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Summary Libertarians believe that free will is incompatible with causal determinism, and agents have free will. They therefore deny that causal determinism is true. There are three major categories of libertarians. Event-causal libertarians believe that free actions are indeterministically caused by prior events. Agent-causal libertarians believe that agents indeterministically cause free actions. Non-causal libertarians typically believe that free actions are constituted by basic mental actions, such as a decision or choice.
Key works In the contemporary debate, event-causal libertarianism has been most powerfully defended by Robert Kane; Kane 1996 is the most complete statement of his position. O'Connor 2000 is perhaps the best articulated defence of agent-causation. Ginet 1990 and McCann 1998 are influential defences of non-causal theories. Clarke 2003 is careful and penetrating overview.
Introductions Clarke & Capes ms
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777 found
1 — 50 / 777
  1. added 2018-11-06
    Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck*: ALFRED R. MELE.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (2):274-293.
    My topic lies on conceptual terrain that is quite familiar to philosophers. For others, a bit of background may be in order. In light of what has filtered down from quantum mechanics, few philosophers today believe that the universe is causally deterministic. That is, to use Peter van Inwagen's succinct definition of “determinism,” few philosophers believe that “there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future.” Even so, partly for obvious historical reasons, philosophers continue to argue about whether free (...)
  2. added 2018-11-05
    Two Libertarian Theories: Or Why Event-Causal Libertarians Should Prefer My Daring Libertarian View to Robert Kane's View.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:49-68.
    Libertarianism about free will is the conjunction of two theses: the existence of free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism, and at least some human beings sometimes exercise free will (or act freely, for short). 1 Some libertarian views feature agent causation, others maintain that free actions are uncaused, and yet others – event-causal libertarian views – reject all views of these two kinds and appeal to indeterministic causation by events and states. 2 This article explores the relative (...)
  3. added 2018-10-25
    Experimental Philosophy, Robert Kane, and the Concept of Free Will.J. Neil Otte - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (1):281-296.
    Trends in experimental philosophy have provided new and compelling results that are cause for re-evaluations in contemporary discussions of free will. In this paper, I argue for one such re-evaluation by criticizing Robert Kane’s well-known views on free will. I argue that Kane’s claims about pre-theoretical intuitions are not supported by empirical findings on two accounts. First, it is unclear that either incompatibilism or compatibalism is more intuitive to nonphilosophers, as different ways of asking about free will and responsibility reveal (...)
  4. added 2018-10-17
    Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    Martin Luther affirms his theological position by saying “Here I stand. I can do no other.” Supposing that Luther’s claim is true, he lacks alternative possibilities at the moment of choice. Even so, many libertarians have the intuition that he is morally responsible for his action. One way to make sense of this intuition is to assert that Luther’s action is indirectly free, because his action inherits its freedom and moral responsibility from earlier actions when he had alternative possibilities and (...)
  5. added 2018-09-27
    Gilberto Gomes é mesmo um compatibilista?Marcelo Fischborn - 2018 - Filosofia Unisinos 19 (3):179-188.
    This paper focuses on Gilberto Gomes’ work on free will. In a series of contributions that have had a significant impact on the respective literature, Gomes developed a conception about free will and argued that its existence is consistent with recent scientific findings, specially in neuroscience. In this paper, I object to a claim of Gomes about his conception of free will, namely the claim that it is a compatibilist conception. I seek to show that Gomes does not use the (...)
  6. added 2018-09-14
    Closing the Door on the Belief in Ability Thesis.Neil Levy - manuscript
    It is, as Dana Nelkin (2004) says, a rare point of agreement among participants in the free will debate that rational deliberation presupposes a belief in freedom. Of course, the precise content of that belief – and, indeed, the nature of deliberation – is controversial, with some philosophers claiming that deliberation commits us to a belief in libertarian free will (Taylor 1966; Ginet 1966), and others claiming that, on the contrary, deliberation presupposes nothing more than an epistemic openness that is (...)
  7. added 2018-08-20
    A Libertarian Response to Dennett and Harris on Free Will.John Lemos - 2017 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 8 (3):231-246.
    : This article critically examines central arguments made in Sam Harris’ Free Will as well as key aspects of Daniel Dennett’s compatibilist conception of free will. I argue that while Dennett makes thoughtful replies to Harris’ critique of compatibilism, his compatibilism continues to be plagued by critical points raised by Bruce Waller. Additionally, I argue that Harris’ rejection of the libertarian view of free will is ill-informed and I explain the basics of Robert Kane’s libertarian view, arguing that it can (...)
  8. added 2018-08-20
    Free Will Remains a Mystery: The Eighth Philosophical Perspectives Lecture.Peter Van Inwagen - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):1 - 19.
  9. added 2018-08-04
    The Problem of Free Will and Determinism: An Abductive Approach.Kristin M. Mickelson - forthcoming - Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (1).
    This essay begins by dividing the traditional problem of free will and determinism into a “correlation” problem and an “explanation” problem. I then focus on the explanation problem, and argue that a standard form of abductive (i.e. inference to the best-explanation) reasoning may be useful in solving it. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of the abductive approach, I apply it to three standard accounts of free will. While each account implies the same solution to the correlation problem, each implies a unique (...)
  10. added 2018-08-03
    Compatibilist Fatalism.Paul Russell - 2000 - In A. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 199--218.
    Compatibilists argue, famously, that it is a simple incompatibilist confusion to suppose that determinism implies fatalism. Incompatibilists argue, on the contrary, that determinism implies fatalism, and thus cannot be consistent with the necessary conditions of moral responsibility. Despite their differences, however, both parties are agreed on one important matter: the refutation of fatalism is essential to the success of the compatibilist strategy. In this paper I argue that compatibilism requires a richer conception of fatalistic concern; one that recognizes the _legitimacy_ (...)
  11. added 2018-07-09
    William King on Free Will.Kenneth L. Pearce - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    William King’s De Origine Mali (1702) contains an interesting, sophisticated, and original account of free will. King finds ‘necessitarian’ theories of freedom, such as those advocated by Hobbes and Locke, inadequate, but argues that standard versions of libertarianism commit one to the claim that free will is a faculty for going wrong. On such views, free will is something we would be better off without. King argues that both problems can be avoided by holding that we confer value on objects (...)
  12. added 2018-05-31
    Libertarianism, the Rollback Argument, and the Objective Probability of Free Choices.Peter Furlong - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):512-532.
    It is widely assumed that candidates for free, undetermined choices must have objective probabilities prior to their performance. Indeed although this premise figures prominently in a widely discussed argument against libertarianism, few libertarians have called it into question. In this article, I will investigate whether libertarians ought to reject it. I will conclude that doing so should not be tempting to event-causal libertarians or most agent-causal ones, because the added costs outweigh the benefits.
  13. added 2018-05-14
    A Principle of Rational Explanation?Randolph Clarke - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1-12.
    This paper addresses an argument from Richard Double to the effect that any libertarian account of free will must attribute to human action a kind of rationality that is impossible. Double's argument relies on an alleged principle of rational explanation. Here it is argued that the proposed principle is false, and hence that Double has failed to show that libertarianism has any problem with rationality. The paper concludes with a suggestion as to how the sort of rationality in question is (...)
  14. added 2018-04-17
    Mythen über die libertarische Freiheitsauffassung.Geert Keil - 2007 - In Jan-Christoph Heilinger (ed.), Naturgeschichte der Freiheit. de Gruyter. pp. 281-305.
    Der Kern der libertarischen Freiheitsauffassung ist das So-oder-Anderskönnen unter gegebenen Bedingungen, also die Annahme von Zwei-Wege-Vermögen. Dieses definierende Merkmal wird in der jüngeren Freiheitsdebatte mit einer Reihe von Zusatzbehauptungen verknüpft, die dem Libertarier unterschoben werden, um die Unhaltbarkeit seiner Position zu erweisen. Ich unterscheide vier dieser Mythen: Dem Mythos des Dualismus zufolge leugnen Libertarier, dass Personen und ihre Entscheidungen Teil der natürlichen Welt sind. Dem Mythos der Unbedingtheit zufolge nehmen sie an, dass ein freier Wille ein durch nichts bedingter Wille (...)
  15. added 2018-04-12
    Freiheitsskepsis auf dem Prüfstand. Zu Sven Walters Neubewertung der empirischen Herausforderungen für die Willensfreiheit.Geert Keil - 2017 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 71 (3):418-424.
    In seinem Buch Illusion freier Wille? verfolgt Sven Walter zwei Hauptziele. Das erste besteht in dem detaillierten Nachweis, dass die in den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten öffentlichkeitswirksam vorgetragene kognitions- und neurowissenschaftlich begründete Freiheitsskepsis durch die empirischen Befunde nicht gedeckt sei. Das zweite Hauptziel ist, aufzuzeigen, dass Willensfreiheit bzw. „unsere intuitive Freiheitsgewissheit“ durchaus empirisch erforschbaren Beeinträchtigungen unterliegt, aber anderen als von den Wortführern der neurobiologischen Freiheitskritik angeführten: „Unbewusste situationale Einflüsse“ auf unsere Willens- und Entscheidungsbildung seien zwar nicht per se, wohl aber dann (...)
  16. added 2018-04-12
    Libertarische Freiheit für natürliche Wesen. Zu Ansgar Beckermanns Freiheitsauffassung.Geert Keil - 2011 - Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 36 (2):154-176.
    Der Beitrag ist ein Kommentar zu Ansgar Beckermanns kompatibilistischer Freiheitsauffassung. Nach Beckermann können libertarische Auffassungen die Willensfreiheit nicht verständlich machen. Durch ihre Ablehnung des Determinismus sähen sie sich zwei unattraktiven Optionen gegenüber: die Freiheit auf Akteurskausalität zu gründen oder auf den Zufall. Ich stimme Beckermann darin zu, dass Akteurskausalität schwer verständlich und das Zufallsproblem eine große Herausforderung für den Libertarismus ist. Ob der Kompatibilismus in einer besseren Lage ist, ist aber fraglich. Es gibt zwei Arten von Kompatibilisten: solche, die den (...)
  17. added 2018-04-08
    A Minimal Libertarianism: Free Will and the Promise of Reduction.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Christopher Evan Franklin develops and defends a novel version of event-causal libertarianism. This view is a combination of libertarianism--the view that humans sometimes act freely and that those actions are the causal upshots of nondeterministic processes--and agency reductionism--the view that the causal role of the agent in exercises of free will is exhausted by the causal role of mental states and events (e.g., desires and beliefs) involving the agent. Franklin boldly counteracts a dominant theory that has similar (...)
  18. added 2018-03-13
    Libet-Style Experiments, Neuroscience, and Libertarian Free Will.Marcelo Fischborn - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):494-502.
    People have disagreed on the significance of Libet-style experiments for discussions about free will. In what specifically concerns free will in a libertarian sense, some argue that Libet-style experiments pose a threat to its existence by providing support to the claim that decisions are determined by unconscious brain events. Others disagree by claiming that determinism, in a sense that conflicts with libertarian free will, cannot be established by sciences other than fundamental physics. This paper rejects both positions. First, it is (...)
  19. added 2018-02-18
    The Will to Believe: And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy.William James - 2014 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    For this 1897 publication, the American philosopher William James brought together ten essays, some of which were originally talks given to Ivy League societies. Accessible to a broader audience, these non-technical essays illustrate the author's pragmatic approach to belief and morality, arguing for faith and action in spite of uncertainty. James thought his audiences suffered 'paralysis of their native capacity for faith' while awaiting scientific grounds for belief. His response consisted in an attitude of 'radical empiricism', which deals practically rather (...)
  20. added 2018-02-17
    Consciousness and Free Will: A Critique of the Argument From Introspection.Gregg Caruso - 2008 - Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):219-231.
    One of the main libertarian arguments in support of free will is the argument from introspection. This argument places a great deal of faith in our conscious feeling of freedom and our introspective abilities. People often infer their own freedom from their introspective phenomenology of freedom. It is here argued that from the fact that I feel myself free, it does not necessarily follow that I am free. I maintain that it is our mistaken belief in the transparency and infallibility (...)
  21. added 2018-02-17
    Libertarianism as a Scientifically Reputable View.Mark Balaguer - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (2):189-211.
  22. added 2018-02-16
    Lucky Libertarianism.Mike Almeida & M. Bernstein - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (2):93-119.
    Perhaps the greatest impediment to a viable libertarianism is the provision of a satisfactory explanation of how actions that are undetermined by an agent's character can still be under the control of, or 'up to', the agent. The 'luck problem' has been most assiduously examined by Robert Kane who supplies a detailed account of how this problem can be resolved. Although Kane's theory is innovative, insightful, and more resourceful than most of his critics believe, it ultimately cannot account for the (...)
  23. added 2018-02-14
    Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil.Guillaume Bignon - 2017 - Eugene: Pickwick Publications.
  24. added 2018-02-10
    The Two‐Stage Luck Objection.Seth Shabo - forthcoming - Noûs.
    The Luck Objection is an influential family of challenges to libertarianism. In recent years, discussions of the Luck Objection have reached an impasse of sorts. On one hand, existing responses to the objection have failed to satisfy libertarianism’s many critics. On the other hand, a growing number of libertarians seem unimpressed by existing formulations of the objection. To break the impasse, I present a two-stage version of the objection. The first stage has the limited objective of showing that supposed exercises (...)
  25. added 2018-02-02
    Mark Belaguer, Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem Reviewed By.Neil Levy - 2010 - Philosophy in Review 30 (2):80-82.
  26. added 2017-12-29
    On Flew’s Compatibilism and His Objections to Theistic Libertarianism.Hakan Gundogdu - 2015 - Kaygı Uludağ University Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Philosophy 25:115-142.
    Flew strongly defends a compatibilist thesis in the free will debate before going on to totally object to theistic libertarianism. His objections basically rely on his compatibilism embracing the notion of agent causation, which is not very common in compatibilist theses. Since he is a strong proponent of ordinary language philosophy, he also holds that linguistic analyses can certainly solve the free will problem as well as many other problems of philosophy. In doing so, he first uses the paradigm cases (...)
  27. added 2017-12-12
    The Efficacy of Reasons: A Reply to Hendrickson.Timothy O'Connor - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):135-137.
    Noel Hendrickson, in “Against an Agent-Causal Theory of Action” (this volume), carefully and intelligently probes aspects of the agent-causal account of free will I present in Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. The central target of his criticism is my contention that agent-causal events, by their very nature, cannot be caused. Here, I respond to his argument on this point.
  28. added 2017-12-11
    Probability and Freedom: A Reply to Vicens.Timothy O'Connor - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):289-293.
    I have argued elsewhere that human free action is governed by objective probabilities. This view, I suggested, is strongly supported by our experience of motivated decision-making and by our having emerged from probabilistically-governed physical causes. Leigh Vicens (2016) criticizes these arguments. She also argues that an account of human freedom as probabilistically-unstructured indeterminacy is less vulnerable to challenges to the plausibility of libertarian views of freedom. In this article, I explain why I am not persuaded by Vicens’s arguments.
  29. added 2017-12-11
    Probability and Freedom.Timothy O'Connor - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):289-293.
    I have argued elsewhere that human free action is governed by objective probabilities. This view, I suggested, is strongly supported by our experience of motivated decision-making and by our having emerged from probabilistically-governed physical causes. Leigh Vicens criticizes these arguments. She also argues that an account of human freedom as probabilisticallyunstructured indeterminacy is less vulnerable to challenges to the plausibility of libertarian views of freedom. In this article, I explain why I am not persuaded by Vicens’s arguments.
  30. added 2017-11-07
    Downward Causation and Supervenience: The Non-Reductionist’s Extra Argument for Incompatibilism.Joana Rigato - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):384-399.
    Agent-causal theories of free will, which rely on a non-reductionist account of the agent, have traditionally been associated with libertarianism. However, some authors have recently argued in favor of compatibilist agent-causal accounts. In this essay, I will show that such accounts cannot avoid serious problems of implausibility or incoherence. A careful analysis of the implications of non-reductionist views of the agent (event-causal or agent-causal as they may be) reveals that such views necessarily imply either the denial of the principle of (...)
  31. added 2017-11-07
    The Agent as Her Self: How Taking Agency Seriously Leads to Emergent Dualism.Maria Joana Rigato - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):48-60.
    : To act is to be the author of an intentional bodily movement. I will show that, in order for that authorship to be assured, the agent must both amount to more than the mereological sum of her mental or neural states and events, and have an irreducible causal power over, at least, some of them. Hence, agent-causalism is the best position for any realist about action to assume. I will contend that, contrary to what many have claimed, agent-causalism is (...)
  32. added 2017-10-30
    Indeterminism and Free Agency: Three Recent Views.Timothy O'Connor - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):499-526.
    In recent years, as the enterprise of speculative metaphysics has attained a newfound measure of respectability, incompatibilist philosophers who are inclined to think that freedom of action is not only possible, but actual, have re-emerged to take on the formidable task of providing a satisfactory indeterministic account of the connections among an agent's freedom to do otherwise, her reasons, and her control over her act. In this paper, I want to examine three of these proposals, all of which give novel (...)
  33. added 2017-10-17
    Hugh J. McCann (Ed.), Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Freedom in Perfect Being Theology. [REVIEW]Garrett Pendergraft - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 16.
    This volume collects a set of papers that were presented at a conference on “Big Questions in Free Will,” held at the University of Saint Thomas in October of 2014. It is dedicated to its editor, who passed away shortly after completing the manuscript. I will briefly summarize each of the 11 chapters and then offer a few critical comments.
  34. added 2017-10-17
    Rolling Back the Luck Problem for Libertarianism.Zac Cogley - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (1):121-137.
    I here sketch a reply to Peter van Inwagen’s Rollback Argument, which suggests that libertarian accounts of free agency are beset by problems involving luck. Van Inwagen imagines an indeterministic agent whose universe is repeatedly ‘rolled back’ by God to the time of her choice. Since the agent’s choice is indeterministic, her choices are sometimes di erent in the imaginary rollback scenarios. I show that although this is true, this need not impair her control over what she does. I develop (...)
  35. added 2017-10-05
    In Defense of Free Will: With Other Philosophical Essays.Henry R. West & C. A. Campbell - 1969 - Philosophical Review 78 (4):549.
  36. added 2017-09-21
    Libertarianism and the Belief in Transempirical Entities, EJ Russell on Causation and Agency.Harold Ofstad - 1963 - In Gunnar Aspelin (ed.), Philosophical Essays. Lund, Cwk Gleerup. pp. 152.
  37. added 2017-09-19
    Review: Thomas Pink's The Psychology of Freedom (1996 CUP). [REVIEW]Randolph Clarke - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):634-637.
  38. added 2017-09-18
    Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.Randolph Clarke & Justin Capes - unknown - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    To have free will is to have what it takes to act freely. When an agent acts freely—when she exercises her free will—what she does is up to her. A plurality of alternatives is open to her, and she determines which she pursues. When she does, she is an ultimate source or origin of her action. So runs a familiar conception of free will.
  39. added 2017-08-04
    Aquinas on Free Will and Intellectual Determinism.Tobias Hoffmann & Cyrille Michon - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.
    From the early reception of Thomas Aquinas up to the present, many have interpreted his theory of liberum arbitrium to imply intellectual determinism: we do not control our choices, because we do not control the practical judgments that cause our choices. In this paper we argue instead that he rejects determinism in general and intellectual determinism in particular, which would effectively destroy liberum arbitrium as he conceives of it. We clarify that for Aquinas moral responsibility presupposes liberum arbitrium and thus (...)
  40. added 2017-07-29
    Aspects of Agency: Decisions, Abilities, Explanations, and Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Oup Usa.
    Mele develops a view of paradigmatically free actions--including decisions--as indeterministically caused by their proximal causes. He mounts a masterful defense of this thesis that includes solutions to problems about luck and control widely discussed in the literature on free will and moral responsibility.
  41. added 2017-07-29
    Introduction to Free Will and Theism.Kevin Timpe & Daniel Speak - 2016 - In Kevin Timpe & Daniel Speak (eds.), Free Will and Theism: Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-26.
    Concerns both about the nature of free will and about the credibility of theistic belief and commitment have long preoccupied philosophers. This is just to make the obvious point that philosophical questions about whether we enjoy free will and about whether God exists are truly perennial. In addition, there can be no denying that the history of philosophical inquiry into these two questions has been dynamic and, at least to some degree, integrated. In a great many cases, classical answers to (...)
  42. added 2017-07-29
    Free Will and the Stages of Theological Anthropology.Kevin Timpe & Audra Jenson - 2015 - In Joshua Farris & Charles Champe Taliaferro (eds.), Assignee Research Companion to Theological Anthropology. Ashgate. pp. 233-244.
    The basic idea of the article is to explain how free will relates to the progression from the status integritatis to the status corruptionis to the status gratiae to the status gloriae, contrasting libertarian and compatibilist views. We argue that either account can give an account of these stages (even though it might seem that compatibilist views would have it easier).
  43. added 2017-07-29
    Free Will and Naturalism: How to Be a Libertarian and a Naturalist Too.Kevin Timpe & Jonathan D. Jacobs - 2015 - In Kelly James (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Blackwell. pp. 319-335.
    As pop naturalists tell it, free will is incompatible with naturalism. And apparently many scientists agree. Philosopher Daniel Dennett reports, for example, that he has “learned from discussions with a variety of scientists…[that] free will, in their view, is obviously incompatible with naturalism, with determinism, and very likely incoherent against any background, so they cheerfully insist that of course they don’t have free will” (2013, 47). Many philosophers, however, disagree (e.g., Mele 2014; Nahmias 2014; Vargas 2014), since compatibilist forms of (...)
  44. added 2017-04-05
    Fischer's Fate With Fatalism.Christoph Jäger - forthcoming - European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 9 (2017).
    John Martin Fischer’s core project in Our Fate (2016) is to develop and defend Pike-style arguments for theological incompatibilism, i. e., for the view that divine omniscience is incompatible with human free will. Against Ockhamist attacks on such arguments, Fischer maintains that divine forebeliefs constitute so-called hard facts about the times at which they occur, or at least facts with hard ‘kernel elements’. I reconstruct Fischer’s argument and outline its structural analogies with an argument for logical fatalism. I then point (...)
  45. added 2017-03-01
    Libertarianism and Skepticism About Free Will: Some Arguments Against Both.Manuel Vargas - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):403-426.
  46. added 2017-02-24
    II—Acting ‘of One's Own Free Will’: Modern Reflections on an Ancient Philosophical Problem.Robert Kane - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (1pt1):35-55.
    Over the past five decades, I have been developing a distinctive view of free will according to which it requires that agents be to some degree ultimately responsible for the formation of their own wills. To act ‘of one's own free will’ in this sense is to act ‘from a will’ that is to some extent ‘of one's own free making’. A free will of this ultimate kind has been under attack in the modern era as obscure and unintelligible. In (...)
  47. added 2017-02-24
    Plain Person's Free Will.David Hodgson - 2005 - Imprint Academic.
    'Plain' persons tend to accept that free will exists and is inconsistent with determinism, but this commonsense position is widely debunked by professional philosophers and cognitive scientists. In this special issue of the _Journal of Consciousness Studies_ David Hodgson defends a simple, robust account of the plain person's position on free will, and intends it to support equally robust views of personal responsibility for conduct. In a lively debate his ideas are discussed and challenged by ten philosophers and scientists of (...)
  48. added 2017-02-24
    Free Will and Indeterminism: Robert Kane’s Libertarianism.Robert Francis Allen - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355.
    Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of “ultimate responsibility,” Robert Kane argues that to be exercising a free will an agent must have taken some character forming decisions for which there were no sufficient conditions or decisive reasons. That is, an agent whose will is free not only had the ability to develop values and beliefs besides those that presently make up her motives, but could have exercised that ability without being irrational. An agent wills freely, on this view, by beingultimately responsible (...)
  49. added 2017-02-24
    Free Will, Chance, and Mystery.L. Ekstrom - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (2):153-180.
    This paper proposes a reconciliation between libertarian freedom and causal indeterminism, without relying on agent-causation as a primitive notion. I closely examine Peter van Inwagen's recent case for free will mysterianism, which is based in part on the widespread worry that undetermined acts are too chancy to be free. I distinguish three senses of the term 'chance.' I then argue that van Inwagen's case for free will mystrianism fails, since there is no single construal of the term 'change' on which (...)
  50. added 2017-02-16
    Radical Indeterminism and Top-Down Causation.Helen Beebee - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):537-545.
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