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Machines cast the problem of explaining consciousness in a particularly interesting light.  The most basic question is: Could a machine be conscious? Or, can consciousness be explained mechanically? More specifically, does consciousness have anything to do with what something is made out of, or is the only relevant issue what a thing’s parts are doing, whatever those parts are made of?  Could a machine made out of gears and pulleys be conscious?  Could a computer be conscious (a variant: is the internet conscious)?  Could a machine made out mostly water, carbon, and nitrogen be conscious? Are only information processors conscious (however this is defined, and however information processing is implemented)?  Perhaps can openers aren’t conscious not because they are made out of steel and plastic, but because their parts aren’t processing information, or not processing information in the right way.  These two issues can be combined: Can only machines with neurons be conscious because only neurons can do what has to be done to produce consciousness?  Perhaps consciousness cannot be explained mechanically, but nevertheless only mechanical things can be conscious; rocks are excluded, perhaps.  Is being alive necessary?  Could we upload our consciousness to another kind of machine?  Finally, what is the relation between behavior and the attribution of consciousness? Confronted with a non-conscious robot that behaved as if it were conscious, we would find it nearly impossible not to treat it accordingly, say, by refraining from insulting it or hitting it. Behaving as if they are conscious is in fact all we have to go on concerning our fellow carbon-based earthlings.  So, it is because animals like dogs, cats, octopi, and humans behave as if they are conscious, that we naturally conclude that they are (at least today . . . throughout history, however, many humans have been reluctant to attribute consciousness to others significantly unlike them, including other humans, dogs, cats, and octopi, etc.)  

Key works Leibniz, in section 17 of his Monodology, was one of the first to argue that thinking and perception could not be mechanical by imagining walking around in a large machine, like a windmill, that could think; one could not find the root of its thinking in the workings of its gears and pulleys.  An excellent modern version of Leibniz is Searle 1980.  Block 1978 comes to a negative conclusion again, like Leibniz's.  Stan Franklin's  Artificial Minds, MIT Press, 1995, has a more positive conclusion, and covers a lot interesting ground.  Another positive argument is Chalmers 2011.
Introductions An introduction is Gamez 2008. Also good is Stan Franklin's Artificial Minds, MIT Press, 1995.
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309 found
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  1. Machine Consciousness: Plausible Idea or Semantic Distortion?William Y. Adams - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):46-56.
    I found the JCS issue on Machine Consciousness, Volume 10, No. 4-5 , frustrating and alienating. There seems to be a consensus building that consciousness is accessible to scientific scrutiny, so much so that it is already understood well enough to be modeled and even synthesized. I'm not so sure. It could be instead that the vocabulary of consciousness is being subtly redefined to be amenable to scientific investigation and explicit modeling. Such semantic revisionism is confusing and often misleading. Whatever (...)
  2. Intersubjective Transparency and Artificial Consciousness.William Y. Adams - manuscript
  3. Phenomenal Consciousness and Biologically Inspired Systems.Igor Aleksander - 2013 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 5 (1):3-9.
  4. Workspace Theories Are Alive and Well.Igor Aleksander - 2011 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (02):309-312.
  5. Does Sloman criticise Sloman?Igor Aleksander - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (1):19-22.
  6. Conscious Machines.Igor Aleksander - 2010 - The Philosophers' Magazine 50 (50):18-19.
  7. The Potential Impact of Machine Consciousness in Science and Engineering.Igor Aleksander - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):1-9.
  8. Modeling Consciousness in Virtual Computational Machines. Functionalism and Phenomenology.Igor Aleksander - 2007 - Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):447-454.
    This paper describes the efforts of those who work with informational machines and with informational analyses to provide a basis for understanding consciousness and for speculating on what it would take to make a conscious machine. Some of the origins of these considerations are covered and the contributions of several researchers are reviewed. A distinction is drawn between functional and phenomenological approaches showing how the former lead to algorithmic methods based on conventional programming, while the latter lead to neural network (...)
  9. Machine Consciousness.Igor L. Aleksander - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
  10. Machine Consciousness.Igor L. Aleksander - 2006 - In Steven Laureys (ed.), Boundaries of Consciousness. Elsevier.
  11. Axioms and Tests for the Presence of Minimal Consciousness in Agents I: Preamble.Igor L. Aleksander & B. Dunmall - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):7-18.
    This paper relates to a formal statement of the mechanisms that are thought minimally necessary to underpin consciousness. This is expressed in the form of axioms. We deem this to be useful if there is ever to be clarity in answering questions about whether this or the other organism is or is not conscious. As usual, axioms are ways of making formal statements of intuitive beliefs and looking, again formally, at the consequences of such beliefs. The use of this style (...)
  12. Information or Logic in Modeling Conscious Systems?Igor Aleksander, David Gamez & Helen Morton - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (2):185-192.
  13. Informational Minds: From Aristotle to Laptops (Book Extract).Igor Aleksander & Helen B. Morton - 2011 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (02):383-397.
  14. The Theoretical Foundations for Engineering a Conscious Quantum Computer.Richard L. Amoroso - 1997 - In M. Gams, M. Paprzycki & X. Wu (eds.), Mind Versus Computer: Were Dreyfus and Winograd Right? Amsterdam: IOS Press.
  15. Design of a Conscious Robot.John H. Andreae - 1987 - Metascience 5:41-54.
  16. Cognitive Models and Spiritual Maps.Jensine Andresen & Robert Kc Forman - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies. Controversies in Science and the Humanities, Special Edition 7 (11-12):4-287.
  17. Machines and Thought The Legacy of Alan Turing.Peter Millican Andy Clark (ed.) - 1996
  18. Am I a Computer?Leonard Angel - 1994 - In Eric Dietrich (ed.), Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons. Academic Press.
  19. How to Build a Conscious Machine.Leonard Angel - 1989 - Westview Press.
  20. Beware the Passionate Robot.Michael A. Arbib - 2004 - In J. Fellous (ed.), Who Needs Emotions. Oxford University Press.
  21. Experimental Methods for Unraveling the Mind-Body Problem: The Phenomenal Judgment Approach.Victor Argonov - 2014 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 35 (1-2):51-70.
    A rigorous approach to the study of the mind–body problem is suggested. Since humans are able to talk about consciousness (produce phenomenal judgments), it is argued that the study of neural mechanisms of phenomenal judgments can solve the hard problem of consciousness. Particular methods are suggested for: (1) verification and falsification of materialism; (2) verification and falsification of interactionism; (3) falsification of epiphenomenalism and parallelism (verification is problematic); (4) verification of particular materialistic theories of consciousness; (5) a non-Turing test for (...)
  22. Thinking Inside the Box: Controlling and Using an Oracle AI.Stuart Armstrong, Anders Sandberg & Nick Bostrom - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (4):299-324.
    There is no strong reason to believe that human-level intelligence represents an upper limit of the capacity of artificial intelligence, should it be realized. This poses serious safety issues, since a superintelligent system would have great power to direct the future according to its possibly flawed motivation system. Solving this issue in general has proven to be considerably harder than expected. This paper looks at one particular approach, Oracle AI. An Oracle AI is an AI that does not act in (...)
  23. Modelling Consciousness for Autonomous Robot Exploration.R. Arrabales, A. Ledezma & A. Sanchis - unknown - Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
  24. Applying Machine Consciousness Models in Autonomous Situated Agents.R. Arrabales & A. Sanchis - forthcoming - Pattern Recognition Letters.
  25. Haikonen's View on Machine Consciousness: Back to the Engineering Stance.Raúl Arrabales - 2014 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 6 (1):1-4.
    Raúl Arrabales, Int. J. Mach. Conscious., 06, 1 (2014). DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400010.
  26. ConsScale: A Pragmatic Scale for Measuring the Level of Consciousness in Artificial Agents.Raul Arrabales, Agapito Ledezma & Araceli Sanchis - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):3-4.
    One of the key problems the field of Machine Consciousness is currently facing is the need to accurately assess the potential level of consciousness that an artificial agent might develop. This paper presents a novel artificial consciousness scale designed to provide a pragmatic and intuitive reference in the evaluation of MC implementations. The version of ConsScale described in this work provides a comprehensive evaluation mechanism which enables the estimation of the potential degree of consciousness of most of the existing artificial (...)
  27. The Cognitive Development of Machine Consciousness Implementations.Raúl Arrabales, Agapito Ledezma & Araceli Sanchis - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (2):213-225.
  28. Strategies for Measuring Machine Consciousness.Raúl Arrabales, Agapito Ledezma & Araceli Sanchis - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (2):193-201.
  29. Machines, Consciousness, and Thought.Robert L. Arrington - 1999 - Idealistic Studies 29 (3):231-243.
  30. Consciousness, Intentionality, and Intelligence: Some Foundational Issues for Artificial Intelligence.Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere - 2000 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 12 (3):263-277.
  31. Consciousness is Computational: The Lida Model of Global Workspace Theory.Bernard J. Baars & Stan Franklin - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):23-32.
  32. The Metaphors Of Consciousness.Puran K. Bair - 1981 - New York: Plenum Press.
  33. Computer Metaphors for Consciousness.Puran K. Bair - 1981 - In The Metaphors of Consciousness. New York: Plenum Press.
  34. Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, and Human Nature: Theological and Philosophical Reflections.Ian G. Barbour - 1999 - In Zygon. Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press. pp. 361-398.
  35. The Causal History of Computational Activity: Maudlin and Olympia.E. Barnes - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (6):304-16.
    This paper critically responds to Tim Maudlin's argument against a computational theory of consciousness. It is argued that his artfully constructed Turing machine 'Olympia' does not meet an important condition for computation, namely that the computed input serve as an active cause of the computational activity. Thus a computational theory of consciousness remains a live option.
  36. The Designer Stance Towards Shanahan's Dynamic Network Theory of the "Conscious Condition".Luc Patrick Beaudoin - 2011 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (02):313-319.
  37. Sixteen Years of Artificial Intelligence: Mind Design and Mind Design II.Andrew beedle - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):243 – 250.
    John Haugeland's Mind design and Mind design II are organized around the idea that the fundamental idea of cognitive science is that, “intelligent beings are semantic engines — in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense”. The goal of artificial intelligence research, or the problem of “mind design” as Haugeland calls it, is to develop computers that are in fact semantic engines. This paper canvasses the changes in artificial intelligence research reflected in the different (...)
  38. Algorithmicity and Consciousness.John L. Bell - manuscript
    Why should one believe that conscious awareness is solely the result of organizational complexity? What is the connection between consciousness and combinatorics: transformation of quantity into quality? The claim that the former is reducible to the other seems unconvincing—as unlike as chalk and cheese! In his book1 Penrose is at least attempting to compare like with like: the enigma of consciousness with the progress of physics.
  39. The Folk on Knowing How.John Bengson, Marc A. Moffett & Jennifer C. Wright - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):387–401.
    It has been claimed that the attempt to analyze know-how in terms of propositional knowledge over-intellectualizes the mind. Exploiting the methods of so-called “experimental philosophy”, we show that the charge of over-intellectualization is baseless. Contra neo-Ryleans, who analyze know-how in terms of ability, the concrete-case judgments of ordinary folk are most consistent with the view that there exists a set of correct necessary and sufficient conditions for know-how that does not invoke ability, but rather a certain sort of propositional knowledge. (...)
  40. Artificial Consciousness.Dieter Birnbacher - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
  41. Why Computers Can't Feel Pain.John Mark Bishop - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):507-516.
    The most cursory examination of the history of artificial intelligence highlights numerous egregious claims of its researchers, especially in relation to a populist form of ‘strong’ computationalism which holds that any suitably programmed computer instantiates genuine conscious mental states purely in virtue of carrying out a specific series of computations. The argument presented herein is a simple development of that originally presented in Putnam’s (Representation & Reality, Bradford Books, Cambridge in 1988 ) monograph, “Representation & Reality”, which if correct, has (...)
  42. Dancing with Pixies: Strong Artificial Intelligence and Panpsychism.John Mark Bishop - 2003 - In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
  43. Meme Machines and Consciousness. Blackmore - 1999 - Journal of Intelligent Systems 9 (5-6):355-376.
  44. Consciousness in Meme Machines.Susan J. Blackmore - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4):19-30.
    Setting aside the problems of recognising consciousness in a machine, this article considers what would be needed for a machine to have human-like conscious- ness. Human-like consciousness is an illusion; that is, it exists but is not what it appears to be. The illusion that we are a conscious self having a stream of experi- ences is constructed when memes compete for replication by human hosts. Some memes survive by being promoted as personal beliefs, desires, opinions and pos- sessions, leading (...)
  45. Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity, and Consciousness.Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield - 1987 - Blackwell.
  46. MICHAEL POLANYI: CAN THE MIND BE REPRESENTED BY A MACHINE?Paul Richard Blum - 2010 - Polanyiana 19 (1-2):35-60.
    In 1949, the Department of Philosophy at the University of Manchester organized a symposium “Mind and Machine” with Michael Polanyi, the mathematicians Alan Turing and Max Newman, the neurologists Geoff rey Jeff erson and J. Z. Young, and others as participants. Th is event is known among Turing scholars, because it laid the seed for Turing’s famous paper on “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, but it is scarcely documented. Here, the transcript of this event, together with Polanyi’s original statement and his (...)
  47. Consciousness and Conceptual Learning in a Socially Situated Agent.Myles Bogner, Uma Ramamurthy & Stan Franklin - 2000 - In Kerstin Dauthenhahn (ed.), Human Cognition and Social Agent Technology. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. pp. 113--135.
  48. Haikonen's Philosophy of Machine Consciousness.Peter Boltuc - 2014 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 6 (1):5-11.
    Peter Boltuc, Int. J. Mach. Conscious., 06, 5 (2014). DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400022.
  49. Sloman and H-Consciousness.Piotr Boltuc - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (1):23-26.
  50. The Philosophical Issue in Machine Consciousness.Piotr Boltuc - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):155-176.
    The truly philosophical issue in machine conscioiusness is whether machines can have 'hard consciounsess'. Criteria for hard consciousness are higher than for phenomenal consciousness, since the latter incorporates first-person functional consciousness.
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