About this topic
Summary Logical Pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. What this claim amounts to depends on a specification both of what a logic is and of what it means for a logic to be correct. One of the strongest and most controversial varieties of logical pluralism is the claim that there is more than one correct account of logical consequence, that is, that multiple distinct logics correctly capture the logical consequence relation of natural language.
Key works The recent flurry of interest in strong forms of logical pluralism was initiated by Beall & Restall 2000, in which Beall and Restall argue that there is no single logical consequence relation in natural language, and so no single correct logic. Beall & Restall 2005 further develops the argument. Carnap 1937 argues for pluralism on linguistic grounds: for Carnap, the correctness of logic is relative to the choice of language, and there is no neutral standpoint from which the choice of language can be made. Shapiro 2006 and Cook 2002 independently argue that we should understand logic as a modelling tool: if this is right, then it is certainly possible that there could be two equally good and incommensurable models of the same unitary phenomena. Field 2009 argues that very few forms of logical pluralism are both interesting and true, and Priest 2005 defends logical monism: the view that there is just one correct logic.
Introductions Cook 2010 Russell 2013
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  1. added 2019-01-09
    Pluralizm logiczny a relatywizm w logice.Bożena Czernecka-Rej - 2018 - Diametros 56:51-68.
    The aim of the article is to analyze the situation of contemporary logic with reference to the issue concerning connections between the pluralism of logical systems and relativism in logic. Accordingly, I seek answers to the following questions: Can the plurality of logic, more specifically, a large number and variety of systems constructed by logicians, be justified in a rational way? Does pluralism in logic imply the thesis of relativism? Is logical relativism in the contemporary philosophy of logic just a (...)
  2. added 2018-10-11
    Skeptics and Unruly Connectives: A Defence of and Amendment to the Non-Factualist Justification of Logic.Oliver Oxton - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Waterloo
    This thesis attempts to positively solve three problems in the foundations of logic. If logical connectives are defined by their introduction and elimination rules, then how might one prohibit the construction of dysfunctional rules, i.e. rules which let us infer anything from anything else? How might one be held accountable to the consequences of those logical rules that they accept in an argument? And, how might one who, for whatever reason, doubts those logical rules regularly taken for granted, be convinced (...)
  3. added 2018-09-28
    Logical Nihilism: Could There Be No Logic?Gillian Russell - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):308-324.
    Logical monists and pluralists disagree about how many correct logics there are; the monists say there is just one, the pluralists that there are more. Could it turn out that both are wrong, and that there is no logic at all?
  4. added 2018-07-06
    Quantifier Variance Dissolved.Suki Finn & Otávio Bueno - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:289-307.
    Quantifier variance faces a number of difficulties. In this paper we first formulate the view as holding that the meanings of the quantifiers may vary, and that languages using different quantifiers may be charitably translated into each other. We then object to the view on the basis of four claims: (i) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning extensionally by changing the domain of quantification; (ii) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning intensionally without collapsing into logical pluralism; (iii) quantifier variance is not an (...)
  5. added 2018-07-05
    Logical Particularism.Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette - forthcoming - In Nathan Kellen, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen & Jeremy Wyatt (eds.), Pluralisms: Truth and Logic.
    Logics—that is to say logical systems—are generally conceived of as describing the logical forms of arguments as well as endorsing cer- tain principles or rules of inference specified in terms of these forms. From this perspective, a correct logic is a system which captures only (and perhaps all) of the correct principles, and good—i.e. logical— reasoning is reasoning which at the level of logical form conforms to the principles of a correct logic. In contrast, as logical particularists we reject the (...)
  6. added 2018-06-26
    Logical Pluralism and Logical Normativity.Florian Steinberger - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    This paper explores an apparent tension between two widely held views about logic: that logic is normative and that there are multiple equally legitimate logics. The tension is this. If logic is normative, it tells us something about how we ought to reason. If, as the pluralist would have it, there are several correct logics, those logics make incompatible recommendations as to how we ought to reason. But then which of these logics should we look to for normative guidance? I (...)
  7. added 2018-06-26
    Pluralism in Scientific Problem Solving. Why Inconsistency is No Big Deal.Diderik Batens - 2017 - Humana Mente 10 (32).
    Pluralism has many meanings. An assessment of the need for logical pluralism with respect to scientific knowledge requires insights in its domain of application. So first a specific form of epistemic pluralism will be defended. Knowledge turns out a patchwork of knowledge chunks. These serve descriptive as well as evaluative functions, may have competitors within the knowledge system, interact with each other, and display a characteristic dynamics caused by new information as well as by mutual readjustment. Logics play a role (...)
  8. added 2018-05-24
    Logic, Logical Form and the Disunity of Truth.Will Gamester - forthcoming - Analysis:anx165.
    Monists say that the nature of truth is invariant, whichever sentence you consider; pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between different sets of sentences. The orthodoxy is that logic and logical form favour monism: there must be a single property that is preserved in any valid inference; and any truth-functional complex must be true in the same way as its components. The orthodoxy, I argue, is mistaken. Logic and logical form impose only structural constraints on a metaphysics of (...)
  9. added 2018-05-24
    Logical Pluralism From a Pragmatic Perspective.Teresa Kouri Kissel - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):578-591.
    This paper presents a new view of logical pluralism. This pluralism takes into account how the logical connectives shift, depending on the context in which they occur. Using the Question-Under-Discussion Framework as formulated by Craige Roberts, I identify the contextual factor that is responsible for this shift. I then provide an account of the meanings of the logical connectives which can accommodate this factor. Finally, I suggest that this new pluralism has a certain Carnapian flavour. Questions about the meanings of (...)
  10. added 2018-05-24
    Logical Pluralism and Normativity.Teresa Kouri Kissel & Stewart Shapiro - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
    We are logical pluralists who hold that the right logic is dependent on the domain of investigation; different logics for different mathematical theories. The purpose of this article is to explore the ramifications for our pluralism concerning normativity. Is there any normative role for logic, once we give up its universality? We discuss Florian Steingerger’s “Frege and Carnap on the Normativity of Logic” as a source for possible types of normativity, and then turn to our own proposal, which postulates that (...)
  11. added 2018-05-24
    Logic Isn’T Normative.Gillian Russell - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    Some writers object to logical pluralism on the grounds that logic is normative. The rough idea is that the relation of logical consequence has consequences for what we ought to think and how we ought to reason, so that pluralism about the consequence relation would result in an incoherent or unattractive pluralism about those things. In this paper I argue that logic isn’t normative. I distinguish three different ways in which a theory – such as a logical theory – can (...)
  12. added 2018-05-24
    Varieties of Logic, by Stewart Shapiro.J. P. Studd - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):955-963.
    © Mind Association 2017Shapiro’s wide-ranging and thought-provoking book marks a major milestone in the recent debate initiated by JC Beall and Greg Restall’s influential Logical Pluralism. Pluralism about a given subject, such as etiquette or logic, is loosely characterized as ‘the view that different accounts of the subject are equally correct, or equally good, or equally legitimate, or perhaps even true’. Shapiro’s book offers us many ways to adopt ‘an eclectic orientation to logic’. But his official position, which sometimes takes (...)
  13. added 2018-05-24
    How to Water a Thousand Flowers. On the Logic of Logical Pluralism.Andrea Sereni & Maria Paola Sforza Fogliani - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    How many logics do logical pluralists adopt, or are allowed to adopt, or ought to adopt, in arguing for their view? These metatheoretical questions lurk behind much of the discussion on logical pluralism, and have a direct bearing on normative issues concerning the choice of a correct logic and the characterization of valid reasoning. Still, they commonly receive just swift answers – if any. Our aim is to tackle these questions head on, by clarifying the range of possibilities that logical (...)
  14. added 2018-05-24
    Normativity for Alethic-Logical Pluralists.Andy Demfree Yu - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
    Differences among scientific, mathematical, and ethical subject matters motivate a pluralism where distinct domains of subject matter are associated with distinct truth properties and logics. However, it is unclear how such pluralism might accommodate potentially attractive epistemic norms, such as that one ought to believe only what is true, and that one ought to believe what is logically true. In this paper, I show how such pluralism can accommodate such norms by supplementing the account developed in Yu (2017a,b) with epistemic, (...)
  15. added 2018-05-24
    A Guide to Logical Pluralism for Non-Logicians.Zach Weber - 2017 - Think 16 (47):93-114.
  16. added 2018-05-24
    Logical Pluralism, Indeterminacy and the Normativity of Logic.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    According to the form of logical pluralism elaborated by Beall and Restall there is more than one relation of logical consequence. Since they take the relation of logical consequence to reside at the very heart of a logical system, different relations of logical consequence yield different logics. In this paper, we are especially interested in understanding what are the consequences of endorsing Beall and Restall’s version of logical pluralism vis-à-vis the normative guidance that logic is taken to provide to reasoners. (...)
  17. added 2018-05-24
    The Football of Logic.Fabien Schang - 2017 - Studia Humana 6 (1):50-60.
    An analogy is made between two rather different domains, namely: logic, and football. Starting from a comparative table between the two activities, an alternative explanation of logic is given in terms of players, ball, goal, and the like. Our main thesis is that, just as the task of logic is preserving truth from premises to the conclusion, footballers strive to keep the ball as far as possible until the opposite goal. Assuming this analogy may help think about logic in the (...)
  18. added 2018-05-10
    Rumfitt on Truth-Grounds, Negation, and Vagueness.Richard Zach - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):2079-2089.
    In The Boundary Stones of Thought, Rumfitt defends classical logic against challenges from intuitionistic mathematics and vagueness, using a semantics of pre-topologies on possibilities, and a topological semantics on predicates, respectively. These semantics are suggestive but the characterizations of negation face difficulties that may undermine their usefulness in Rumfitt’s project.
  19. added 2018-01-17
    Logical Partisanhood.Jack Woods - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    A natural suggestion and increasingly popular account of how to revise our logical beliefs treats revision of logic analogously to the revision of any scientific theory (Hjortland, Priest, Russell, Williamson, etc.) I investigate this approach and argue that simple applications of abductive methodology to logic result in revision-cycles, developing a case study of an actual dispute with this property. This is problematic if we take abductive methodology to provide justification for revising our logical framework. I then generalize the case study, (...)
  20. added 2017-09-18
    A Constructionist Philosophy of Logic.Patrick Allo - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (3):545-564.
    This paper develops and refines the suggestion that logical systems are conceptual artefacts that are the outcome of a design-process by exploring how a constructionist epistemology and meta-philosophy can be integrated within the philosophy of logic.
  21. added 2017-09-08
    Frege and Carnap on the Normativity of Logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Synthese 194 (1):143-162.
    In this paper I examine the question of logic’s normative status in the light of Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance. I begin by contrasting Carnap’s conception of the normativity of logic with that of his teacher, Frege. I identify two core features of Frege’s position: first, the normative force of the logical laws is grounded in their descriptive adequacy; second, norms implied by logic are constitutive for thinking as such. While Carnap breaks with Frege’s absolutism about logic and hence with the (...)
  22. added 2017-09-08
    The Normative Status of Logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy.
  23. added 2017-09-08
    How Tolerant Can You Be? Carnap on Rationality.Florian Steinberger - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):645-668.
    In this paper I examine a neglected question concerning the centerpiece of Carnap's philosophy: the principle of tolerance. The principle of tolerance states that we are free to devise and adopt any well-defined form of language or linguistic framework we please. A linguistic framework defines framework-internal standards of correct reasoning that guide us in our first-order scientific pursuits. The choice of a linguistic framework, on the other hand, is an ‘external’ question to be settled on pragmatic grounds and so not (...)
  24. added 2017-07-26
    Radical Interpretation and Logical Pluralism.Piers Rawling - forthcoming - Topoi:1-13.
    I examine Quine’s and Davidson’s arguments to the effect that classical logic is the one and only correct logic. This conclusion is drawn from their views on radical translation and interpretation, respectively. I focus on the latter, but I first address, independently, Quine’s argument to the effect that the ‘deviant’ logician, who departs from classical logic, is merely changing the subject. Regarding logical pluralism, the question is whether there is more than one correct logic. I argue that bivalence may be (...)
  25. added 2017-07-25
    Translating Logical Terms.Stewart Shapiro - forthcoming - Topoi:1-13.
    The is an old question over whether there is a substantial disagreement between advocates of different logics, as they simply attach different meanings to the crucial logical terminology. The purpose of this article is to revisit this old question in light a pluralism/relativism that regards the various logics as equally legitimate, in their own contexts. We thereby address the vexed notion of translation, as it occurs between mathematical theories. We articulate and defend a thesis that the notion of “same meaning” (...)
  26. added 2017-07-25
    Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.
    Logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn’t a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position is most famously defended by Quine, but has more recent advocates in Maddy, Priest, Russell, and Williamson. Although these authors agree on many methodological issues about logic, (...)
  27. added 2017-07-25
    Making Sense of Logical Pluralism.Matti Eklund - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
    The article is centered on the question of how best to understand the logical pluralism/logical monism debate. A number of suggestions are brought up and rejected on the ground that they render the debate trivial or otherwise philosophically uninteresting. One way to make philosophical good sense of the debate is to find a canonical purpose for logic such that the monist is someone who holds that some unique logic best serves this purpose and the pluralist holds that many logics do. (...)
  28. added 2017-07-25
    A Proof-Theoretic Defence of Meaning-Invariant Logical Pluralism.Bogdan Dicher - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):727-757.
    In this paper I offer a proof-theoretic defence of meaning-invariant logical pluralism. I argue that there is a relation of co-determination between the operational and structural aspects of a logic. As a result, some features of the consequence relation are induced by the connectives. I propose that a connective is defined by those rules which are conservative and unique, while at the same time expressing only connective-induced structural information. This is the key to stabilizing the meaning of the connectives across (...)
  29. added 2017-07-25
    Argument Objectivity and Ontological/Logical Pluralism: Must Arguments Be Domain Sensitive?Rose Philip - unknown
    The idea of ontological/logical pluralism raises an interesting question about the objectivity of arguments and argument forms: Are all arguments and argument forms domain dependent? In his recent work Bruno Latour outlines a radical form of ontological pluralism in which each domain or “mode of existence” has its own set of “felicity conditions” that serve as “veridiction” conditions unique to that mode. To “speak well” requires that one speak in the “interpretive key” proper to each mode. Since there is no (...)
  30. added 2017-07-25
    Philosophical Problems of Foundations of Logic.Alexander S. Karpenko - 2014 - Studia Humana 3 (1):13-26.
    In the paper the following questions are discussed: What is logical consequence? What are logical constants? What is a logical system? What is logical pluralism? What is logic? In the conclusion, the main tendencies of development of modern logic are pointed out.
  31. added 2017-07-25
    Mathematical Pluralism.G. Priest - 2013 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 21 (1):4-13.
  32. added 2017-07-25
    Logical Pluralism.Gillian Russell - 2013 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  33. added 2017-07-25
    On the Pluralistic Conception of Logic.Zoltán Vecsey - 2010 - Radical Philosophy Review of Books 18 (1):1-16.
    Beall and Restall argue for a pluralistic conception of logic, which may be called Background Pluralism. In the first part of this paper, I outline the core tenets of Beall and Restall's position. In the second part I consider a particular line of criticism presented in Read and Priest. Finally, in the last part of the paper, I develop a new argument which is directed against the fundamental thesis of Beall and Restall's pluralistic theory. Since the argument attempts to show (...)
  34. added 2017-07-25
    Logical Pluralism Hollandaise.Graham Priest - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Logic 6:210-214.
    Johan van Benthem compares and contrasts two research programmes, which he calls logical pluralism and logical dynamics, stating his ‘preference’ for the second of these ‘alternatives’. In this note I want to put the matter into a slightly different perspective.
  35. added 2017-07-25
    Logical Pluralism, by J. C. Beall and Greg Restall.Richard Woodward - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):336-339.
  36. added 2017-07-25
    Logical Pluralism. [REVIEW]Marcin Tkaczyk - 2007 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 55 (1):316-319.
  37. added 2017-07-25
    Relativism Vs. Pluralism and Objectivism.Joseph Margolis - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21:95-106.
    Relativism may take a coherent and self-consistent form, by replacing a bivalent logic with a many-valued logic; “incongruent” propositions may then be valid, that is, propositions that on a bivalent model but not now would be or would yield contradictories. I reject “relationalism,” any relativism in accord with which “true” means “true-for-x”. I show how epistemic pluralism is an analogue of the “is”/“appears” distinction and presupposes a form of objectivism, however attenuated. By “objectivism” I understand the thesis that what obtains (...)
  38. added 2017-07-10
    Logical Pluralism and Logical Form.Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette - 2018 - Logique Et Analyse 61 (241):25-42.
    Disputes about logic are commonplace and undeniable. It is sometimes argued that these disputes are not genuine disagreements, but are rather merely verbal ones. Are advocates of different logics simply talking past each other? In this paper we argue that pluralists (and anyone who sees competing logics as genuine rivals), should reject the claim that real disagreement requires competing logics to assign the same meaning to logical connectives, or the same logical form to arguments. Along the way we argue that (...)
  39. added 2017-07-10
    Rivalry, Normativity, and the Collapse of Logical Pluralism.Erik Stei - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
    Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic. This very general characterization gives rise to a whole family of positions. I argue that not all of them are stable. The main argument in the paper is inspired by considerations known as the “collapse problem”, and it aims at the most popular form of logical pluralism advocated by JC Beall and Greg Restall. I argue that there is a more general argument available that challenges all variants (...)
  40. added 2017-06-23
    How Do Logics Explain?Nicole Wyatt & Gillman Payette - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):157-167.
    Anti-exceptionalists about logic maintain that it is continuous with the empirical sciences. Taking anti-exceptionalism for granted, we argue that traditional approaches to explanation are inadequate in the case of logic. We argue that Andrea Woody's functional analysis of explanation is a better fit with logical practice and accounts better for the explanatory role of logical theories.
  41. added 2017-05-12
    From Natural to Formal Language: A Case for Logical Pluralism.Pilar Terrés Villalonga - forthcoming - Topoi:1-13.
    I argue for a version of logical pluralism based on the plurality of legitimate formalizations of the logical vocabulary. In particular, I argue that the apparent rivalry between classical and relevant logic can be resolved, given that both logics capture and formalize normative and legitimate senses of logical consequence: classical logic encodes “follows from” as truth preservation and captures the truth conditions of the logical constants, while relevant logic encodes a notion of “follows from” which, apart from preserving truth, avoids (...)
  42. added 2017-04-10
    An Objection to Naturalism and Atheism From Logic.Christopher Gregory Weaver - forthcoming - In Graham Oppy (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Atheism and Philosophy. Blackwell Publishers.
    I proffer a success argument for classical logical consequence. I articulate in what sense that notion of consequence should be regarded as the privileged notion for metaphysical inquiry aimed at uncovering the fundamental nature of the world. Classical logic breeds necessitism. I use necessitism to produce problems for both ontological naturalism and atheism.
  43. added 2017-03-02
    7. Preserving Logical Structure.Gillman Payette - 2009 - In Raymond Jennings, Bryson Brown & Peter Schotch (eds.), On Preserving: Essays on Preservationism and Paraconsistent Logic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. pp. 105-144.
    In this paper Gillman Payette looks at various structural properties of the underlying logic X, and ascertains if these properties will hold of the forcing relation based on X. The structural properties are those that do not deal with particular connectives directly. These properties include the structural rules of inference, compactness, and compositionality among others. The presentation of the logic X is carried out in the style of algebraic logic; thus, a description of the resulting ‘forcing algebras’ is given. The (...)
  44. added 2017-03-02
    6. Preserving What?Peter Schotch & Gillman Payette - 2009 - In Raymond Jennings, Bryson Brown & Peter Schotch (eds.), On Preserving: Essays on Preservationism and Paraconsistent Logic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. pp. 85-104.
    In this essay Gillman Payette and Peter Schotch present an account of the key notions of level and forcing in much greater generality than has been managed in any of the early publications. In terms of this level of generality the hoary notion that correct inference is truth-preserving is carefully examined and found wanting. The authors suggest that consistency preservation is a far more natural approach, and one that can, furthermore, characterize an inference relation. But an examination of the usual (...)
  45. added 2017-02-08
    The Present Position of Logical Theory.John Dewey - 1891 - The Monist 2 (1):1-17.
  46. added 2017-02-03
    Pluralism Unconstrained.Steve Clarke - 1997 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (2):143 – 146.
    The problem of constraining methodological pluralism is highlighted in a discussion of John Dupr 's The Disorder of Things . Dupr requires limits on what are to count as legitimate scientific methodologies. Although Dupr recognises this requirement, he fails in his attempt to appropriately ground such limitations.
  47. added 2017-01-24
    Review: A. J. Ayer, Logical Positivism. [REVIEW]Alonzo Church - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (2):312-312.
  48. added 2017-01-24
    Review: P. H. Nowell-Smith, E. J. Lemmon, Escapism: The Logical Basis of Ethics. [REVIEW]Layman E. Allen - 1968 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (4):611-612.
  49. added 2017-01-24
    Review: Harry Ruja, The Logic of Logical Positivism. [REVIEW]C. H. Langford - 1936 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 1 (3):114-115.
  50. added 2017-01-21
    In Carnap’s Defense: A Survey on the Concept of a Linguistic Framework in Carnap’s Philosophy.Parzhad Torfehnezhad - 2016 - Abstracta 9 (1):03-30.
    The main task in this paper is to detail and investigate Carnap’s conception of a “linguistic framework”. On this basis, we will see whether Carnap’s dichotomies, such as the analytic-synthetic distinction, are to be construed as absolute/fundamental dichotomies or merely as relative dichotomies. I argue for a novel interpretation of Carnap’s conception of a LF and, on that basis, will show that, according to Carnap, all the dichotomies to be discussed are relative dichotomies; they depend on conventional decisions concerning the (...)
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