Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy

The Buddhist philosophical investigation of the elements of existence and/or experience (or dharmas) provides the basis on which Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and their followers deliberate on such topics as the ontological status of external objects and the epistemic import of perceptual states of cognitive awareness. In this essay I will argue that the Buddhist epistemologists, insofar as they accord perception a privileged epistemic status, share a common ground with phenomenologists in the tradition of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, who contend that perception is (...) best understood as bearing intentional content. On this phenomenological account of intentionality, to perceive an object (or to have a perceptual experience) is to apprehend an intentional relation: whether the object intended in perception (the one the perception is of) is real is less important than how it is intended. Indeed, the central feature of intentionality is that it reveals the co-constitutive nature of perception and that which is perceived; as such, it discloses the world rather than attempting to establish a relationship to a discrete, ‘external’ world. I will begin by offering an overview of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's account of perception and intentionality, focusing on the epistemic role of svasaṃvitti ("self-awareness," "self-cognition") as a dual aspect cognition. Then, I will briefly discuss three dominant accounts of the relation between perception and phenomenal content in contemporary philosophy (drawing from the work of Dennett, Dreyfus, O'Regan and Noë, and Zahavi, among others). Finally, I will offer several reasons why the Buddhist epistemologists, along with Western phenomenologists, are justified in asserting that direct perception opens up a domain of phenomenal experience that is prior to our conceptualizing and theorizing about it. (shrink)

Among the many questions raised by Nāgārjuna’s catuṣkoṭi, the most fundamental concerns the type of objects to which its negative statements apply. These statements deny the reality of conditioned Being, which can be understood in two ways: as a negation of our concept or knowledge of conditioned Being, or as a negation of conditioned Being as such. The first interpretation can be called “epistemological” and the second “metaphysical.” Scholarship has almost unanimously accepted the epistemological approach. In this paper I object (...) to this approach and propose to reinterpret the catuṣkoṭi metaphysically, as a description of Being and its inherent principles. I ground my objection in Hegel’s “Doctrine of Being” and argue that the catuṣkoṭi exhibits similar features to the Hegelian concept of substantial negativity. In the end, I draw some conclusions for the study of Nāgārjuna in general and highlight the limits of the parallelism. (shrink)

Translation of Nagarjuna's -Treatise on the Twelve Gates- as well as fazang's commentary on that treatise.

This monograph includes an analysis of the Commentary on the Introduction to Reality (Tattvāvatāravṛtti) by the Indian Madhyamaka Buddhist philosopher, Śrīgupta (7th/8th century), together with a Tibetan critical edition and annotated translation of this text, which has never before been available in English. In this work, Śrīgupta advances the “neither-one-nor-many argument,” which sets out to prove that all things lack ontological independence, and by implication, that everything depends for its existence on something else. I present a detailed reconstruction and analysis (...) of the argument, showing how Śrīgupta rejects the possibility of ontological independence by way of rejecting the possibility of mereological simples, both material and immaterial. Śrīgupta's other important philosophical contributions are brought to light, including his influential threefold criterion for conventional reality (saṃvṛtisatya) and his argument for the possibility of conceptual enlightened cognition (vikalpajñāna), which is standardly supposed to be non-conceptual. (shrink)

This paper examines whether proto-phenomenological accounts in Chinese thought, introduced through Buddhism, provide a conceptual bridge to Husserlian phenomenology. It explores the renewed interest in Yogācāra among twentieth-century Chinese intellectuals, in particular Xiong Shili, revealing inevitable tensions in his interpretation of Yogācāra concepts. Coseru argues that while something analogous to an appearance-reality distinction is present in classical Chinese philosophy, it differs in important ways from how that distinction is drawn in the Yogācāra and Husserlian traditions. He further argues that the (...) fundamental act-content distinction central to Husserlian phenomenology may be absent in Xiong’s monism, raising questions about the compatibility of his New Confucian thought with Yogācāra and the broader phenomenological project, and showcasing the challenges that cross-cultural philosophical inquiry sometimes faces. (shrink)

This paper examines whether proto-phenomenological accounts in Chinese thought, introduced through Buddhism, provide a conceptual bridge to Husserlian phenomenology. It explores the renewed interest in Yogācāra among twentieth-century Chinese intellectuals, in particular Xiong Shili, revealing inevitable tensions in his interpretation of Yogācāra concepts. Coseru argues that while something analogous to an appearance-reality distinction is present in classical Chinese philosophy, it differs in important ways from how that distinction is drawn in the Yogācāra and Husserlian traditions. He further argues that the (...) fundamental act-content distinction central to Husserlian phenomenology may be absent in Xiong’s monism, raising questions about the compatibility of his New Confucian thought with Yogācāra and the broader phenomenological project, and showcasing the challenges that cross-cultural philosophical inquiry sometimes faces. (shrink)

Chinese, European and Indian ancient philosophy all saw movements of skepticism. However, the philosophical proximity in which these three movements stand is often not appreciated. In this article, I provide a comparison of the three most important figures of these movements: Zhuangzi, Sextus Empiricus and Nāgārjuna. I show a broad range of similarities with respect to the arguments they provide for their skeptical views, but also with respect to the way they conceptualize skepticism. I argue that in light of these (...) similarities, we should regard ancient skepticism as a global phenomenon, rather than one confined to one tradition. I also argue that while there are differences in tonality, Zhuangzi and Nāgārjuna are properly classified as skeptics, contrary to their treatment by Matthew Bagger. (shrink)

There’s a common line of reasoning which supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary, Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophers like Śrīgupta (seventh–eighth century) argue that any kind of mental simple is incoherent and thus metaphysically impossible. Lacking any unifying principle, the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is instead an unfounded illusion. In this paper, I present an analysis of Śrīgupta’s "neither-one-nor-many argument" against mental simples and show how his line of reasoning (...) is driven by a set of implicit questions concerning the nature of and relation between consciousness and its intentional object. These questions not only set the agenda for centuries of intra-Buddhist debate on the topic, but they are also questions to which any defender of unified consciousness or a simple subject of experience arguably owes responses. (shrink)

A comprehensive comparison of the Chinese and Sanskrit texts of the Heart Sutra shows that, even after correcting transmission errors, there are substantial differences between them. Most of the differences appear to arise from the process of translating the text from Chinese to Sanskrit in isolation from Sanskrit Prajñaparamita literary traditions. Some differences appear to reflect the differing doctrinal commitments of those involved in creating/transmitting the texts. Following a suggestion by Huifeng (2014), I take a phenomenological approach when reading the (...) Heart Sutra, effectively creating a new kind of commentary that eschews the usual references to metaphysics, mysticism, and magic. The focus here is on the phenomenology of sensory experience and especially the cessation of sensory experience in meditation. (shrink)

This paper addresses the seemingly insurmountable challenges the problem of personal identity raises for the prospect of radical human enhancement and synthetic consciousness. It argues that conceptions of personal identity rooted in psychological continuity akin to those proposed by Parfit and the Buddha may not provide the sort of grounding that many transhumanists chasing the dream of life extension think that they do if they rest upon ontologies that assume an incompatibility between identity and change. It also suggests that process (...) ontologies that take change to be primary, such as those that align with contemporary systems biology, offer a better way out of the personal identity dilemma. But the solution in this case, which regards biological organisms as processes rather than things, may constrain the possibility of biologically inspired superintelligent aliens (BISAs), which Schneider (following Bostrom 2014) posits as possibly the most common form of (extraterrestrial) superintelligence in the universe. (shrink)

Drawing on three Platonic dialogues (Charmides, Alcibiades I, and Theaetetus) and the epistemology of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, this chapter argues that the self-knowledge project need not depend on a metaphysics of self if the awareness present in each knowledge episode is taken to exhibit a reflexive dimension. Whatever the ultimate ground for self-knowledge, it must be such as to provide unity and coherence to experience, even if the achieved unity or harmony is not something determinate or fixed (as suggested by (...) some interpretations of the Platonic soul as form-like, hence as impersonal). The chapter argues that an account of self-knowledge that can explain what turns knowledge onto itself, what makes it personal, is better equipped to show how such knowledge can become a vehicle for self-cultivation. Doctrinal commitment to a no-self view notwithstanding, the recognition on the part of certain Buddhist thinkers that an irreflexive view of awareness may fail to capture the phenomenal and subjective dimensions of knowledge episodes further bolsters such an account. (shrink)

An accessible introduction to Mahayana Buddhist moral philosophy and its relationship to consequentialism.

This article provides an annotated English translation and edition of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of Bhāviveka’s (490/500-570) _Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā_ 3.129cd-136 and of the Tibetan text of the _Tarkajvālā_ thereon, which focus on the discussion of unconditioned entities (_asaṃskṛta_). The study is accompanied by an introduction that outlines the general themes of the third chapter, the specific topics within the examined section and various problematic aspects found in the _Tarkajvālā_ exposition of Buddhist (Vaibhāṣika, Yogācāra) and non-Buddhist (Vaiśeṣika, Jain) doctrines and philosophies. (...) The multitude of inaccuracies detected within the examined _Tarkajvālā_ section cast doubt on its authenticity as a genuine work of Bhāviveka. It is hypothesized that the author of at least this portion of the _Tarkajvālā_ might have been a young student who struggled to recall the fundamental doctrines of the schools he attempts to elucidate. (shrink)

Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience argument objects to the possibility of emergent causation (both downward and same-level) based on both (1) the causal overdetermination of both (a) higher-level emergent events and (b) lower-level basal events, and (2) the causal closure principle of the physical domain. Kim argues that emergent causation entails epiphenomenalism. Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy skeptically critiques the primary (ultimate) existence of causal phenomena and instead suggests that all such phenomena may only be secondarily (conventionally) existent. Mādhyamikas acknowledge that, conventionally, emergent phenomena (...) appear to cause both basal phenomena and other emergent phenomena. However, contra Kim, Mādhyamikas doubt that causal relations ultimately exist between, or among, emergent phenomena and basal phenomena because they doubt that anything ultimately exists. As such, the Madhyamaka critique of causality may provide a skeptical response to Kim because Kim assumes that both emergent and basal phenomena are primarily existent. Altogether, I argue that if we draw upon and accept the Madhyamaka critique of causality, then we may resolve Kim’s problem of epiphenomenalism by reconceptualizing causality as a relation obtaining conventionally between phenomena, while remaining silent on the status of causation at the ultimate level of truth. By arguing this point, I do not mean to suggest that the Madhyamaka critique of causality, while plausible, is in fact correct. Rather, I intend only to show that plausible responses to Kim’s argument may be found by considering less commonly taught philosophical traditions in relation to Kim’s metaphysical assumptions. (shrink)

Riflessione sulla felicità come esito dialettico della dinamica concettuale tra pieno e vuoto.

Among Buddhist reformers, Longlian 隆蓮 (1909–2006) is renowned for revitalizing monastic discipline and Buddhist education in modern China, especially for Buddhist women. Complementing findings in social history and cultural anthropology, I reread Longlian’s work on morality to investigate the philosophical thought that supports her monastic reform. I argue for interpreting her moral theory as a Buddhist expression of meta-ethical pluralism. It is a theory that appreciates a plurality of moralities for sentient beings who are preoccupied with this-worldly life, aspiring to (...) other-worldly liberation, or re-engaging with this-worldly reality to guide others to the Bodhisattvas’ path. Instead of postulating a unitary standard of morality, Longlian encourages each person to explore moral values suitable to their own world as a preparatory step towards universal awakening. In doing so, Longlian makes a case for her monastic reform in a secular world and manages to respond to the (neo-)Confucian critique of Buddhism as a socially disengaged teaching. (shrink)

Among Buddhist reformers, Longlian 隆蓮 (1909–2006) is renowned for revitalizing monastic discipline and Buddhist education in modern China, especially for Buddhist women. Complementing findings in social history and cultural anthropology, I reread Longlian’s work on morality to investigate the philosophical thought that supports her monastic reform. I argue for interpreting her moral theory as a Buddhist expression of meta-ethical pluralism. It is a theory that appreciates a plurality of moralities for sentient beings who are preoccupied with this-worldly life, aspiring to (...) other-worldly liberation, or re-engaging with this-worldly reality to guide others to the Bodhisattvas’ path. Instead of postulating a unitary standard of morality, Longlian encourages each person to explore moral values suitable to their own world as a preparatory step towards universal awakening. In doing so, Longlian makes a case for her monastic reform in a secular world and manages to respond to the (neo-)Confucian critique of Buddhism as a socially disengaged teaching. (shrink)

Among Buddhist reformers, Longlian 隆蓮 (1909–2006) is renowned for revitalizing monastic discipline and Buddhist education in modern China, especially for Buddhist women. Complementing findings in social history and cultural anthropology, I reread Longlian’s work on morality to investigate the philosophical thought that supports her monastic reform. I argue for interpreting her moral theory as a Buddhist expression of meta-ethical pluralism. It is a theory that appreciates a plurality of moralities for sentient beings who are preoccupied with this-worldly life, aspiring to (...) other-worldly liberation, or re-engaging with this-worldly reality to guide others to the Bodhisattvas’ path. Instead of postulating a unitary standard of morality, Longlian encourages each person to explore moral values suitable to their own world as a preparatory step towards universal awakening. In doing so, Longlian makes a case for her monastic reform in a secular world and manages to respond to the (neo-)Confucian critique of Buddhism as a socially disengaged teaching. (shrink)

Among Buddhist reformers, Longlian 隆蓮 (1909–2006) is renowned for revitalizing monastic discipline and Buddhist education in modern China, especially for Buddhist women. Complementing findings in social history and cultural anthropology, I reread Longlian’s work on morality to investigate the philosophical thought that supports her monastic reform. I argue for interpreting her moral theory as a Buddhist expression of meta-ethical pluralism. It is a theory that appreciates a plurality of moralities for sentient beings who are preoccupied with this-worldly life, aspiring to (...) other-worldly liberation, or re-engaging with this-worldly reality to guide others to the Bodhisattvas’ path. Instead of postulating a unitary standard of morality, Longlian encourages each person to explore moral values suitable to their own world as a preparatory step towards universal awakening. In doing so, Longlian makes a case for her monastic reform in a secular world and manages to respond to the (neo-)Confucian critique of Buddhism as a socially disengaged teaching. (shrink)

This essay develops an intercultural approach to the skeptical way of life through an interpretation of two classical traditions: the Pyrrhonian tradition of ancient Greece and the Madhyamaka Buddhist tradition of classical India. The skeptical way of life is characterized by several important features, including a goal of tranquility or of freedom from disturbance and suffering, a philosophical strategy of dialectical argument that terminates in the suspension of judgment or the abandonment of views, a purgative philosophic therapy, and life without (...) belief. A constellation of practical questions that emerge from the skeptical way of life are also considered, including the skeptic’s character, conformity, and care. One of the principal aims of the essay will be to develop this intercultural account of the skeptical way of life and to show by way of this illustrative example how our understanding of skepticism and ancient philosophy is enhanced through an intercultural approach. (shrink)

According to Arti Dhand, it can be argued that all Indian ethics have been primarily virtue ethics. Many have indeed jumped on the virtue bandwagon, providing prima facie interpretations of Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist canons in virtue terms. Others have expressed firm skepticism, claiming that virtues are not proven to be grounded in the nature of things and that, ultimately, the appeal to virtue might just well be a mere façon de parler. In this paper, we aim to advance the (...) discussion of Indian virtue ethics. Our intent is not to provide a catch-all interpretation of the different Indian schools. Our goal is, more modestly, to offer a theory of virtues in Indian philosophies, as a framework for theorists and interpreters who see these diverse traditions as amenable to systematic virtue analysis. Our theory grounds virtues in the reality of genuine moral dispositions and in a system of beliefs where morality is understood as transformative in nature. (shrink)

Nagarjuna (c. 150-250), founder of the Madhyamaka or Middle Way school of Buddhist philosophy and the most influential of all Buddhist thinkers aside from the Buddha himself, concludes his masterpiece, Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way, with these baffling verses: -/- For the abandonment of all views He taught the true teaching By means of compassion I salute him, Gautama -/- But how could anyone possibly abandon all views? In Buddhism between Religion and Philosophy, Rafal K. Stepien shows not only (...) how Nagarjuna's radical teaching of no-view or “abelief” makes sense within his Buddhist philosophy, but also how it stands at the summit of his religious mission to care for all living beings. Rather than treating any one aspect of Nagarjuna's ideas in isolation, here his metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics emerge as a single coherent and convincing philosophical-religious system of thought and practice. -/- Grounded in meticulous study of original texts from classical India and China but innovating on the theories and methods underpinning contemporary scholarship East and West, this study shows how profoundly important voices from the diverse religious and philosophical traditions of the world have until now been diminished, distorted, and silenced. In opening up truly global horizons of existing and co-existing in the world, this work challenges the very ways in which we think about religion and philosophy. (shrink)

Contemplative scholarship has recently reoriented attention towards the neuroscientific study of the soteriological ambition of Buddhist practice, 'awakening'. This article evaluates the project of seeking neural correlates for awakening. Key definitional and operational issues are identified demonstrating that: the nature of awakening is highly contested both within and across Buddhist traditions; the meaning of awakening is both context- and concept-dependent; and awakening may be non-conceptual and ineffable. It is demonstrated that operationalized secular conceptions of awakening, divorced from soteriological and cultural (...) factors, have little relationship to traditional Buddhist construct(s) of awakening. This article identifies methodological issues for secular conceptions of awakening concerning introspection and neuroimaging yet demonstrates also the value of recent advancements in empirical first-person phenomenology for attenuating introspective bias. Overall, it is contended that significant problems arise when decontextualizing awakening and placing it within a scientific naturalistic framework. Careful attention to the definitional, operational, and methodological neuroscientific obstacles identified herein is required in the responsible approach to the investigation of awakening states. (shrink)

This essay critically discusses the rising interest in process philosophy in recent years. I argue that the appeal of process philosophy lies in its ability to circumnavigate the binary dichotomies pervasive in European philosophy and defend an interpretation of process philosophy in terms of relationality, difference, and change. After outlining the central tenets of process philosophy, Graham Harman’s critique of a relational account of process philosophy is examined, particularly his assertion that this type of philosophy cannot fully explain genuine change. (...) Despite the merits of Harman’s critique, I will show that his object-oriented ontology faces similar limitations. Turning to Graham Priest’s dialethism I suggest that philosophy, instead of striving for a consistent representation of fundamental metaphysics, must embrace paradox to some extent. This leads the philosophical discipline to understand itself as a transformative process. This essay critically discusses the rising interest in process philosophy in recent years. I argue that the appeal of process philosophy lies in its ability to circumnavigate the binary dichotomies pervasive in European philosophy and defend an interpretation of process philosophy in terms of relationality, difference, and change. After outlining the central tenets of process philosophy, Graham Harman’s critique of a relational account of process philosophy is examined, particularly his assertion that this type of philosophy cannot fully explain genuine change. Despite the merits of Harman’s critique, I will show that his object-oriented ontology faces similar limitations. Turning to Graham Priest’s dialethism I suggest that philosophy, instead of striving for a consistent representation of fundamental metaphysics, must embrace paradox to some extent. This leads the philosophical discipline to understand itself as a transformative process. (shrink)

Dharmakīrti’s (c. seventh century) Examination of Relations (Sambandhaparīkṣā) is unique in the Indian Buddhist canon for its being the only extant root text devoted entirely to the topic of the ontological status of relations. But the core thesis of this treatise—that relations are only nominally real—is in prima facie tension with another claim that is central to Dharmakīrti’s epistemology: that there exists some kind of “natural relation” (svabhāvapratibandha) that reliably underwrites inferences. Understanding how Dharmakīrti can consistently rely on natural relations (...) to prop up his presentation of inferential reasoning while at the same time advancing an anti-realist account of relations is critical for making sense of his system of logic and epistemology, which came to be nearly universally adopted in Tibetan Buddhism cutting across traditions. Chomden Rikpé Reldri (1227–1305), who was perhaps the most prolific commentator on logic and epistemology in the history of Tibetan philosophy, composed two texts commenting on the Examination of Relations, neither of which have received any scholarly attention to date. In this paper, I provide an introduction to Chomden Reldri’s two commentaries and consider how they may illuminate Dharmakīrti’s text and also what they reveal about the understanding of Dharmakīrti’s account of relations in early Tibetan scholasticism. I then present a translation of Dharmakīrti’s Examination of Relations together with Chomden Reldri’s commentary, Annotations and Topical Outline of the Examination of Relations (’Brel pa brtag pa’i mchan dang sa bcad gnyis). (shrink)

This chapter presents an overview of the life, work, and philosophical contributions of Śāntarakṣita (c. 725–788), who is known for his synthesis of Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka with elements of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition of logic and epistemology. His two most important independent treatises, the Compendium of True Principles (Tattvasaṃgraha) and the Ornament of the Middle Way (Madhyamakālaṃkāra), are characterized by an emphasis on the indispensable role of rational analysis on the Buddhist path as well as serious and systematic engagement with competing Buddhist (...) and non-Buddhist schools of thought. Śāntarakṣita employs a pedagogical-rhetorical device of provisionally adopting what he deems to be successively more rational views to reject less rational ones. Using this approach, in the Ornament of the Middle Way, he recommends a gradual path to arrive at an understanding of the Madhyamaka ultimate truth by incorporating Yogācāra idealist ontology into his presentation of conventional truth. In this same text, he presents an influential iteration of the neither-one-nor-many argument for the Madhyamaka ultimate truth, the emptiness of intrinsic nature—i.e., the universal negation of ontologically independent being—leaving a lasting and significant impact on both Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy. (shrink)

A critical review of five articles that appeared in the special issue of Acta Asiatica, i.e. • Saitō, Akira. “Avalokiteśvara in the Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya.” • Watanabe, Shōgo. “The Lineage of the Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya: With a Focus on Its Introduction and Expressions of Emptiness.” • Horiuchi, Toshio. “Revisiting the ‘Indian’ Commentaries on the Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya: Vimalamitra’s Interpretation of the Eight Aspects.” • Ishii, Kōsei. “The Chinese Texts and Sanskrit Text of the Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya Seen by Wŏnch’ŭk 円測.” • Silk, Jonathan A. “The Heart Sūtra as (...) Dhāraṇī.” -/- My overall impression of Frontier is that the authors are committed to a hermeneutic dictated by the Buddhist religion itself, that the Heart Sutra is an Indian text, composed in Sanskrit. The articles in Frontier seem to suggest that no counterfactual evidence exists, or could exist, that would change this conclusion. (shrink)

Illusionists about consciousness boldly argue that phenomenal consciousness does not fundamentally exist — it only seems to exist. For them, the impression of having a private inner life of conscious qualia is nothing more than a cognitive error, a conjuring trick put on by a purely physical brain. Some phenomenal realists have accused illusionism of being a byproduct of modern Western scientism and overzealous naturalism. However, Jay Garfield has endorsed illusionism by explicitly drawing support from the classical Yogācāra Buddhist philosopher (...) Vasubandhu. In this paper, I assess the degree to which Garfield’s illusionist interpretation accurately captures the views of Vasubandhu and his commentator Sthiramati in their extant Sanskrit works. As it turns out, Vasubandhu and Sthiramati converge with contemporary illusionists in taking an unconscious causal basis of cognitive/linguistic processes to be responsible for generating the illusion of representational states with apparently phenomenal contents. Within their constitutive understanding of the mind as the “imagination of what is non-existent” (abhūtaparikalpa), I raise possible candidates for what might seem to be real instances of phenomenality — mental appearances (pratibhāsa), affective sensory experience (vedanā), and “intrinsic luminosity” (prakṛtiprabhāsvara) — and consider possible responses on behalf of an illusionist interpreter. I conclude that Vasubandhu and Sthiramati really do appear to be strong illusionists about phenomenal consciousness, particularly if phenomenal states are assumed to be essentially representational. (shrink)

Mark Siderits’ confluence approach to philosophy, first sketched in his landmark monograph, Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy (2003), is emblematic of what has arguably become the most influential way of engaging historically and culturally distant Buddhist thinkers and texts systematically and constructively. For nearly half a century, and rather fittingly for someone enthralled by Madhyamaka, Siderits has successfully charted a middle ground between the text-based, exegetical approach to Buddhist philosophy still dominant in many parts of Europe and East Asia and (...) the methods of contemporary Anglophone analytic philosophy. Indebted to both, yet unconstrained by either, the confluence approach represents Siderits’ unique brand of historically-informed systematic reflection, delivered in the characteristically forceful and tightly argued prose that defines his inimitable style. (shrink)

In classical South Asia, most philosophers thought that the self (if it exists at all) is what the first-person pronoun ‘I’ stands for. It is something that persists through time, undergoes conscious thoughts and experiences, and exercises control over actions. The Buddhists accepted the ‘no self’ thesis: they denied that such a self is substantially real. This gave rise to a puzzle for these Buddhists. If there is nothing substantially real that ‘I’ stands for, what are we talking about when (...) we speak of ourselves? In this paper, I present one Buddhist answer to this question, an answer that emerges from the work of the Abhidharma thinker Vasubandhu (4th to 5th century CE). (shrink)

The article discusses Bhāviveka’s Prajñāpradīpavṛtti and Avalokitavrata’s Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā commentaries on the “not without a cause” (nāpy ahetutaḥ) alternative of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 1.1ab, from which it emerges that at least two distinct theories of causality can be attributed to the Lokāyata school. The first one is a physicalist theory that confines all causal relations within the sphere of material elements and is assimilated to accidentalism. The second one is a naturalist theory that attributes causal power to inner nature (svabhāva). The paper (...) discusses the theoretical differences between these two approaches, considers Bhāviveka’s and Avalokitavrata’s counter-arguments and concludes that some of the conjectures that modern scholars have put forward on the relation between svabhāvavāda, accidentalism and Lokāyata should be revised. (shrink)

This paper develops two novel views that help solve the ‘now what’ problem for moral error theorists concerning what they should do with morality once they accept it is systematically false. It does so by reconstructing aspects of the metaethical and metanormative reflections found in the Madhyamaka Buddhist, and in particular the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka Buddhist, tradition. It also aims to resolve the debate among contemporary scholars of Madhyamaka Buddhism concerning the precise metaethical status of its views, namely, whether Madhyamaka Buddhism (...) can count as a genuine moral skepticism. The paper argues that Mādhyamikas are indeed moral skeptics, and moral skeptics more in a ‘Pyrrhonian,’ or quietist, sense if one follows the Prāsaṅgika line of thinkers. Overall, the claim is that Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka Buddhists treat morality and normativity more broadly as a source of suffering to be ultimately overcome for therapeutic reasons. They propose to do this by abolishing fully asserting genuine moral and normative beliefs while also occasionally passively and reactively pretending some normative judgments are true when it appears doing so would be salutary. These two approaches are called ‘nonassertive moral abolitionism’ and ‘reactionary moral fictionalism,’ respectively. They are developed and offered to contemporary error theorists willing to consider a non-normative and non-collectivist criterion for solving the ‘now what’ problem. (shrink)

Buddhanature, or tathagatagarbha: some say it is not Buddhist, some say it is quintessentially so. I do not want to push either judgment upon you; there is more than one way to be a Buddhist! Instead, I want to provide a roundup of some formative buddhanature texts and allow you to see what is unique about them, in the hope that you might explore these fascinating works for yourself. -/- In the texts outlined below, we see innovative steps taken away (...) from the philosophical preoccupation with emptiness (sunyata) and not-self (anatman) with which much early Buddhist scholasticism was concerned, with a focus instead on a type of liberative phenomenology that allows us to uncover our “true” nature and realize liberation. (shrink)

Santideva's 8th century Mahayana Buddhist classic, the Guide to the Practices of Awakening (Bodhicaryavatara), has been a source of philosophical inspiration in the Indian and Tibetan traditions for over a thousand years. Stephen Harris guides us through a philosophical exploration of Santideva's masterpiece, introducing us to his understanding of the compassionate bodhisattva, who vows to liberate the entire universe from suffering. Individual chapters provide studies of the bodhisattva virtues of generosity, patience, compassion, and wisdom, illustrating the role each plays in (...) Santideva's account of well-being and moral development. Harris also provides in-depth analysis of many of Santideva's most influential arguments, demonstrating how he employs reasoning as a method to cultivate moral character. (shrink)

The article examines two claims made by Antoine Panaïoti: (1) That both Nietzsche and Buddhists denounce the self as a misleading fiction. (2) That Buddhist compassion is close to a “compassion of strength” that Nietzsche approves. This article agrees with (1) and disagrees with (2). The descriptive metaphysical commitments of Nietzsche and Buddhism are subordinate to their divergent normative projects. Both reject a single, enduring, and independent self; but where Mahāyāna Buddhism advocates care or compassion toward all sentient beings, Nietzsche (...) questions the value of compassion, holding that suffering is not bad in itself. Some recent commentators suggest that a text by the Buddhist philosopher Śāntideva offers an argument from “no‐self” to universal compassion. Nietzsche disputes this connection; and Śāntideva's Madhyamaka position, in which nothing has an intrinsic nature, cannot easily counter Nietzsche's claim that suffering is not intrinsically bad. Nietzsche's privileging of states of “becoming,” “discovering,” or “creating” oneself sets him deeply at odds with Buddhism. For Buddhists the fundamentally problematic attitude is a pre‐theoretical sense of self, “egoism,” or “self‐grasping” which is at the root of human craving. Agreeing with the philosophical claim that there is no self is not sufficient to dispel this pre‐theoretical orientation. (shrink)

The publication in 2015 (ed. Li) of Chap. 6 of the rediscovered Sanskrit text of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra (MA) allows us to witness more directly Candrakīrti’s careful and deliberate critique of the ‘chariot argument’ for the merely conventional existence of the self in Indian Abhidharmic thought. I argue that in MA 6.140–141, Candrakīrti alludes to the use of the chariot argument in the Milindapañha as negating only the view of a permanent self (compared to an elephant), rather than negating ego-identification (compared (...) to a snake in its hole). In contrast to this misuse of the chariot argument, in MA 6.150–165 Candrakīrti uses the chariot argument as an allegory to enable the meditator to refute the basis of ego-identification in seven ways. Candrakīrti’s use of the chariot argument does not establish any theory about the self or not-self, but acts as a guide to meditation as part of philosophy as a spiritual practice with the goal of liberation. (shrink)

In this paper I am addressing the question whether Nāgārjuna’s doctrine should be understood as a theory that describes reality itself (ontology) or as a theory of our relation to reality (epistemological, logical, psychological, etc.). To answer this question, I propose to compare Nāgārjuna’s concept of emptiness to that of ‘caducity’, a key element in the ontology of Renaissance Neoplatonist philosopher Francisco Patrizi. By showing that these concepts are similar, I argue that Nāgārjuna’s standpoint can be considered as that of (...) ontology. (shrink)

Is Yogācāra a system of idealist metaphysics or a theory of experience without metaphysical commitments? An increasing amount of literature has argued, since the 1980s, in favor of the second answer. In this paper, I propose to review the background to the question. In fact, most of the attempts to answer the question have been made with reference to Buddhist texts and concepts. However, labels such as “idealism” emerged from Western philosophy and are reflective of specific historical situations and problems. (...) Extending their use to other contexts requires that these specificities are taken into account. Building on an historical survey, I suggest that some essential features of Yogācāra correspond to features of an ancient Greek tradition of metaphysics that has been characterized as idealist: Neoplatonism. On this basis, I come back to the initial question and argue in favor of the idealist interpretation. (shrink)

In his book review of Graham Priest's The Fifth Corner of Four, Mark Siderits, while criticising Priest's philology, suggests that Priest's work is 'of considerable interest' for two reasons. First, 'when two independent traditions use similar methods to work on similar issues, it is always possible that one may have hit on approaches that the other missed'. Second, 'the decentering that can be induced by looking at another tradition may trigger fresh insights, even if those insights are not ones that (...) were actually developed by the tradition marked 'other''. The main task of this paper is to unpack Siderits' thought. By analysing some of Priest's work, I will suggest a decentering that must have taken place in China when Buddhism was 'exported to China in Buddhist shipping containers'. For anyone familiar with the forms of Buddhist philosophy developed in India, various forms of Chinese Buddhism can often look strange. Some ideas that were debated and defended by Indian Buddhists do not appear anywhere in Chinese Buddhism and some assumptions have been quietly added to Buddhism by Chinese Buddhists. By showing that Priest's work brings out the 'innovation' that Chinese Buddhists gave to Buddhism, I will suggest that it is this decentering that Siderits suggests Priest makes use of. (shrink)

At the end of his review of The Fifth Corner of Four: An Essay on Buddhist Metaphysics and the Catuṣkoṭi by Graham Priest, Mark Siderits (2019) remarks.

In the early twentieth century, Uchiyama Gudō, Seno’o Girō, Lin Qiuwu, and others advocated a Buddhism that was radical in two respects. Firstly, they adopted a more or less naturalist stance with respect to Buddhist doctrine and related matters, rejecting karma or other supernatural beliefs. And secondly, they held political and economic views that were radically anti-hegemonic, anti-capitalist, and revolutionary. Taking the idea of such a “radical Buddhism” seriously, A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism asks (...) whether it is possible to develop a philosophy that is simultaneously naturalist, anti-capitalist, Buddhist, and consistent. Rather than a study of radical Buddhism, then, this book is an attempt to radicalize it. The foundations of this “radicalized radical Buddhism” are provided by a realist interpretation of Yogācāra, elucidated and elaborated with some help from thinkers in the broader Tiantai/Tendai tradition and American philosophers Donald Davidson and W.V.O. Quine. A key implication of this foundation is that only this world and only this life are real, from which it follows that if Buddhism aims to alleviate suffering, it has to do so in this world and in this life. Twentieth-century radical Buddhists (as well as some engaged Buddhists) came to a similar conclusion, often expressed in their aim to realize “a Buddha land in this world.” Building on this foundation, but also on Mahāyāna moral philosophy, this book argues for an ethics and social philosophy based on a definition of evil as that what is or should be expected to cause death or suffering. On that ground, capitalism should be rejected indeed, but utopianism must be treated with caution as well, which raises questions about what it means – from a radicalized radical Buddhist perspective – to aim for a Buddha land in this world. (shrink)

Mark Siderits’ Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy is a rich and wide-ranging volume. It is an exercise in what Siderits calls “fusion philosophy,” where the theoretical resources invented by one philosophical tradition are used to solve problems for another. The aim of this book, therefore, is to show how innovations in Buddhist philosophy in Sanskrit can help us make progress in contemporary debates about the nature of persons and personal identity. Here, I think, the book is a success. Not only (...) has it opened up new possibilities within the theoretical space where these debates take place, but also it persuasively explains why these possibilities are worth taking seriously.In a nutshell, the argument of the... (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna of the Ratnamālāvadāna presents six key aspects of the development of Buddhist thought from the Pāli canon to the Sarvāstivāda tradition: childlessness, the arrival of a fetus through the propitiation of gods, presence of heretics, the impact of Buddha’s intervention and a child bodhisattva, soteriological elements of the story’s didactics, and the Buddha’s peculiar smile. These six key aspects were chosen to reflect and explore the content of Sarvāstivādin society and teachings concerning (...) its source narratives of the Kusīdāvadāna of Avadānaśataka and the Pāli canon. This helps us to understand the composition of Sarvāstivāda doctrine as recounted in the Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna, which varies from its source the Kusīdāvadāna of Avadānaśataka. It also aids in the identification of the avadāna and avadānamālā forms of Sarvāstivāda, as well as the impact of the Pāli canon and Brahmanical thought on them. The Kusīdāvadāna of Avadānaśataka, which is the source of the Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna and the Pāli canon, will be utilized to examine the six aspects of the societal and doctrinal development of the Buddhist thought of Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna. The final portion is the very first annotated translation of Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna based on Takahata’s 1954 original version. (shrink)

Ajahn Sona, Bloom: Buddhist Reflections on Serenity and Love. Ottawa, Ontario: Sumeru Press Inc, 2020. 144 pp. CAN $24.95 (pb). ISBN 978-1-89655-960-5.

Superiority Conceit in Buddhist Traditions: A Historical Perspective, by Bhikkhu Analayo. Wisdom Publications, 2021. 184pp. Hb. $24.95, ISBN-13: 9781614297192; Ebook $12.99, ISBN-10:1614297193.