This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

13 found
Order:
  1. added 2018-09-06
    Speaking Your Mind: Expression in Locke's Theory of Language.Lewis Powell - 2017 - ProtoSociology 34:15-30.
    There is a tension between John Locke’s awareness of the fundamental importance of a shared public language and the manner in which his theorizing appears limited to offering a psychologistic account of the idiolects of individual speakers. I argue that a correct understanding of Locke’s central notion of signification can resolve this tension. I start by examining a long standing objection to Locke’s view, according to which his theory of meaning systematically gets the subject matter of our discourse wrong, by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2018-04-26
    Locke, Hume, and Reid on the Objects of Belief.Lewis Powell - 2018 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 35 (1):21-38.
    The goal of this paper is show how an initially appealing objection to David Hume's account of judgment can only be put forward by philosophers who accept an account of judgment that has its own sizable share of problems. To demonstrate this, I situate the views of John Locke, David Hume, and Thomas Reid with respect to each other, so as to illustrate how the appealing objection is linked to unappealing features of Locke's account of judgment.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2015-04-09
    Particles and Ideas in Locke's Theory of Meaning.D. Berman - 1994 - Locke Studies 25:15.
  4. added 2015-02-27
    Propositions and Judgments in Locke and Arnauld: A Monstrous and Unholy Union?Jennifer Smalligan Marušić - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (2):255-280.
    Philosophers have accused locke of holding a view about propositions that simply conflates the formation of a propositional thought with the judgment that a proposition is true, and charged that this has obviously absurd consequences.1 Worse, this account appears not to be unique to Locke: it bears a striking resemblance to one found in both the Port-Royal Logic (the Logic, for short) and the Port-Royal Grammar. In the Logic, this account forms part of the backbone of the traditional logic expounded (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  5. added 2014-10-27
    Locke on Particles: A Reply to Nuchelmans.David Berman & Timothy Williamson - 1988 - Logique Et Analyse 31 (123-124):213-218.
  6. added 2014-04-02
    Locke on Propositions and Assertion.Benjamin Hill - 2008 - Modern Schoolman 85 (3):187-205.
  7. added 2014-03-23
    Locke and Hume on Belief, Judgment and Assent.David Owen - 2003 - Topoi 22 (1):15-28.
    Hume's account of belief has been much reviled, especially considered as an account of what it is to assent to or judge a proposition to be true. In fact, given that he thinks that thoughts about existence can be composed of a single idea, and that relations are just complex ideas, it might be wondered whether he has an account of judgment at all. Nonetheless, Hume was extremely proud of his account of belief, discussing it at length in the Abstract, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  8. added 2014-03-17
    Locke on Judgment.David Owen - 2007 - In Lex Newman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding". Cambridge University Press.
    Locke usually uses the term “judgment” in a rather narrow but not unusual sense, as referring to the faculty that produces probable opinion or assent.2 His account is explicitly developed in analogy with knowledge, and like knowledge, it is developed in terms of the relation various ideas bear to one another. Whereas knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, judgment is the presumption of their agreement or disagreement. Intuitive knowledge is the immediate perception (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  9. added 2014-03-12
    Locke and Arnauld on Judgment and Proposition.Maria van der Schaar - 2008 - History and Philosophy of Logic 29 (4):327-341.
    To understand pre-Fregean theories of judgment and proposition, such as those found in Locke and the Port-Royal logic, it is important to distinguish between propositions in the modern sense and propositions in the pre-Fregean sense. By making this distinction it becomes clear that these pre-Fregean theories cannot be meant to solve the propositional attitude problem. Notwithstanding this fact, Locke and Arnauld are able to make a distinction between asserted and unasserted propositions (in their sense). The way Locke makes this distinction (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  10. added 2013-08-14
    Locke: "Our Knowledge, Which All Consists in Propositions".Ruth Marie Mattern - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (4):677 - 695.
    Locke often writes that our knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. For example, he refers to “our Knowledge consisting in the perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of any two Ideas” in the second chapter of the Essay's book on knowledge. Similarly, at the beginning of this book he characterizes knowledge as “the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas”. Since commentators remark on this formula so frequently, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  11. added 2013-08-13
    Propositional Attitudes in Modern Philosophy.Walter Ott - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (3):551-568.
    Philosophers of the modern period are often presented as having made an elementary error: that of confounding the atttitude one adopts toward a proposition with its content. By examining the works of Locke and the Port-Royalians, I show that this accusation is ill-founded and that Locke, in particular, has the resources to construct a theory of propositional attitudes.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  12. added 2013-08-13
    Locke and Leibniz on Linguistic Particles.Robert McRae - 1988 - Synthese 75 (2):155 - 161.
  13. added 2013-08-13
    Locke on Knowledge and Propositions.David E. Soles - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (2):19-29.