Liar Paradox

Edited by Kevin Scharp (University of Twente, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)
About this topic
Summary A liar paradox is generated by a sentence or proposition (or any truth bearer more generally) that says that it is false.  If we use the name 'S' for the sentence ‘S is false’, then that very sentence says of itself that it is false. We can reason intuitively that if it is true, then what it says is true, namely that it is false. So it is true that it is false, or, more directly, it is false. On the other hand, if it is false, then what it says is false, namely that it is false. So it is false that it is false, or, more directly, it is true. Thus, we derive that it is false from the assumption that it is true, and we derive that it is true from the assumption that it is false. It takes just a couple of steps from here to the claim that S is both true and false.  The above reasoning relies on the following two principles regarding truth (for some class of sentences p of which S is a member): (i) if p is true, then p, and (ii) if p, then p is true.  It also relies on principles of classical (and intuitionistic) logic.  Approaches to the liar paradox usually reject one of the principles of truth, one of the logical principles, or find some defect in S and any other sentence like it.  The liar paradox is closely related to several other paradoxes associated with truth, including Curry's paradox and Yablo's paradox.
Key works The classic work on the liar paradox in analytic philosophy is Tarski 1931. Kripke 1975 solidified the importance of logical rigor in investigations of the liar paradox. Early contextual approaches include Parsons 1974 and Burge 1979Priest 1979 and Chihara 1979 initiated the inconsistency approach. Gupta 1982 and Herzberger 1982 were the first to offer revision theories of truth. 
Introductions Introductory works include the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry: Beall & Glanzberg 2010
Related

Contents
2107 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 2107
  1. Paradoxes of Logical Equivalence and Identity.Andrew Bacon - 2013 - Topoi (1):1-10.
    In this paper a principle of substitutivity of logical equivalents salve veritate and a version of Leibniz’s law are formulated and each is shown to cause problems when combined with naive truth theories.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  2. De la ingeniosa disolución que dio el gobernador Sancho Panza a la paradoja del suicida.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - manuscript
    This is the story of how the noble squire Sancho Panza, while governing what he thought to be an insula, ingeniously solved a paradox not unlike those of modern logic.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. A Note on Logical Paradoxes and Aristotelian Square of Opposition.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    According to Aristotle if a universal proposition (for example: “All men are white”) is true, its contrary proposition (“All men are not white”) must be false; and, according to Aristotle, if a universal proposition (for example: “All men are white”) is true, its contradictory proposition (“Not all men are white”) must be false. I agree with what Aristotle wrote about universal propositions, but there are universal propositions which have no contrary proposition and have no contradictory proposition. The proposition X “All (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. The Synthetic Concept of Truth and its Descendants.Boris Culina - manuscript
    The concept of truth has many aims but only one source. The article describes the primary concept of truth, here called the synthetic concept of truth, according to which truth is the objective result of the synthesis of us and nature in the process of rational cognition. It is shown how various aspects of the concept of truth -- logical, scientific, and mathematical aspect -- arise from the synthetic concept of truth. Also, it is shown how the paradoxes of truth (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. The Power of Naive Truth.Hartry Field - manuscript
    While non-classical theories of truth that take truth to be transparent have some obvious advantages over any classical theory that evidently must take it as non-transparent, several authors have recently argued that there's also a big disadvantage of non-classical theories as compared to their “external” classical counterparts: proof-theoretic strength. While conceding the relevance of this, the paper argues that there is a natural way to beef up extant internal theories so as to remove their proof-theoretic disadvantage. It is suggested that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  6. Some Open Questions about Degrees of Paradoxes.Ming Hsiung - manuscript
    We can classify the (truth-theoretic) paradoxes according to their degrees of paradoxicality. Roughly speaking, two paradoxes have the same degrees of paradoxicality, if they lead to a contradiction under the same conditions, and one paradox has a (non-strictly) lower degree of paradoxicality than another, if whenever the former leads to a contradiction under a condition, the latter does so under the same condition. In this paper, we outline some results and questions around the degrees of paradoxicality and summarize recent progress.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Meaning, Presuppositions, Truth-relevance, Gödel's Sentence and the Liar Paradox.X. Y. Newberry - manuscript
    Section 1 reviews Strawson’s logic of presuppositions. Strawson’s justification is critiqued and a new justification proposed. Section 2 extends the logic of presuppositions to cases when the subject class is necessarily empty, such as (x)((Px & ~Px) → Qx) . The strong similarity of the resulting logic with Richard Diaz’s truth-relevant logic is pointed out. Section 3 further extends the logic of presuppositions to sentences with many variables, and a certain valuation is proposed. It is noted that, given this valuation, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Cut elimination for systems of transparent truth with restricted initial sequents.Carlo Nicolai - manuscript
    The paper studies a cluster of systems for fully disquotational truth based on the restriction of initial sequents. Unlike well-known alternative approaches, such systems display both a simple and intuitive model theory and remarkable proof-theoretic properties. We start by showing that, due to a strong form of invertibility of the truth rules, cut is eliminable in the systems via a standard strategy supplemented by a suitable measure of the number of applications of truth rules to formulas in derivations. Next, we (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Formalizing the logical (self-reference) error of the Liar Paradox.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    This paper decomposes the Liar Paradox into its semantic atoms using Meaning Postulates (1952) provided by Rudolf Carnap. Formalizing truth values of propositions as Boolean properties of these propositions is a key new insight. This new insight divides the translation of a declarative sentence into its equivalent mathematical proposition into three separate steps. When each of these steps are separately examined the logical error of the Liar Paradox is unequivocally shown.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Provability with Minimal Type Theory.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    Minimal Type Theory (MTT) shows exactly how all of the constituent parts of an expression relate to each other (in 2D space) when this expression is formalized using a directed acyclic graph (DAG). This provides substantially greater expressiveness than the 1D space of FOPL syntax. -/- The increase in expressiveness over other formal systems of logic shows the Pathological Self-Reference Error of expressions previously considered to be sentences of formal systems. MTT shows that these expressions were never truth bearers, thus (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Minimal Type Theory (MTT).Pete Olcott - manuscript
    Minimal Type Theory (MTT) is based on type theory in that it is agnostic about Predicate Logic level and expressly disallows the evaluation of incompatible types. It is called Minimal because it has the fewest possible number of fundamental types, and has all of its syntax expressed entirely as the connections in a directed acyclic graph.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. The Notion of Truth in Natural and Formal Languages.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    For any natural (human) or formal (mathematical) language L we know that an expression X of language L is true if and only if there are expressions Γ of language L that connect X to known facts. -/- By extending the notion of a Well Formed Formula to include syntactically formalized rules for rejecting semantically incorrect expressions we recognize and reject expressions that evaluate to neither True nor False.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Defining a Decidability Decider.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    By extending the notion of a Well Formed Formula to include syntactically formalized rules for rejecting semantically incorrect expressions we recognize and reject expressions that have the semantic error of Pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004). The foundation of this system requires the notion of a BaseFact that anchors the semantic notions of True and False. When-so-ever a formal proof from BaseFacts of language L to a closed WFF X or ~X of language L does not exist X is decided to be semantically (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Xeno Semantics for Ascending and Descending Truth.Kevin Scharp - manuscript
    As part of an approach to the liar paradox and the other paradoxes affecting truth, I have proposed replacing our concept of truth with two concepts: ascending truth and descending truth.1 I am not going to discuss why I think this is the best approach or how it solves the paradoxes; instead, I concentrate on the theory of ascending and descending truth. I formulate an axiomatic theory of ascending truth and descending truth (ADT) and provide a possible-worlds semantics for it (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. A Quantificational Analysis of the Liar Paradox.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    It seems that the most common strategy to solve the liar paradox is to argue that liar sentences are meaningless and, consequently, truth-valueless. The other main option that has grown in recent years is the dialetheist view that treats liar sentences as meaningful, truth-apt and true. In this paper I will offer a new approach that does not belong in either camp. I hope to show that liar sentences can be interpreted as meaningful, truth-apt and false, but without engendering any (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Truth and Subjunctive Theories of Knwledge: No Luck?Johannes Stern - manuscript
    The paper explores applications of Kripke's theory of truth to semantics for anti-luck epistemology, that is, to subjunctive theories of knowledge. Subjunctive theories put forward modal or subjunctive conditions to rule out knowledge by mere luck as to be found in Gettier-style counterexamples to the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. Because of the subjunctive nature of these conditions the resulting semantics turns out to be non-monotone, even if it is based on non-classical evaluation schemes such as strong Kleene (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Inconsistency theories: The importance of being metalinguistic.Douglas Patterson - manuscript
    This is a discussion of different ways of working out the idea that the semantic paradoxes show that natural languages are somehow “inconsistent”. I take the workable form of the idea to be that there are expressions such that a necessary condition of understanding them is that one be inclined to accept inconsistent claims (an conception also suggested by Matti Eklund). I then distinguish “simple” from “complex” forms of such views. On a simple theory, such expressions are meaningless, while on (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  18. Models for liars in bradwardine's theory of truth.Greg Restall - manuscript
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  19. Not much of a liar paradox: An exercise.Jordan Howard Sobel - manuscript
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. The Paradox of Liar and Fazil Sarab's Solution.Muhammed Ejei - unknown - Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 36.
    In spite of the various responses and solutions provided for the paradox of liar, different scholars and thinkers are still trying to discover some new points in this regard. We can say that this paradox has attracted the attention of a lot of philosophers due to its simplicity of formulation, long history and complexity of solution. In fact, the existing diversity in the presented solutions to this paradox is not less than the diversity in the solutions provided for the very (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Revenge for Alethic Nihilism.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    Note: This is a "pre-review" version, not the final version that will be published. -/- In “Nothing is True,” Will Gamester defends a form of alethic nihilism that still grants truth-talk a kind of legitimacy: an expressive role that is implemented via a pretense. He argues that this view has all of the strengths of deflationism, while also providing an elegant resolution of the Liar Paradox and its kin. For the alethic nihilist, Liar and related sentences are not true, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. The Liar Paradox: Between Evidence and Truth.Jonas Becker Arenhart & Ederson Safra Melo - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1-23.
    Systems of paraconsistent logics violate the law of explosion: from contradictory premises not every formula follows. One of the philosophical options for interpreting the contradictions allowed as premises in these cases was put forward recently by Carnielli and Rodrigues, with their epistemic approach to paraconsistent logics. In a nutshell, the plan consists in interpreting the contradictions in epistemic terms, as indicating the presence of non-conclusive evidence for both a proposition and its negation. Truth, in this approach, is consistent and is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Buddhist Epistemology and the Liar Paradox.Szymon Bogacz - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    The liar paradox is still an open philosophical problem. Most contemporary answers to the paradox target the logical principles underlying the reasoning from the liar sentence to the paradoxical conclusion that the liar sentence is both true and false. In contrast to these answers, Buddhist epistemology offers resources to devise a distinctively epistemological approach to the liar paradox. In this paper, I mobilise these resources and argue that the liar sentence is what Buddhist epistemologists call a contradiction with one’s own (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. A Note on Gödel, Priest and Naïve Proof.Massimiliano Carrara - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.
    In the 1951 Gibbs lecture, Gödel asserted his famous dichotomy, where the notion of informal proof is at work. G. Priest developed an argument, grounded on the notion of naïve proof, to the effect that Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem suggests the presence of dialetheias. In this paper, we adopt a plausible ideal notion of naïve proof, in agreement with Gödel’s conception, superseding the criticisms against the usual notion of naïve proof used by real working mathematicians. We explore the connection between (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Self-Reference: The Meta-Mathematics of the Liar Paradox.Richard Kimberly Heck - forthcoming - In TBA.
    Central to the liar paradox is the phenomenon of 'self-reference'. The paradox typically begins with a sentence like: -/- (L): (L) is not true -/- Historically, doubts about the intelligibility of self-reference have been quite common. In some sense, though, these doubts were answered by Kurt Gödel's famous 'diagonal lemma'. This paper surveys some of the methods by which self-reference can be achieved, focusing first on purely syntactic methods before turning attention to the 'arithmetized' methods introduced by Gödel. It's primary (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Inferential Deflationism.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.
    Deflationists about truth hold that the function of the truth predicate is to enable us to make certain assertions we could not otherwise make. Pragmatists claim that the utility of negation lies in its role in registering incompatibility. The pragmatist insight about negation has been successfully incorporated into bilateral theories of content, which take the meaning of negation to be inferentially explained in terms of the speech act of rejection. We implement the deflationist insight in a bilateral theory by taking (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. Marxism as a Disguised Epimenides Liar Paradox and false consciousnes.Richard Michael McDonough - forthcoming - Future Journal of Social Science and Humanities:75-93.
    One of Marx‘s and Engels‘ main claims (hereafter ―original Marxism) in their account of the historical ―inevitability of the collapse of capitalism is that one‘s material (economic) conditions, not one‘s ideas, arguments or philosophy, determines one‘s ―consciousness and actions. However, the self-reference in this characterization of philosophical views generates a paradox analogous to the 7th century B.C. Epimenides ―Liar paradox. The Epimenides-paradox arises when Epimenides, a Cretan, states that all Cretans are liars. Epimenides-statement is paradoxical in the sense that if (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. A Liar-Like Paradox for Rational Reflection Principles.Joshua Schechter - forthcoming - Analysis.
    This article shows that there is a liar-like paradox that arises for rational credence that relies only on very weak logical and credal principles. The paradox depends on a weak rational reflection principle, logical principles governing conjunction, and principles governing the relationship between rational credence and proof. To respond to this paradox, we must either reject even very weak rational reflection principles or reject some highly plausible logical or credal principle.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Classical Logic and the Liar.Yannis Stephanou - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.
    The liar and kindred paradoxes show that we can derive contradictions when we reason in accordance with classical logic from the schema (T) about truth: S is true iff p, where ‘p’ is to be replaced with a sentence and ‘S’ with a name of that sentence. The paper presents two arguments to the effect that the blame lies not with (T) but with classical logic. The arguments derive contradictions using classical logic, but instead of appealing to (T), they invoke (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Review of Wright & Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. [REVIEW]Andreas Stokke - forthcoming - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Proof-theoretic semantics, paradoxes and the distinction between sense and denotation.Luca Tranchini - forthcoming - Journal of Logic and Computation 2014.
    In this paper we show how Dummett-Prawitz-style proof-theoretic semantics has to be modified in order to cope with paradoxical phenomena. It will turn out that one of its basic tenets has to be given up, namely the definition of the correctness of an inference as validity preservation. As a result, the notions of an argument being valid and of an argument being constituted by correct inference rules will no more coincide. The gap between the two notions is accounted for by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  32. Truth, Hierarchy and Incoherence.Bruno Whittle - forthcoming - In Bradley Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford University Press.
    Approaches to truth and the Liar paradox seem invariably to face a dilemma: either appeal to some sort of hierarchy, or declare apparently perfectly coherent concepts incoherent. But since both options lead to severe expressive restrictions, neither seems satisfactory. The aim of this paper is a new approach, which avoids the dilemma and the resulting expressive restrictions. Previous approaches tend to appeal to some new sort of semantic value for the truth predicate to take. I argue that such approaches inevitably (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Exceptional Logic.Bruno Whittle - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-37.
    The aim of the paper is to argue that all—or almost all—logical rules have exceptions. In particular, it is argued that this is a moral that we should draw from the semantic paradoxes. The idea that we should respond to the paradoxes by revising logic in some way is familiar. But previous proposals advocate the replacement of classical logic with some alternative logic. That is, some alternative system of rules, where it is taken for granted that these hold without exception. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Review of Nuel Belnap, Michael Perloff, and Ming Xu's Facing the Future. [REVIEW]S. Wölfl - forthcoming - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic.Thomas Hofweber - 209 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5.
    Although there is a prima facie strong case for a close connection between the meaning and inferential role of certain expressions, this connection seems seriously threatened by the semantic and logical paradoxes which rely on these inferential roles. Some philosophers have drawn radical conclusions from the paradoxes for the theory of meaning in general, and for which sentences in our language are true. I criticize these overreactions, and instead propose to distinguish two conceptions of inferential role. This distinction is closely (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  36. Solving the Ross and Prior Paradoxes. Classical Modal Calculus..Pociej Jan - 2024 - Https://Doi.Org/10.6084/M9.Figshare.25257277.V1.
    Resolving the Ross and Prior paradoxes proved to be a difficult task. Its first two stages, involving the identification of the true natures of the implication and truth values, are described in the articles "Solving the Paradox of Material Implication – 2024" and "Solving Jörgensen's Dilemma – 2024". This article describes the third stage, which involves the discovery of missing modal operators and the Classical Modal Calculus. Finally, procedures for solving both paradoxes are provided.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. How to Conquer the Liar and Enthrone the Logical Concept of Truth.Boris Culina - 2023 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 23 (67):1-31.
    This article informally presents a solution to the paradoxes of truth and shows how the solution solves classical paradoxes (such as the original Liar) as well as the paradoxes that were invented as counterarguments for various proposed solutions (“the revenge of the Liar”). This solution complements the classical procedure of determining the truth values of sentences by its own failure and, when the procedure fails, through an appropriate semantic shift allows us to express the failure in a classical two-valued language. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. A Fifteenth-Century Ottoman Solution to the Liar Paradox by Ḫaṭībzāde Muḥyiddīn.Yusuf Daşdemir - 2023 - Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 33 (2):237-263.
    RésuméCet article traite d’une solution au tristement célèbre paradoxe du menteur, généralement connu dans la littérature arabe sous le nom de Maġlaṭat al-ǧaḏr al-aṣamm. La solution est donnée dans un traité ottoman du XVe siècle attribué, entre autres, à Ḫaṭībzāde Muḥyiddīn Efendī. L’article la compare également à la solution du philosophe persan contemporain, Ǧalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī. Le court traité consacré au paradoxe est l’un des rares ouvrages des Ottomans sur le sujet et il aborde de manière exhaustive le paradoxe sous (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. The Liar Paradox - A Case of Mistaken Truth Attribution.Jasper Doomen - 2023 - Axiomathes 33 (1):1-11.
    A semantic solution to the liar paradox (“This statement is not true”) is presented in this article. Since the liar paradox seems to evince a contradiction, the principle of non-contradiction is preliminarily discussed, in order to determine whether dismissing this principle may be reason enough to stop considering the liar paradox a problem. No conclusive outcome with respect to the value of this principle is aspired to here, so that the inquiry is not concluded at this point and the option (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Truth as none and many.Will Gamester - 2023 - Synthese 202 (6):1-25.
    Truth pluralists say that there are many ways to be true. Aaron Cotnoir (“Pluralism and Paradox” in: Pedersen and Wright (eds) Truth and pluralism: current debates, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) has suggested a “uniquely pluralist response to the liar”. The basic idea is to maintain that, if a sentence says of itself that it is not true in a certain way, then that sentence is not apt to be true in that way, but is instead apt to be true (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Nothing Is True.Will Gamester - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (6):314-338.
    This paper motivates and defends alethic nihilism, the theory that nothing is true. I first argue that alethic paradoxes like the Liar and Curry motivate nihilism; I then defend the view from objections. The critical discussion has two primary outcomes. First, a proof of concept. Alethic nihilism strikes many as silly or obviously false, even incoherent. I argue that it is in fact well-motivated and internally coherent. Second, I argue that deflationists about truth ought to be nihilists. Deflationists maintain that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  42. Is Truth Inconsistent?Patrick Greenough - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    A popular and enduring approach to the liar paradox takes the concept of truth to be inconsistent. Very roughly, truth is an inconsistent concept if the central principles of this concept (taken together) entail a contradiction, where one of these central principles is Tarski's T-schema for truth: a sentence S is true if and only if p, (where S says that p). This article targets a version of Inconsistentism which: retains classical logic and bivalence; takes the truth-predicate “is true” to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Some Remarks on the Notion of Paradox.Sergi Oms - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (2):211-228.
    This paper argues that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox — an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises and an apparently false conclusion — is too narrow; there are paradoxes that do not satisfy it. After discussing, and discarding, some alternatives, an outline of a new characterization of the notion of paradox is presented. A paradox is found to be an apparently valid argument such that, apparently, it does not present the kind of commitment to the conclusion (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Modest versus ultra-modest dialetheism.T. Parent - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-17.
    Jc Beall is known for defending modest dialetheism; this is the view that there are dialetheia, but only in the form of “spandrels” arising otherwise reasonable semantic terminology (e.g., the Liar paradox). Beall also regards his view as modest in partaking of a deflationary view of truth, a view where ‘true’ is a device of disquotational inference which expresses no “substantive property.” Beall supports deflationism by an appeal to Ockham’s razor; however, the premise that ‘true’ is fundamentally disquotational is found (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Scharp on inconsistent concepts and their engineered replacements, or: can we mend these broken things?Mark Pinder - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):863-884.
    Kevin Scharp’s influential work on the alethic paradoxes combines an extensively developed inconsistency theory with a substantial conceptual engineering project. I argue that Scharp’s inconsistency theory is in tension with his conceptual engineering project: the inconsistency theory includes an account of concepts that implies that the conceptual engineering project will fail. I recommend that Scharp revises his account of concepts, and show how doing so allows him to resolve the tension. The discussion is important for ongoing work on conceptual engineering. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Not every truth could have a truthmaker.John Stigall - 2023 - Theoria 89 (1):7-13.
    Mark Jago argues for truthmaker maximalism in some recent papers based on a key premise: that every truth could have a truthmaker. Jago contends that many would pretheoretically accept this principle and that counterexamples to it would be difficult to find. In this note, I show how truthmaker non-maximalists can use a modified version of Peter Milne's argument against maximalism to provide a counterexample to this key premise.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Restricting the T‐schema to Solve the Liar.Jared Warren - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):238-258.
    If we want to retain classical logic and standard syntax in light of the liar, we are forced to restrict the T-schema. The traditional philosophical justification for this is sentential – liar sentences somehow malfunction. But the standard formal way of implementing this is conditional, our T-sentences tell us that if “p” does not malfunction, then “p” is true if and only if p. Recently Bacon and others have pointed out that conditional T-restrictions like this flirt with incoherence. If we (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. The Liar Paradox and “Meaningless” Revenge.Jared Warren - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (1):49-78.
    A historically popular response to the liar paradox (“this sentence is false”) is to say that the liar sentence is meaningless (or semantically defective, or malfunctions, or…). Unfortunately, like all other supposed solutions to the liar, this approach faces a revenge challenge. Consider the revenge liar sentence, “this sentence is either meaningless or false”. If it is true, then it is either meaningless or false, so not true. And if it is not true, then it can’t be either meaningless or (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. What of multi- and interdisciplinarity? A (personal) case study.Luis M. Augusto - 2022 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 3 (2):1-3.
    An analysis of--yet another--case of academic failure in multi- and interdisciplinarity. An editorial of the Journal of Knowledge Structures & Systems.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. KF, PKF and Reinhardt’s Program.Luca Castaldo & Johannes Stern - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic (1):33-58.
    In “Some Remarks on Extending and Interpreting Theories with a Partial Truth Predicate”, Reinhardt [21] famously proposed an instrumentalist interpretation of the truth theory Kripke–Feferman ( $\mathrm {KF}$ ) in analogy to Hilbert’s program. Reinhardt suggested to view $\mathrm {KF}$ as a tool for generating “the significant part of $\mathrm {KF}$ ”, that is, as a tool for deriving sentences of the form $\mathrm{Tr}\ulcorner {\varphi }\urcorner $. The constitutive question of Reinhardt’s program was whether it was possible “to justify the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
1 — 50 / 2107