, and Carl Craver (MDC, (...)
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  49. added 2016-10-18
    Evaluating the Evidence for Multiple Realization.Thomas W. Polger - 2009 - Synthese 167 (3):457 - 472.
    Consider what the brain-state theorist has to do to make good his claims. He has to specify a physical–chemical state such that any organism (not just a mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it possesses a brain of suitable physical–chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that physical–chemical state. This means that the physical–chemical state in question must be a possible state of a mammalian brain, a reptilian brain, a mollusc’s brain (octopuses are mollusca, and certainly (...)
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  50. added 2016-10-12
    Mechanisms in Psychology: Ripping Nature at its Seams.Catherine Stinson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (5).
    Recent extensions of mechanistic explanation into psychology suggest that cognitive models are only explanatory insofar as they map neatly onto, and serve as scaffolding for more detailed neural models. Filling in those neural details is what these accounts take the integration of cognitive psychology and neuroscience to mean, and they take this process to be seamless. Critics of this view have given up on cognitive models possibly explaining mechanistically in the course of arguing for cognitive models having explanatory value independent (...)
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