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  1. Tuples all the way down?Simon Hewitt - manuscript
    We can introduce singular terms for ordered pairs by means of an abstraction principle. Doing so proves useful for a number of projects in the philosophy of mathematics. However there is a question whether we can appeal to the abstraction principle in good faith, since a version of the Caesar Problem can be generated, posing the worry that abstraction fails to introduce expressions which refer determinately to the requisite sort of object. In this short paper I will pose the difficulty, (...)
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  2. Meaning, Presuppositions, Truth-relevance, Gödel's Sentence and the Liar Paradox.X. Y. Newberry - manuscript
    Section 1 reviews Strawson’s logic of presuppositions. Strawson’s justification is critiqued and a new justification proposed. Section 2 extends the logic of presuppositions to cases when the subject class is necessarily empty, such as (x)((Px & ~Px) → Qx) . The strong similarity of the resulting logic with Richard Diaz’s truth-relevant logic is pointed out. Section 3 further extends the logic of presuppositions to sentences with many variables, and a certain valuation is proposed. It is noted that, given this valuation, (...)
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  3. Logicism: A new look.John Burgess - manuscript
    Adapated from talks at the UCLA Logic Center and the Pitt Philosophy of Science Series. Exposition of material from Fixing Frege, Chapter 2 (on predicative versions of Frege’s system) and from “Protocol Sentences for Lite Logicism” (on a form of mathematical instrumentalism), suggesting a connection. Provisional version: references remain to be added. To appear in Mathematics, Modality, and Models: Selected Philosophical Papers, coming from Cambridge University Press.
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  4. The Primacy of the Universal Quantifier in Frege's Concept-Script.Joongol Kim - forthcoming - Dialectica.
    This paper presents three explanations of why Frege took the universal, rather than the existential, quantifier as primitive in his formalization of logic. The first two explanations provide technical reasons related to how Frege formalizes the logic of truth-functions and the logic of quantification. The third, philosophical explanation locates the reason in Frege's logicist goal of analyzing arithmetical concepts---especially the concepts of 0 and 1---in purely logical terms.
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  5. Frege meets Belnap: Basic Law V in a Relevant Logic.Shay Logan & Francesca Boccuni - forthcoming - In Andrew Tedder, Shawn Standefer & Igor Sedlar (eds.), New Directions in Relevant Logic. Springer. pp. 381-404.
    Abstractionism in the philosophy of mathematics aims at deriving large fragments of mathematics by combining abstraction principles (i.e. the abstract objects $\S e_1, \S e_2$, are identical if, and only if, an equivalence relation $Eq_\S$ holds between the entities $e_1, e_2$) with logic. Still, as highlighted in work on the semantics for relevant logics, there are different ways theories might be combined. In exactly what ways must logic and abstraction be combined in order to get interesting mathematics? In this paper, (...)
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  6. Neo-logicism and Conservativeness.Stephen Mackereth - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    Neo-logicists have claimed that Hume's Principle (HP) may be taken as a stipulative definition of cardinal number. This claim is threatened by the fact that HP is not conservative over pure second-order logic. I argue that the dominant neo-logicist response to the conservativeness objection is not satisfactory. Then I propose a novel version of neo-logicism, based on Heck's Two-sorted Hume's Principle (2HP), which does meet the conservativeness objection—provided that conservativeness is understood semantically and not deductively. I also argue that on (...)
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  7. Higher-Order Metaphysics in Frege and Russell.Kevin C. Klement - 2024 - In Peter Fritz & Nicholas K. Jones (eds.), Higher-Order Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 355-377.
    This chapter explores the metaphysical views about higher-order logic held by two individuals responsible for introducing it to philosophy: Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970). Frege understood a function at first as the remainder of the content of a proposition when one component was taken out or seen as replaceable by others, and later as a mapping between objects. His logic employed second-order quantifiers ranging over such functions, and he saw a deep division in nature between objects and functions. (...)
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  8. Frege’s Theory of Types.Bruno Bentzen - 2023 - Manuscrito 46 (4):2022-0063.
    It is often claimed that the theory of function levels proposed by Frege in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik anticipates the hierarchy of types that underlies Church’s simple theory of types. This claim roughly states that Frege presupposes a type of functions in the sense of simple type theory in the expository language of Grundgesetze. However, this view makes it hard to accommodate function names of two arguments and view functions as incomplete entities. I propose and defend an alternative interpretation of first-level (...)
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  9. Refocusing Frege’s Other Puzzle: A Response to Snyder, Samuels, and Shapiro.Thomas Hofweber - 2023 - Philosophia Mathematica 31 (2):216-235.
    In their recent article ‘Resolving Frege’s other Puzzle’ Eric Snyder, Richard Samuels, and Stewart Shapiro defend a semantic type-shifting solution to Frege’s other Puzzle and criticize my own cognitive type-shifting solution. In this article I respond to their criticism and in turn point to several problems with their preferred solution. In particular, I argue that they conflate semantic function and semantic value, and that their proposal is neither based on general semantic type-shifting principles nor adequate to the data.
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  10. Précis.Øystein Linnebo - 2023 - Theoria 89 (3):247-255.
    Thin Objects has two overarching ambitions. The first is to clarify and defend the idea that some objects are ‘thin’, in the sense that their existence does not make a substantive demand on reality. The second is to develop a systematic and well-motivated account of permissible abstraction, thereby solving the so-called ‘bad company problem’. Here I synthesise the book by briefly commenting on what I regard as its central themes.
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  11. Replies.Øystein Linnebo - 2023 - Theoria 89 (3):393-406.
    Thin Objects has two overarching ambitions. The first is to clarify and defend the idea that some objects are ‘thin’, in the sense that their existence does not make a substantive demand on reality. The second is to develop a systematic and well-motivated account of permissible abstraction, thereby solving the so-called ‘bad company problem’. Here I synthesise the book by briefly commenting on what I regard as its central themes.
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  12. Gödel Mathematics Versus Hilbert Mathematics. II Logicism and Hilbert Mathematics, the Identification of Logic and Set Theory, and Gödel’s 'Completeness Paper' (1930).Vasil Penchev - 2023 - Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics eJournal (Elsevier: SSRN) 15 (1):1-61.
    The previous Part I of the paper discusses the option of the Gödel incompleteness statement (1931: whether “Satz VI” or “Satz X”) to be an axiom due to the pair of the axiom of induction in arithmetic and the axiom of infinity in set theory after interpreting them as logical negations to each other. The present Part II considers the previous Gödel’s paper (1930) (and more precisely, the negation of “Satz VII”, or “the completeness theorem”) as a necessary condition for (...)
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  13. The Potential in Frege’s Theorem.Will Stafford - 2023 - Review of Symbolic Logic 16 (2):553-577.
    Is a logicist bound to the claim that as a matter of analytic truth there is an actual infinity of objects? If Hume’s Principle is analytic then in the standard setting the answer appears to be yes. Hodes’s work pointed to a way out by offering a modal picture in which only a potential infinity was posited. However, this project was abandoned due to apparent failures of cross-world predication. We re-explore this idea and discover that in the setting of the (...)
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  14. The Caesar Problem — A Piecemeal Solution.J. P. Studd - 2023 - Philosophia Mathematica 31 (2):236-267.
    The Caesar problem arises for abstractionist views, which seek to secure reference for terms such as ‘the number of Xs’ or #X by stipulating the content of ‘unmixed’ identity contexts like ‘#X = #Y’. Frege objects that this stipulation says nothing about ‘mixed’ contexts such as ‘# X = Julius Caesar’. This article defends a neglected response to the Caesar problem: the content of mixed contexts is just as open to stipulation as that of unmixed contexts.
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  15. A Logical Foundation for Potentialist Set Theory.Sharon Berry - 2022 - Cambridge University Press.
    In many ways set theory lies at the heart of modern mathematics, and it does powerful work both philosophical and mathematical – as a foundation for the subject. However, certain philosophical problems raise serious doubts about our acceptance of the axioms of set theory. In a detailed and original reassessment of these axioms, Sharon Berry uses a potentialist approach to develop a unified determinate conception of set-theoretic truth that vindicates many of our intuitive expectations regarding set theory. Berry further defends (...)
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  16. Frege's Theorem and Mathematical Cognition.Lieven Decock - 2022 - In Francesca Boccuni & Andrea Sereni (eds.), Origins and Varieties of Logicism: On the Logico-Philosophical Foundations of Logicism. New York: Routledge. pp. 372-394.
  17. Two-Sorted Frege Arithmetic is Not Conservative.Stephen Mackereth & Jeremy Avigad - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic 16 (4):1199-1232.
    Neo-Fregean logicists claim that Hume’s Principle (HP) may be taken as an implicit definition of cardinal number, true simply by fiat. A long-standing problem for neo-Fregean logicism is that HP is not deductively conservative over pure axiomatic second-order logic. This seems to preclude HP from being true by fiat. In this paper, we study Richard Kimberly Heck’s Two-Sorted Frege Arithmetic (2FA), a variation on HP which has been thought to be deductively conservative over second-order logic. We show that it isn’t. (...)
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  18. Origins and Varieties of Logicism. A Foundational Journey in the Philosophy of Mathematics.Andrea Sereni & Francesca Boccuni (eds.) - 2021
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  19. From Phenomenology to the Philosophy of the Concept: Jean Cavaillès as a Reader of Edmund Husserl.Jean-Paul Cauvin - 2020 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 10 (1):24-47.
    The article reconstructs Jean Cavaillès’s polemical engagement with Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy of mathematics. I argue that Cavaillès’s encounter with Husserl clarifies the scope and ambition of Cavaillès’s philosophy of the concept by identifying three interrelated epistemological problems in Husserl’s phenomenological method: (1) Cavaillès claims that Husserl denies a proper content to mathematics by reducing mathematics to logic. (2) This reduction obliges Husserl, in turn, to mischaracterize the significance of the history of mathematics for the philosophy of mathematics. (3) Finally, (...)
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  20. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Dictating Philosophy To Francis Skinner: The Wittgenstein-Skinner Manuscripts. Transcribed and edited, with an Introduction, Introductory Chapters and Notes by Arthur Gibson.Arthur Gibson & Niamh O'Mahony (eds.) - 2020 - Berlin, Germany: Springer.
    This book publishes the previously unpublished Wittgenstein-Skinner Archive held in Trinity College Cambridge Wren Library. The principal Editor is Arthur Gibson, joined by the Editor Niamh O'Mahony in the editing project. The manuscripts were transcribed by Arthur Gibson, checked and edited by Niamh O'Mahony and Arthur Gibson, with additional assistance from Kelsey Gibson. The Chapters that reproduce the Archive, including the Preface, and Part I (chapters 1 and 2) are authored by Arthur Gibson. Arthur Gibson and Niamh O'Mahony jointly edited (...)
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  21. All science as rigorous science: the principle of constructive mathematizability of any theory.Vasil Penchev - 2020 - Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics eJournal 12 (12):1-15.
    A principle, according to which any scientific theory can be mathematized, is investigated. Social science, liberal arts, history, and philosophy are meant first of all. That kind of theory is presupposed to be a consistent text, which can be exhaustedly represented by a certain mathematical structure constructively. In thus used, the term “theory” includes all hypotheses as yet unconfirmed as already rejected. The investigation of the sketch of a possible proof of the principle demonstrates that it should be accepted rather (...)
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  22. Universal Logic in terms of Quantum Information.Vasil Penchev - 2020 - Metaphilosophy eJournal (Elsevier: SSRN) 12 (9):1-5.
    Any logic is represented as a certain collection of well-orderings admitting or not some algebraic structure such as a generalized lattice. Then universal logic should refer to the class of all subclasses of all well-orderings. One can construct a mapping between Hilbert space and the class of all logics. Thus there exists a correspondence between universal logic and the world if the latter is considered a collection of wave functions, as which the points in Hilbert space can be interpreted. The (...)
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  23. Neo-Logicism and Its Logic.Panu Raatikainen - 2020 - History and Philosophy of Logic 41 (1):82-95.
    The rather unrestrained use of second-order logic in the neo-logicist program is critically examined. It is argued in some detail that it brings with it genuine set-theoretical existence assumptions and that the mathematical power that Hume’s Principle seems to provide, in the derivation of Frege’s Theorem, comes largely from the ‘logic’ assumed rather than from Hume’s Principle. It is shown that Hume’s Principle is in reality not stronger than the very weak Robinson Arithmetic Q. Consequently, only a few rudimentary facts (...)
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  24. Frege on Referentiality and Julius Caesar in Grundgesetze Section 10.Bruno Bentzen - 2019 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 60 (4):617-637.
    This paper aims to answer the question of whether or not Frege's solution limited to value-ranges and truth-values proposed to resolve the "problem of indeterminacy of reference" in section 10 of Grundgesetze is a violation of his principle of complete determination, which states that a predicate must be defined to apply for all objects in general. Closely related to this doubt is the common allegation that Frege was unable to solve a persistent version of the Caesar problem for value-ranges. It (...)
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  25. "Cała matematyka to właściwie geometria". Poglądy Gottloba Fregego na podstawy matematyki po upadku logicyzmu.Krystian Bogucki - 2019 - Hybris. Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny 44:1 - 20.
    Gottlob Frege abandoned his logicist program after Bertrand Russell had discovered that some assumptions of Frege’s system lead to contradiction (so called Russell’s paradox). Nevertheless, he proposed a new attempt for the foundations of mathematics in two last years of his life. According to this new program, the whole of mathematics is based on the geometrical source of knowledge. By the geometrical source of cognition Frege meant intuition which is the source of an infinite number of objects in arithmetic. In (...)
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  26. Essays on Frege's Basic Laws of Arithmetic.Philip A. Ebert & Marcus Rossberg (eds.) - 2019 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The volume is the first collection of essays that focuses on Gottlob Frege's Basic Laws of Arithmetic (1893/1903), highlighting both the technical and the philosophical richness of Frege's magnum opus. It brings together twenty-two renowned Frege scholars whose contributions discuss a wide range of topics arising from both volumes of Basic Laws of Arithmetic. The original chapters in this volume make vivid the importance and originality of Frege's masterpiece, not just for Frege scholars but for the study of the history (...)
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  27. The Enhanced Indispensability Argument, the circularity problem, and the interpretability strategy.Jan Heylen & Lars Arthur Tump - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3033-3045.
    Within the context of the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument, one discussion about the status of mathematics is concerned with the ‘Enhanced Indispensability Argument’, which makes explicit in what way mathematics is supposed to be indispensable in science, namely explanatory. If there are genuine mathematical explanations of empirical phenomena, an argument for mathematical platonism could be extracted by using inference to the best explanation. The best explanation of the primeness of the life cycles of Periodical Cicadas is genuinely mathematical, according to Baker (...)
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  28. Hale’s argument from transitive counting.Eric Snyder, Richard Samuels & Stewart Shaprio - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):1905-1933.
    A core commitment of Bob Hale and Crispin Wright’s neologicism is their invocation of Frege’s Constraint—roughly, the requirement that the core empirical applications for a class of numbers be “built directly into” their formal characterization. According to these neologicists, if legitimate, Frege’s Constraint adjudicates in favor of their preferred foundation—Hume’s Principle—and against alternatives, such as the Dedekind–Peano axioms. In this paper, we consider a recent argument for legitimating Frege’s Constraint due to Hale, according to which the primary empirical application of (...)
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  29. Neologicism for Real – Are We There Yet?Rafal Urbaniak - 2019 - In Bartłomiej Skowron (ed.), Contemporary Polish Ontology. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 181-204.
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  30. Cardinality and Acceptable Abstraction.Roy T. Cook & Øystein Linnebo - 2018 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 59 (1):61-74.
    It is widely thought that the acceptability of an abstraction principle is a feature of the cardinalities at which it is satisfiable. This view is called into question by a recent observation by Richard Heck. We show that a fix proposed by Heck fails but we analyze the interesting idea on which it is based, namely that an acceptable abstraction has to “generate” the objects that it requires. We also correct and complete the classification of proposed criteria for acceptable abstraction.
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  31. Russell's Logicism.Kevin C. Klement - 2018 - In Russell Wahl (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Bertrand Russell. London, UK: BloomsburyAcademic. pp. 151-178.
    Bertrand Russell was one of the best-known proponents of logicism: the theory that mathematics reduces to, or is an extension of, logic. Russell argued for this thesis in his 1903 The Principles of Mathematics and attempted to demonstrate it formally in Principia Mathematica (PM 1910–1913; with A. N. Whitehead). Russell later described his work as a further “regressive” step in understanding the foundations of mathematics made possible by the late 19th century “arithmetization” of mathematics and Frege’s logical definitions of arithmetical (...)
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  32. Thin Objects: An Abstractionist Account.Øystein Linnebo - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Are there objects that are “thin” in the sense that their existence does not make a substantial demand on the world? Frege famously thought so. He claimed that the equinumerosity of the knives and the forks suffices for there to be objects such as the number of knives and the number of forks, and for these objects to be identical. The idea of thin objects holds great philosophical promise but has proved hard to explicate. This book attempts to develop the (...)
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  33. Cardinals, Ordinals, and the Prospects for a Fregean Foundation.Eric Snyder, Stewart Shapiro & Richard Samuels - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:77-107.
    There are multiple formal characterizations of the natural numbers available. Despite being inter-derivable, they plausibly codify different possible applications of the naturals – doing basic arithmetic, counting, and ordering – as well as different philosophical conceptions of those numbers: structuralist, cardinal, and ordinal. Some influential philosophers of mathematics have argued for a non-egalitarian attitude according to which one of those characterizations is ‘more basic’ or ‘more fundamental’ than the others. This paper addresses two related issues. First, we review some of (...)
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  34. Introduction to Special Issue: Abstraction Principles.Salvatore Florio - 2017 - Philosophia Mathematica 25 (1):1-2.
    Introduction to a special issue on abstraction principles.
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  35. What Russell Should Have Said to Burali–Forti.Salvatore Florio & Graham Leach-Krouse - 2017 - Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (4):682-718.
    The paradox that appears under Burali-Forti’s name in many textbooks of set theory is a clever piece of reasoning leading to an unproblematic theorem. The theorem asserts that the ordinals do not form a set. For such a set would be—absurdly—an ordinal greater than any ordinal in the set of all ordinals. In this article, we argue that the paradox of Burali-Forti is first and foremost a problem about concept formation by abstraction, not about sets. We contend, furthermore, that some (...)
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  36. Dimension‐Based Statistical Learning Affects Both Speech Perception and Production.Matthew Lehet & Lori L. Holt - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S4):885-912.
    Multiple acoustic dimensions signal speech categories. However, dimensions vary in their informativeness; some are more diagnostic of category membership than others. Speech categorization reflects these dimensional regularities such that diagnostic dimensions carry more “perceptual weight” and more effectively signal category membership to native listeners. Yet perceptual weights are malleable. When short-term experience deviates from long-term language norms, such as in a foreign accent, the perceptual weight of acoustic dimensions in signaling speech category membership rapidly adjusts. The present study investigated whether (...)
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  37. Russell’s method of analysis and the axioms of mathematics.Lydia Patton - 2017 - In Sandra Lapointe Christopher Pincock (ed.), Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy. London: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 105-126.
    In the early 1900s, Russell began to recognize that he, and many other mathematicians, had been using assertions like the Axiom of Choice implicitly, and without explicitly proving them. In working with the Axioms of Choice, Infinity, and Reducibility, and his and Whitehead’s Multiplicative Axiom, Russell came to take the position that some axioms are necessary to recovering certain results of mathematics, but may not be proven to be true absolutely. The essay traces historical roots of, and motivations for, Russell’s (...)
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  38. Later Wittgenstein on the Logicist Definition of Number.Sorin Bangu - 2016 - In Sorin Costreie (ed.), Early Analytic Philosophy – New Perspectives on the Tradition. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag. pp. 233-257.
    The paper focuses on the lectures on the philosophy of mathematics delivered by Wittgenstein in Cambridge in 1939. Only a relatively small number of lectures are discussed, the emphasis falling on understanding Wittgenstein’s views on the most important element of the logicist legacy of Frege and Russell, the definition of number in terms of classes—and, more specifically, by employing the notion of one-to-one correspondence. Since it is clear that Wittgenstein was not satisfied with this definition, the aim of the essay (...)
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  39. The Breadth of the Paradox.Patricia Blanchette - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (1):30-49.
    This essay examines Frege's reaction to Russell's Paradox and his views about the grounding of existence claims in mathematics. It is argued that Frege's strict requirements on existential proofs would rule out the attempt to ground arithmetic in. It is hoped that this discussion will help to clarify the ways in which Frege's position is both coherent and significantly different from the neo-logicist position on the issues of: what's required for proofs of existence; the connection between models, consistency, and existence; (...)
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  40. A Framework for Implicit Definitions and the A priori.Philip A. Ebert - 2016 - In Philip A. Ebert & Marcus Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism: Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 133--160.
  41. Hale and Wright on the Metaontology of Neo-Fregeanism.Matti Eklund - 2016 - In Philip A. Ebert & Marcus Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism: Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
  42. NeoFregean Metaontology.Fraser MacBride - 2016 - In Philip A. Ebert & Marcus Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism: Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 94-112.
    According to neo-Fregeans, an expression that is syntactically singular and figures in a true sentence is guaranteed to have some existing thing in the world to pick out. But this approach is confronted by a dilemma. If reality is crystalline, has a structure fixed independently of language, then the view that reality is guaranteed to contain a sufficient plenitude of objects to supply referents for the relevant expressions is left hostage to cosmological fortune. Whereas if reality is plastic then it (...)
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  43. Hume's Principle and entitlement: on the epistemology of the neo-Fregean programme.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2016 - In Philip A. Ebert & Marcus Rossberg (eds.), Abstractionism: Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
  44. A Vindication of Logicism.Peter Roeper - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (3):360-378.
    Frege regarded Hume's Principle as insufficient for a logicist account of arithmetic, as it does not identify the numbers; it does not tell us which objects the numbers are. His solution, generally regarded as a failure, was to propose certain sets as the referents of numerical terms. I suggest instead that numbers are properties of pluralities, where these properties are treated as objects. Given this identification, the truth-conditions of the statements of arithmetic can be obtained from logical principles with the (...)
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  45. Abstraction Reconceived.J. P. Studd - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (2):579-615.
    Neologicists have sought to ground mathematical knowledge in abstraction. One especially obstinate problem for this account is the bad company problem. The leading neologicist strategy for resolving this problem is to attempt to sift the good abstraction principles from the bad. This response faces a dilemma: the system of ‘good’ abstraction principles either falls foul of the Scylla of inconsistency or the Charybdis of being unable to recover a modest portion of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with its intended generality. This article (...)
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  46. The Strength of Abstraction with Predicative Comprehension.Sean Walsh - 2016 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 22 (1):105–120.
    Frege's theorem says that second-order Peano arithmetic is interpretable in Hume's Principle and full impredicative comprehension. Hume's Principle is one example of an abstraction principle, while another paradigmatic example is Basic Law V from Frege's Grundgesetze. In this paper we study the strength of abstraction principles in the presence of predicative restrictions on the comprehension schema, and in particular we study a predicative Fregean theory which contains all the abstraction principles whose underlying equivalence relations can be proven to be equivalence (...)
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  47. William Demopoulos logicism and its philosophical legacy.Bob Hale - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):459-463.
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  48. A Logical Foundation of Arithmetic.Joongol Kim - 2015 - Studia Logica 103 (1):113-144.
    The aim of this paper is to shed new light on the logical roots of arithmetic by presenting a logical framework that takes seriously ordinary locutions like ‘at least n Fs’, ‘n more Fs than Gs’ and ‘n times as many Fs as Gs’, instead of paraphrasing them away in terms of expressions of the form ‘the number of Fs’. It will be shown that the basic concepts of arithmetic can be intuitively defined in the language of ALA, and the (...)
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  49. Dedekind's Logicism.Ansten Mørch Klev - 2015 - Philosophia Mathematica:nkv027.
    A detailed argument is provided for the thesis that Dedekind was a logicist about arithmetic. The rules of inference employed in Dedekind's construction of arithmetic are, by his lights, all purely logical in character, and the definitions are all explicit; even the definition of the natural numbers as the abstract type of simply infinite systems can be seen to be explicit. The primitive concepts of the construction are logical in their being intrinsically tied to the functioning of the understanding.
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  50. Dedekind's Logicism†.Ansten Mørch Klev - 2015 - Philosophia Mathematica 25 (3):341-368.
    A detailed argument is provided for the thesis that Dedekind was a logicist about arithmetic. The rules of inference employed in Dedekind's construction of arithmetic are, by his lights, all purely logical in character, and the definitions are all explicit; even the definition of the natural numbers as the abstract type of simply infinite systems can be seen to be explicit. The primitive concepts of the construction are logical in their being intrinsically tied to the functioning of the understanding.
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