Related categories

63 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 63
  1. The Many Faces of Closure and Introspection.Patrick Allo - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):91-124.
    In this paper I present a more refined analysis of the principles of deductive closure and positive introspection. This analysis uses the expressive resources of logics for different types of group knowledge, and discriminates between aspects of closure and computation that are often conflated. The resulting model also yields a more fine-grained distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, and places Hintikka’s original argument for positive introspection in a new perspective.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2. Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument.Anthony Brueckner - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):285-293.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  3. Luminosity Guaranteed.Wolfgang Barz - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly: early view.
    This article aims to show that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument does not succeed if we presuppose a constitutive connection between the phenomenal and the doxastic. In contrast to other luminists, however, my strategy is not to critically focus on the refined safety condition in terms of degrees of confidence that anti-luminists typically use in this context. Instead, I will argue that, given a certain conception of what Chalmers calls ‘direct phenomenal concepts,’ luminosity is guaranteed even if the refined safety condition in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Luminosity Regained.Selim Berker - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8 (2):1-22.
    The linchpin of Williamson (2000)'s radically externalist epistemological program is an argument for the claim that no non-trivial condition is luminous—that no non-trivial condition is such that whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know that it obtains. I argue that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument succeeds only if one assumes that, even in the limit of ideal reflection, the obtaining of the condition in question and one's beliefs about that condition can be radically disjoint from one another. However, no (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  5. On Williamson's Argument for (Ii) in His Anti-Luminosity Argument.Thomas A. Blackson - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):397-405.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  6. Inexact Knowledge with Introspection.Denis Bonnay & Paul Égré - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2):179-227.
    This paper supersedes an ealier version, entitled "A Non-Standard Semantics for Inexact Knowledge with Introspection", which appeared in the Proceedings of "Rationality and Knowledge". The definition of token semantics, in particular, has been modified, both for the single- and the multi-agent case.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  7. Margins for Error in Context.Denis Bonnay & Paul Egré - 2008 - In G. Carpintero & M. Koelbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 103--107.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  8. How to Moore a Gettier: Notes on the Dark Side of Knowledge.Rodrigo Borges - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (2):133-140.
    The Gettier Problem and Moore’s Paradox are related in a way that is unappreciated by philosophers. If one is in a Gettier situation, then one is also in a Moorean situation. The fact that S is in a Gettier situation (the fact that S is “Gettiered”), like the fact that S is in a Moorean situation (the fact that S is “Moored”), cannot (in the logical sense of “cannot”) be known by S while S is in that situation. The paper (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Williamson on Luminosity and Contextualism.Jessica Brown - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):319–327.
    According to contextualism, the truth-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on features of the attributor's context. Contextualists take their view to be supported by cases in which the intuitive correctness of knowledge attributions depends on the attributor's context. Williamson offers a complex invariantist account of such cases which appeals to two elements, psychological bias and a failure of luminosity. He provides independent reasons for thinking that contextualist cases are characterized by psychological bias and a failure of luminosity, and argues that some (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument.Anthony Brueckner & M. Oreste Fiocco - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):285–293.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  11. On the Margin Irving Howe Reconsidered.William M. Chace - 2008 - Common Knowledge 14 (2):270-277.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. The Concept of Self-Luminosity of Knowledge in Advaita Vedānta.Girdhari Lal Chaturvedi - 1982 - Adarsha Prakashan.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Luminosity, Reliability, and the Sorites.Stewart Cohen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):718-730.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  14. The Comforts of Home.Earl Conee - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):444–451.
    The paper argues against Timothy Williamson's anti-luminosity argument. It also offers an argument against luminosity from the possibility of defeat of introspective justification.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  15. Transparency and the KK Principle.Nilanjan Das & Bernhard Salow - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2).
    An important question in epistemology is whether the KK principle is true, i.e., whether an agent who knows that p is also thereby in a position to know that she knows that p. We explain how a “transparency” account of self-knowledge, which maintains that we learn about our attitudes towards a proposition by reflecting not on ourselves but rather on that very proposition, supports an affirmative answer. In particular, we show that such an account allows us to reconcile a version (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. What Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument Really Is.Carmelo di Primo, Gaston H. U. I. Bon Hoa, Pierre Douzou & Stephen Sligar - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Margin for Error and the Transparency of Knowledge.Jérôme Dokic & Paul Égré - 2008 - Synthese 166 (1):1-20.
    In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, T. Williamson formulates an argument against the principle (KK) of epistemic transparency, or luminosity of knowledge, namely “that if one knows something, then one knows that one knows it”. Williamson’s argument proceeds by reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, he shows that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of principle (KK) and additional epistemic principles that he claims are better grounded. One of them is a reflective (...)
    No categories
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  18. Inexact Knowledge, Margin for Error and Positive Introspection.Julien Dutant - 2007 - Proceedings of Tark XI.
    Williamson (2000a) has argued that posi- tive introspection is incompatible with in- exact knowledge. His argument relies on a margin-for-error requirement for inexact knowledge based on a intuitive safety prin- ciple for knowledge, but leads to the counter- intuitive conclusion that no possible creature could have both inexact knowledge and posi- tive introspection. Following Halpern (2004) I put forward an alternative margin-for-error requirement that preserves the safety require- ment while blocking Williamson’s argument. I argue that the infallibilist conception of knowledge (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19. Reliability, Margin for Error, and Self-Knowledge.Paul Egré - 2006 - In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 215--250.
    Forthcoming in D.H. Pritchard & V. Hendricks, New Waves in Epistemology,.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  20. Reliability, Margin for Error and Self-Knowledge.Paul Egré - unknown
    Forthcoming in D.H. Pritchard & V. Hendricks, New Waves in Epistemology,.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Luminous Enough for a Cognitive Home.Richard Fumerton - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):67 - 76.
    In this paper I argue that there is no viable alternative to construing our knowledge and justified belief as resting on a foundation restricted to truths about our internal states. Against Williamson and others I defend the claim that the internal life of a cognizer really does constitute a special sort of cognitive home that is importantly different from the rest of what we think we know and justifiably believe.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  22. Vagueness and Margin for Error Principles.Mario Gómez-Torrente - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):107-125.
    Timothy Williamson’s potentially most important contribution to epistemicism about vagueness lies in his arguments for the basic epistemicist claim that the alleged cut-off points of vague predicates are not knowable. His arguments for this are based on so-called ‘margin for error principles’. This paper argues that these principles fail to provide a good argument for the basic claim. Williamson has offered at least two kinds of margin for error principles applicable to vague predicates. A certain fallacy of equivocation seems to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  23. An Anti-Epistemicist Consequence of Margin for Error Semantics for Knowledge.Delia Graff Fara - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):127-142.
    Let us say that the proposition that p is transparent just in case it is known that p, and it is known that it is known that p, and it is known that it is known that it is known that p, and so on, for any number of iterations of the knowledge operator ‘it is known that’. If there are transparent propositions at all, then the claim that any man with zero hairs is bald seems like a good candidate. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  24. Discrimination and Self-Knowledge.Patrick Greenough - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper I show that a variety of Cartesian Conceptions of the mental are unworkable. In particular, I offer a much weaker conception of limited discrimination than the one advanced by Williamson (2000) and show that this weaker conception, together with some plausible background assumptions, is not only able to undermine the claim that our core mental states are luminous (roughly: if one is in such a state then one is in a position to know that one is) but (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  25. The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence. By David Walsh.T. Remington Harkness - 2011 - Heythrop Journal 52 (1):153-154.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. The Milieu: A Chart of Our Margin of Play.Matti Itkonen - 2002 - In Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), The Visible and the Invisible in the Interplay Between Philosophy, Literature, and Reality. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 139--155.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Williamson on Inexact Knowledge.Anna Mahtani - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):171 - 180.
    Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson’s argument for margin for error principles does not go through. The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson’s account of inexact knowledge is not compelling.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Skeptics Without Borders.Kevin Meeker & Ted Poston - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (3):223.
    Timothy Williamson’s anti luminosity argument has received considerable attention. Escaping unnoticed, though, is a strikingly similar argument from David Hume. This paper highlights some of the arresting parallels between Williamson’s reasoning and Hume’s that will allow us to appreciate more deeply the plausibility of Williamson’s reasoning and to understand how, following Hume, we can extend this reasoning to undermine the “luminosity” of simple necessary truths. More broadly the parallels help us to identify a common skeptical predicament underlying both arguments, which (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  29. Williamson and the Argument From Luminosity.P. X. Monaghan - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (3-4):619-.
    ABSTRACT: Many of the results of Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits depend upon his argument that many, if not all, of our mental states fail to be luminous in the sense that if we are in them, then we are in a position to know that we are in them. The purpose of this article is to show that his argument is unsound. I conclude by distinguishing between partial and total luminosity, and by arguing that even if mental states (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge.Ram Neta & Guy Rohrbaugh - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406.
    In his recent Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that no non-trivial mental state is such that being in that state suffices for one to be in a position to know that one is in it. In short, there are no “luminous” mental states. His argument depends on a “safety” requirement on knowledge, that one’s confident belief could not easily have been wrong if it is to count as knowledge. We argue that the safety requirement is ambiguous; on one (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   55 citations  
  31. Locke on Particles: A Reply to Berman and Williamson.Gabriel Nuchelmans - 1988 - Logique Et Analyse 31 (23):217.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Review of David Walsh, The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence[REVIEW]David S. Pacini - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (9).
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Williamson on Knowledge.Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Eighteen leading philosophers offer critical assessments of Timothy Williamson's ground-breaking work on knowledge and its impact on philosophy today. They discuss epistemological issues concerning evidence, defeasibility, scepticism, testimony, assertion, and perception, and debate Williamson's central claim that knowledge is a mental state.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   27 citations  
  34. Into the Margin!Michèle Pujol - 1995 - In Edith Kuiper & Jolande Sap (eds.), Out of the Margin: Feminist Perspectives on Economics. Routledge. pp. 17--34.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. 2 Into the Margin!Michèle A. Pujol - 2003 - In Drucilla K. Barker & Edith Kuiper (eds.), Toward a Feminist Philosophy of Economics. Routledge. pp. 21.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Anti-Luminosity.Murali Ramachandran - manuscript
    Timothy Williamson (2000) reckons that hardly any mental state is luminous, i.e. is such that if one were in it, then one would invariably be in a position to know that one was. This paper examines an argument he presents against the luminosity of feeling cold, which he claims generalizes to other phenomenal states, such as e.g. being in pain. As we shall see, the argument fails. However, our deliberations do yield two anti-luminosity results: a simple refutation of the claim (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Anti-Luminosity: Four Unsuccessful Strategies.Murali Ramachandran - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):659-673.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  38. Williamson’s Argument Against the KK-Principle 157.Murali Ramachandran - 2005 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 1.
    Timothy Williamson (2000 ch. 5) presents a reductio against the luminosity of knowing, against, that is, the so-called KK-principle: if one knows p, then one knows (or is at least in a position to know) that one knows p.1 I do not endorse the principle, but I do not think Williamson’s argument succeeds in refuting it. My aim here is to show that the KK-principle is not the most obvious culprit behind the contradiction Williamson derives.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Shelter for the Cognitively Homeless.Baron Reed - 2006 - Synthese 148 (2):303-308.
    One of the main strands of the Cartesian tradition is the view that the mental realm is cognitively accessible to us in a special way: whenever one is in a mental state of a certain sort, one can know it just by considering the matter. In that sense, the mental realm is thought to be a cognitive home for us, and the mental states it comprises are luminous. Recently, however, Timothy Williamson has argued that we are cognitively homeless: no mental (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. On an Argument of Williamson's.M. Richard - 2000 - Analysis 60 (2):213-217.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  41. On an Argument of Williamson's.Mark Richard - 2000 - Analysis 60 (266):213–217.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  42. The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments.Bernhard Salow - forthcoming - Mind:fzw029.
    Suppose you’d like to believe that p, whether or not it’s true. What can you do to help? A natural initial thought is that you could engage in Intentionally Biased Inquiry : you could look into whether p, but do so in a way that you expect to predominantly yield evidence in favour of p. This paper hopes to do two things. The first is to argue that this initial thought is mistaken: intentionally biased inquiry is impossible. The second is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Community at the Margin.Crispin Sartwell - 2002 - In Philip Alperson (ed.), Diversity and Community: An Interdisciplinary Reader. Blackwell. pp. 47--57.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Mr. Magoo's Mistake.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):289 - 306.
    Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the (KK) principle (roughly, that if one knows that p, then one knows that one knows that p) should be rejected. We analyze Williamson’s argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly stated this premise no longer supports the argument against (KK). After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge from prior knowledge (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
    Questions about the transparency of evidence are central to debates between factive and non-factive versions of mentalism about evidence. If all evidence is transparent, then factive mentalism is false, since no factive mental states are transparent. However, Timothy Williamson has argued that transparency is a myth and that no conditions are transparent except trivial ones. This paper responds by drawing a distinction between doxastic and epistemic notions of transparency. Williamson's argument may show that no conditions are doxastically transparent, but it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  46. Knowledge Beyond the Margin for Error.R. A. Sorensen - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):717-722.
    Epistemicists say there is a last positive instance in a sorites sequence-we just cannot know which is the last. Timothy Williamson explains that knowledge requires a margin for error and this ensures that the last heap will not be knowable as a heap. However, there is a class of disjunctive predicates for which knowledge at the thresholds is possible. They generate sorites paradoxes that cannot be diagnosed with the margin for error principle.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Margin for Error Semantics and Signal Perception.David Spector - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3247-3263.
    A joint modelling of objective worlds and subjective perceptions within two-dimensional semantics eliminates the margin for error principle and solves the epistemic sorites paradox. Two objective knowledge modalities can be defined in two-dimensional frames accounting for subjective perceptions: “necessary knowledge” (NK) and “possible knowledge” (PK), the latter being better suited to the interpretation of knowledge utterances. Two-dimensional semantics can in some cases be reduced to one-dimensional ones, by defining accessibility relations between objective worlds that reflect subjective perceptions: NK and PK (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Are We Luminous?Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):294-319.
    Since its appearance over a decade ago, Timothy Williamson's anti-luminosity argument has come under sustained attack. Defenders of the luminous overwhelmingly object to the argument's use of a certain margin-for-error premise. Williamson himself claims that the premise follows easily from a safety condition on knowledge together with his description of the thought experiment. But luminists argue that this is not so: the margin-for-error premise either requires an implausible interpretation of the safety requirement on knowledge, or it requires other equally implausible (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  49. On Hawthorne and Magidor on Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility.R. C. Stalnaker - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):399-409.
    Hawthorne and Magidor's criticisms of the model of presupposition and assertion that I have used and defended are all based on a rejection of some transparency or introspection of assumptions about speaker presupposition. This response to those criticisms aims first to clarify, and then to defend, the required transparency assumptions. It is argued, first, that if the assumptions are properly understood, some prima facie problems for them do not apply, second, that rejecting the assumptions has intuitively implausible consequences, and third, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  50. Citsukha's View on Self-Luminosity.M. M. Trivedi - 1987 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 15 (2):115-123.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 63