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  1. ``Probability and the Logic of Conditionals&Quot.Ernest Adams - 1966 - In Jaakko Hintikka & Patrick Suppes (eds.), Aspects of Inductive Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland. pp. 165-316.
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  2. Transmissible Improbabilities and Marginal Essentialness of Premises in Inferences Involving Indicative Conditionals.Ernest W. Adams - 1981 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (2):149 - 177.
  3. A Note on Comparing Probabilistic and Modal Logics of Conditionals.Ernest W. Adams - 1977 - Theoria 43 (3):186-194.
  4. Out of the Closet.A. Ahmed - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):77-85.
  5. Walters on Conjunction Conditionalization.Arif Ahmed - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):115-122.
    This discussion note examines a recent argument for the principle that any counterfactual with true components is itself true. That argument rests upon two widely accepted principles of counterfactual logic to which the paper presents counterexamples. The conclusion speculates briefly upon the wider lessons that philosophers should draw from these examples for the semantics of counterfactuals.
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  6. Classical Logic, Conditionals and “Nonmonotonic” Reasoning.Nicholas Allott & Hiroyuki Uchida - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):85-85.
    Reasoning with conditionals is often thought to be non-monotonic, but there is no incompatibility with classical logic, and no need to formalise inference itself as probabilistic. When the addition of a new premise leads to abandonment of a previously compelling conclusion reached by modus ponens, for example, this is generally because it is hard to think of a model in which the conditional and the new premise are true.
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  7. Counterfactuals, Correlatives, and Disjunction.Luis Alonso-Ovalle - 2009 - Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (2):207-244.
    The natural interpretation of counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents involves selecting from each of the disjuncts the worlds that come closest to the world of evaluation. It has been long noticed that capturing this interpretation poses a problem for a minimal change semantics for counterfactuals, because selecting the closest worlds from each disjunct requires accessing the denotation of the disjuncts from the denotation of the disjunctive antecedent, which the standard boolean analysis of or does not allow (Creary and Hill, Philosophy of (...)
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  8. A Propositional Logic with Subjunctive Conditionals.R. B. Angell - 1962 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 27 (3):327-343.
  9. Logic - a Map of Language?Rani Lill Anjum - manuscript
    This is the trial lecture for Anjum's doctoral defence in 2005 at University of Tromsø.
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  10. What's Wrong with Logic?Rani Lill Anjum - 2012 - Argumentos 4 (8).
    The truth functional account of conditional statements ‘if A then B’ is not only inadequate; it eliminates the very conditionality expressed by ‘if’. Focusing only on the truth-values of the statements ‘A’ and ‘B’ and different combinations of these, one is bound to miss out on the conditional relation expressed between them. All approaches that treat conditionals as functions of their antecedents and consequents will end up in some sort of logical atomism where causal matters simply are reduced to the (...)
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  11. Three Dogmas of 'If'.Rani Lill Anjum - 2008 - In A. Leirfall & T. Sandmel (eds.), Enhet i Mangfold. Unipub.
    In this paper I argue that a truth functional account of conditional statements ‘if A then B’ not only is inadequate, but that it eliminates the very conditionality expressed by ‘if’. Focusing only on the truth-values of the statements ‘A’ and ‘B’ and different combinations of these, one is bound to miss out on the conditional relation expressed between them. But this is not a flaw only of truth functionality and the material conditional. All approaches that try to treat conditionals (...)
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  12. The Logic of `If' — or How to Philosophically Eliminate Conditional Relations.Rani Lill Anjum - 2007 - Sorites 19:51-57.
    In this paper I present some of Robert N. McLaughlin's critique of a truth functional approach to conditionals as it appears in his book On the Logic of Ordinary Conditionals. Based on his criticism I argue that the basic principles of logic together amount to epistemological and metaphysical implications that can only be accepted from a logical atomist perspective. Attempts to account for conditional relations within this philosophical framework will necessarily fail. I thus argue that it is not truth functionality (...)
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  13. All Men Are Animals: Hypothetical, Categorical, or Material?Rani Lill Anjum & Johan Arnt Myrstad - manuscript
    The conditional interpretation of general categorical statements like ‘All men are animals’ as universally quantified material conditionals ‘For all x, if x is F, then x is G’ suggests that the logical structure of law statements is conditional rather than categorical. Disregarding the problem that the universally quantified material conditional is trivially true whenever there are no xs that are F, there are some reasons to be sceptical of Frege’s equivalence between categorical and conditional expressions. -/- Now many philosophers will (...)
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  14. Modal Logic with Subjunctive Conditionals and Dispositional Predicates.Lennart Åqvist - 1973 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (1):1 - 76.
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  15. Transitivity and the Hypothetical Syllogism.L. C. Archie - 1977 - International Logic Review 15:102.
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  16. The Logic of Conditionals.Horacio Arlo-Costa - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    entry for the Entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007.
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  17. Bayesian Epistemology and Epistemic Conditionals: On the Status of the Export-Import Laws.Horacio Arló-Costa - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (11):555-593.
    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
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  18. Modus Operandi.L. K. B. - 1958 - Review of Metaphysics 11 (3):516-516.
  19. In Defence of a Naïve Conditional Epistemology.Andrew Bacon - manuscript
    Numerous triviality results have been directed at a collection of views that tie the probability of a conditional sentence to the conditional probability of the consequent on its antecedent. -/- In this paper I argue that this identification makes little sense if conditional sentences are context sensitive. The best alternative, I argue, is a version of the thesis which states that if your total evidence is E then the evidential probability of a conditional evaluated in a context where E is (...)
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  20. Stalnaker’s Thesis in Context.Andrew Bacon - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):131-163.
    In this paper I present a precise version of Stalnaker's thesis and show that it is both consistent and predicts our intuitive judgments about the probabilities of conditionals. The thesis states that someone whose total evidence is E should have the same credence in the proposition expressed by 'if A then B' in a context where E is salient as they have conditional credence in the proposition B expresses given the proposition A expresses in that context. The thesis is formalised (...)
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  21. Entailment with Near Surety of Scaled Assertions of High Conditional Probability.Donald Bamber - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (1):1-74.
    An assertion of high conditional probability or, more briefly, an HCP assertion is a statement of the type: The conditional probability of B given A is close to one. The goal of this paper is to construct logics of HCP assertions whose conclusions are highly likely to be correct rather than certain to be correct. Such logics would allow useful conclusions to be drawn when the premises are not strong enough to allow conclusions to be reached with certainty. This goal (...)
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  22. Hypotheticals: Conditionals and Theticals.John A. Barker - 1973 - Philosophical Quarterly 23 (93):335-345.
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  23. Conditional Excluded Middle, Conditional Assertion, and 'Only If'.Stephen J. Barker - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):254 - 261.
  24. A Conditional Logic for Abduction.Mathieu Beirlaen & Atocha Aliseda - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3733-3758.
    We propose a logic of abduction that (i) provides an appropriate formalization of the explanatory conditional, and that (ii) captures the defeasible nature of abductive inference. For (i), we argue that explanatory conditionals are non-classical, and rely on Brian Chellas’s work on conditional logics for providing an alternative formalization of the explanatory conditional. For (ii), we make use of the adaptive logics framework for modeling defeasible reasoning. We show how our proposal allows for a more natural reading of explanatory relations, (...)
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  25. Foundations of Conditional Logic.Johan Benthem - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (3):303 - 349.
  26. Counterfactuals and Non-Locality of Quantum Mechanics: The Bedford–Stapp Version of the GHZ Theorem.Tomasz Bigaj - 2007 - Foundations of Science 12 (1):85-108.
    In the paper, the proof of the non-locality of quantum mechanics, given by Bedford and Stapp (1995), and appealing to the GHZ example, is analyzed. The proof does not contain any explicit assumption of realism, but instead it uses formal methods and techniques of the Lewis calculus of counterfactuals. To ascertain the validity of the proof, a formal semantic model for counterfactuals is constructed. With the help of this model it can be shown that the proof is faulty, because it (...)
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  27. Strengthening Principles and Counterfactual Semantics.David Boylan & Ginger Schultheis - 2017 - Proceedings of the 21st Amsterdam Colloquium.
  28. Counterfactuals and Context.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2008 - Analysis 68 (1):39–46.
    It is widely agreed that contraposition, strengthening the antecedent and hypothetical syllogism fail for subjunctive conditionals. The following putative counter-examples are frequently cited, respectively.
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  29. Quick Completeness Proofs for Some Logics of Conditionals.John P. Burgess - 1981 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22 (1):76-84.
  30. An Incompatible Pair of Subjunctive Conditional Modal Axioms.David Butcher - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (1):71 - 110.
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  31. Teaching Truth-Functional Conditionals.James Cain - 1999 - APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy 98 (2):160-162.
  32. Conditionals in Reasoning.John Cantwell - 2009 - Synthese 171 (1):47 - 75.
    The paper presents a non-monotonic inference relation on a language containing a conditional that satisfies the Ramsey Test. The logic is a weakening of classical logic and preserves many of the ‘paradoxes of implication’ associated with the material implication. It is argued, however, that once one makes the proper distinction between supposing that something is the case and accepting that it is the case, these ‘paradoxes’ cease to be counterintuitive. A representation theorem is provided where conditionals are given a non-bivalent (...)
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  33. Conditional Heresies.Fabrizio Cariani & Simon Goldstein - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    The principles of Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM) and Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents (SDA) have received substantial attention in isolation. Both principles are plausible generalizations about natural language conditionals. There is however little or no discussion of their inter- action. This paper aims to remedy this gap and explore the significance of having both principles constrain the logic of the conditional. Our negative finding is that, together with elementary logical assumptions, CEM and SDA yield a variety of implausible consequences. Despite these (...)
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  34. Experimenting with (Conditional) Perfection.Fabrizio Cariani & Lance J. Rips - manuscript
    We present and discuss a series of experiments designed to test one of the most promising pragmatic accounts of conditional perfection—the phenomenon according to which conditionals can sometimes be strengthened to biconditionals. We test the idea that conditional perfection is a form of exhaustification triggered by the kind of question that the conditional is used to answer. We uncover evidence that conditional perfection is a form of exhaustification, but not that it is triggered by a relationship to a salient question.
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  35. Book Review:The Logic of Conditionals Ernest W. Adams. [REVIEW]Ian F. Carlstrom & Christopher S. Hill - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (1):155-.
  36. Breaking de Morgan's Law in Counterfactual Antecedents.Lucas Champollion, Ivano Ciardelli & Linmin Zhang - manuscript
    The main goal of this paper is to investigate the relation between the meaning of a sentence and its truth conditions. We report on a comprehension experiment on counterfactual conditionals, based on a context in which a light is controlled by two switches. Our main finding is that the truth-conditionally equivalent clauses (i) "switch A or switch B is down" and (ii) "switch A and switch B are not both up" make different semantic contributions when embedded in a conditional antecedent. (...)
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  37. Preservation, Commutativity and Modus Ponens: Two Recent Triviality Results.Jake Chandler - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):579-602.
    In a recent pair of publications, Richard Bradley has offered two novel no-go theorems involving the principle of Preservation for conditionals, which guarantees that one’s prior conditional beliefs will exhibit a certain degree of inertia in the face of a change in one’s non-conditional beliefs. We first note that Bradley’s original discussions of these results—in which he finds motivation for rejecting Preservation, first in a principle of Commutativity, then in a doxastic analogue of the rule of modus ponens —are problematic (...)
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  38. Modus Ponens and the Logic of Dominance Reasoning.Nate Charlow - manuscript
    If modus ponens is valid (in the usual sense of that notion), then you should take up smoking.
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  39. Triviality For Restrictor Conditionals.Nate Charlow - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):533-564.
    I present two Triviality results for Kratzer's standard “restrictor” analysis of indicative conditionals. I both refine and undermine the common claim that problems of Triviality do not arise for Kratzer conditionals since they are not strictly conditionals at all.
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  40. What We Know and What to Do.Nate Charlow - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2291-2323.
    This paper discusses an important puzzle about the semantics of indicative conditionals and deontic necessity modals (should, ought, etc.): the Miner Puzzle (Parfit, ms; Kolodny and MacFarlane, J Philos 107:115–143, 2010). Rejecting modus ponens for the indicative conditional, as others have proposed, seems to solve a version of the puzzle, but is actually orthogonal to the puzzle itself. In fact, I prove that the puzzle arises for a variety of sophisticated analyses of the truth-conditions of indicative conditionals. A comprehensive solution (...)
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  41. Basic Conditional Logic.Brian F. Chellas - 1975 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (2):133 - 153.
  42. Two Switches in the Theory of Counterfactuals: A Study of Truth Conditionality and Minimal Change.Ivano Ciardelli, Linmin Zhang & Lucas Champollion - forthcoming - Linguistics and Philosophy.
    Based on a crowdsourced truth value judgment experiment, we provide empirical evidence challenging two classical views in semantics, and we develop a novel account of counterfactuals that combines ideas from inquisitive semantics and causal reasoning. First, we show that two truth-conditionally equivalent clauses can make different semantic contributions when embedded in a counterfactual antecedent. Assuming compositionality, this means that the meaning of these clauses is not fully determined by their truth conditions. This finding has a clear explanation in inquisitive semantics: (...)
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  43. If Conditionals Were Not Contraposable . .Michael Clark - 1976 - Analysis 36 (2):112.
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  44. The Propositional Logic of Ordinary Discourse.William S. Cooper - 1968 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 11 (1-4):295 – 320.
    The logical properties of the 'if-then' connective of ordinary English differ markedly from the logical properties of the material conditional of classical, two-valued logic. This becomes apparent upon examination of arguments in conversational English which involve (noncounterfactual) usages of if-then'. A nonclassical system of propositional logic is presented, whose conditional connective has logical properties approximating those of 'if-then'. This proposed system reduces, in a sense, to the classical logic. Moreover, because it is equivalent to a certain nonstandard three-valued logic, its (...)
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  45. Conversely: Extrapropositional and Prosentential.John Corcoran & Sriram Nambiar - 2014 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 20 (3):404-5.
    This self-contained lecture examines uses and misuses of the adverb conversely with special attention to logic and logic-related fields. Sometimes adding conversely after a conjunction such as and signals redundantly that a converse of what preceded will follow. -/- (1) Tarski read Church and, conversely, Church read Tarski. -/- In such cases, conversely serves as an extrapropositional constituent of the sentence in which it occurs: deleting conversely doesn’t change the proposition expressed. Nevertheless it does introduce new implicatures: a speaker would (...)
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  46. Comparative World Similarity and What is Held Fixed in Counterfactuals.C. B. Cross - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):91-96.
    Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno (Counterfactuals and Context, ANALYSIS 68 (2008): 39-46) argue that the standard Stalnaker-Lewis counterexamples to hypothetical syllogism, strengthening the antecedent, and contraposition trade on a failure to hold fixed the context in which truth values are determined for the premises and conclusion in each counterexample. I argue that no contextual fallacy is committed in the standard counterexamples, and I offer a different view of what it is for a fact to be held fixed by a counterfactual (...)
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  47. Conditional Excluded Middle.Charles B. Cross - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (2):173-188.
    In this essay I renew the case for Conditional Excluded Middle (CXM) in light of recent developments in the semantics of the subjunctive conditional. I argue that Michael Tooley’s recent backward causation counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis comparative world similarity semantics undermines the strongest argument against CXM, and I offer a new, principled argument for the validity of CXM that is in no way undermined by Tooley’s counterexample. Finally, I formulate a simple semantics for the subjunctive conditional that is consistent with (...)
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  48. Conditional Excluded Middle.Charles B. Cross - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (2):173-188.
    In this essay I renew the case for Conditional Excluded Middle in light of recent developments in the semantics of the subjunctive conditional. I argue that Michael Tooley's recent backward causation counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis comparative world similarity semantics undermines the strongest argument against CXM, and I offer a new, principled argument for the validity of CXM that is in no way undermined by Tooley's counterexample. Finally, I formulate a simple semantics for the subjunctive conditional that is consistent with both (...)
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  49. Antecedent-Relative Comparative World Similarity.Charles B. Cross - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (2):101-120.
    In “Backward Causation and the Stalnaker–Lewis Approach to Counterfactuals,” Analysis 62:191–7, (2002), Michael Tooley argues that if a certain kind of backward causation is possible, then a Stalnaker–Lewis comparative world similarity account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals cannot be sound. In “Tooley on Backward Causation,” Analysis 63:157–62, (2003), Paul Noordhof argues that Tooley’s example can be reconciled with a Stalnaker–Lewis account of counterfactuals if the comparative world similarity relation on which the Stalnaker–Lewis account relies is allowed to be antecedent-relative. (...)
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  50. Conditional Logic and the Significance of Tooleys Example.Charles B. Cross - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):325–335.
    In "Backward causation and the Stalnaker-Lewis approach to counterfactuals," Analysis 62 (2002): 191–97, Michael Tooley argues that if a certain kind of backward causation is possible, then a Stalnaker-Lewis style comparative world similarity account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals cannot be sound. Tooley’s target is one particular type of semantics, but, as I show, the significance of Tooley’s example goes well beyond its consequences for any one semantics for the conditional.
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