About this topic
Summary The content of this category can be found in the categories "Can machines think?" and "Machine consciousness." 
Key works The content of this category can be found in the categories "Can machines think?" and "Machine consciousness."  See those two for readings and references, also.
Introductions See the categories "Can machines think?" and "Machine consciousness"
Related categories

323 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 323
  1. Limitation of 'Intelligence Tests'.S. Alam - 1989 - Pakistan Philosophical Journal 26:59-71.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Comments on Hilary Putnam's Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life.Rogers Albritton - 1964 - Journal of Philosophy 61 (November):691-694.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Computers and Education.Donald L. Alderman & Ernest J. Anastasio - 1974 - Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 5 (2):3-5.
  4. Workspace Theories Are Alive and Well.Igor Aleksander - 2011 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (02):309-312.
  5. Information or Logic in Modeling Conscious Systems?Igor Aleksander, David Gamez & Helen Morton - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (2):185-192.
  6. Informational Minds: From Aristotle to Laptops (Book Extract).Igor Aleksander & Helen B. Morton - 2011 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (02):383-397.
  7. Ends and Meaning in Machine-Like Systems.Henri Allan - 1992 - In G. van der Vijve (ed.), New Perspectives on Cybernetics. pp. 220--35.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Who Shapes the Future?: Problem Framings and the Development of Handheld Computers.Jonathan P. Allen - 1998 - Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 28 (2):3-8.
  9. Kees van Deemter: Not Exactly: In Praise of Vagueness. [REVIEW]Patrick Allo - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (1):41-45.
  10. Word Associations Contribute to Machine Learning in Automatic Scoring of Degree of Emotional Tones in Dream Reports.Reza Amini, Catherine Sabourin & Joseph de Koninck - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1570-1576.
    Scientific study of dreams requires the most objective methods to reliably analyze dream content. In this context, artificial intelligence should prove useful for an automatic and non subjective scoring technique. Past research has utilized word search and emotional affiliation methods, to model and automatically match human judges’ scoring of dream report’s negative emotional tone. The current study added word associations to improve the model’s accuracy. Word associations were established using words’ frequency of co-occurrence with their defining words as found in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  11. Minds and Machines.Alan Ross Anderson - 1964 - Prentice-Hall.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  12. Machine Ethics.Susan Anderson & Michael Anderson (eds.) - 2011 - Cambridge University Press.
    The essays in this volume represent the first steps by philosophers and artificial intelligence researchers toward explaining why it is necessary to add an ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  13. Man, Machine and Creativity.Hans G. Andersson - 1989 - AI and Society 3 (2):155-158.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Phenomenology in Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence.Daniel Andler - 2006 - In H. Dreyfus & M. Wrathall (eds.), A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism.
    Fifty years before the present volume appeared, artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive science (Cogsci) emerged from a couple of small-scale academic encounters on the East Coast of the United States. Wedded together like Siamese twins, these nascent research programs appeared to rest on some general assumptions regarding the human mind, and closely connected methodological principles, which set them at such a distance from phenomenology that no contact between the two approaches seemed conceivable. Soon however contact was made, in the form (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Beware the Passionate Robot.Michael A. Arbib - 2004 - In J. Fellous (ed.), Who Needs Emotions. Oxford University Press.
  16. The Nervous System as Physical Machine: With Special Reference to the Origin of Adaptive Behaviour.W. R. Ashby - 1947 - Mind 56 (January):44-59.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  17. Can a Mechanical Chess-Player Outplay its Designer?W. Ross Ashby - 1952 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3 (9):44-57.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Early British Computers: The Story of Vintage Computers and the People Who Built Them. Simon LavingtonProject Whirlwind: The History of a Pioneer Computer. Kent C. Redmond, Thomas M. Smith. [REVIEW]William Aspray - 1982 - Isis 73 (1):132-133.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Evolutionary Computation: Toward a New Philosophy of Machine Intelligence.Thomas B.�ck - 1997 - Complexity 2 (4):28-30.
  20. Consciousness is Computational: The Lida Model of Global Workspace Theory.Bernard J. Baars & Stan Franklin - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):23-32.
  21. The Intelligence Left in AI.Denis L. Baggi - 2000 - AI and Society 14 (3-4):348-378.
    In its forty years of existence, Artificial Intelligence has suffered both from the exaggerated claims of those who saw it as the definitive solution of an ancestral dream — that of constructing an intelligent machine-and from its detractors, who described it as the latest fad worthy of quacks. Yet AI is still alive, well and blossoming, and has left a legacy of tools and applications almost unequalled by any other field-probably because, as the heir of Renaissance thought, it represents a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Why Computers Can't Act.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1981 - American Philosophical Quarterly 18 (April):157-163.
    To be an agent, one must be able to formulate intentions. To be able to formulate intentions, one must have a first-person perspective. Computers lack a first-person perspective. So, computers are not agents.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  23. The Perplexing Conclusion: The Essential Difference Between Natural and Artificial Intelligence is Human Beings' Ability to Deceive.Alexander Barzel - 1998 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (2):165–178.
    As opposed to the computer, the human being can intentionally mislead in many different ways, can behave chaotically, and whenever he has the motivation can choose also by improvisation, non‐consequent misleading, and spontaneous manners of reasoning and articulation. Human perception and the elaboration of the experience are existentially interest‐related, and distorted if found necessary. The arbitrariness is unlimited; human beings can initiate and produce absurd combinations, contextual failures and deceptive expressions, and do so also by intonation and body‐language. These are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. Computers and Life Styles.Yves Battagion - 1994 - World Futures 41 (1):17-20.
  25. The Designer Stance Towards Shanahan's Dynamic Network Theory of the "Conscious Condition".Luc Patrick Beaudoin - 2011 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (02):313-319.
  26. Dennett's Overlooked Originality.David Beisecker - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (1):43-55.
    No philosopher has worked harder than Dan Dennett to set the possibility of machine mentality on firm philosophical footing. Dennett’s defense of this possibility has both a positive and a negative thrust. On the positive side, he has developed an account of mental activity that is tailor-made for the attribution of intentional states to purely mechanical contrivances, while on the negative side, he pillories as mystery mongering and skyhook grasping any attempts to erect barriers to the conception of machine mentality (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Computers, Society, and Nicaragua.David Bellin - 1986 - Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 15 (4):38-38.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Minds or Machines.John Beloff - 2002 - Truth Journal.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. 'You Gotta Listen to How People Talk': Machines and Natural Language.Jacob Berger & Kyle Ferguson - 2009 - In Richard Brown & Kevin S. Decker (eds.), Terminator and Philosophy: I'll be Back, Therefore I Am. pp. 239-252.
    A fun piece discussing the challenges to and prospects of building machines that are able to produce and understand natural language.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Computers and Democracy.H. L. Berghel & D. L. Sallach - 1983 - Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 13 (2):12-16.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Levels of Representationality.Mark H. Bickhard - 1998 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 10 (2):179-215.
    The dominant assumptions -- throughout contemporary philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence -- about the ontology underlying intentionality, and its core of representationality, is that of encodings -- some sort of informational or correspondence or covariation relationship between the represented and its representation that constitutes that representational relationship. There are many disagreements concerning details and implementations, and even some suggestions about claimed alternative ontologies, such as connectionism (though none that escape what I argue is the fundamental flaw in these (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  32. Automata Theory, Artificial Intelligence and Genetic Epistemology.Mark H. Bickhard - 1982 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 36 (4):549.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33. MICHAEL POLANYI: CAN THE MIND BE REPRESENTED BY A MACHINE?Paul Richard Blum - 2010 - Polanyiana 19 (1-2):35-60.
    In 1949, the Department of Philosophy at the University of Manchester organized a symposium “Mind and Machine” with Michael Polanyi, the mathematicians Alan Turing and Max Newman, the neurologists Geoff rey Jeff erson and J. Z. Young, and others as participants. Th is event is known among Turing scholars, because it laid the seed for Turing’s famous paper on “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, but it is scarcely documented. Here, the transcript of this event, together with Polanyi’s original statement and his (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Android Epistemology.Margaret A. Boden - 1995 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Could a Robot Be Creative--And Would We Know?Margaret A. Boden - 1995 - In Android Epistemology. Cambridge: MIT Press.
  36. Machine Perception.Margaret A. Boden - 1969 - Philosophical Quarterly 19 (January):33-45.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. DAKO on Trial.Kimberly Bonia, Fern Brunger, Laura Fullerton, Chad Griffiths & Chris Kaposy - 2012 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 16 (3):275-295.
    This paper tells the story of a recent laboratory medicine controversy in the Canadian province of Newfoundland and Labrador. During the controversy, a DAKOAutostainer machine was blamed for inaccurate breast cancer test results that led to the suboptimal treatment of many patients. In truth, the machine was not at fault. Using concepts developed by Bruno Latour and Pierre Bourdieu, we document the changing nature of the DAKO machine’s agency before, during, and after the controversy, and we make the ethical argument (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. The Superintelligent Will: Motivation and Instrumental Rationality in Advanced Artificial Agents. [REVIEW]Nick Bostrom - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (2):71-85.
    This paper discusses the relation between intelligence and motivation in artificial agents, developing and briefly arguing for two theses. The first, the orthogonality thesis, holds (with some caveats) that intelligence and final goals (purposes) are orthogonal axes along which possible artificial intellects can freely vary—more or less any level of intelligence could be combined with more or less any final goal. The second, the instrumental convergence thesis, holds that as long as they possess a sufficient level of intelligence, agents having (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  39. Taking Intelligent Machines Seriously: Reply to Critics.Nick Bostrom - 2003 - Futures 35 (8):901-906.
    In an earlier paper in this journal[1], I sought to defend the claims that (1) substantial probability should be assigned to the hypothesis that machines will outsmart humans within 50 years, (2) such an event would have immense ramifications for many important areas of human concern, and that consequently (3) serious attention should be given to this scenario. Here, I will address a number of points made by several commentators.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. American Philosophy of Technology: The Empirical Turn.Philip Brey - 2001 - Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Hubert Dreyfus: Humans Versus Computers.Philip Brey - 2001 - In American Philosophy of Technology: The Empirical Turn. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  42. Meeting Floridi's Challenge to Artificial Intelligence From the Knowledge-Game Test for Self-Consciousness.Selmer Bringsjord - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (3):292-312.
    Abstract: In the course of seeking an answer to the question "How do you know you are not a zombie?" Floridi (2005) issues an ingenious, philosophically rich challenge to artificial intelligence (AI) in the form of an extremely demanding version of the so-called knowledge game (or "wise-man puzzle," or "muddy-children puzzle")—one that purportedly ensures that those who pass it are self-conscious. In this article, on behalf of (at least the logic-based variety of) AI, I take up the challenge—which is to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  43. In Computation, Parallel is Nothing, Physical Everything.Selmer Bringsjord - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (1):95-99.
    Andrew Boucher (1997) argues that ``parallel computation is fundamentally different from sequential computation'' (p. 543), and that this fact provides reason to be skeptical about whether AI can produce a genuinely intelligent machine. But parallelism, as I prove herein, is irrelevant. What Boucher has inadvertently glimpsed is one small part of a mathematical tapestry portraying the simple but undeniable fact that physical computation can be fundamentally different from ordinary, ``textbook'' computation (whether parallel or sequential). This tapestry does indeed immediately imply (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (14 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Cognition is Not Computation: The Argument From Irreversibility.Selmer Bringsjord - 1997 - Synthese 113 (2):285-320.
    The dominant scientific and philosophical view of the mind – according to which, put starkly, cognition is computation – is refuted herein, via specification and defense of the following new argument: Computation is reversible; cognition isn't; ergo, cognition isn't computation. After presenting a sustained dialectic arising from this defense, we conclude with a brief preview of the view we would put in place of the cognition-is-computation doctrine.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Precis of What Robots Can and Can't Be.Selmer Bringsjord - 1994 - Psycholoquy 5 (59).
    This book argues that (1) AI will continue to produce machines with the capacity to pass stronger and stronger versions of the Turing Test but that (2) the "Person Building Project" (the attempt by AI and Cognitive Science to build a machine which is a person) will inevitably fail. The defense of (2) rests in large part on a refutation of the proposition that persons are automata -- a refutation involving an array of issues, from free will to Godel to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Intelligence Without Representation.Rodney Brooks - 1991 - Artificial Intelligence 47:139-159.
    Artificial intelligence research has foundered on the issue of representation. When intelligence is approached in an incremental manner, with strict reliance on interfacing to the real world through perception and action, reliance on representation disappears. In this paper we outline our approach to incrementally building complete intelligent Creatures. The fundamental decomposition of the intelligent system is not into independent information processing units which must interface with each other via representations. Instead, the intelligent system is decomposed into independent and parallel activity (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   137 citations  
  47. Do Computers Think? (I).Mario Bunge - 1956 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 7 (26):139-148.
  48. Do Computers Think? (II).Mario Bunge - 1956 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 7 (27):212-219.
  49. Computers and Control in Society.Arthur W. Burks - unknown
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Logic, Computers, and Men.Arthur W. Burks - 1972 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 46:39-57.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
1 — 50 / 323