Locke: Philosophy of Religion

The aim of my paper is to show links and parallels between Locke’s concept of the state of nature and the Unitarian (Socinian) denial of original sin. At first I will give an overview of the Unitarian history and thought, then I will logically and philologically demon- strate a parallelism of Locke’s hidden anthropology and the Unitarian doctrine on human being, with data of Locke’s Unitarian readings, especially writings of a Transylvanian theologian in the late 16th century, György Enyedi.

In the fourth book of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke hints that he could explain how God may have created matter ex nihilo, but refrains from doing so. Leibniz, when he came upon this passage, pricked up his ears. There ensued a sequence of personal events which are not without charm and piquancy, and a sequence of philosophical events which are of some interest. In this paper we tell the tale.

John Locke holds that matter is solid, the soul thinks, and for all we know the soul may be a material substance divinely endowed with a power to think. Though he openly admits to nothing stronger than the bare possibility of thinking matter, Locke grants that what thinks in us occupies a definite spatial location to the exclusion of other souls. Solidity is the quality that prevents other things from occupying a spatial location. Locke’s general criterion for identity is spatiotemporal (...) exclusion of other things of the same kind. To meet these conditions for identity, souls must be solid. Although Locke refuses to declare that souls really are material things, taking the solidity of souls to be a condition for their identity is consistent with the following of Locke’s other important commitments: nominalism about the essences by which substances are classified, agnosticism about the underlying reality of what supports such “nominal essences,” and the identity of persons is distinct from the identity of any substance. Locke ignores the implication that souls are solid because the solidity of souls is irrelevant to those three aims. Nevertheless he could allow for the solidity of souls without giving up on any of his other important and explicitly held commitments. There is therefore no need for Locke’s commentators to refrain from employing solidity in their accounts of Locke’s general criterion for identity from fear of attributing to Locke the position that souls would be solid. (shrink)

The paper examines the copious correspondence between the English philosopher John Locke and the French intellectual Nicolas Toinard ; Locke made the acquaintance of Toinard in Paris in 1677 or early in 1678, and the latter remained his lifelong friend and most assiduous correspondent. An Orléanais and a devout Catholic, Toinard combined an intense interest in the Scriptures with an enthusiasm for experimental science and inventions of every kind; he introduced Locke to all the French official institutions and to a (...) number of private laboratories. Toinard’s principal work, Evangeliorum Harmonia Graeco-Latina, was greatly appreciated by Locke for its new method. The paper attempts to explore the bulk of this correspondence in detail, giving an account of the wide range of topics dealt with in the two hundred letters; it is divided into four paragraphs referring, respectively, to the years 1678-1679, 1679-1681, 1681-1686, 1686-1704. The perspective is diachronic; on some occasions, the focus is on a particular topic which is the object of prolonged discussion between the two correspondents. In the conclusion, attention is drawn to the relevance of this correspondence in the context of the 17th century and of Locke’s philosophical thought. (shrink)

This dissertation argues that Locke's ethics can best be understood as an integration of the elements of happiness, virtue and divine command. Drawing on the writings of Richard Ashcraft, John Dunn and Richard Mouw, its thesis is that Locke's ethics is based on his Christian faith. The dissertation begins by examining Locke's use of scripture in developing his doctrinal views. The following chapters use Locke's theology to demonstrate that for Locke ethics are theological and not merely philosophical. Therefore, true happiness (...) for Locke is found only in heaven; all earthly pleasures fall short of true happiness. Happiness includes pleasure, but is not synonymous with pleasure. Virtue requires training and education. John Passmore and Alex Neill's writings are used to show that Locke's idea of training requires more than merely reasoning well and more than an attempt to gain a good reputation. Virtue is obedience to the law of God which requires both training and the assistance of the Holy Spirit. The commands of God are good because they fit creation. As the greatest reasoning being God's will is constrained to choose reason even though God himself is a free being. Locke's ethical theory is an attempt to draw together elements of human psychology and the biblical presentation of an omnipotent God. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to explicate the theological and epistemological elements of John Locke's moral philosophy as presented in the ‘Essay Concerning Human Understanding’ and ‘The Reasonableness of Christianity’. Many detractors hold that Locke's moral philosophy is internally inconsistent due to his seeming commitment to both the intellectualist position that divinely instituted morality admits of pure rational demonstration and the competing voluntarist claim that we must rely for our moral knowledge upon divine revelation. In this paper I argue (...) that Locke is guilty of no such contradiction. In doing so, I attempt to accommodate Locke's position in the ‘Essay’ that moral principles are demonstrable a priori with his views on the sanctity of Christian revelation. I then consider Locke's conception of moral ideas as a species of mixed modes, or arbitrarily constructed complex ideas, and attempt to navigate the mechanism whereby human understanding can recognize these ideas as conforming to, or straying from, divinely appointed natural law. I conclude that despite Locke's failure to actually provide a full-fledged moral theory, he lays a rationally coherent groundwork for the fulfilment of such a project that accommodates a-priori rational reflection and divine revelation as complementary paths to moral understanding. (shrink)

The paper tries to show the importance of the writings of John Locke in preparing the way for secularism. He provides a theory for disentangling religion and the state for several main reasons, including the avoidance of religious persecution of minorties; the avoidance of civil strife; and the need to leave it to individuals to work out their own salvation by exercising their conscience free of state interference. Locke is a creative theorist; his creativity shows itself in the new arguments (...) he formulates and publishes on behalf of the freedom of religion from the state and the freedom of the state from religion. The influence of his Letter on Toleration and the Second Treatise in Two Treatises of Government has proved worldwide and lasting. The paper also takes up a later work by Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, where Locke retreats to some extent from the religious individualism, but not the religious toleration, of his most famous works. But even that retreat gives only a little comfort to those who deplore secularism. (shrink)

This paper illuminates Leibniz’s conception of faith and its relationship to reason. Given Leibniz’s commitment to natural religion, we might expect his view of faith to be deflationary. We show, however, that Leibniz’s conception of faith involves a significant non-rational element. We approach the issue by considering the way in which Leibniz positions himself between the views of two of his contemporaries, Bayle and Locke. Unlike Bayle, but like Locke, Leibniz argues that reason and faith are in conformity. Nevertheless, in (...) contrast to the account that he finds in Locke’s Essay, Leibniz does not reduce faith to a species of reasonable belief. Instead, he insists that, while faith must be grounded in reason, true or divine faith also requires a supernatural infusion of grace. (shrink)

In his Epistle to the Reader in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding , John Locke declares moral philosophy and divinity studies to be the two most important areas of human inquiry. However, while he clearly affirms the existence of God in this work, and, debatably, presupposes libertarian freedom in his account of human will and moral responsibility, he never offers a philosophical reconciliation of human freedom and God's existence. Indeed, Locke bemoans his inability to provide such a reconciliation, and admits (...) to accepting the compatibility of human freedom and God's existence only as a matter of faith. This is startling given the importance of both his account of human action and God's existence to his broader views on ethics and political theory; thus, this reconciliation is critical to Locke's philosophy as a whole. My work demonstrates that a philosophical reconciliation of these views is possible within Lockean empiricism, accommodating the development of my own unique defense of libertarianism as a revision of Locke's theory of action in the process. ;My project incorporates four stages. First, Locke's ideas of reflection are investigated in respect to his representationalism. This leads secondly to defending a libertarian reading of Locke that shows that while freedom and determinism are compatible in the case of God, human freedom requires libertarian choice. Thirdly, I develop an original libertarianism that improves Locke's view by showing that the essential characteristic of freedom is the opportunity to attain a final good, and not choice per se. Here, I elucidate three principles of action that demonstrate that inasmuch as experience provides only probabilistic evidence concerning the effects of our actions on attaining this end, human choice is informed by experience but cannot be determined by it. Libertarian freedom is consequently revealed to be the product of both finite rationality and an existentially basic choice to believe, or disbelieve, in the connection of our experience and actions to a final good. Finally, my account is reconciled with God's existence in a way that meets Locke's criteria for rational, and not just faith-based, belief. (shrink)

This essay argues that Locke’s presentation of justification and the soteriological framework in which it is placed in The Reasonableness of Christianity is broad enough to encompass all “Christian” views on the topics except antinomian ones. In other words, the focus of the treatise is not Locke’s personal views of justification and the broader doctrine of salvation but an ecumenical statement of them. Locke’s personal conclusions on certain theological issues discussed in the opening pages of The Reasonableness of Christianity has (...) led most to assume that the soteriological discussion that follows reveals Locke’s own personal theological position despite clear indications of his ecumenical intent in The Reasonableness of Christianity and elsewhere. (shrink)