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Logical Expressivism
Edited by Ulf Hlobil (Concordia University)
About this topic
| Summary | The term logical expressivism refers to several related but distinct theories in the literature. What they share, roughly, is the idea that a satisfactory account of certain philosophical issues regarding logic must appeal to what one (characteristically) does with logical vocabulary or statements, rather than just what is represented by them. Different versions of logical expressivism differ in at least two respects: (a) the philosophical issue that is the explanatory target, and (b) what they claim one does with logical statements or vocabulary. The most prominent advocate of logical expressivism is Robert Brandom. According to Brandom, the characteristic expressive function of logical vocabulary is “to make inferential relations explicit—that is, to explicitly endorse or reject pieces of reasoning by making assertions using logical vocabulary, rather than merely implicitly doing so by reasoning in certain ways. Thus, an account of what makes some vocabulary logical vocabulary must appeal to the fact that this vocabulary allows one to express what follows from what and what is incompatible with what. Here the relevant kind of inferential relations includes more than just logical relations; it includes what Brandom calls material implication and incompatibility, such as the lexical entailment from something being blue to it being colored. The explanatory target of this brand of logical expressivism is the demarcation of logical vocabulary, and what logical vocabulary allows one to do is to explicitly undertake commitments regarding consequence and incompatibility. Jaroslav Peregrin advocates a similar version of logical expressivism. Others use logical expressivism to denote a claim that is closer to expressivism in meta-ethics, e.g., the claim that endorsing an entailment is not a cognitive state; rather, statements about entailment express pro-attitudes toward drawing corresponding inferences. In this case, the explanatory target is an account of what it means to endorse entailments, and what we do with logical statements is to express non-cognitive mental states. What unifies this account of logical expressivism with those of Brandom and Peregrin is the dismissal of the task of finding a place for logical facts in (discourse-independent) nature. Logical expressivism has close ties to semantic inferentialism, logical inferentialism, proof-theoretic semantics, and logical deflationism. Moreover, logical expressivists are often interested in how one can express claims about consequence and incompatibility in the object language of a logic. |
| Key works | Brandom's original version of logical expressivism is presented in Brandom 1994 and, with a different focus, in B. Brandom 2008. Peregrin spells out his version in Peregrin 2014. |
| Introductions | Chapter 1 of Brandom 2000, entitled "Semantic Inferentialism and Logical Expressivism” is a good starting point. An earlier version of this was published as Brandom 1988. For a discussion of a version of logical expressivism that is closer to expressivism in meta-ethics see Besson 2019. |
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Related
Siblings
- Dialetheism (249)
- Epistemology of Logic (227)
- Informal Logic (5,394)
- Logical Pluralism (206)
- Logic and Information (232)
- Logic in Philosophy (228)
- Model Theory (6,359)
- Proof Theory (3,071)
- Set Theory (2,767 | 710)
- Mathematical Logic (1,676)
- Introductions to Logic (194)
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic, General Works (655)
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic, Misc (1,111)
See also
- Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and Content (400)
- Logical Constants (140)
- Logical Connectives (435 | 234)
- Pragmatism (464 | 329)
- Moral Expressivism (602)
- Logical Expressions (1,602 | 974)
- Deflationary Theories of Meaning (35)
Contents
49 found
Order:
- What is Logical Monism?Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - In Christopher Peacocke & Paul Boghossian (eds.), Normative Realism. Oxford University Press.Logical monism is the view that there is ‘One True Logic’. This is the default position, against which pluralists react. If there were not ‘One True Logic’, it is hard to see how there could be one true theory of anything. A theory is closed under a logic! But what is logical monism? In this article, I consider semantic, logical, modal, scientific, and metaphysical proposals. I argue that, on no ‘factualist’ analysis (according to which ‘there is One True Logic’ expresses (...)
- The Logic of Hyperlogic. Part B: Extensions and Restrictions.Alexander W. Kocurek - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-28.This is the second part of a two-part series on the logic of hyperlogic, a formal system for regimenting metalogical claims in the object language (even within embedded environments). Part A provided a minimal logic for hyperlogic that is sound and complete over the class of all models. In this part, we extend these completeness results to stronger logics that are sound and complete over restricted classes of models. We also investigate the logic of hyperlogic when the language is enriched (...)
- Reasons for Logic, Logic for Reasons: Pragmatics, Semantics, and Conceptual Roles.Ulf Hlobil & Robert B. Brandom - 2024 - New York: Routledge.This book presents a philosophical conception of logic -- "logical expressivism"-- according to which the role of logic is to make explicit reason relations, which are often neither monotonic nor transitive. It reveals new perspectives on inferential roles, sequent calculi, representation, truthmakers, and many extant logical theories.
- The Logic of Hyperlogic. Part A: Foundations.Alexander W. Kocurek - 2024 - Review of Symbolic Logic 17 (1):244-271.Hyperlogic is a hyperintensional system designed to regiment metalogical claims (e.g., “Intuitionistic logic is correct” or “The law of excluded middle holds”) into the object language, including within embedded environments such as attitude reports and counterfactuals. This paper is the first of a two-part series exploring the logic of hyperlogic. This part presents a minimal logic of hyperlogic and proves its completeness. It consists of two interdefined axiomatic systems: one for classical consequence (truth preservation under a classical interpretation of the (...)
- Outline of a Theory of Reasons.Vincenzo Crupi & Andrea Iacona - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1):117-142.This paper investigates the logic of reasons. Its aim is to provide an analysis of the sentences of the form ‘p is a reason for q’ that yields a coherent account of their logical properties. The idea that we will develop is that ‘p is a reason for q’ is acceptable just in case a suitably defined relation of incompatibility obtains between p and ¬q. As we will suggest, a theory of reasons based on this idea can solve three challenging (...)
- From Epistemic Norms to Logical Rules: Epistemic Models for Logical Expressivists.Niklas Dahl - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (6):1517-1533.In this paper I construct a system of semantics for classical and intuitionistic propositional logic based on epistemic norms governing belief expansion. Working in the AGM-framework of belief change, I give a generalisation of Gärdenfors’ notion of belief systems which can be defined without reference to a logical consequence operator by using a version of the Ramsey Test. These belief expansion systems can then be used to define epistemic models which are sound and complete for either classical or intuitionistic propositional (...)
- .Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2023 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
- An Expressivist Strategy to Understand Logical Forms.Giacomo Turbanti - 2023 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 32 (3):511-525.This paper discusses a generalization of logical expressivism. It is shown that, in the wide sense defined here, the expressivist approach is neutral with respect to different theories of inference and offers a natural framework for understanding logical forms and their function. An expressivist strategy for explaining the development of logical forms is then applied to the analysis of Frege’s Begriffsschrift, Gentzen’s sequent calculus and Belnap’s display logic.
- A forgotten logical expressivist: Strawson’s philosophy of logic and its challenges.Sybren Heyndels - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-23.P.F. Strawson contributed to many philosophical domains, including the philosophy of language, the history of philosophy, metaphysics, moral philosophy and philosophical methodology. Most of his contributions in these areas have influenced contemporary debates, either because his views are still defended or because they are still considered worthy of detailed responses. His views on the philosophy of logic have been only rarely discussed, however. My aim in this paper is threefold. First, I provide a systematic account of Strawson’s philosophy of logic. (...)
- A truth-maker semantics for ST: refusing to climb the strict/tolerant hierarchy.Ulf Hlobil - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.The paper presents a truth-maker semantics for Strict/Tolerant Logic (ST), which is the currently most popular logic among advocates of the non-transitive approach to paradoxes. Besides being interesting in itself, the truth-maker presentation of ST offers a new perspective on the recently discovered hierarchy of meta-inferences that, according to some, generalizes the idea behind ST. While fascinating from a mathematical perspective, there is no agreement on the philosophical significance of this hierarchy. I aim to show that there is no clear (...)
- The Laws of Thought and the Laws of Truth as Two Sides of One Coin.Ulf Hlobil - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (1):313-343.Some think that logic concerns the “laws of truth”; others that logic concerns the “laws of thought.” This paper presents a way to reconcile both views by building a bridge between truth-maker theory, à la Fine, and normative bilateralism, à la Restall and Ripley. The paper suggests a novel way of understanding consequence in truth-maker theory and shows that this allows us to identify a common structure shared by truth-maker theory and normative bilateralism. We can thus transfer ideas from normative (...)
- The problem of plurality of logics: understanding the dynamic nature of philosophical logic.Pavel Arazim - 2021 - New York: Bloomsbury Academic.As the foundation of our rationality, logic has traditionally been considered fixed, stable and constant. This conception of the discipline has been challenged recently by the plurality of logics and in this book, Pavel Arazim extends the debate to offer a new view of logic as dynamic and without a definite, specific shape. The Problem of Plurality of Logics examines the origins of our standard view of logic alongside Kant's theories, the holistic view, the issue of logic's pragmatic significance and (...)
- Counterlogicals as Counterconventionals.Alexander W. Kocurek & Ethan J. Jerzak - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (4):673-704.We develop and defend a new approach to counterlogicals. Non-vacuous counterlogicals, we argue, fall within a broader class of counterfactuals known as counterconventionals. Existing semantics for counterconventionals, 459–482 ) and, 1–27 ) allow counterfactuals to shift the interpretation of predicates and relations. We extend these theories to counterlogicals by allowing counterfactuals to shift the interpretation of logical vocabulary. This yields an elegant semantics for counterlogicals that avoids problems with the usual impossible worlds semantics. We conclude by showing how this approach (...)
- Logical Expressivism and Pluralism.Giacomo Turbanti - 2021 - In Giacomo Turbanti & Luca Bellotti (eds.), Fourth Pisa Colloquium in Logic, Language and Epistemology. Essays in Honour of Enrico Moriconi. Pisa: ETS. pp. 183-202.This paper explores some of the assumptions orienting the debate about logical pluralism. I argue that these assumptions are grounded in the truth-conditional character of the semantic metavocabularies in which the debate is conducted. Then, I suggest an expressivist strategy to reinterpret the pluralist claim that there are different logics and I show how the expressive role of logical vocabularies can be equally well characterized by means of different expressive resources not involving the notion of truth.
- Logical Expressivism and Carroll's Regress.Corine Besson - 2019 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 86:35-62.In this paper, I address a key argument in favour of logical expressivism, the view that knowing a logical principle such as Modus Ponens is not a cognitive state but a pro-attitude towards drawing certain types of conclusions from certain types of premises. The argument is that logical expressivism is the only view that can take us out of Lewis Carroll's Regress – which suggests that elementary deductive reasoning is impossible. I show that the argument does not hold scrutiny and (...)
- Logical expressivism, logical theory and the critique of inferences.Georg Brun - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4493-4509.The basic idea of logical expressivism in the Brandomian tradition is that logic makes inferential relations explicit and thereby accessible to critical discussion. But expressivists have not given a convincing explanation of what the point of logical theories is. Peregrin provides a starting point by observing a distinction between making explicit and explication in Carnap’s sense of replacing something unclear and vague by something clear and exact. Whereas logical locutions make inferential relations explicit within a language, logical theories use formal (...)
- Hyperlogic: A System for Talking about Logics.Alexander W. Kocurek - 2019 - Proceedings for the 22nd Amsterdam Colloquium.Sentences about logic are often used to show that certain embedding expressions, including attitude verbs, conditionals, and epistemic modals, are hyperintensional. Yet it not clear how to regiment “logic talk” in the object language so that it can be compositionally embedded under such expressions. This paper does two things. First, it argues against a standard account of logic talk, viz., the impossible worlds semantics. It is shown that this semantics does not easily extend to a language with propositional quantifiers, which (...)
- A First-Order Sequent Calculus for Logical Inferentialists and Expressivists.Shuhei Shimamura - 2019 - In Igor Sedlár & Martin Blicha (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2018. College Publications. pp. 211-228.I present a sequent calculus that extends a nonmonotonic reflexive consequence relation as defined over an atomic first-order language without variables to one defined over a logically complex first-order language. The extension preserves reflexivity, is conservative (therefore nonmonotonic) and supraintuitionistic, and is conducted in a way that lets us codify, within the logically extended object language, important features of the base thus extended. In other words, the logical operators in this calculus play what Brandom (2008) calls expressive roles. Expressivist logical (...)$20.00 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation
Bookmark - At the Roots of Rational Expressivism.Giacomo Turbanti - 2019 - In Luca Bellotti, Luca Gili, Enrico Moriconi & Giacomo Turbanti (eds.), Third Pisa Colloquium in Logic, Language and Epistemology. Essays in Honour of Mauro Mariani and Carlo Marletti. Pisa: Edizioni ETS.The early writings of Wilfrid Sellars are characterized by the analysis of themes and problems from Rudolph Carnap's philosophy of language. In particular, Sellars investigated the notion of "material'' rules of inference and explored the possibility of a "pure'' pragmatics. In these initial researches Sellars laid the foundations for his inferentialist analysis of meaning. A crucial component of such an analysis is the seminal form of rational expressivism that Sellars began to develop at the time. In this paper I address (...)
- Logický pluralismus v historické perspektivě.Pavel Arazim - 2018 - Dissertation, Charles UniversityLogical pluralism from historical perspective -The plurality of logics is understood as a challenge to seek a deeper understanding of the na- ture and import of logic. Two basic approaches to demarcation of logic are considered, the model-theoretic and the proof-theoretic one. Investigation of the history which led to these two appraoches identifies the postion of logic in Kant's epistemology as crucial for the devel- opment. An analogical development from Kant's conception of geometry to the plurality of geometric theories leads (...)
- From logical expressivism to expressivist logic: Sketch of a program and some implementations1.Robert Brandom - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):70-88.
- Three Conceptions of the Logical Form of Exemplification.Valerio Buonomo - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):175-188.My aim in this paper is to discuss the logical form of exemplification. In order to achieve this goal, I analyze three views on the logical form of exemplification, namely, Gustav Bergmann's logical realism, Wilfrid Sellars's meta-linguistic expressivism, and Javier Cumpa's logical eliminativism. I start by examining the account advanced by Bergmann in his 1960 essay "Ineffability, Ontology, and Method," according to which the logical form of exemplification is represented by the juxtaposition of logical signs in a sentence. Then I (...)
- From Global Expressivism to Global Pragmatism.John Capps - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (1-2):71-89.In the twentieth century, questions of meaning and representation played a central role in the development of pragmatism and analytic philosophy. Present-day neopragmatism, such as Huw Price's “global expressivism,” is often framed in terms of a nonrepresentationalist theory of meaning. While some neopragmatists, such as Robert Brandom, advocate a more local approach, this article argues for taking Price's global expressivism to its next logical step: global pragmatism. Global pragmatism prioritizes the behavior-guiding function of language and redefines representation in operational terms. (...)
- A multi-succedent sequent calculus for logical expressivists.Daniel Kaplan - 2018 - In Pavel Arazim & Tomáš Lávička (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2017. College Publications. pp. 139-153.Expressivism in logic is the view that logical vocabulary plays a primarily expressive role: that is, that logical vocabulary makes perspicuous in the object language structural features of inference and incompatibility (Brandom, 1994, 2008). I present a precise, technical criterion of expressivity for a logic (§2). I next present a logic that meets that criterion (§3). I further explore some interesting features of that logic: first, a representation theorem for capturing other logics (§3.1), and next some novel logical vocabulary for (...)
- Inferentialist-Expressivism for Explanatory Vocabulary.Jared A. Millson, Kareem Khalifa & Mark Risjord - 2018 - In Ondřej Beran, Vojtěch Kolman & Ladislav Koreň (eds.), From rules to meanings. New essays on inferentialism. Routledge.In this essay, we extend earlier inferentialist-expressivist treatments of traditional logical, semantic, modal, and representational vocabulary (Brandom 1994, 2008, 2015; Peregrin 2014) to explanatory vocabulary. From this perspective, Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) appears to be an obvious starting point. In its simplest formulation, IBE has the form: A best explains why B, B; so A. It thereby captures one of the central inferential features of explanation. An inferentialist-expressivist treatment of “best explains” would treat it as a logical operator. (...)$41.45 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark 3 citations
- Logical Expressivism and Logical Relations.Lionel Shapiro - 2018 - In Ondřej Beran, Vojtěch Kolman & Ladislav Koreň (eds.), From rules to meanings. New essays on inferentialism. New York: Routledge. pp. 179-95.According to traditional logical expressivism, logical operators allow speakers to explicitly endorse claims that are already implicitly endorsed in their discursive practice — endorsed in virtue of that practice’s having instituted certain logical relations. Here, I propose a different version of logical expressivism, according to which the expressive role of logical operators is explained without invoking logical relations at all, but instead in terms of the expression of discursive-practical attitudes. In defense of this alternative, I present a deflationary account of (...)$41.45 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark 2 citations
- Expressivist Perspective on Logicality.Pavel Arazim - 2017 - Logica Universalis 11 (4):409-419.Various attempts at demarcating logic were undertaken, many of them based on specific understanding of how logical knowledge is formal and not material. MacFarlane has persuasively shown that general idea of formality of logic can be understood in various ways. I take two of the accounts of formality, namely the requirement of conservativity and the requirement of schematicity of logical vocabulary, into consideration as promising candidates to make the all too unclear notion of formality more precise and study to what (...)
- When Structural Principles Hold Merely Locally.Ulf Hlobil - 2017 - In Pavel Arazim & Tomáš Lávička (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2016. London: College Publications. pp. 53-67.In substructural logics, structural principles may hold in some fragments of a consequence relation without holding globally. I look at this phenomenon in my preferred substructural logic, in which Weakening and Cut fail but which is supra-intuitionistic. I introduce object language operators that keep track of the admissibility of Weakening and of intuitionistic implications. I end with some ideas about local transitivity.
- A Nonmonotonic Modal Relevant Sequent Calculus.Shuhei Shimamura - 2017 - In Alexandru Baltag, Jeremy Seligman & Tomoyuki Yamada (eds.), Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI 2017, Sapporo, Japan). Springer. pp. 570-584.Motivated by semantic inferentialism and logical expressivism proposed by Robert Brandom, in this paper, I submit a nonmonotonic modal relevant sequent calculus equipped with special operators, □ and R. The base level of this calculus consists of two different types of atomic axioms: material and relevant. The material base contains, along with all the flat atomic sequents (e.g., Γ0, p |~0 p), some non-flat, defeasible atomic sequents (e.g., Γ0, p |~0 q); whereas the relevant base consists of the local region (...)$50.95 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark 1 citation
- A Nonmonotonic Sequent Calculus for Inferentialist Expressivists.Ulf Hlobil - 2016 - In Pavel Arazim & Michal Dančák (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2015. College Publications. pp. 87-105.I am presenting a sequent calculus that extends a nonmonotonic consequence relation over an atomic language to a logically complex language. The system is in line with two guiding philosophical ideas: (i) logical inferentialism and (ii) logical expressivism. The extension defined by the sequent rules is conservative. The conditional tracks the consequence relation and negation tracks incoherence. Besides the ordinary propositional connectives, the sequent calculus introduces a new kind of modal operator that marks implications that hold monotonically. Transitivity fails, but (...)$21.50 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct download (2 more)Export citation Bookmark 11 citations
- Discourse as practice: from Bourdieu to Brandom.Rodger Kibble - 2014 - Questions, Discourse and Dialogue: 20 Years After Making It Explicit, Proceedings of AISB50.This paper investigates Robert Brandom’s programme of logical expressivism and in the process attempts to clarify his use of the term practice, by means of a detailed comparison with the works of sociologist and anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu. It turns out that the two scholars have a number of concerns in common, including the means by which core practices can be amalgamated into more sophisticated ones, and the possibility of explicating practices without distorting them or generating incoherent codifications. We find some (...)
- Inferentialism: Why Rules Matter.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2014 - London and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.In this study two strands of inferentialism are brought together: the philosophical doctrine of Brandom, according to which meanings are generally inferential roles, and the logical doctrine prioritizing proof-theory over model theory and approaching meaning in logical, especially proof-theoretical terms.
- The Metaphysical Commitments of Logic.Thomas Brouwer - 2013 - Dissertation, University of LeedsThis thesis is about the metaphysics of logic. I argue against a view I refer to as ‘logical realism’. This is the view that the logical constants represent a particular kind of metaphysical structure, which I dub ‘logico-metaphysical structure’. I argue instead for a more metaphysically lightweight view of logic which I dub ‘logical expressivism’. -/- In the first part of this thesis (Chapters I and II) I argue against a number of arguments that Theodore Sider has given for logical (...)
- What is a Logical Diagram?Catherine Legg - 2013 - In Sun-Joo Shin & Amirouche Moktefi (eds.), Visual Reasoning with Diagrams. Springer. pp. 1-18.Robert Brandom’s expressivism argues that not all semantic content may be made fully explicit. This view connects in interesting ways with recent movements in philosophy of mathematics and logic (e.g. Brown, Shin, Giaquinto) to take diagrams seriously - as more than a mere “heuristic aid” to proof, but either proofs themselves, or irreducible components of such. However what exactly is a diagram in logic? Does this constitute a semiotic natural kind? The paper will argue that such a natural kind does (...)
- Dynamics, Brandom-style.Bernhard Nickel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):333-354.Abstract This paper discusses the semantic theory presented in Robert Brandom’s Making It Explicit . I argue that it is best understood as a special version of dynamic semantics, so that these semantics by themselves offer an interesting theoretical alternative to more standard truth-conditional theories. This reorientation also has implications for more foundational issues. I argue that it gives us the resources for a renewed argument for the normativity of meaning. The paper ends by critically assessing the view in both (...)
- Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism.Huw Price, Simon Blackburn, Robert Brandom, Paul Horwich & Michael Williams - 2013 - Burlington, VT: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Simon Blackburn, Robert Brandom, Paul Horwich & Michael Williams.Pragmatists have traditionally been enemies of representationalism but friends of naturalism, when naturalism is understood to pertain to human subjects, in the sense of Hume and Nietzsche. In this volume Huw Price presents his distinctive version of this traditional combination, as delivered in his René Descartes Lectures at Tilburg University in 2008. Price contrasts his view with other contemporary forms of philosophical naturalism, comparing it with other pragmatist and neo-pragmatist views such as those of Robert Brandom and Simon Blackburn. Linking (...)
- Expressivism and the Layer Cake Picture of Discursive Practice.David Lauer - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (1):55-73.Robert Brandom defends the intelligibility of the notion of a fully discursive practice that does not include any kind of logical vocabulary. Logical vocabulary, according to his account, should be understood as an optional extra to discursive practice, not as a necessary ingredient. Call this the Layer Cake Picture of the relation of logical to non-logical discursive practices. The aim pursued in this paper is to show, by way of an internal critique, that the Layer Cake Picture is in fact (...)
- Dialogue structure and logical expressivism.Paul Piwek - 2011 - Synthese 183 (S1):33-58.This paper aims to develop the implications of logical expressivism for a theory of dialogue coherence. I proceed in three steps. Firstly, certain structural properties of cooperative dialogue are identified. Secondly, I describe a variant of the multi-agent natural deduction calculus that I introduced in Piwek (J Logic Lang Inf 16(4):403–421, 2007 ) and demonstrate how it accounts for the aforementioned structures. Thirdly, I examine how the aforementioned system can be used to formalise an expressivist account of logical vocabulary that (...)
- Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism.Robert B. Brandom - 2008 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.Between Saying and Doing aims to reconcile pragmatism with analytic philosophy. It investigates the relations between the meaning of linguistic expressions and their use. Giving due weight both to what one has to do in order to count as saying various things and to what one needs to say in order to specify those doings, makes it possible to shed new light on the relations between semantics and pragmatics. Among the vocabularies whose interrelated use and meaning are considered are: logical, (...)
- Brandom’s Demarcation of Logic.John MacFarlane - 2008 - Philosophical Topics 36 (2):55-62.This is a lightly edited version of my comments on Brandom’s Lecture 2, as delivered in Prague at the “Prague Locke Lectures” in April, 2007. I try to say why Brandom’s proposed demarcation is significant, by placing it in a broader context of demarcation proposals from Kant to the twentieth century. I then raise some questions about the basic ingredients of Brandom’s demarcation—the notions of PP-sufficiency and VP-sufficiency—and question whether the vocabulary of conditionals, Brandom’s paradigm for logical vocabulary, can be (...)
- 3. Reason, Expression, and the Philosophic Enterprise.Robert Brandom - 2001 - In Anne Applebaum (ed.), What is Philosophy? Yale University Press. pp. 74-95.
- The logical structure of linguistic commitment III Brandomian scorekeeping and incompatibility.Mark Lance - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (5):439-464.Curiously, though he provides in Making It Explicit (MIE) elaborate accounts of various representational idioms, of anaphora and deixis, and of quantification, Robert Brandom nowhere attempts to lay out how his understanding of content and his view of the role of logical idioms combine in even the simplest cases of what he calls paradigmatic logical vocabulary. That is, Brandom has a philosophical account of content as updating potential - as inferential potential understood in the sense of commitment or entitlement preservation (...)
- Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism.Robert Brandom - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Robert B. Brandom is one of the most original philosophers of our day, whose book Making It Explicit covered and extended a vast range of topics in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language--the very core of analytic philosophy. This new work provides an approachable introduction to the complex system that Making It Explicit mapped out. A tour of the earlier book's large ideas and relevant details, Articulating Reasons offers an easy entry into two of the main themes of Brandom's work: (...)
- Articulating reasons: an introduction to inferentialism.Robert Brandom - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.This new work provides an approachable introduction to the complex system that Making It Explicit mapped out.
- Entity and Identity: And Other Essays.P. F. Strawson - 1997 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.This work gathers selected essays by the author in two areas of philosophy. The first 12 pieces concern the philosophy of language, and the volume is completed by four studies in Kantian metaphysics.
- Quantification, substitution, and conceptual content.Mark Lance - 1996 - Noûs 30 (4):481-507.
- The logical structure of linguistic commitment II: Systems of relevant commitment entailment. [REVIEW]Mark Lance & Philip Kremer - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (4):425 - 449.In "The Logical Structure of Linguistic Commitment I" (The Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (1994), 369-400), we sketch a linguistic theory (inspired by Brandom's Making it Explicit) which includes an "expressivist" account of the implication connective, →: the role of → is to "make explicit" the inferential proprieties among possible commitments which proprieties determine, in part, the significances of sentences. This motivates reading (A → B) as "commitment to A is, in part, commitment to B". Our project is to study (...)
- Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert Brandom - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.What would something unlike us--a chimpanzee, say, or a computer--have to be able to do to qualify as a possible knower, like us? To answer this question at the very heart of our sense of ourselves, philosophers have long focused on intentionality and have looked to language as a key to this condition. Making It Explicit is an investigation into the nature of language--the social practices that distinguish us as rational, logical creatures--that revises the very terms of this inquiry. Where (...)
- The logical structure of linguistic commitment I: Four systems of non-relevant commitment entailment. [REVIEW]Mark Norris Lance & Philip Kremer - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (4):369 - 400.
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