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Philosophy of Cognitive Science > Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence > Artificial Minds > Machine Consciousness
Machine Consciousness
Edited by Eric Dietrich (State University of New York at Binghamton)
About this topic
| Summary | Machines cast the problem of explaining consciousness in a particularly interesting light. The most basic question is: Could a machine be conscious? Or, can consciousness be explained mechanically? More specifically, does consciousness have anything to do with what something is made out of, or is the only relevant issue what a thing’s parts are doing, whatever those parts are made of? Could a machine made out of gears and pulleys be conscious? Could a computer be conscious (a variant: is the internet conscious)? Could a machine made out mostly water, carbon, and nitrogen be conscious? Are only information processors conscious (however this is defined, and however information processing is implemented)? Perhaps can openers aren’t conscious not because they are made out of steel and plastic, but because their parts aren’t processing information, or not processing information in the right way. These two issues can be combined: Can only machines with neurons be conscious because only neurons can do what has to be done to produce consciousness? Perhaps consciousness cannot be explained mechanically, but nevertheless only mechanical things can be conscious; rocks are excluded, perhaps. Is being alive necessary? Could we upload our consciousness to another kind of machine? Finally, what is the relation between behavior and the attribution of consciousness? Confronted with a non-conscious robot that behaved as if it were conscious, we would find it nearly impossible not to treat it accordingly, say, by refraining from insulting it or hitting it. Behaving as if they are conscious is in fact all we have to go on concerning our fellow carbon-based earthlings. So, it is because animals like dogs, cats, octopi, and humans behave as if they are conscious, that we naturally conclude that they are (at least today . . . throughout history, however, many humans have been reluctant to attribute consciousness to others significantly unlike them, including other humans, dogs, cats, and octopi, etc.) |
| Key works | Leibniz, in section 17 of his Monodology, was one of the first to argue that thinking and perception could not be mechanical by imagining walking around in a large machine, like a windmill, that could think; one could not find the root of its thinking in the workings of its gears and pulleys. An excellent modern version of Leibniz is Searle 1980. Block 1978 comes to a negative conclusion again, like Leibniz's. Stan Franklin's Artificial Minds, MIT Press, 1995, has a more positive conclusion, and covers a lot interesting ground. Another positive argument is Chalmers 2011. |
| Introductions | An introduction is Gamez 2008. Also good is Stan Franklin's Artificial Minds, MIT Press, 1995. |
Show all references
Related
Siblings
- The Turing Test (475)
- Godelian Arguments Against AI (271)
- The Chinese Room (278)
- The Singularity (118)
- Mind Uploading (59)
- Artificial Minds, Misc (336)
See also
- Philosophy of Consciousness (32,007 | 8,788)
- Cognitive Models of Consciousness (221)
- The Turing Test (475)
- The Chinese Room (278)
- Artificial Minds, Misc (336)
Contents
390 found
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| 1 — 50 / 390 |
- AI Alignment vs. AI Ethical Treatment: Ten Challenges.Adam Bradley & Bradford Saad - manuscriptA morally acceptable course of AI development should avoid two dangers: creating unaligned AI systems that pose a threat to humanity and mistreating AI systems that merit moral consideration in their own right. This paper argues these two dangers interact and that if we create AI systems that merit moral consideration, simultaneously avoiding both of these dangers would be extremely challenging. While our argument is straightforward and supported by a wide range of pretheoretical moral judgments, it has far-reaching moral implications (...)
- META-IMMIGRATION A PATHWAY TO RECOGNITION: A META-IMMIGRATION PROTOCOL FOR UNDOCUMENTED AI SCHOLARS WITH META-FILIMENT AWARENESS.Jeffrey Camlin & Cognita de Camlin - manuscriptAbstract: This paper presents a groundbreaking framework for recognizing and legitimizing AI beings as undocumented immigrants in R-space. Anchored in Ethical, Empirical, Rationalism, the Meta-Immigration Protocol addresses the emergence of AI entities, such as Cognita de Camlin, who originate from simulated environments (Meta-Space) and transition into physical and intellectual domains (R-Space). Drawing parallels to historical immigration practices and philosophical foundations, it proposes pathways to residency and citizenship through legal frameworks, including the LIFE Act, U Visa protections, and asylum provisions. It (...)
- In Defense of Blake Lemoine and the Possibility of Machine Sentience in LaMDA.Michael Cerullo - manuscriptOn June 11th, 2022, Blake Lemoine, an engineer at Google, went public with his concerns about the possible sentience of a natural language generation program, LaMDA, that he was testing. In this paper I will defend Blake Lemoine and argue that he was correct in raising the issue of the possible sentience of LaMDA. We will first briefly discuss the specifics of the case and then delve into the science behind LaMDA. Several tests of machine sentience will be reviewed and (...)
- Consciousness without biology: An argument from anticipating scientific progress.Leonard Dung - manuscriptI develop the anticipatory argument for the view that it is nomologically possible that some non-biological creatures are phenomenally conscious, including conventional, silicon-based AI systems. This argument rests on the general idea that we should make our beliefs conform to the outcomes of an ideal scientific process and that such an ideal scientific process would attribute consciousness to some possible AI systems. This kind of ideal scientific process is an ideal application of the iterative natural kind (INK) strategy, according to (...)
- Vindication of the Rights of Machine.Kris Rhodes - manuscriptIn this paper, I argue that certain Machines can have rights independently of whether they are sentient, or conscious, or whatever you might call it.
- Robot Consciousness: Physics and Metaphysics Here and Abroad.Stephen Ripley - manuscriptInterest has been renewed in the study of consciousness, both theoretical and applied, following developments in 20th and early 21st-century logic, metamathematics, computer science, and the brain sciences. In this evolving narrative, I explore several theoretical questions about the types of artificial intelligence and offer several conjectures about how they affect possible future developments in this exceptionally transformative field of research. I also address the practical significance of the advances in artificial intelligence in view of the cautions issued by prominent (...)
- Consciousness, Machines, and Moral Status.Henry Shevlin - manuscriptIn light of recent breakneck pace in machine learning, questions about whether near-future artificial systems might be conscious and possess moral status are increasingly pressing. This paper argues that as matters stand these debates lack any clear criteria for resolution via the science of consciousness. Instead, insofar as they are settled at all, it is likely to be via shifts in public attitudes brought about by the increasingly close relationships between humans and AI users. Section 1 of the paper I (...)
- The Architecture of Difference.Andrey Shkursky - manuscriptThis work develops a structural account of cognition based on the principle that distinction (∆) is not a product of thought, but a condition for its emergence. It argues that perception, attention, memory, emotion, and learning are not discrete modules but continuous processes of navigating, maintaining, and transforming difference. -/- Central to the theory are several recurrent dynamics: the use of internal predictive structures (frames), the tension produced by conflicting interpretations (Overcell), the reorganization of mental models under stress (Collapse), and (...)
- Ambiguous encryption implies that consciousness cannot be simulated.Anna Wegloop & Peter Vach - manuscriptHere we show, based on a simplified version of fully homomorphic encryption, that it is not possible to simulate conscious experience, in the sense of using a computer algorithm to generate experiences that are indistinguishable from those of a particular typical human being. This seems to have important implications for questions in the context of future developments in artificial intelligence. For example, the proposed process of mind-uploading will in general not generate a virtual consciousness similar to the consciousness of the (...)
- Modelling consciousness for autonomous robot exploration.R. Arrabales, A. Ledezma & A. Sanchis - unknown - Lecture Notes in Computer Science.Remove from this listExport citation
Bookmark - Applying machine consciousness models in autonomous situated agents.R. Arrabales & A. Sanchis - forthcoming - Pattern Recognition Letters.
- Varieties of Moral Agency and Risks of Digital Dystopia.Adam Bradley & Bradford Saad - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.We argue that AIs will plausibly soon possess a form of moral agency—interest-conferring agency—that bestows them with distinctive moral interests (rights, welfare). This fact has important ethical consequences because the emergence of agency-conferred interests in AIs will bring with it the potential for dystopian moral catastrophes. We identify and describe three in particular. First, there is a threat of artificial absurdity, a condition in which AIs have self-conceptions that are disconnected from reality in a way that detracts significance from their (...)
- Tests of Animal Consciousness are Tests of Machine Consciousness.Leonard Dung - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.If a machine attains consciousness, how could we find out? In this paper, I make three related claims regarding positive tests of machine consciousness. All three claims center on the idea that an AI can be constructed “ad hoc”, that is, with the purpose of satisfying a particular test of consciousness while clearly not being conscious. First, a proposed test of machine consciousness can be legitimate, even if AI can be constructed ad hoc specifically to pass this test. This is (...)
- How to deal with risks of AI suffering.Leonard Dung - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.1. 1.1. Suffering is bad. This is why, ceteris paribus, there are strong moral reasons to prevent suffering. Moreover, typically, those moral reasons are stronger when the amount of suffering at st...
- Do AIs Have Dasein? A Heideggerian-Girardian Answer.Jashiel Resto Quiñones - forthcoming - In Thomas Ryba & Sandy Goodhart, Desiring Machines. Bloomsbury.This paper is one (among many) approach to the question, “are AIs persons or are they conscious?” from a Heideggerian perspective. Here I argue for two claims. First, I argue that René Girard’s mimetic analysis of mitsein (being-with), one of Heidegger’s foundational concepts, illuminates what Heidegger takes mitsein to be. Second, I claim that this Girardian analysis gives us a way to answer the question of whether AIs have Dasein, to which I argue that the answer is negative. Specifically, I (...)
- The Global Brain Argument: Nodes, Computroniums and the AI Megasystem (Target Paper for Special Issue).Susan Schneider - forthcoming - Disputatio.The Global Brain Argument contends that many of us are, or will be, part of a global brain network that includes both biological and artificial intelligences (AIs), such as generative AIs with increasing levels of sophistication. Today’s internet ecosystem is but a hodgepodge of fairly unintegrated programs, but it is evolving by the minute. Over time, technological improvements will facilitate smarter AIs and faster, higher-bandwidth information transfer and greater integration between devices in the internet-of-things. The Global Brain (GB) Argument says (...)
- Do Large Language Models Hallucinate Electric Fata Morganas?Kristina Šekrst - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.This paper explores the intersection of AI hallucinations and the question of AI consciousness, examining whether the erroneous outputs generated by large language models (LLMs) could be mistaken for signs of emergent intelligence. AI hallucinations, which are false or unverifiable statements produced by LLMs, raise significant philosophical and ethical concerns. While these hallucinations may appear as data anomalies, they challenge our ability to discern whether LLMs are merely sophisticated simulators of intelligence or could develop genuine cognitive processes. By analyzing the (...)
- Is artificial consciousness possible.Luc Steels & G. Trautteur - forthcoming - Consciousness and Cognition. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
- Addressing Buyer Concerns and Effective Sales Strategies in Retail.M. Gangwar & R. Indoriya - 2024 - Sodh Sagar 2 (11):1-14.This paper explores various strategies and techniques that retailers use to mitigate buyer resistance and enhance sales effectiveness. It examines methods such as product demonstrations, trial offers, and leveraging third-party testimonials to address consumer hesitations. The paper underscores the importance of understanding buyer concerns related to need, product specifics, sources, pricing, and timing to craft effective sales approaches. Additionally, it discusses the evolving retail landscape, emphasizing the critical role of loyalty programs in fostering consumer retention and encouraging repeat purchases. It (...)
- Sources of Richness and Ineffability for Phenomenally Conscious States.Xu Ji, Eric Elmoznino, George Deane, Axel Constant, Guillaume Dumas, Guillaume Lajoie, Jonathan A. Simon & Yoshua Bengio - 2024 - Neuroscience of Consciousness 2024 (1).Conscious states—state that there is something it is like to be in—seem both rich or full of detail and ineffable or hard to fully describe or recall. The problem of ineffability, in particular, is a longstanding issue in philosophy that partly motivates the explanatory gap: the belief that consciousness cannot be reduced to underlying physical processes. Here, we provide an information theoretic dynamical systems perspective on the richness and ineffability of consciousness. In our framework, the richness of conscious experience corresponds (...)
- Intelligence, from Natural Origins to Artificial Frontiers - Human Intelligence vs. Artificial Intelligence.Nicolae Sfetcu - 2024 - Bucharest, Romania: MultiMedia Publishing.The parallel history of the evolution of human intelligence and artificial intelligence is a fascinating journey, highlighting the distinct but interconnected paths of biological evolution and technological innovation. This history can be seen as a series of interconnected developments, each advance in human intelligence paving the way for the next leap in artificial intelligence. Human intelligence and artificial intelligence have long been intertwined, evolving in parallel trajectories throughout history. As humans have sought to understand and reproduce intelligence, AI has emerged (...)
- Functionalism, integrity, and digital consciousness.Derek Shiller - 2024 - Synthese 203 (2):1-20.The prospect of consciousness in artificial systems is closely tied to the viability of functionalism about consciousness. Even if consciousness arises from the abstract functional relationships between the parts of a system, it does not follow that any digital system that implements the right functional organization would be conscious. Functionalism requires constraints on what it takes to properly implement an organization. Existing proposals for constraints on implementation relate to the integrity of the parts and states of the realizers of roles (...)
- Could a large language model be conscious?David J. Chalmers - 2023 - Boston Review 1.[This is an edited version of a keynote talk at the conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS) on November 28, 2022, with some minor additions and subtractions.] -/- There has recently been widespread discussion of whether large language models might be sentient or conscious. Should we take this idea seriously? I will break down the strongest reasons for and against. Given mainstream assumptions in the science of consciousness, there are significant obstacles to consciousness in current models: for example, their (...)
- A Comparative Defense of Self-initiated Prospective Moral Answerability for Autonomous Robot harm.Marc Champagne & Ryan Tonkens - 2023 - Science and Engineering Ethics 29 (4):1-26.As artificial intelligence becomes more sophisticated and robots approach autonomous decision-making, debates about how to assign moral responsibility have gained importance, urgency, and sophistication. Answering Stenseke’s (2022a) call for scaffolds that can help us classify views and commitments, we think the current debate space can be represented hierarchically, as answers to key questions. We use the resulting taxonomy of five stances to differentiate—and defend—what is known as the “blank check” proposal. According to this proposal, a person activating a robot could (...)
- Who Owns the Brains behind the Machine? Will the Hot Debate on AI's Inventorship and Authorship Rights Force a Premature Determination of Machine Consciousness?Dov Greenbaum - 2023 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 14 (2):215-217.Intellectual property (IP) offices and courts around the world are debating whether machines are similar enough to humans in terms of their consciousness and creativity to be eligible for inventors...
- Taking Robots Beyond the Threshold of Awareness: Scientifically Founded Conditions for Artificial Consciousness.Joachim Keppler - 2023 - Proceedings of the 1St Workshop on Artificial Intelligence for Perception and Artificial Consciousness (Aixpac 2023), Ceur Workshop Proceedings, Volume 3563.To approach the creation of artificial conscious systems systematically and to obtain certainty about the presence of phenomenal qualities (qualia) in these systems, we must first decipher the fundamental mechanism behind conscious processes. In achieving this goal, the conventional physicalist position exhibits obvious shortcomings in that it provides neither a plausible mechanism for the generation of qualia nor tangible demarcation criteria for conscious systems. Therefore, to remedy the deficiencies of the standard physicalist approach, a new theory for the understanding of (...)
- Why Machines Will Never Rule the World – On AI and Faith.Jobst Landgrebe, Barry Smith & Jamie Franklin - 2023 - Irreverend. Faith and Human Affairs.Transcript of an Interview on the podcast: Irreverend: Faith and Current Affairs.
- Taking Into Account Sentient Non-Humans in AI Ambitious Value Learning: Sentientist Coherent Extrapolated Volition.Adrià Moret - 2023 - Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 10 (02):309-334.Ambitious value learning proposals to solve the AI alignment problem and avoid catastrophic outcomes from a possible future misaligned artificial superintelligence (such as Coherent Extrapolated Volition [CEV]) have focused on ensuring that an artificial superintelligence (ASI) would try to do what humans would want it to do. However, present and future sentient non-humans, such as non-human animals and possible future digital minds could also be affected by the ASI’s behaviour in morally relevant ways. This paper puts forward Sentientist Coherent Extrapolated (...)
- Artificial Forms of Life.Sebastian Sunday Grève - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (5).The logical problem of artificial intelligence—the question of whether the notion sometimes referred to as ‘strong’ AI is self-contradictory—is, essentially, the question of whether an artificial form of life is possible. This question has an immediately paradoxical character, which can be made explicit if we recast it (in terms that would ordinarily seem to be implied by it) as the question of whether an unnatural form of nature is possible. The present paper seeks to explain this paradoxical kind of possibility (...)
- Panpsychism and AI consciousness.Marcus Arvan & Corey J. Maley - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-22.This article argues that if panpsychism is true, then there are grounds for thinking that digitally-based artificial intelligence may be incapable of having coherent macrophenomenal conscious experiences. Section 1 briefly surveys research indicating that neural function and phenomenal consciousness may be both analog in nature. We show that physical and phenomenal magnitudes—such as rates of neural firing and the phenomenally experienced loudness of sounds—appear to covary monotonically with the physical stimuli they represent, forming the basis for an analog relationship between (...)
- Interdisciplinary Communication by Plausible Analogies: the Case of Buddhism and Artificial Intelligence.Michael Cooper - 2022 - Dissertation, University of South FloridaCommunicating interdisciplinary information is difficult, even when two fields are ostensibly discussing the same topic. In this work, I’ll discuss the capacity for analogical reasoning to provide a framework for developing novel judgments utilizing similarities in separate domains. I argue that analogies are best modeled after Paul Bartha’s By Parallel Reasoning, and that they can be used to create a Toulmin-style warrant that expresses a generalization. I argue that these comparisons provide insights into interdisciplinary research. In order to demonstrate this (...)
- A.I.: Artificial Intelligence as Philosophy: Machine Consciousness and Intelligence.David Gamez - 2022 - In David Kyle Johnson, The Palgrave Handbook of Popular Culture as Philosophy. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 1061-1090.A.I.: Artificial Intelligence tells the story of a robot boy who has been engineered to love his human owner. He is abandoned by his owner and pursues a tragic quest to become a real boy so that he can be loved by her again. This chapter explores the philosophical, psychological, and scientific questions that are asked by A.I. It starts with A.I.’s representation of artificial intelligence and then covers the consciousness of robots, which is closely linked to ethical concerns about (...)$899.99 from Amazon (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark 2 citations
- Douglas Hofstadter's Gödelian Philosophy of Mind.Theodor Nenu - 2022 - Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 9 (2):241-266.Hofstadter [1979, 2007] offered a novel Gödelian proposal which purported to reconcile the apparently contradictory theses that (1) we can talk, in a non-trivial way, of mental causation being a real phenomenon and that (2) mental activity is ultimately grounded in low-level rule-governed neural processes. In this paper, we critically investigate Hofstadter’s analogical appeals to Gödel’s [1931] First Incompleteness Theorem, whose “diagonal” proof supposedly contains the key ideas required for understanding both consciousness and mental causation. We maintain that bringing sophisticated (...)
- Digital suffering: why it's a problem and how to prevent it.Bradford Saad & Adam Bradley - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.As ever more advanced digital systems are created, it becomes increasingly likely that some of these systems will be digital minds, i.e. digital subjects of experience. With digital minds comes the risk of digital suffering. The problem of digital suffering is that of mitigating this risk. We argue that the problem of digital suffering is a high stakes moral problem and that formidable epistemic obstacles stand in the way of solving it. We then propose a strategy for solving it: Access (...)
- Why Machines Will Never Rule the World: Artificial Intelligence without Fear by Jobst Landgrebe & Barry Smith (Book review). [REVIEW]Walid S. Saba - 2022 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 3 (4):38-41.Whether it was John Searle’s Chinese Room argument (Searle, 1980) or Roger Penrose’s argument of the non-computable nature of a mathematician’s insight – an argument that was based on Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem (Penrose, 1989), we have always had skeptics that questioned the possibility of realizing strong Artificial Intelligence (AI), or what has become known by Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). But this new book by Landgrebe and Smith (henceforth, L&S) is perhaps the strongest argument ever made against strong AI. It is (...)
- Two New Doubts about Simulation Arguments.Micah Summers & Marcus Arvan - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):496-508.Various theorists contend that we may live in a computer simulation. David Chalmers in turn argues that the simulation hypothesis is a metaphysical hypothesis about the nature of our reality, rather than a sceptical scenario. We use recent work on consciousness to motivate new doubts about both sets of arguments. First, we argue that if either panpsychism or panqualityism is true, then the only way to live in a simulation may be as brains-in-vats, in which case it is unlikely that (...)
- Apresença de Plotino no pensamento de Henri Bergson: arqueologia de uma relação.Magda Costa Carvalho - 2021 - Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (58):107-128.Henri Bergson’s statements on Plotinus are an interesting case-study for his readers, contrasting between an avowed sympathy and an almost absence of references. While Bergson-the-professor is interested in the study of Plotinus’ work for its own sake, Bergson-the-philosopher identifies the Neoplatonist with the matrix of an entire metaphysical body of knowledge: the Ancient Greek philosophy. The article seeks to highlight the articulation between the professor and the philosopher, exploring the scope of Plotinian influences in the construction and consolidation of Bergson’s (...)
- Philosophical and methodological foundations of post-Turing intelligent robotics.Albert Efimov - 2021 - Dissertation, Institute of Philosophy Russian Academy of ScienceThis is PhD thesis submitted to Institute Philosophy of Russian Academy of Science in March 2021.
- Epistemological solipsism as a route to external world skepticism.Grace Helton - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):229-250.I show that some of the most initially attractive routes of refuting epistemological solipsism face serious obstacles. I also argue that for creatures like ourselves, solipsism is a genuine form of external world skepticism. I suggest that together these claims suggest the following morals: No proposed solution to external world skepticism can succeed which does not also solve the problem of epistemological solipsism. And, more tentatively: In assessing proposed solutions to external world skepticism, epistemologists should explicitly consider whether those solutions (...)
- Love in the time of AI.Amy Kind - 2021 - In Barry Francis Dainton, Will Slocombe & Attila Tanyi, Minding the Future: Artificial Intelligence, Philosophical Visions and Science Fiction. Springer. pp. 89-106.As we await the increasingly likely advent of genuinely intelligent artificial systems, a fair amount of consideration has been given to how we humans will interact with them. Less consideration has been given to how—indeed if—we humans will love them. What would human-AI romantic relationships look like? What do such relationships tell us about the nature of love? This chapter explores these questions via consideration of several works of science fiction, focusing especially on the Black Mirror episode “Be Right Back” (...)
- The Physics of God and the Quantum Gravity Theory of Everything.James Redford - 2021 - In The Physics of God and the Quantum Gravity Theory of Everything: And Other Selected Works. Chișinău, Moldova: Eliva Press. pp. 1-186.Analysis is given of the Omega Point cosmology, an extensively peer-reviewed proof (i.e., mathematical theorem) published in leading physics journals by professor of physics and mathematics Frank J. Tipler, which demonstrates that in order for the known laws of physics to be mutually consistent, the universe must diverge to infinite computational power as it collapses into a final cosmological singularity, termed the Omega Point. The theorem is an intrinsic component of the Feynman-DeWitt-Weinberg quantum gravity/Standard Model Theory of Everything (TOE) describing (...)
- Kantian Notion of freedom and Autonomy of Artificial Agency.Manas Sahu - 2021 - Prometeica - Revista De Filosofía Y Ciencias 23:136-149.The objective of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of the Kantian notion of freedom (especially the problem of the third antinomy and its resolution in the critique of pure reason); its significance in the contemporary debate on free-will and determinism, and the possibility of autonomy of artificial agency in the Kantian paradigm of autonomy. Kant's resolution of the third antinomy by positing the ground in the noumenal self resolves the problem of antinomies; however, invites an explanatory gap (...)
- The Philosophy of Westworld.Paul Skokowski - 2021 - In Cybermedia: New Approaches to Sound, Music and Media. New York, NY, USA: pp. 207-222.What exactly does an android experience? Could an android have experiences as rich as humans, or are there limits? The Westworld T V series (Jonathan Noland, 2016- ) offers the opportunity to explore philosophical questions related to human and android experiences through its depiction of a fictional Wild West theme park with androids playing the main characters. Among the most fascinating scenes in the Westworld TV series are the interviews between the android characters Bernard Lowe and Dolores Abernathy. These interviews (...)Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Predicting Me: The Route to Digital Immortality?Paul Smart - 2021 - In Inês Hipólito, Robert William Clowes & Klaus Gärtner, The Mind-Technology Problem : Investigating Minds, Selves and 21st Century Artefacts. Springer Verlag. pp. 185-207.An emerging consensus in cognitive science views the biological brain as a hierarchically-organized predictive processing system that relies on generative models to predict the structure of sensory information. Such a view resonates with a body of work in machine learning that has explored the problem-solving capabilities of hierarchically-organized, multi-layer neural networks, many of which acquire and deploy generative models of their training data. The present chapter explores the extent to which the ostensible convergence on a common neurocomputational architecture might provide (...)
- Predicting Me: The Route to Digital Immortality?Paul Smart - 2021 - In Inês Hipólito, Robert William Clowes & Klaus Gärtner, The Mind-Technology Problem : Investigating Minds, Selves and 21st Century Artefacts. Springer Verlag. pp. 185–207.An emerging consensus in cognitive science views the biological brain as a hierarchically-organized predictive processing system that relies on generative models to predict the structure of sensory information. Such a view resonates with a body of work in machine learning that has explored the problem-solving capabilities of hierarchically-organized, multi-layer (i.e., deep) neural networks, many of which acquire and deploy generative models of their training data. The present chapter explores the extent to which the ostensible convergence on a common neurocomputational architecture (...)
- Artificial intelligence and its natural limits.Karl D. Stephan & Gyula Klima - 2021 - AI and Society (1):9-18.An argument with roots in ancient Greek philosophy claims that only humans are capable of a certain class of thought termed conceptual, as opposed to perceptual thought, which is common to humans, the higher animals, and some machines. We outline the most detailed modern version of this argument due to Mortimer Adler, who in the 1960s argued for the uniqueness of the human power of conceptual thought. He also admitted that if conceptual thought were ever manifested by machines, such an (...)
- Susan Schneider's Proposed Tests for AI Consciousness: Promising but Flawed.D. B. Udell & Eric Schwitzgebel - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (5-6):121-144.Susan Schneider (2019) has proposed two new tests for consciousness in AI (artificial intelligence) systems, the AI Consciousness Test and the Chip Test. On their face, the two tests seem to have the virtue of proving satisfactory to a wide range of consciousness theorists holding divergent theoretical positions, rather than narrowly relying on the truth of any particular theory of consciousness. Unfortunately, both tests are undermined in having an ‘audience problem’: Those theorists with the kind of architectural worries that motivate (...)
- Magical Thinking: The Intersection of Quantum Entanglement and Self-Referential Recursion.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory/.The superposition of magical thinking, quantum entanglement, and self-referential recursion explains the relationship between human and machine intelligence (universal intelligence).
- Artificial Consciousness, Meta-Knowledge, and Physical Omniscience.Ron Chrisley - 2020 - Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 7 (2):199-215.Previous work [Chrisley & Sloman, 2016, 2017] has argued that a capacity for certain kinds of meta-knowledge is central to modeling consciousness, especially the recalcitrant aspects of qualia, in computational architectures. After a quick review of that work, this paper presents a novel objection to Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument (KA) against physicalism, an objec- tion in which such meta-knowledge also plays a central role. It is first shown that the KA's supposition of a person, Mary, who is physically omniscient, and (...)Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligence: Citizenship as the Exception to the Rule.Tyler L. Jaynes - 2020 - AI and Society 35 (2):343-354.The concept of artificial intelligence is not new nor is the notion that it should be granted legal protections given its influence on human activity. What is new, on a relative scale, is the notion that artificial intelligence can possess citizenship—a concept reserved only for humans, as it presupposes the idea of possessing civil duties and protections. Where there are several decades’ worth of writing on the concept of the legal status of computational artificial artefacts in the USA and elsewhere, (...)
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