About this topic

The relationship between logic and information is an intimate one that goes both ways. Firstly, information has played a role in providing a basis for certain accounts of logic. At a basic level there is the interpretation that good logic arguments are just those arguments where the information in the conclusion is already contained in the premises of that argument. Furthermore, notions of information have been used to good effect in developing semantics for certain logics, particularly relevant logic. Secondly, logics of information have provided formal accounts of various information phenomena, such as logics of being informed.

Key works Jakko Hintikka has been one of the pioneers in investigating the relationship between logic and information, looking at measures of semantic information for contingent propositions and information measures for tautologies/deductive inferences. His Hintikka 1970 contains papers on the topic. Devlin 1991, Barwise & Seligman 1997 and Israel & Perry unknown represent an important collection of works that provide general accounts of information flow based on situation semantics/theory. Mares 1996 and Restall 1996 are attempts to provide an informational semantics for relevant logic.
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147 found
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  1. The Market Logic of Information.Philip E. Agre - 2000 - Knowledge, Technology and Policy 13 (3):67-77.
  2. Nonstandard Set Theories and Information Management.Varol Akman & Mujdat Pakkan - 1996 - Philosophical Explorations.
    The merits of set theory as a foundational tool in mathematics stimulate its use in various areas of artificial intelligence, in particular intelligent information systems. In this paper, a study of various nonstandard treatments of set theory from this perspective is offered. Applications of these alternative set theories to information or knowledge management are surveyed.
  3. Information and Logical Discrimination.Patrick Allo - 2012 - In S. Barry Cooper (ed.), How the World Computes. pp. 17--28.
    Informational conceptions of logic are barely novel. We find them in the work of John Corcoran, in several papers on substructural and constructive logics by Heinrich Wansing, and in the interpretation of the Routley-Meyer semantics for relevant logics in terms of Barwises and Perrys theory of situations. Allo & Mares [2] present an informational account of logical consequence that is based on the content-nonexpantion platitude, but that also relies on a double inversion of the standard direction of explanation (in- formation (...)
  4. The Logic of 'Being Informed' Revisited and Revised.Patrick Allo - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):417-434.
    The logic of ‘being informed’ gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out (...)
  5. A Classical Prejudice?Patrick Allo - 2010 - Knowledge, Technology & Policy 23 (1-2):25-40.
    In this paper, I reassess Floridi’s solution to the Bar-Hillel–Carnap paradox (the information yield of inconsistent propositions is maximal) by questioning the orthodox view that contradictions cannot be true. The main part of the paper is devoted to showing that the veridicality thesis (semantic information has to be true) is compatible with dialetheism (there are true contradictions) and that, unless we accept the additional non-falsity thesis (information cannot be false), there is no reason to presuppose that there is no such (...)
  6. A Classical Prejudice?Patrick Allo - 2010 - Knowledge, Technology and Policy 23 (1-2):25-40.
    In this paper I reassess Floridi's solution to the Bar-Hillel-Carnap paradox (the information-yield of inconsistent propositions is maximal) by questioning the orthodox view that contradictions cannot be true. The main part of the paper is devoted to showing that the veridicality thesis (semantic information has to be true) is compatible with dialetheism (there are true contradictions), and that unless we accept the additional non-falsity thesis (information cannot be false) there is no reason to presuppose that there is no such thing (...)
  7. Reasoning About Data and Information.Patrick Allo - 2009 - Synthese 167 (2):231-249.
    Cognitive states as well as cognitive commodities play central though distinct roles in our epistemological theories. By being attentive to how a difference in their roles affects our way of referring to them, we can undoubtedly accrue our understanding of the structure and functioning of our main epistemological theories. In this paper we propose an analysis of the dichotomy between states and commodities in terms of the method of abstraction, and more specifically by means of infomorphisms between different ways to (...)
  8. Logical Pluralism and Semantic Information.Patrick Allo - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):659 - 694.
    Up to now theories of semantic information have implicitly relied on logical monism, or the view that there is one true logic. The latter position has been explicitly challenged by logical pluralists. Adopting an unbiased attitude in the philosophy of information, we take a suggestion from Beall and Restall at heart and exploit logical pluralism to recognise another kind of pluralism. The latter is called informational pluralism, a thesis whose implications for a theory of semantic information we explore.
  9. Local Information and Adaptive Consequence.Patrick Allo - 2006 - Logique Et Analyse 149:461-488.
    In this paper we provide a formal description of what it means to be in a local or partial information-state. Starting from the notion of locality in a relational structure, we define so-called adaptive gen- erated submodels. The latter are then shown to yield an adaptive logic wherein the derivability of Pφ is naturally interpreted as a core property of being in a state in which one holds the information that φ.
  10. Informational Semantics as a Third Alternative?Patrick Allo & Edwin Mares - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (2):167-185.
    Informational semantics were first developed as an interpretation of the model-theory of substructural (and especially relevant) logics. In this paper we argue that such a semantics is of independent value and that it should be considered as a genuine alternative explication of the notion of logical consequence alongside the traditional model-theoretical and the proof-theoretical accounts. Our starting point is the content-nonexpansion platitude which stipulates that an argument is valid iff the content of the conclusion does not exceed the combined content (...)
  11. Epistemic Logic and Information Update.A. Baltag, H. P. van Ditmarsch & L. S. Moss - 2008 - In P. Adriaans & J. van Benthem (eds.), hilosophy of Information. MIT Press.
  12. 3rd Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation (Wollic'96).L. S. Baptista, A. Duran, T. Monteiro & A. G. de Oliveira - 1996 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 2 (3).
  13. Language and Information.Yehoshua Bar-Hillel - 1965 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 30 (3):382-385.
  14. Semantic Information.Yehoshua Bar-Hillel & Rudolf Carnap - 1953 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 4 (14):147-157.
  15. Information and Impossibilities.Jon Barwise - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):488-515.
    In this paper I explore informationalism, a pragmatic theory of modality that seems to solve some serious problems in the familiar possible worlds accounts of modality. I view the theory as an elaboration of Stalnaker's moderate modal realism, though it also derives from Dretske's semantic theory of information. Informationalism is presented in Section 2 after the prerequisite stage setting in Section 1. Some applications are sketched in Section 3. Finally, a mathematical model of the theory is developed in Section 4.How (...)
  16. Constraints, Channels and the Flow of Information.Jon Barwise - 1993 - In Peter Aczel, David Israel, Yosuhiro Katagiri & Stanley Peters (eds.), Situation Theory and its Applications Vol. 3. CSLI Publications.
  17. Information and Circumstance.Jon Barwise - 1986 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (July):324-338.
  18. Information Flow: The Logic of Distributed Systems.Jon Barwise & Jerry Seligman - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
    Presents a mathematically rigorous, philosophically sound foundation for a science of information.
  19. 18th Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation (Wollic 2011).Lev Beklemishev, Ruy de Queiroz & Andre Scedrov - 2012 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18 (1):152-153.
  20. Review: Rulon Wells, A Measure of Subjective Information. [REVIEW]Nuel D. Belnap - 1965 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 30 (2):244-245.
  21. Using Modal Logics to Express and Check Global Graph Properties.Mario Benevides & L. Schechter - 2009 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 17 (5):559-587.
    Graphs are among the most frequently used structures in Computer Science. Some of the properties that must be checked in many applications are connectivity, acyclicity and the Eulerian and Hamiltonian properties. In this work, we analyze how we can express these four properties with modal logics. This involves two issues: whether each of the modal languages under consideration has enough expressive power to describe these properties and how complex it is to use these logics to actually test whether a given (...)
  22. The Information in Intuitionistic Logic.Johan Benthem - 2009 - Synthese 167 (2):251-270.
    Issues about information spring up wherever one scratches the surface of logic. Here is a case that raises delicate issues of 'factual' versus 'procedural' information, or 'statics' versus 'dynamics'. What does intuitionistic logic, perhaps the earliest source of informational and procedural thinking in contemporary logic, really tell us about information? How does its view relate to its 'cousin' epistemic logic? We discuss connections between intuitionistic models and recent protocol models for dynamic-epistemic logic, as well as more general issues that emerge.
  23. Non-Normal Worlds and Representation.Francesco Berto - 2012 - In Michal Peliš & Vít Punčochář (eds.), The Logica Yearbook. College Publications.
    World semantics for relevant logics include so-called non-normal or impossible worlds providing model-theoretic counterexamples to such irrelevant entailments as (A ∧ ¬A) → B, A → (B∨¬B), or A → (B → B). Some well-known views interpret non-normal worlds as information states. If so, they can plausibly model our ability of conceiving or representing logical impossibilities. The phenomenon is explored by combining a formal setting with philosophical discussion. I take Priest’s basic relevant logic N4 and extend it, on the syntactic (...)
  24. A Logic of Ethical Information.Joseph E. Brenner - 2010 - Knowledge, Technology and Policy 23 (1-2):109-133.
  25. J. Van Eijck and A. Visser, Logic and Information Flow.C. Brink - 1997 - Journal of Logic Language and Information 6:337-338.
  26. Information Retrieval From Hospital Information System: Increasing Effectivity Using Swarm Intelligence.Miroslav Bursa, Lenka Lhotska, Vaclav Chudacek, Jiri Spilka, Petr Janku & Lukas Hruban - 2015 - Journal of Applied Logic 13 (2):126-137.
  27. Some Combinatorics of Imperfect Information.Peter Cameron & Wilfrid Hodges - 2001 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (2):673-684.
  28. An Outline of a Theory of Semantic Information.Rudolf Carnap & Yehoshua Bar-Hillel - 1954 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 19 (3):230-232.
  29. Towards an Informational Pragmatic Realism.Ariel Caticha - 2014 - Minds and Machines 24 (1):37-70.
    I discuss the design of the method of entropic inference as a general framework for reasoning under conditions of uncertainty. The main contribution of this discussion is to emphasize the pragmatic elements in the derivation. More specifically: (1) Probability theory is designed as the uniquely natural tool for representing states of incomplete information. (2) An epistemic notion of information is defined in terms of its relation to the Bayesian beliefs of ideally rational agents. (3) The method of updating from a (...)
  30. Algorithmic Information Theory.Gregory J. Chaitin - 1989 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (2):624-627.
  31. A Farewell Letter To My Students.John Corcoran - 2012 - Philosophy Now 92:18-18.
    I am saying farewell after more than forty happy years of teaching logic at the University of Buffalo. But this is only a partial farewell. I will no longer be at UB to teach classroom courses or seminars. But nothing else will change. I will continue to be available for independent study. I will continue to write abstracts and articles with people who have taken courses or seminars with me. And I will continue to honor the LogicLifetimeGuarantee™, which is earned (...)
  32. Contra-Argumento/Contraejemplo.John Corcoran - 2011 - In Luis Vega and Paula Olmos (ed.), Compendio de Lógica, Argumentación y Retórica. Editorial Trotta. pp. 137--141.
    A universal proposition is shown false by a known counterexample. A premise-conclusion argument is shown invalid by a known counterargument. The failure to distinguish counterexample from counterargument is like the failure to distinguish falsehood from invalidity.
  33. Forma lógica/Formalización.John Corcoran - 2011 - In Luis Vega and Paula Olmos (ed.), Compendio de Lógica, Argumentación y Retórica. Editorial Trotta. pp. 257--258.
    The logical form of a discourse—such as a proposition, a set of propositions, an argument, or an argumentation—is obtained by abstracting from the subject-matter of its content terms or by regarding the content terms as mere place-holders or blanks in a form. In a logically perfect language the logical form of a proposition, a set of propositions, an argument, or an argumentation is determined by the grammatical form of the sentence, the set of sentences, the argument-text, or the argumentation-text expressing (...)
  34. Review of Striker Translation of Aristotle's PRIOR ANALYTICS. [REVIEW]John Corcoran - 2010 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:1-13.
    This review places this translation and commentary on Book A of Prior Analytics in historical, logical, and philosophical perspective. In particular, it details the author’s positions on current controversies. The author of this translation and commentary is a prolific and respected scholar, a leading figure in a large and still rapidly growing area of scholarship: Prior Analytics studies PAS. PAS treats many aspects of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics: historical context, previous writings that influenced it, preservation and transmission of its manuscripts, editions (...)
  35. Schema.John Corcoran - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    -/- A schema (plural: schemata, or schemas), also known as a scheme (plural: schemes), is a linguistic template or pattern together with a rule for using it to specify a potentially infinite multitude of phrases, sentences, or arguments, which are called instances of the schema. Schemas are used in logic to specify rules of inference, in mathematics to describe theories with infinitely many axioms, and in semantics to give adequacy conditions for definitions of truth. -/- 1. What is a Schema? (...)
  36. George Boole.John Corcoran - 2006 - In Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2nd edition. macmillan.
    2006. George Boole. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2nd edition. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA. -/- George Boole (1815-1864), whose name lives among modern computer-related sciences in Boolean Algebra, Boolean Logic, Boolean Operations, and the like, is one of the most celebrated logicians of all time. Ironically, his actual writings often go unread and his actual contributions to logic are virtually unknown—despite the fact that he was one of the clearest writers in the field. Working with various students including Susan Wood and Sriram (...)
  37. Information-Theoretic Logic and Transformation-Theoretic Logic,.John Corcoran - 1999 - In R. A. M. M. (ed.), Fragments in Science,. World Scientific Publishing Company,. pp. 25-35.
    Information-theoretic approaches to formal logic analyze the "common intuitive" concepts of implication, consequence, and validity in terms of information content of propositions and sets of propositions: one given proposition implies a second if the former contains all of the information contained by the latter; one given proposition is a consequence of a second if the latter contains all of the information contained by the former; an argument is valid if the conclusion contains no information beyond that of the premise-set. This (...)
  38. Two-Method Errors: Having It Both Ways.John Corcoran & Idris Samawi Hamid - 2016 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 21:444-5.
    ►JOHN CORCORAN AND IDRIS SAMAWI HAMID, Two-method errors: having it both ways. Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150, USA E-mail: corcoran@buffalo.edu Philosophy, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523-1781 USA E-mail: ishamid@colostate.edu Where two methods produce similar results, mixing the two sometimes creates errors we call two-method errors, TMEs: in style, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, implicature, logic, or action. This lecture analyzes examples found in technical and in non-technical contexts. One can say “Abe knows whether Ben draws” in two other (...)
  39. An Informational View of Classical Logic.Marcello D'Agostino - forthcoming - Theoretical Computer Science.
    We present an informational view of classical propositional logic that stems from a kind of informational semantics whereby the meaning of a logical operator is specified solely in terms of the information that is actually possessed by an agent. In this view the inferential power of logical agents is naturally bounded by their limited capability of manipulating “virtual information”, namely information that is not implicitly contained in the data. Although this informational semantics cannot be expressed by any finitely-valued matrix, it (...)
  40. The Enduring Scandal of Deduction: Is Propositional Logic Really Uninformative?Marcello D'Agostino & Luciano Floridi - 2009 - Synthese 167 (2):271 - 315.
    Deductive inference is usually regarded as being "tautological" or "analytical": the information conveyed by the conclusion is contained in the information conveyed by the premises. This idea, however, clashes with the undecidability of first-order logic and with the (likely) intractability of Boolean logic. In this article, we address the problem both from the semantic and the proof-theoretical point of view. We propose a hierarchy of propositional logics that are all tractable (i.e. decidable in polynomial time), although by means of growing (...)
  41. Semantic Information and the Trivialization of Logic: Floridi on the Scandal of Deduction.Marcello D'Agostinoemail - 2013 - Information 4 (1):33-59.
    In this paper we discuss Floridi’s views concerning semantic information in the light of a recent contribution (in collaboration with the present author) [1] that defies the traditional view of deductive reasoning as “analytic” or “tautological” and construes it as an informative, albeit non-empirical, activity. We argue that this conception paves the way for a more realistic notion of semantic information where the “ideal agents” that are assumed by the standard view can be indefinitely approximated by real ones equipped with (...)
  42. The Logic of Knowledge and the Flow of Information.Simon D'Alfonso - 2014 - Minds and Machines 24 (3):307-325.
    In this paper I look at Fred Dretske’s account of information and knowledge as developed in Knowledge and The Flow of Information. In particular, I translate Dretske’s probabilistic definition of information to a modal logical framework and subsequently use this to explicate the conception of information and its flow which is central to his account, including the notions of channel conditions and relevant alternatives. Some key products of this task are an analysis of the issue of information closure and an (...)
  43. Determination, Uniformity, and Relevance: Normative Criteria for Generalization and Reasoning by Analogy.Todd R. Davies - 1988 - In David H. Helman (ed.), Analogical Reasoning. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 227-250.
    This paper defines the form of prior knowledge that is required for sound inferences by analogy and single-instance generalizations, in both logical and probabilistic reasoning. In the logical case, the first order determination rule defined in Davies (1985) is shown to solve both the justification and non-redundancy problems for analogical inference. The statistical analogue of determination that is put forward is termed 'uniformity'. Based on the semantics of determination and uniformity, a third notion of "relevance" is defined, both logically and (...)
  44. 17th Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation (Wollic 2010).Anuj Dawar, Mauricio Ayala-Rincon & Ruy de Queiroz - 2011 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 17 (3):480-481.
  45. 9th Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation (WoLLIC'2002).Rio de Janeiro & Ruy J. G. B. de Queiroz - 2003 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (1):121-122.
  46. 9th Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation.Rio de Janeiro & Ruy J. G. B. de Queiroz - 2003 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (1):121-122.
  47. 10th Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation.J. G. B. de Queiroz - 2004 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10 (2):295-296.
  48. 4th Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation.J. G. B. de Queiroz - 1998 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4 (2):225-226.
  49. 11th Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation.Ruy J. G. B. de Queiroz - 2005 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (1):120-121.
  50. 11th Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation (WoLLIC'2004).Ruy J. G. B. de Queiroz - 2005 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (1):120-121.
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