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  1. Command and Consequence.Josh Parsons - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):61-92.
    An argument is usually said to be valid iff it is truth-preserving—iff it cannot be that all its premises are true and its conclusion false. But imperatives (it is normally thought) are not truth-apt. They are not in the business of saying how the world is, and therefore cannot either succeed or fail in doing so. To solve this problem, we need to find a new criterion of validity, and I aim to propose such a criterion.
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  2. Maximization of Originality.Miro Brada - manuscript
    The richer you are, the less equally rich or richer people. The richest is only one (=unique). Maximization of richness or leisure (=classic utility), maximizes the uniqueness (=improbability) that can be maximized also by: extreme sport, suicide, tattoo, count of views... The richest seem unique as the poorest, but the rich can easily become poor, while the poor can hardly get rich. So the aim of maximization reflects IQ and options. Few options increase irrationality, regardless of IQ. I also present (...)
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  3. Model of Intelligence.Miro Brada - manuscript
    Model of intelligence and new methods to assess IQ. MA thesis in 1998 (Comenius University). Art exhibitions "From Animation" London 2013, "Fading Memory" Weißenohe 2015, TAIF Tokyo 2017. Conferences in Santorini, Daejon 2016, Geneva 2017.
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  4. Aristotle on Logical Consequence.Phil Corkum - manuscript
    Compare two conceptions of validity: under an example of a modal conception, an argument is valid just in case it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false; under an example of a topic-neutral conception, an argument is valid just in case there are no arguments of the same logical form with true premises and a false conclusion. This taxonomy of positions suggests a project in the philosophy of logic: the reductive analysis of the modal conception (...)
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  5. Is Every Deductively Valid Argument Circular?Danny Frederick - manuscript
    David Miller claims that every valid deductive argument begs the question. Other philosophers and logicians have made similar claims. I show that the claim is false. Its appeal depends on the existence of logical terminology, particularly concerning what a proposition 'contains' or its 'logical content,' that is best understood as metaphoric and that, given its aptness to mislead, would be better eschewed. I show how the terminology appears to derive from early modern theories of the nature of mind, ideas and (...)
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  6. Knowledge and Content: Critique of David Miller.Danny Frederick - manuscript
    David Miller propounds a theory of objective knowledge from which he mistakenly derives some consequences about question-begging and persuasion that appear to be false. He makes a further claim about persuasion that also seems false. I argue that Miller’s account of objective knowledge is explanatorily weak unless supplemented with an account of subjective knowledge and that the latter enables us to extricate Miller’s theory from the falsehoods he associates with it.
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  7. Are There Any Good Reasons?Danny Frederick - manuscript
    David Miller argues that there are no good reasons, either sufficient or insufficient. I show that most of his arguments are invalid or unsound. Several of his arguments depend upon the false claim that every deductively valid argument is circular. I accept one of Miller's arguments for the conclusion that there are no good reasons which are less-than-sufficient. I accept one of his arguments to the conclusion that there are no probative sufficient reasons. But I explain how there are epistemic (...)
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  8. Proof Terms for Classical Derivations.Restall Greg - manuscript
    I give an account of proof terms for derivations in a sequent calculus for classical propositional logic. The term for a derivation δ of a sequent Σ≻Δ encodes how the premises Σ and conclusions Δ are related in δ. This encoding is many–to–one in the sense that different derivations can have the same proof term, since different derivations may be different ways of representing the same underlying connection between premises and conclusions. However, not all proof terms for a sequent Σ≻Δ (...)
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  9. A Puzzle About Inferential Strength and Probability.Alexander Hughes - manuscript
    Inductive logic would be the logic of arguments that are not valid, but nevertheless justify belief in something like the way in which valid arguments would. Maybe we could describe it as the logic of “almost valid” arguments. There is a sort of transitivity to valid arguments. Valid arguments can be chained together to form arguments and such arguments are themselves valid. One wants to distinguish the “almost valid” arguments by noting that chains of “almost valid” arguments are weaker than (...)
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  10. Harmony, Normality and Stability.Nils Kurbis - manuscript
    The paper begins with a conceptual discussion of Michael Dummett's proof-theoretic justification of deduction or proof-theoretic semantics, which is based on what we might call Gentzen's thesis: 'the introductions constitute, so to speak, the "definitions" of the symbols concerned, and the eliminations are in the end only consequences thereof, which could be expressed thus: In the elimination of a symbol, the formula in question, whose outer symbol it concerns, may only "be used as that which it means on the basis (...)
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  11. A Decision Procedure for Herbrand Formulas Without Skolemization.Timm Lampert - manuscript
    This paper describes a decision procedure for disjunctions of conjunctions of anti-prenex normal forms of pure first-order logic (FOLDNFs) that do not contain V within the scope of quantifiers. The disjuncts of these FOLDNFs are equivalent to prenex normal forms whose quantifier-free parts are conjunctions of atomic and negated atomic formulae (= Herbrand formulae). In contrast to the usual algorithms for Herbrand formulae, neither skolemization nor unification algorithms with function symbols are applied. Instead, a procedure is described that rests on (...)
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  12. Systems for Non-Reflexive Consequence.Carlo Nicolai & Lorenzo Rossi - manuscript
    Substructural logics and their application to logical and semantic paradoxes have been extensively studied, but non-reexive systems have been somewhat neglected. Here, we aim to (at least partly) ll this lacuna, by presenting a non-reexive logic and theory of naïve consequence (and truth). We also investigate the semantics and the proof-theory of the system. Finally, we develop a compositional theory of truth (and consequence) in our non-reexive framework.
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  13. Refuting Tarski and Gödel with a Sound Deductive Formalism.P. Olcott - manuscript
    The conventional notion of a formal system is adapted to conform to the sound deductive inference model operating on finite strings. Finite strings stipulated to have the semantic value of Boolean true provide the sound deductive premises. Truth preserving finite string transformation rules provide the valid deductive inference. Sound deductive conclusions are the result of these finite string transformation rules.
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  14. Tarski Undefinability Theorem Terse Refutation.P. Olcott - manuscript
    Both Tarski and Gödel “prove” that provability can diverge from Truth. When we boil their claim down to its simplest possible essence it is really claiming that valid inference from true premises might not always derive a true consequence. This is obviously impossible.
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  15. Prolog Detects Pathological Self Reference in the Gödel Sentence.P. Olcott - manuscript
    This sentence G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G) and its negation G ↔ ~(F ⊢ ¬G) are shown to meet the conventional definition of incompleteness: Incomplete(T) ↔ ∃φ ((T ⊬ φ) ∧ (T ⊬ ¬φ)). They meet conventional definition of incompleteness because neither the sentence nor its negation is provable in F (or any other formal system).
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  16. Defining Gödel Incompleteness Away.P. Olcott - manuscript
    We can simply define Gödel 1931 Incompleteness away by redefining the meaning of the standard definition of Incompleteness: A theory T is incomplete if and only if there is some sentence φ such that (T ⊬ φ) and (T ⊬ ¬φ). This definition construes the existence of self-contradictory expressions in a formal system as proof that this formal system is incomplete because self-contradictory expressions are neither provable nor disprovable in this formal system. Since self-contradictory expressions are neither provable nor disprovable (...)
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  17. Minimal Type Theory (MTT).Pete Olcott - manuscript
    Minimal Type Theory (MTT) is based on type theory in that it is agnostic about Predicate Logic level and expressly disallows the evaluation of incompatible types. It is called Minimal because it has the fewest possible number of fundamental types, and has all of its syntax expressed entirely as the connections in a directed acyclic graph.
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  18. Defining a Decidability Decider.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    By extending the notion of a Well Formed Formula to include syntactically formalized rules for rejecting semantically incorrect expressions we recognize and reject expressions that have the semantic error of Pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004). The foundation of this system requires the notion of a BaseFact that anchors the semantic notions of True and False. When-so-ever a formal proof from BaseFacts of language L to a closed WFF X or ~X of language L does not exist X is decided to be semantically (...)
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  19. Provability with Minimal Type Theory.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    Minimal Type Theory (MTT) shows exactly how all of the constituent parts of an expression relate to each other (in 2D space) when this expression is formalized using a directed acyclic graph (DAG). This provides substantially greater expressiveness than the 1D space of FOPL syntax. -/- The increase in expressiveness over other formal systems of logic shows the Pathological Self-Reference Error of expressions previously considered to be sentences of formal systems. MTT shows that these expressions were never truth bearers, thus (...)
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  20. Probability of Immortality and God’s Existence. A Mathematical Perspective.Jesús Sánchez - manuscript
    What are the probabilities that this universe is repeated exactly the same with you in it again? Is God invented by human imagination or is the result of human intuition? The intuition that the same laws/mechanisms (evolution, stability winning probability) that have created something like the human being capable of self-awareness and controlling its surroundings, could create a being capable of controlling all what it exists? Will be the characteristics of the next universes random or tend to something? All these (...)
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  21. Credence for Epistemic Discourse.Paolo Santorio - manuscript
    Many recent theories of epistemic discourse exploit an informational notion of consequence, i.e. a notion that defines entailment as preservation of support by an information state. This paper investigates how informational consequence fits with probabilistic reasoning. I raise two problems. First, all informational inferences that are not also classical inferences are, intuitively, probabilistically invalid. Second, all these inferences can be exploited, in a systematic way, to generate triviality results. The informational theorist is left with two options, both of them radical: (...)
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  22. Liar Sentences Are Truth-Apt.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    Lycan (2010: 617) maintained that if we know about a deductive argument P1, P2…, ∴C that it is valid, this shows that a set containing the premises and the negation of conclusion is internally inconsistent {P1, P2,…, ~C}. Using a similar reasoning, we should conclude that an invalid deductive argument shows that a set containing the premises and the negation of conclusion is internally consistent. This implies that premises and conclusion of any deductive argument are truth-apt. Since it is uncontroversial (...)
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  23. Making Conditional Speech Acts in the Material Way.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    The conventional wisdom about conditionals claims that (1) conditionals that have non-assertive acts in their consequents, such as commands and promises, are not plausibly interpreted as material implications; (2) the most promising hypothesis about these sentences is conditional-assertion theory, which explains a conditional as a conditional speech act, i.e., a performance of a speech act given the assumption of the antecedent. This hypothesis has far-reaching and revisionist consequences, because conditional speech acts are not synonymous with a proposition with truth conditions. (...)
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  24. 'If-Then' as a Version of 'Implies'.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    Russell’s role in the controversy about the paradoxes of material implication is usually presented as a tale of how even the greatest minds can fall prey of basic conceptual confusions. Quine accused him of making a silly mistake in Principia Mathematica. He interpreted ‘if-then’ as a version of ‘implies’ and called it material implication. Quine’s accusation is that this decision involved a use-mention fallacy because the antecedent and consequent of ‘if-then’ are used instead of being mentioned as the premise and (...)
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  25. The False Promises of Logic Textbooks - How Logic Has a Much More Limited Role Than People Usually Think.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    Logic textbooks advertise that they can teach how to spot a valid argument by its logical form alone. They also boast having collections with the most basic valid argumentative forms people of flesh and blood can use in deductive matters. Think about this for a moment. These are bold statements. If they were accurate, philosophers would be in higher demand than software engineers and no one would be able to make contributions to theoretical physics without ever taking a logic class. (...)
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  26. Modus Ponens, Conditional-Circularity and Material Implication.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    The modus ponens can be interpreted as an answer to a circularity charge, but this strategy is only feasible if the additional conditional premise is interpreted as a claim to a material implication. Here’s how it works.
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  27. Conditional Sentences as Implication Statements: A New Approach.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    It is usually accepted that conditional sentences are sui generis and enigmatic. In this paper I try to make them more accessible by interpreting them as claims to relations of implication restricted to a parameter world. This interpretation revives an old idea that fell into disuse, but in its improved version leads to refreshing solutions to known problems in conditional theory. The many benefits of this approach are evidenced by its insightful explanation of some apparent counter-examples to classical argumentative forms (...)
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  28. The Inextricable Link Between Conditionals and Logical Consequence.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    There is a profound, but frequently ignored, relationship between the classical conception of logical consequence and the material implication. The first repeats the patterns of the latter, but with a wider modal reach. This relationship suggests that there should be also a connection between the notion of logical consequence and the conditional connective of any given logical system. This implies, among other things, that it is incoherent to propose alternatives to the material implication while maintaining the classical conception of logical (...)
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  29. Making Sense of Deduction.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    An argument is deductive when the arguer believes the truth of the premises necessitates the truth of the conclusion. A deductive argument is valid when the arguer’s claim is true, i.e., when there are no possible worlds whether the premises are true and the conclusion is false. But in order to evaluate this claim in an accurate manner we need to consider three qualifications that have been repeatedly ignored in the literature, namely, consistency in the attribution of truth values, world (...)
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  30. The Logical Web - Why Most Alternatives to the Material Account Are Ad Hoc.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    The material account of indicative conditionals states that indicative conditional sentences and the material implication have the same truth conditions. Many conditional logics are motivated by attempts to fix the counter-intuitive aspects associated with the material account. Some counter-intuitive instances of classical argumentative forms, e.g., strengthening of the antecedent, contraposition, and conditional negation, are regarded as evidence that the material account is wrong and that classical logic should be rejected in favour of a new logic system in which these argumentative (...)
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  31. An Even Simpler Defense of Material Implication.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    Lee Archie argued that if any truth values are consistently assigned to a natural language conditional to which Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens are valid argumentative forms, and affirming the consequent is an invalid argumentative form, this conditional would have the same truth conditions than a material implication. This argument is simple and it requires few assumptions that are relatively uncontroversial. We show that it is possible to extend Archie’s argument to three-valued logics and five-valued logics and vindicate a slightly (...)
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  32. Restricted and Unrestricted Modus Ponens.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    In a typical modus ponens the reasoner will (a) assert that a premise materially implies a conclusion in a given world; (b) assert this premise and (c) infer the conclusion. But this restricted modus ponens has little in common with the unrestricted textbook modus ponens, since the latter claims that there are no possible worlds where: (a’) a premise materially implies a conclusion, (b’) that premise is true and (c’) the conclusion is false. It is clear that this textbook modus (...)
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  33. The Material Account of Conditionals and the Clash Between Intensional and Extensional Evidence.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    Intensional evidence is any reason to accept a proposition that is not the truth values of the proposition accepted or, if it is a complex proposition, its propositional contents. Extensional evidence is non-intensional evidence. Someone can accept a complex proposition, but deny its logical consequences in two circumstances: (1) when her acceptance is based on intensional evidence, while the logical consequences of the proposition presuppose the acceptance of extensional evidence, e.g., she can refuse the logical consequence of a proposition she (...)
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  34. Subjunctive Conditionals Are Material.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    The material account claims that indicative conditionals are material. However, the conventional wisdom even among material account enthusiasts is that the material account cannot be extended to subjunctive conditionals. There are mainly three reasons that motivate this consensus: (1) the belief that if subjunctives were material, most subjunctive conditionals would be vacuously true, which is implausible; (2) its inconsistency with Adam pairs, which suggest that indicative and subjunctive conditionals have different truth conditions; and (3) the belief that it is an (...)
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  35. In Defense of Hypothetical Syllogism.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    Moti Mizrahi (2013) presented a putative counterexample to Hypothetical Syllogism (HS) for indicative conditionals aiming to succeed where previous attempts to refute HS have failed. Lee Walters (2014a) objected that Mizrahi’s putative counterexample results from an inadequate analysis of conditionals with embedded modals, but advanced new putative counterexamples to HS for subjunctive conditionals that are supposed to bypass this issue (Walters, 2014a; 2014b). It is argued that Walter’s analysis of embedded modals is unnecessary to prevent Mizrahi’s putative counterexample, since the (...)
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  36. A Contextualist Defence of the Material Account of Indicative Conditionals.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    The material account of indicative conditionals faces a legion of counterexamples that are the bread and butter in any entry about the subject. For this reason, the material account is widely unpopular among conditional experts. I will argue that this consensus was not built on solid foundations, since these counterexamples are contextual fallacies. They ignore a basic tenet of semantics according to which when evaluating arguments for validity we need to maintain the context constant, otherwise any argumentative form can be (...)
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  37. The Big Four - Their Interdependence and Limitations.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    Four intuitions are recurrent and influential in theories about conditionals: the Ramsey’s test, the Adams’ Thesis, the Equation, and the robustness requirement. For simplicity’s sake, I call these intuitions ‘the big four’. My aim is to show that: (1) the big four are interdependent; (2) they express our inferential dispositions to employ a conditional on a modus ponens; (3) the disposition to employ conditionals on a modus ponens doesn’t have the epistemic significance that is usually attributed to it, since the (...)
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  38. Looking for the Missing Antecedent.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    The conclusion of a valid deductive argument is contained in its premises, but the deductive argument can still be informative if the arguer is trying to find the missing premises that together with the accepted premises will ensure the truth of the conclusion. Necessarily true conditionals have a deductive-like character so their consequents are contained in their antecedents. These conditionals can be informative, so we need to find the missing antecedent that makes the connection between the antecedent and the consequent. (...)
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  39. Is Classical Logic Monotonic?Matheus Silva - manuscript
    It is usually accepted that one of the properties of classical logic is monotonicity, which states that the validity of implication is not affected by the addition of new premises. In this piece, I will argue that this common notion is unjustified since it is motivated by a category mistake. The notion of monotonicity is primarily epistemic in character and can’t be meaningfully attributed to a system. This is acutely clear in the contrast of monotonicity with non-monotonicity, which we tend (...)
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  40. Two Degrees of Implication.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    In a material implication the relation of logical consequence is restricted to a world parameter, whereas in a formal implication the relation of logical consequence extends over many worlds. One could infer from this pattern that the material implication should be reduced to formal implication since it is just a restricted version of it, or, inversely, that formal implication should be reduced to material implication since it is an unrestricted version of it. But both reductionist claims would betray a superficial (...)
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  41. Indicative Conditionals Are Material - Expanding the Survey.Matheus Martins Silva - manuscript
    The material account of indicative conditionals states that indicative conditional sentences and the material implication have the same truth conditions. Recently, Adam Rieger has carried out a survey of arguments in favour of the material account. In this paper, I extend this survey by presenting yet more arguments for the material account. On top of presenting more arguments, I also want to argue that it is plausible to extend the material account to subjunctive conditionals. For that reason, the arguments here (...)
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  42. Logical Consequence — C. Model-Theoretic Conceptions.Author unknown - manuscript
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  43. Relation Of Correspondence And Logical Consequence.Jan Such - unknown - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 79:185-215.
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  44. The Significance of Evidence-Based Reasoning for Mathematics, Mathematics Education, Philosophy and the Natural Sciences.Bhupinder Singh Anand - forthcoming
    In this multi-disciplinary investigation we show how an evidence-based perspective of quantification---in terms of algorithmic verifiability and algorithmic computability---admits evidence-based definitions of well-definedness and effective computability, which yield two unarguably constructive interpretations of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA---over the structure N of the natural numbers---that are complementary, not contradictory. The first yields the weak, standard, interpretation of PA over N, which is well-defined with respect to assignments of algorithmically verifiable Tarskian truth values to the formulas of PA under the interpretation. (...)
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  45. Logical Argumentation by Dynamic Proof Systems.Ofer Arieli & Christian Straßer - forthcoming - Theoretical Computer Science.
    In this paper we provide a proof theoretical investigation of logical argumentation, where arguments are represented by sequents, conflicts between arguments are represented by sequent elimination rules, and deductions are made by dynamic proof systems extending standard sequent calculi. The idea is to imitate argumentative movements in which certain claims are introduced or withdrawn in the presence of counter-claims. This is done by a dynamic evaluation of sequences of sequents, in which the latter are considered ‘derived’ or ‘not derived’ according (...)
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  46. Substructural Logics, Pluralism and Collapse.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Federico Pailos & Damian Szmuc - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    When discussing Logical Pluralism several critics argue that such an open-minded position is untenable. The key to this conclusion is that, given a number of widely accepted assumptions, the pluralist view collapses into Logical Monism. In this paper we show that the arguments usually employed to arrive at this conclusion do not work. The main reason for this is the existence of certain substructural logics which have the same set of valid inferences as Classical Logic—although they are, in a clear (...)
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  47. (Meta)Inferential Levels of Entailment Beyond the Tarskian Paradigm.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Federico Pailos & Damian Szmuc - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
    In this paper we discuss the extent to which the very existence of substructural logics puts the Tarskian conception of logical systems in jeopardy. In order to do this, we highlight the importance of the presence of different levels of entailment in a given logic, looking not only at inferences between collections of formulae but also at inferences between collections of inferences—and more. We discuss appropriate refinements or modifications of the usual Tarskian identity criterion for logical systems, and propose an (...)
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  48. Why Logical Pluralism?Colin R. Caret - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.
    This paper scrutinizes the debate over logical pluralism. I hope to make this debate more tractable by addressing the question of motivating data: what would count as strong evidence in favor of logical pluralism? Any research program should be able to answer this question, but when faced with this task, many logical pluralists fall back on brute intuitions. This sets logical pluralism on a weak foundation and makes it seem as if nothing pressing is at stake in the debate. The (...)
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  49. In Pursuit of the Non-Trivial.Colin R. Caret - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.
    This paper is about the underlying logical principles of scientific theories. In particular, it concerns ex contradictione quodlibet the principle that anything follows from a contradiction. ECQ is valid according to classical logic, but invalid according to paraconsistent logics. Some advocates of paraconsistency claim that there are ‘real’ inconsistent theories that do not erupt with completely indiscriminate, absurd commitments. They take this as evidence in favor of paraconsistency. Michael calls this the non-triviality strategy. He argues that this strategy fails in (...)
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  50. On Stalnaker's "Indicative Conditionals".Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - In Louise McNally, Yael Sharvit & Zoltan Szabo (eds.), Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, Vol 100. Springer.
    This paper is a guide to the main ideas and innovations in Robert Stalnaker's "Indicative Conditionals". The paper is for a volume of essays on twenty-one classics of formal semantics edited by Louise McNally, Yael Sharvit and Zoltàn Gendler Szabò.
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