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Summary Libertarians believe that free will is incompatible with causal determinism, and agents have free will. They therefore deny that causal determinism is true. There are three major categories of libertarians. Event-causal libertarians believe that free actions are indeterministically caused by prior events. Agent-causal libertarians believe that agents indeterministically cause free actions. Non-causal libertarians typically believe that free actions are constituted by basic mental actions, such as a decision or choice.
Key works In the contemporary debate, event-causal libertarianism has been most powerfully defended by Robert Kane; Kane 1996 is the most complete statement of his position. O'Connor 2000 is perhaps the best articulated defence of agent-causation. Ginet 2012 and McCann 1998 are influential defences of non-causal theories. Clarke 2003 is careful and penetrating overview.
Introductions Clarke & Capes ms
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  1. .[author unknown] - unknown
  2. Smart on Free-Will.Richard Acworth - 1963 - Mind 72 (286):271-272.
  3. Robert Kane, Free Will, and Neuro-Indeterminism.Roksana Alavi - 2005 - Philo 8 (2):95-108.
    In this paper I argue that Robert Kane’s defense of event-causal libertarianism, as presented in Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism, fails because his event-causal reconstruction is incoherent. I focus on the notions of efforts and self-forming actions essential to his defense.
  4. Free Will and Indeterminism: Robert Kane's Libertarianism.Robert F. Allen - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355.
    Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of “ultimate responsibility,” Robert Kane argues that to be exercising a free will an agent must have taken some character forming decisions for which there were no sufficient conditions or decisive reasons.1 That is, an agent whose will is free not only had the ability to develop other dispositions, but could have exercised that ability without being irrational. To say it again, a person has a free will just in case her character is the product of (...)
  5. Free Will and Indeterminism.Robert Francis Allen - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355.
    Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of “ultimate responsibility,” Robert Kane argues that to be exercising a free will an agent must have taken some character forming decisions for which there were no sufficient conditions or decisive reasons. That is, an agent whose will is free not only had the ability to develop values and beliefs besides those that presently make up her motives, but could have exercised that ability without being irrational. An agent wills freely, on this view, by beingultimately responsible (...)
  6. Free Will and Indeterminism: Robert Kane’s Libertarianism.Robert Francis Allen - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355.
    Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of “ultimate responsibility,” Robert Kane argues that to be exercising a free will an agent must have taken some character forming decisions for which there were no sufficient conditions or decisive reasons. That is, an agent whose will is free not only had the ability to develop values and beliefs besides those that presently make up her motives, but could have exercised that ability without being irrational. An agent wills freely, on this view, by beingultimately responsible (...)
  7. Lucky Libertarianism.M. Almeida & M. Bernstein - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 22 (2):93-119.
    Perhaps the greatest impediment to a viable libertarianism is the provision of a satisfactory explanation of how actions that are undetermined by an agent''s character can still be under the control of, or up to, the agent. The luck problem has been most assiduously examined by Robert Kane who supplies a detailed account of how this problem can be resolved. Although Kane''s theory is innovative, insightful, and more resourceful than most of his critics believe, it ultimately cannot account for the (...)
  8. Libertad de la Voluntad y Poderes Causales.José Tomás Alvarado Marambio - 2012 - Veritas 26:107-123.
  9. On Counterfactuals of Libertarian Freedom: Is There Anything I Would Have Done If I Could Have Done Otherwise?Paul C. Anders, Joshua C. Thurow & Kenneth Hochstetter - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):85-94.
  10. Free Speech.Judith Andre - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 31:519-521.
  11. Free Will and the Christian Faith.W. S. Anglin - 1990 - Oxford University Press.
    Libertarians such as J.R. Lucas have abandoned traditional Christian doctrines because they cannot reconcile them with the freedom of the will. Traditional Christian thinkers such as Augustine have repudiated libertarianism because they cannot reconcile it with the dogmas of the Faith. In Free Will and the Christian Faith, W.S. Anglin demonstrates that free will and traditional Christianity are ineed compatible. He examines, and solves, puzzles about the relationships between free will and omnipotence, omniscience, and God's goodness, using the idea of (...)
  12. Free Will and the Divergence Problem.Takuo Aoyama, Shogo Shimizu & Yuki Yamada - 2015 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 23:1-18.
    This paper presents what the authors call the ‘divergence problem’ regarding choosing between different future possibilities. As is discussed in the first half, the central issue of the problem is the difficulty of temporally locating the ‘active cause’ on the modal divergent diagram. In the second half of this paper, we discuss the ‘second-person freedom’ which is, strictly, neither compatibilist negative freedom nor incompatibilist positive freedom. The divergence problem leads us to two hypothetical views (i.e. the view of single-line determination (...)
  13. A New Theory of Free Will.Marcus Arvan - 2013 - Philosophical Forum 44 (1):1-48.
    This paper shows that several live philosophical and scientific hypotheses – including the holographic principle and multiverse theory in quantum physics, and eternalism and mind-body dualism in philosophy – jointly imply an audacious new theory of free will. This new theory, "Libertarian Compatibilism", holds that the physical world is an eternally existing array of two-dimensional information – a vast number of possible pasts, presents, and futures – and the mind a nonphysical entity or set of properties that "read" that physical (...)
  14. An Essay on Free Will.Robert Audi - 1986 - Faith and Philosophy 3 (2):213-220.
  15. Humean Libertarianism: Outline of a Revisionist Account of the Joint Problem of Free Will, Determinism, and Laws of Nature.M. Backmann - 2013 - Berlin/New York.
    3 LIBERTARIANISM Now that we have discussed determinism and laws of nature, let us finally turn to libertarianism. Traditionally, libertarianism has been viewed as an incompatibilist theory of free will, as it requires the existence of real ...
  16. Epiphenomenalism Explained.Norman Bacrac - 2010 - Philosophy Now 81:10-13.
    Epiphenomenalism expressed as a form of materialism in two key axioms; distinguished from Cartesian dualism, physicalism, eliminativism; shown to be compatible with a subjective experience of free choice but not with libertarian free will - the social consequences of this view.
  17. Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism.Baker Lynne Rudder - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):307-330.
  18. Why Christians Should Not Be Libertarians: An Augustinian Challenge.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2003 - Faith and Philosophy 20 (4):460-478.
    The prevailing view of Christian philosophers today seems to be that Christianity requires a libertarian conception of free will. Focusing on Augustine’s mature anti-Pelagian works, I try to show that the prevailing view is in error. Specifically, I want to show that---on Augustine’s view of grace-a libertarian account of free will is irrelevant to salvation. On Augustine’s view, the grace of God through Christ is sufficient as weIl as necessary for salvation. Salvation is entirely in the hands of God, totally (...)
  19. Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem.Mark Balaguer - 2012 - Bradford.
    In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events. In the course of his argument, Balaguer provides a naturalistic defense of the libertarian view of free will. The metaphysical component of the problem of free will, Balaguer argues, essentially boils down to the question of whether humans possess libertarian free will. Furthermore, he (...)
  20. Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem.Mark Balaguer - 2010 - MIT Press.
    In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will boils down to an open ...
  21. Why There Are No Good Arguments for Any Interesting Version of Determinism.Mark Balaguer - 2009 - Synthese 168 (1):1 - 21.
    This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong version of indeterminism, so it can be refuted not just by universal determinism, but by some much weaker theses as well. However, it is argued that at present, we have no good reason to believe even these weak deterministic views and, hence, no good reason—at least from (...)
  22. Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem.Mark Balaguer - 2009 - Bradford.
    In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events. In the course of his argument, Balaguer provides a naturalistic defense of the libertarian view of free will. The metaphysical component of the problem of free will, Balaguer argues, essentially boils down to the question of whether humans possess libertarian free will. Furthermore, he (...)
  23. Libertarianism as a Scientifically Respectable View.Mark Balaguer - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (2):189-211.
  24. The Significance of Free Will.Bruce W. Ballard - 1998 - International Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2):211-212.
  25. Indeterminacy and Freedom: A Reappraisal.Ian Barbour - 1955 - Philosophy of Science 22 (1):8-20.
  26. Tolstoy on Free Will.Joe Barnhart - 1995 - The Personalist Forum 11 (1):33-54.
  27. Book Review: Less Than Two Dollars a Day: A Christian View of World Poverty and the Free Market. [REVIEW]Michael Barram - forthcoming - Interpretation 62 (4):450-450.
  28. Truth and Freedom.Gary Bedell - 1992 - Modern Schoolman 70 (1):53-62.
  29. Radical Indeterminism and Top-Down Causation.Helen Beebee - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):537-545.
  30. Free Will Sans Metaphysics?Helen Beebee - 2012 - Metascience 21 (1):77-81.
    Free will sans metaphysics? Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9525-5 Authors Helen Beebee, Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 2TT UK Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
  31. Branching Histories Approach to Indeterminism and Free Will.Nuel Belnap - unknown
    An informal sketch is offered of some chief ideas of the (formal) ``branching histories'' theory of objective possibility, free will and indeterminism. Reference is made to ``branching time'' and to ``branching space-times,'' with emphasis on a theme that they share: Objective possibilities are in Our World, organized by the relation of causal order.
  32. Facing the Future: Agents and Choices in Our Indeterminist World.Nuel D. Belnap - 2001 - Oxford University Press on Demand.
    Here is an important new theory of human action, a theory that assumes actions are founded on choices made by agents who face an open future.
  33. Ethics and the Quest for Wisdom. By Robert Kane. (Cambridge UP, 2010. Pp. Ix + 287. Price £50.00.). [REVIEW]Sandrine Berges - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):198-199.
  34. Time and Free Will, Tr. By F.L. Pogson.Henri Louis Bergson & Frank Lubecki Pogson - 1910
  35. Indeterminism in Nature. Par G. E. Fitzgibbon S.V.D., Pontifica Universitas Gregoriana, Boston, 1963. Vii-52 P. $3.00.Réjane Bernier - 1968 - Dialogue 6 (4):640.
  36. Kanean Libertarianism.M. Bernstein - 1995 - Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (1):151-57.
  37. Robert Kane, the Significance of Free Will.Mark Bernstein - 1997 - Southwest Philosophy Review 13 (2):171-172.
  38. Robert Kane, Through the Moral Maze.Mark Bernstein - 1995 - Southwest Philosophy Review 11 (2):267-274.
  39. Review of Robert Kane, Free Will and Values. [REVIEW]Mark Bernstein - 1989 - Noûs 23 (4):557-559.
  40. Global Control and Freedom.Bernard Berofsky - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):419-445.
    Several prominent incompatibilists, e.g., Robert Kane and Derk Pereboom, have advanced an analogical argument in which it is claimed that a deterministic world is essentially the same as a world governed by a global controller. Since the latter world is obviously one lacking in an important kind of freedom, so must any deterministic world. The argument is challenged whether it is designed to show that determinism precludes freedom as power or freedom as self-origination. Contrary to the claims of its adherents, (...)
  41. Ultimate Responsibility in a Deterministic World. [REVIEW]Bernard Berofsky - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):135-40.
  42. On the Prospects for a Naturalistic Incompatibilist Metaphysics of Agency.John Bishop - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):655-661.
  43. Chaos, Indeterminism, and Free Will.Robert C. Bishop - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
  44. The Significance of Free Will by Robert Kane. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. [REVIEW]Roger Bissell - 1999 - Reason Papers 24:121-130.
  45. Bergson's Dualism in 'Time and Free Will'.Andrew G. Bjelland - 1974 - Process Studies 4 (2):83-106.
  46. Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism is Not a Liberal View, and a Good Thing Too; Reply to Samuel Freeman.Walter Block - 2010 - Journal of Libertarian Studies 22 (1):537-580.
  47. Reply to 'Against Libertarian Legalism'by Frank van Dun.Walter Block - 2004 - Journal of Libertarian Studies 18 (2):1-30.
  48. Libertarianism Vs Objectivism: A Response to Peter Schwartz.Walter Block - 2003 - Reason Papers 26:39-62.
  49. Toward a Libertarian Theory of Blackmail.Walter Block - 2001 - Journal of Libertarian Studies 15 (2):55-88.
  50. A Libertarian Case for Free Immigration.Walter Block - 1998 - Journal of Libertarian Studies 13 (2):167-186.
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