Related categories

69 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 69
  1. added 2020-05-28
    Rosenkranz’s Logic of Justification and Unprovability.Jan Heylen - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-14.
    Rosenkranz has recently proposed a logic for propositional, non-factive, all-things-considered justification, which is based on a logic for the notion of being in a position to know, 309–338 2018). Starting from three quite weak assumptions in addition to some of the core principles that are already accepted by Rosenkranz, I prove that, if one has positive introspective and modally robust knowledge of the axioms of minimal arithmetic, then one is in a position to know that a sentence is not provable (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2020-05-27
    Rosenkranz' Logic of Justification.Jan Heylen - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic.
    Rosenkranz has recently proposed a logic for propositional, non-factive, all-thingsconsidered justification, which is based on a logic for the notion of being in a position to know (Rosenkranz Mind, 127(506), 309–338 2018). Starting from three quite weak assumptions in addition to some of the core principles that are already accepted by Rosenkranz, I prove that, if one has positive introspective and modally robust knowledge of the axioms of minimal arithmetic, then one is in a position to know that a sentence (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2019-09-23
    Reason and Experience in Buddhist Epistemology.Christian Coseru - 2013 - In Steven Emmanuel (ed.), A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. West Sussex, UKL: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.. pp. 241–255.
    Among the key factors that play a crucial role in the acquisition of knowledge, Buddhist philosophers list (i) the testimony of sense experience, (ii) introspective awareness (iii) inferences drawn from these directs modes of acquaintance, and (iv) some version of coherentism, so as guarantee that truth claims remains consistent across a diverse philosophical corpus. This paper argues that when Buddhists employ reason, they do so primarily in order to advance a range of empirical and introspective claims. As a result, reasoning, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2019-09-18
    Indicative Conditionals Without Iterative Epistemology.Ben Holguín - forthcoming - Noûs.
    This paper argues that two widely accepted principles about the indicative conditional jointly presuppose the falsity of one of the most prominent arguments against epistemological iteration principles. The first principle about the indicative conditional, which has close ties both to the Ramsey test and the “or-to-if” inference, says that knowing a material conditional suffices for knowing the corresponding indicative. The second principle says that conditional contradictions cannot be true when their antecedents are epistemically possible. Taken together, these principles entail that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2019-07-20
    When Do Introspection Axioms Matter for Multi-Agent Epistemic Reasoning?Wesley H. Holliday, Yifeng Ding & Cedegao Zhang - 2019 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 297:121–139.
    The early literature on epistemic logic in philosophy focused on reasoning about the knowledge or belief of a single agent, especially on controversies about "introspection axioms" such as the 4 and 5 axioms. By contrast, the later literature on epistemic logic in computer science and game theory has focused on multi-agent epistemic reasoning, with the single-agent 4 and 5 axioms largely taken for granted. In the relevant multi-agent scenarios, it is often important to reason about what agent A believes about (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2019-06-06
    On Williamson’s Argument for in His Anti-Luminosity Argument.Thomas A. Blackson - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):397-405.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  7. added 2019-06-06
    Shelter for the Cognitively Homeless.Baron Reed - 2006 - Synthese 148 (2):303-308.
    One of the main strands of the Cartesian tradition is the view that the mental realm is cognitively accessible to us in a special way: whenever one is in a mental state of a certain sort, one can know it just by considering the matter. In that sense, the mental realm is thought to be a cognitive home for us, and the mental states it comprises are luminous. Recently, however, Timothy Williamson has argued that we are cognitively homeless: no mental (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  8. added 2019-03-11
    Enough is Enough: Austin on Knowing.Guy Longworth - 2018 - In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays. Oxford, UK: pp. 186–205.
  9. added 2019-02-19
    Luminosity and the KK Thesis.Robert Stalnaker - 2015 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 19-40.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  10. added 2019-01-12
    Cognitive Homelessness.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (11):554-573.
    There is a constant temptation in philosophy to postulate a realm of phenomena in which nothing is hidden from us. Rene Descartes thought that one's own mind is such a realm. Ludwig Wittgenstein' enlarged the realm to everything that is of interest to philosophy. That they explained this special feature in very different ways hardly needs to be said; what is remarkable is their agreement on our possession of a cognitive home in which everything lies open to our view. Much (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  11. added 2018-10-11
    Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259.
    KK is the thesis that if you can know p, you can know that you can know p. Though it’s unpopular, a flurry of considerations has recently emerged in its favour. Here we add fuel to the fire: standard resources allow us to show that any failure of KK will lead to the knowability and assertability of abominable indicative conditionals of the form ‘If I don’t know it, p’. Such conditionals are manifestly not assertable—a fact that KK defenders can easily (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  12. added 2018-09-06
    Margins and Errors.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):63-76.
    Recently, Timothy Williamson has argued that considerations about margins of errors can generate a new class of cases where agents have justified true beliefs without knowledge. I think this is a great argument, and it has a number of interesting philosophical conclusions. In this note I’m going to go over the assumptions of Williamson’s argument. I’m going to argue that the assumptions which generate the justification without knowledge are true. I’m then going to go over some of the recent arguments (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  13. added 2018-07-12
    Updating for Externalists.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Noûs.
    The externalist says that your evidence could fail to tell you what evidence you do or not do have. In that case, it could be rational for you to be uncertain about what your evidence is. This is a kind of uncertainty which orthodox Bayesian epistemology has difficulty modeling. For, if externalism is correct, then the orthodox Bayesian learning norms of conditionalization and reflection are inconsistent with each other. I recommend that an externalist Bayesian reject conditionalization. In its stead, I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2018-05-14
    Luminosity in the Stream of Consciousness.David Jenkins - forthcoming - Synthese:1-14.
    Williamson’s “anti-luminosity” argument aims to establish that there are no significant luminous conditions. “Far from forming a cognitive home”, luminous conditions are mere “curiosities”. Even supposing Williamson’s argument succeeds in showing that there are no significant luminous states his conclusion has not thereby been established. When it comes to determining what is luminous, mental events and processes are among the best candidates. It is events and processes, after all, which constitute the stream of consciousness. Judgment, for instance, is plausibly self-conscious. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2018-02-16
    Mr. Magoo’s Mistake.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):289-306.
    Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the principle should be rejected. We analyze Williamson's argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly stated this premise no longer supports the argument against. After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge from prior knowledge by deduction.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. added 2017-05-30
    The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments.Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):691-728.
    Suppose you’d like to believe that p, whether or not it’s true. What can you do to help? A natural initial thought is that you could engage in Intentionally Biased Inquiry : you could look into whether p, but do so in a way that you expect to predominantly yield evidence in favour of p. This paper hopes to do two things. The first is to argue that this initial thought is mistaken: intentionally biased inquiry is impossible. The second is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  17. added 2017-05-19
    Luminosity Guaranteed.Wolfgang Barz - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):480-496.
    This article aims to show that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument does not succeed if we presuppose a constitutive connection between the phenomenal and the doxastic. In contrast to other luminists, however, my strategy is not to critically focus on the refined safety condition in terms of degrees of confidence that anti-luminists typically use in this context. Instead, I will argue that, given a certain conception of what Chalmers calls ‘direct phenomenal concepts,’ luminosity is guaranteed even if the refined safety condition in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. added 2017-02-15
    Researching, and Learning Mathematics at the Margin: From “Shelter” to School.Renuka Vithal - 2007 - Philosophy of Mathematics Education Journal 20.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. added 2017-02-14
    Margins for Error in Context.Denis Bonnay & Paul Egré - 2008 - In G. Carpintero & M. Koelbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 103--107.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  20. added 2017-02-14
    The Milieu: A Chart of Our Margin of Play.Matti Itkonen - 2002 - In Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), The Visible and the Invisible in the Interplay Between Philosophy, Literature, and Reality. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 139--155.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. added 2017-02-13
    Locke on Particles: A Reply to Berman and Williamson.Gabriel Nuchelmans - 1988 - Logique Et Analyse 31 (23):217.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. added 2017-02-12
    On the Margin Irving Howe Reconsidered.William M. Chace - 2008 - Common Knowledge 14 (2):270-277.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2017-01-26
    2 Into the Margin!Michèle A. Pujol - 2003 - In Drucilla K. Barker & Edith Kuiper (eds.), Toward a Feminist Philosophy of Economics. Routledge. pp. 21.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. added 2017-01-26
    Community at the Margin.Crispin Sartwell - 2002 - In Philip Alperson (ed.), Diversity and Community: An Interdisciplinary Reader. Blackwell. pp. 47--57.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. added 2017-01-19
    Margins for Error: A Reply.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):76-81.
    I address Peter Mott's 'Margins for Error and the Sorites Paradox' , pp. 494–503). Mott criticizes my account of inexact knowledge, on which it satisfies margin for error principles of the form 'If one knows in a given case, one avoids false belief in sufficiently similar cases'. Mott's arguments are shown to be fallacious because they ignore the fact that our knowledge of inexact knowledge is itself inexact. In the examples discussed, the first-level inexact knowledge is perceptual. Since my defense (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. added 2016-12-08
    The Modern Philosophical Revolution: The Luminosity of Existence.David Walsh - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
    The Modern Philosophical Revolution breaks new ground by demonstrating the continuity of European philosophy from Kant to Derrida. Much of the literature on European philosophy has emphasised the breaks that have occurred in the course of two centuries of thinking. But as David Walsh argues, such a reading overlooks the extent to which Kant, Hegel, and Schelling were already engaged in the turn toward existence as the only viable mode of philosophising. Where many similar studies summarise individual thinkers, this book (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  27. added 2016-12-05
    Inexact Knowledge with Introspection.Denis Bonnay & Paul Égré - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2):179-227.
    This paper supersedes an ealier version, entitled "A Non-Standard Semantics for Inexact Knowledge with Introspection", which appeared in the Proceedings of "Rationality and Knowledge". The definition of token semantics, in particular, has been modified, both for the single- and the multi-agent case.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  28. added 2016-12-05
    Margin for Error and the Transparency of Knowledge.Jérôme Dokic & Paul Égré - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):1-20.
    In chapter 5 of Knowledge and its Limits, T. Williamson formulates an argument against the principle (KK) of epistemic transparency, or luminosity of knowledge, namely “that if one knows something, then one knows that one knows it”. Williamson’s argument proceeds by reductio: from the description of a situation of approximate knowledge, he shows that a contradiction can be derived on the basis of principle (KK) and additional epistemic principles that he claims are better grounded. One of them is a reflective (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  29. added 2016-12-05
    Knowledge Beyond the Margin for Error.R. A. Sorensen - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):717-722.
    Epistemicists say there is a last positive instance in a sorites sequence-we just cannot know which is the last. Timothy Williamson explains that knowledge requires a margin for error and this ensures that the last heap will not be knowable as a heap. However, there is a class of disjunctive predicates for which knowledge at the thresholds is possible. They generate sorites paradoxes that cannot be diagnosed with the margin for error principle.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. added 2016-10-31
    The Comforts of Home.Earl Conee - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):444–451.
    The paper argues against Timothy Williamson's anti-luminosity argument. It also offers an argument against luminosity from the possibility of defeat of introspective justification.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  31. added 2016-09-11
    How to Moore a Gettier: Notes on the Dark Side of Knowledge.Rodrigo Borges - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (2):133-140.
    The Gettier Problem and Moore’s Paradox are related in a way that is unappreciated by philosophers. If one is in a Gettier situation, then one is also in a Moorean situation. The fact that S is in a Gettier situation (the fact that S is “Gettiered”), like the fact that S is in a Moorean situation (the fact that S is “Moored”), cannot (in the logical sense of “cannot”) be known by S while S is in that situation. The paper (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32. added 2015-03-03
    On Hawthorne and Magidor on Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility.R. C. Stalnaker - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):399-409.
    Hawthorne and Magidor's criticisms of the model of presupposition and assertion that I have used and defended are all based on a rejection of some transparency or introspection of assumptions about speaker presupposition. This response to those criticisms aims first to clarify, and then to defend, the required transparency assumptions. It is argued, first, that if the assumptions are properly understood, some prima facie problems for them do not apply, second, that rejecting the assumptions has intuitively implausible consequences, and third, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  33. added 2014-10-04
    What Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument Really Is.Carmelo di Primo, Gaston H. U. I. Bon Hoa, Pierre Douzou & Stephen Sligar - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. added 2014-10-04
    Are We Luminous?Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):294-319.
    Since its appearance over a decade ago, Timothy Williamson's anti-luminosity argument has come under sustained attack. Defenders of the luminous overwhelmingly object to the argument's use of a certain margin-for-error premise. Williamson himself claims that the premise follows easily from a safety condition on knowledge together with his description of the thought experiment. But luminists argue that this is not so: the margin-for-error premise either requires an implausible interpretation of the safety requirement on knowledge, or it requires other equally implausible (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  35. added 2014-10-04
    The Many Faces of Closure and Introspection: An Interactive Perspective.Patrick Allo - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):91-124.
    In this paper I present a more refined analysis of the principles of deductive closure and positive introspection. This analysis uses the expressive resources of logics for different types of group knowledge, and discriminates between aspects of closure and computation that are often conflated. The resulting model also yields a more fine-grained distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, and places Hintikka’s original argument for positive introspection in a new perspective.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  36. added 2014-10-04
    Luminosity and Determinacy.Elia Zardini - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):765-786.
    The paper discusses some ways in which the phenomenon of borderline cases may be thought to bear on the traditional philosophical idea that certain domains of facts are fully open to our view. The discussion focusses on a very influential argument (due to Tim Williamson) to the effect that, roughly, no such domains of luminous facts exist. Many commentators have felt that the vagueness unavoidably inherent in the description of the facts that are best candidates for being luminous plays an (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  37. added 2014-10-04
    Margin for Error Semantics and Signal Perception.David Spector - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3247-3263.
    A joint modelling of objective worlds and subjective perceptions within two-dimensional semantics eliminates the margin for error principle and solves the epistemic sorites paradox. Two objective knowledge modalities can be defined in two-dimensional frames accounting for subjective perceptions: “necessary knowledge” (NK) and “possible knowledge” (PK), the latter being better suited to the interpretation of knowledge utterances. Two-dimensional semantics can in some cases be reduced to one-dimensional ones, by defining accessibility relations between objective worlds that reflect subjective perceptions: NK and PK (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38. added 2014-10-04
    Luminosity and Vagueness.Elia Zardini - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):375-410.
    The paper discusses some ways in which vagueness and its phenomena may be thought to impose certain limits on our knowledge and, more specifically, may be thought to bear on the traditional philosophical idea that certain domains of facts are luminous, i.e., roughly, fully open to our view. The discussion focuses on a very influential argument to the effect that almost no such interesting domains exist. Many commentators have felt that the vagueness unavoidably inherent in the description of the facts (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  39. added 2014-10-04
    Williamson on Knowledge.Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Eighteen leading philosophers offer critical assessments of Timothy Williamson's ground-breaking work on knowledge and its impact on philosophy today. They discuss epistemological issues concerning evidence, defeasibility, scepticism, testimony, assertion, and perception, and debate Williamson's central claim that knowledge is a mental state.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  40. added 2014-10-04
    Knowledge Within the Margin for Error.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):723 - 726.
    Roy Sorensen's criticism of my use of margin for error principles to explain ignorance in borderline cases fails because it misidentifies the relevant margin for error principles. His alternative explanation in terms of truth-maker gaps is briefly criticized.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  41. added 2014-10-04
    Inexact Knowledge, Margin for Error and Positive Introspection.Julien Dutant - 2007 - Proceedings of Tark XI.
    Williamson (2000a) has argued that posi- tive introspection is incompatible with in- exact knowledge. His argument relies on a margin-for-error requirement for inexact knowledge based on a intuitive safety prin- ciple for knowledge, but leads to the counter- intuitive conclusion that no possible creature could have both inexact knowledge and posi- tive introspection. Following Halpern (2004) I put forward an alternative margin-for-error requirement that preserves the safety require- ment while blocking Williamson’s argument. I argue that the infallibilist conception of knowledge (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  42. added 2014-10-04
    Reliability, Margin for Error, and Self-Knowledge.Paul Egré - 2006 - In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 215--250.
    Forthcoming in D.H. Pritchard & V. Hendricks, New Waves in Epistemology,.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  43. added 2014-10-04
    Précis of Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):431–435.
    A creature that is not aware of anything does not lead a genuinely intelligent life. Its activity is unintelligent because unguided by awareness. Although intelligent life does not consist solely of awareness, it is intelligent only where it is intimately related to awareness. Awareness of anything involves some awareness of how things are in some respect. Even awareness merely of how things appear to be is awareness of how they are in respect of appearance. Awareness of how things are is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44. added 2014-10-04
    Williamson’s Argument Against the KK-Principle 157.Murali Ramachandran - 2005 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 1.
    Timothy Williamson (2000 ch. 5) presents a reductio against the luminosity of knowing, against, that is, the so-called KK-principle: if one knows p, then one knows (or is at least in a position to know) that one knows p.1 I do not endorse the principle, but I do not think Williamson’s argument succeeds in refuting it. My aim here is to show that the KK-principle is not the most obvious culprit behind the contradiction Williamson derives.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. added 2014-10-04
    Luminous Margins.Brian Weatherson - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):373 – 383.
    Timothy Williamson has recently argued that few mental states are luminous , meaning that to be in that state is to be in a position to know that you are in the state. His argument rests on the plausible principle that beliefs only count as knowledge if they are safely true. That is, any belief that could easily have been false is not a piece of knowledge. I argue that the form of the safety rule Williamson uses is inappropriate, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  46. added 2014-10-04
    An Anti-Epistemicist Consequence of Margin for Error Semantics for Knowledge.Delia Graff Fara - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):127-142.
    Let us say that the proposition that p is transparent just in case it is known that p, and it is known that it is known that p, and it is known that it is known that it is known that p, and so on, for any number of iterations of the knowledge operator ‘it is known that’. If there are transparent propositions at all, then the claim that any man with zero hairs is bald seems like a good candidate. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  47. added 2014-10-04
    Reply to Machina and Deutsch on Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margins for Error.Timothy Williamson - 2002 - Acta Analytica 17 (1):47-61.
    In their paper “Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margins for Error” Kenton Machina and Harry Deutsch criticize the epistemic theory of vagueness. This paper answers their objections. The main issues discussed are: the relation between meaning and use; the principle of bivalence; the ontology of vaguely specified classes; the proper form of margin for error principles; iterations of epistemic operators and semantic compositionality; the relation or lack of it between quantum mechanics and theories of vagueness.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. added 2014-10-04
    Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument.Brueckner Anthony - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):285-293.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  49. added 2014-10-04
    Vagueness and Margin for Error Principles.Mario Gómez-Torrente - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):107-125.
    Timothy Williamson’s potentially most important contribution to epistemicism about vagueness lies in his arguments for the basic epistemicist claim that the alleged cut-off points of vague predicates are not knowable. His arguments for this are based on so-called ‘margin for error principles’. This paper argues that these principles fail to provide a good argument for the basic claim. Williamson has offered at least two kinds of margin for error principles applicable to vague predicates. A certain fallacy of equivocation seems to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  50. added 2014-10-04
    Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge and its Limits presents a systematic new conception of knowledge as a kind of mental stage sensitive to the knower's environment. It makes a major contribution to the debate between externalist and internalist philosophies of mind, and breaks radically with the epistemological tradition of analyzing knowledge in terms of true belief. The theory casts new light on such philosophical problems as scepticism, evidence, probability and assertion, realism and anti-realism, and the limits of what can be known. The arguments are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1111 citations  
1 — 50 / 69