Locke: Political Obligation

The traditional view according to which we adults tacitly consent to a state’s lawful actions just by living within its borders—the residence theory—is now widely rejected by political philosophers. According to the critics, this theory fails because consent must be (i) intentional, (ii) informed, and (iii) voluntary, whereas one’s continued residence within a state is typically none of these things. Few people intend to remain within the state in which they find themselves, and few realize that by remaining they are (...) consenting to the state’s lawful actions. Moreover, the various obstacles standing in the way of us leaving the state render our remaining involuntary. Thus, the critics conclude, few if any people can be considered to have consented through their residence. I argue that these objections fail and that the residence theory remains a viable option, at least for those who are not committed incompatibilists. (shrink)

THE SUBJECT MATTER of this essay is Locke's well-known discussion of consent in sections 116-122 of the Second Treatise of Government.' I will not be concerned to discuss the place of consent in Locke's political philosophy 2 My concerns are somewhat narrower than this. I will simply be concerned to show that in important respects several recent discussions of Locke's political philosophy have misrepresented Locke's views on the subject of express and tacit consent. At theheart of these misinterpretations lie misunderstandings (...) about the way in which landownership and the inheritance of land are related to express and tacit consent. I will show that these misinterpretations of Locke's views are, to a certain extent, indicative of internal strains that can bediscovered in Locke's arguments. My discussion will fall into four sections. In the first I will try toclarify Locke's views on the nature of express consent. I will show that Locke's views on this matter, when examined in their historical context, are not as obscure as some critics have suggested. In the second section I will examine Locke's views on the nature of tacit consent. I will be especially concerned to examine the relationship between landownership and express and tacit consent. In the third section I will look at Locke's views on the inheritance of land and how it relates to express and tacit consent. I will show that his views on this matter are not entirely consistent. In one passage Locke suggests that inheritance of land requires only tacit consent whereas, in another passage, he suggests that inheritance of land requires full membership of society and express consent. In the fourth and final section I will summarize the salient features of my interpretation of Locke's views on the subject of express and tacit consent. I will also briefly note interpretations of Locke's views that have been rejected in the course of this essay. ____ Reprinted in J.R.Milton, ed., Locke's Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy (Ashgate, 1999), 465-482. -/- . (shrink)

John Locke es célebre como defensor de la libertad de conciencia, pero no ofrece una concepción robusta de la conciencia moral. Se busca realizar una exposición completa de la discusión que lleva a cabo Locke sobre ambos problemas, y se plantea la necesidad de tratarlos en conjunto para evitar la ba..

The contemporary political philosopher John Rawls considers himself to be part of the social contract tradition of John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, but not of the tradition of Locke's predecessor, Thomas Hobbes. Call the Hobbesian tradition interest-based, and the Lockean tradition right-based, because it assumes that there are irreducible moral facts which the social contract can assume. The primary purpose of Locke's social contract is to justify the authority of the state over its citizens despite the fact that (...) those citizens are naturally free and equal. I assume that this task is of central importance to all right-based social contract theories: in chapter one I lay out the general problems faced by all contract theories, and in chapter two, three and four I examine in depth the accounts of political obligation offered by Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls. I conclude that all members of the right-based social contract tradition fail to provide an account of obligation that can explain the bond between a citizen and her state. (shrink)

Europe and England in the seventeenth century -- John Locke : his life -- Essay concerning human understanding and other works -- Influences on Locke -- The meaning of Locke's philosophy -- The influence and importance of Locke's work and ideas.

Much has been written about Locke 's Second Treatise,[Note 1] but still, I believe, the book's main line of argument has been left unclear. Some concepts need more prominence---the duty to preserve mankind, the right of war, and private judgment; others need less---consent, majority rule, and property. Locke 's aim was not to show that political obligation rests upon consent: that is assumed without argument.[Note 2] What he set out to prove is that there are certain limits to political obligation (...) which not even consent could set aside.[Note 3]. (shrink)

Até que ponto o Poder Político é condição de Liberdade, e até que ponto a liberdade do cidadão contradiz o Poder Político? Dois autores entre os principais merecem especial acolhimento nas correntes políticas dos últimos séculos: John Locke e J. J. Rousseau. John Locke propôs a teoria da separação dos poderes, e a fundamentação da sociedade política no consenso da maioria. A maioria manda e é livre; a minoria obedece e é escrava. Obediência sem assentimento justificado é uma certa forma (...) de escravatura. J. J. Rousseau fundamentou e organizou a sociedade política na Vontade Geral. A Liberdade do cidadão é garantida pela obediência e adesão espontânea a essa Vontade: deste modo a liberdade individual desaparece. Tais doutrinas não conduziram à conciliação entre o Poder e a Liberdade. É urgente aprofundar o estudo das relações entre o Poder e a Liberdade pelo aprofundamento da natureza, origem e organização do Poder Político. /// To what extent is Political Power a condition of Freedom, and to what extent the citizen's freedom contradicts Political Power? Two among the main authors deserve a special attention in the context of political thought over the last centuries: John Locke and J. J. Rousseau. The former proposed a theory of powers separation, and founded political society on the majority consensus. The majority comands and is free; the minority obeys and is enslaved. Obedience without justified assent is a certain form of slavery. J. J. Rousseau organized and founded political society on General Will. Citizen's freedom is guaranteed by obedience and spontaneous agreement as to that Will: in this way, individual freedom desappears. Such doctrines did not reconcile Power and Freedom. It is, therefore, urgent a more penetrating study of the relations between Power and Freedom, by clarifying the origin, nature and organization of Political Power. (shrink)