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  1. Causal Explanation Beyond the Gene: Manipulation and Causality in Epigenetics.Jan Baedke - 2012 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 27 (2):153-174.
    This paper deals with the interrelationship between causal explanation and methodology in a relatively young discipline in biology: epigenetics. Based on cases from molecular and ecological epigenetics, I show that James Woodward’s interventionist account of causation captures essential features about how epigeneticists using highly diverse methods, i.e. laboratory experiments and purely observational studies, think about causal explanation. I argue that interventionism thus qualifies as a useful unifying explanatory approach when it comes to cross-methodological research efforts: It can act as a (...)
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  2. Defending the Piggyback Principle Against Shapiro and Sober's Empirical Approach.Joseph A. Baltimore - 2010 - Synthese 175 (2):151-168.
    Jaegwon Kim’s supervenience/exclusion argument attempts to show that non-reductive physicalism is incompatible with mental causation. This influential argument can be seen as relying on the following principle, which I call “the piggyback principle”: If, with respect to an effect, E, an instance of a supervenient property, A, has no causal powers over and above, or in addition to, those had by its supervenience base, B, then the instance of A does not cause E (unless A is identical with B). In (...)
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  3. Interventionism and Epiphenomenalism.Michael Baumgartner - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):359-383.
    In a recent paper, Shapiro and Sober (2007) defend two claims with respect to the master argument for epiphenomenalism, which is designed to rebut non-reductive physicalism: (i) relative to an interventionist account of causation, as most elaborately presented in (Woodward 2003), the master argument turns out to be invalid; and (ii) interventionism provides a means to experimentally uncover micro effects of macro causes. The first part of this paper takes issue with both of these claims by showing that Woodward’s interventionism (...)
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  4. Interdefining Causation and Intervention.Michael Baumgartner - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (2):175-194.
    Non-reductive interventionist theories of causation and methodologies of causal reasoning embedded in that theoretical framework have become increasingly popular in recent years. This paper argues that one variant of an interventionist account of causation, viz. the one presented, for example, in Woodward (2003 ), is unsuited as a theoretical fundament of interventionist methodologies of causal reasoning, because it renders corresponding methodologies incapable of uncovering a causal structure in a finite number of steps. This finding runs counter to Woodward's own assessment (...)
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  5. Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non-Reductive Physicalism.Michael Baumgartner - 2009 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):161-178.
    The first part of this paper presents an argument showing that the currently most highly acclaimed interventionist theory of causation, i.e. the one advanced by Woodward, excludes supervening macro properties from having a causal influence on effects of their micro supervenience bases. Moreover, this interventionist exclusion argument is demonstrated to rest on weaker premises than classical exclusion arguments. The second part then discusses a weakening of interventionism that Woodward suggests. This weakened version of interventionism turns out either to be inapplicable (...)
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  6. Introduction to Special Issue on 'Actual Causation'.Michael Baumgartner & Luke Glynn - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):1-8.
    An actual cause of some token effect is itself a token event that helped to bring about that effect. The notion of an actual cause is different from that of a potential cause – for example a pre-empted backup – which had the capacity to bring about the effect, but which wasn't in fact operative on the occasion in question. Sometimes actual causes are also distinguished from mere background conditions: as when we judge that the struck match was a cause (...)
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  7. The Oxford Handbook of Causation.Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Causation is a central topic in many areas of philosophy. In metaphysics, philosophers want to know what causation is, and how it is related to laws of nature, probability, action, and freedom of the will. In epistemology, philosophers investigate how causal claims can be inferred from statistical data, and how causation is related to perception, knowledge and explanation. In the philosophy of mind, philosophers want to know whether and how the mind can be said to have causal efficacy, and in (...)
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  8. Judge Woodward and the Catholepistemiad.William Warner Bishop - 1945
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  9. How Effects Depend on Their Causes, Why Causal Transitivity Fails, and Why We Care About Causation.Gunnar Björnsson - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):349-390.
    Despite recent efforts to improve on counterfactual theories of causation, failures to explain how effects depend on their causes are still manifest in a variety of cases. In particular, theories that do a decent job explaining cases of causal preemption have problems accounting for cases of causal intransitivity. Moreover, the increasing complexity of the counterfactual accounts makes it difficult to see why the concept of causation would be such a central part of our cognition. In this paper, I propose an (...)
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  10. Making Something Happen.Max Black - 1958 - In Sidney Hook (ed.), Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science. Collier-Macmillan. pp. 15--15.
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  11. Why the Difference Between Explanation and Argument Matters to Science Education.Ingo Brigandt - 2016 - Science and Education 25:251-275.
    Contributing to the recent debate on whether or not explanations ought to be differentiated from arguments, this article argues that the distinction matters to science education. I articulate the distinction in terms of explanations and arguments having to meet different standards of adequacy. Standards of explanatory adequacy are important because they correspond to what counts as a good explanation in a science classroom, whereas a focus on evidence-based argumentation can obscure such standards of what makes an explanation explanatory. I provide (...)
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  12. Ioan Woodward.Tom Burns - 2013 - In Morgen Witzel & Malcolm Warner (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Management Theorists. Oxford University Press. pp. 174.
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  13. An Interventionist Approach to Causation in Psychology by John Campbell.John Campbell - manuscript
    My project in this paper is to extend the interventionist analysis of causation to give an account of causation in psychology. Many aspects of empirical investigation into psychological causation fit straightforwardly into the interventionist framework. I address three problems. First, the problem of explaining what it is for a causal relation to be properly psychological rather than merely biological. Second, the problem of rational causation: how it is that reasons can be causes. Finally, I look at the implications of an (...)
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  14. An Interventionist Approach to Causation in Psychology.John Campbell - 2006 - In Alison Gopnik & Larry J. Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy and Computation. Oxford University Press. pp. 58--66.
  15. Against Modularity, the Causal Markov Condition, and Any Link Between the Two: Comments on Hausman and Woodward.Nancy Cartwright - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):411-453.
    In their rich and intricate paper ‘Independence, Invariance, and the Causal Markov Condition’, Daniel Hausman and James Woodward ([1999]) put forward two independent theses, which they label ‘level invariance’ and ‘manipulability’, and they claim that, given a specific set of assumptions, manipulability implies the causal Markov condition. These claims are interesting and important, and this paper is devoted to commenting on them. With respect to level invariance, I argue that Hausman and Woodward's discussion is confusing because, as I point out, (...)
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  16. Measuring Causes Invariance, Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition.Nancy Cartwright, London School of Economics and Political Science & Universiteit van Amsterdam - 2000 - London School of Economics, Centre for the Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences.
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  17. Review of James Woodward, Making Things Happen. [REVIEW]H. De Regt - forthcoming - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  18. Review of James Woodward, Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation[REVIEW]Henk W. de Regt - 2004 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (7).
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  19. Absences and Late Preemption.Oisín Deery - 2013 - Theoria 79 (1):309-325.
    I focus on token, deterministic causal claims as they feature in causal explanations. Adequately handling absences is difficult for most causal theories, including theories of causal explanation. Yet so is adequately handling cases of late preemption. The best account of absence-causal claims as they appear in causal explanations is Jonathan Schaffer's quaternary, contrastive account. Yet Schaffer's account cannot handle preemption. The account that best handles late preemption is James Woodward's interventionist account. Yet Woodward's account is inadequate when it comes to (...)
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  20. Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist Causation and Compatibilist Sourcehood.Oisín Deery & Eddy Nahmias - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1255-1276.
    We use recent interventionist theories of causation to develop a compatibilist account of causal sourcehood, which provides a response to Manipulation Arguments for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. Our account explains the difference between manipulation and determinism, against the claim of Manipulation Arguments that there is no relevant difference. Interventionism allows us to see that causal determinism does not mean that variables outside of the agent causally explain her actions better than variables within the agent, whereas the causal (...)
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  21. Direct Cause.Frederick Eberhardt - unknown
    An interventionist account of causation characterizes causal relations in terms of changes resulting from particular interventions. We provide an example of a causal relation for which there does not exist an intervention satisfying the common interventionist standard. We consider adaptations that would save this standard and describe their implications for an interventionist account of causation. No adaptation preserves all the aspects that make the interventionist account appealing.
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  22. Direct Causes and the Trouble with Soft Interventions.Frederick Eberhardt - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (4):1-23.
    An interventionist account of causation characterizes causal relations in terms of changes resulting from particular interventions. I provide a new example of a causal relation for which there does not exist an intervention satisfying the common interventionist standard. I consider adaptations that would save this standard and describe their implications for an interventionist account of causation. No adaptation preserves all the aspects that make the interventionist account appealing. Part of the fallout is a clearer account of the difficulties in characterizing (...)
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  23. Experimental Indistinguishability of Causal Structures.Frederick Eberhardt - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):684-696.
    Using a variety of different results from the literature, I show how causal discovery with experiments is limited unless substantive assumptions about the underlying causal structure are made. These results undermine the view that experiments, such as randomized controlled trials, can independently provide a gold standard for causal discovery. Moreover, I present a concrete example in which causal underdetermination persists despite exhaustive experimentation and argue that such cases undermine the appeal of an interventionist account of causation as its dependence on (...)
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  24. Manipulability Theory and Event Types.Douglas Ehring - 1982 - Analysis 42 (3):149 - 151.
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  25. Causal Projectivism, Agency, and Objectivity.Elena Popa - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (2):147-163.
    This article examines how specific realist and projectivist versions of manipulability theories of causation deal with the problem of objectivity. Does an agent-dependent concept of manipulability imply that conflicting causal claims made by agents with different capacities can come out as true? In defence of the projectivist stance taken by the agency view, I argue that if the agent’s perspective is shown to be uniform across different agents, then the truth-values of causal claims do not vary arbitrarily and, thus, reach (...)
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  26. Review of Mathias Frisch's Causal Reasoning in Physics. [REVIEW]Matt Farr - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (4):axw020.
    Review of 'Causal Reasoning in Physics' by Mathias Frisch for British Journal for Philosophy of Science.
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  27. High-Level Explanation and the Interventionist's 'Variables Problem'.L. R. Franklin-Hall - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (2):553-577.
    The interventionist account of causal explanation, in the version presented by Jim Woodward, has been recently claimed capable of buttressing the widely felt—though poorly understood—hunch that high-level, relatively abstract explanations, of the sort provided by sciences like biology, psychology and economics, are in some cases explanatorily optimal. It is the aim of this paper to show that this is mistaken. Due to a lack of effective constraints on the causal variables at the heart of the interventionist causal-explanatory scheme, as presently (...)
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  28. Causality, Mechanisms and Manipulation.Maria Carla Galavotti - unknown
    This paper suggests an integration of Wesley Salmon's mechanistic theory of causality with a manipulative account of causation of the kind that has been recently defended by Huw Price and Peter Menzies. Firstly, Salmon's view of causality is outlined, and the main issues of the debate around it are recollected. Secondly, the manipulative view of causality is sketched and the possibility of its integration with Salmon's theory is considered for the purpose of coping with some of the problems raised by (...)
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  29. Causal Nets, Interventionism, and Mechanisms.Alexander Gebharter - 2017 - Cham: Springer.
    This monograph looks at causal nets from a philosophical point of view. The author shows that one can build a general philosophical theory of causation on the basis of the causal nets framework that can be fruitfully used to shed new light on philosophical issues. Coverage includes both a theoretical as well as application-oriented approach to the subject. The author first counters David Hume’s challenge about whether causation is something ontologically real. The idea behind this is that good metaphysical concepts (...)
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  30. How Occam's Razor Provides a Neat Definition of Direct Causation.Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz - 2014 - In J. M. Mooij, D. Janzing, J. Peters, T. Claassen & A. Hyttinen (eds.), Proceedings of the UAI Workshop Causal Inference: Learning and Prediction. CEUR-WS. pp. 1-10.
    In this paper we show that the application of Occam’s razor to the theory of causal Bayes nets gives us a neat definition of direct causation. In particular we show that Occam’s razor implies Woodward’s (2003) definition of direct causation, provided suitable intervention variables exist and the causal Markov condition (CMC) is satisfied. We also show how Occam’s razor can account for direct causal relationships Woodward style when only stochastic intervention variables are available.
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  31. An Internal Limit of the Structural Analysis of Causation.Alessandro Giordani - 2016 - Axiomathes 26 (4):429-450.
    Structural models of systems of causal connections have become a common tool in the analysis of the concept of causation. In the present paper I offer a general argument to show that one of the most powerful definitions of the concept of actual cause, provided within the structural models framework, is not sufficient to grant a full account of our intuitive judgements about actual causation, so that we are still waiting for a comprehensive definition. This is done not simply by (...)
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  32. Running Head: Conditional Interventions.Clark Glymour - manuscript
    The conditional intervention principle is a formal principle that relates patterns of interventions and outcomes to causal structure. It is a central assumption of the causal Bayes net formalism. Four experiments suggest that preschoolers can use the conditional intervention principle both to learn complex causal structure from patterns of evidence and to predict patterns of evidence from knowledge of causal structure. Other theories of causal learning do not account for these results.
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  33. Review of James Woodward, Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. [REVIEW]Clark Glymour - unknown
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  34. James Woodward, Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford, 2003, 418pp, $65.00 (Hbk) ISBN 0195155270. [REVIEW]Clark Glymour - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):779-790.
  35. Of Miracles and Interventions.Luke Glynn - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):43-64.
    In Making Things Happen, James Woodward influentially combines a causal modeling analysis of actual causation with an interventionist semantics for the counterfactuals encoded in causal models. This leads to circularities, since interventions are defined in terms of both actual causation and interventionist counterfactuals. Circularity can be avoided by instead combining a causal modeling analysis with a semantics along the lines of that given by David Lewis, on which counterfactuals are to be evaluated with respect to worlds in which their antecedents (...)
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  36. Causal Reasoning Through Intervention.York Hagmayer, Steven A. Sloman, David A. Lagnado & Michael R. Waldmann - 2007 - In Alison Gopnik & Laura Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation. Oxford University Press.
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  37. The Metaphysics of Causal Models: Where's the Biff?Toby Handfield, Charles R. Twardy, Kevin B. Korb & Graham Oppy - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (2):149-68.
    This paper presents an attempt to integrate theories of causal processes—of the kind developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe—into a theory of causal models using Bayesian networks. We suggest that arcs in causal models must correspond to possible causal processes. Moreover, we suggest that when processes are rendered physically impossible by what occurs on distinct paths, the original model must be restricted by removing the relevant arc. These two techniques suffice to explain cases of late preëmption and other cases (...)
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  38. James Woodward on Scientific Explanation and Causal Capacities.I. Hanzel - 2000 - Filozofia 55 (7):521-533.
    The aim of the paper is to present James Woodward's conception of the philosophy of science as it has been developed during last two decades in his essays. Compared with B. van Fraassen, N. Cartwright or W. C. Salmon the views of J. Woodward are not so popular. According to the author, however, they represent an important contribution to the contemporary philosophy of science. In the first two parts of the paper the differences between Woodward's and Hempel's views of scientific (...)
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  39. Systems Without a Graphical Causal Representation.Daniel M. Hausman, Reuben Stern & Naftali Weinberger - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1925-1930.
    There are simple mechanical systems that elude causal representation. We describe one that cannot be represented in a single directed acyclic graph. Our case suggests limitations on the use of causal graphs for causal inference and makes salient the point that causal relations among variables depend upon details of causal setups, including values of variables.
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  40. Modularity and the Causal Markov Condition: A Restatement.Daniel M. Hausman & James Woodward - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):147-161.
    expose some gaps and difficulties in the argument for the causal Markov condition in our essay ‘Independence, Invariance and the Causal Markov Condition’ ([1999]), and we are grateful for the opportunity to reformulate our position. In particular, Cartwright disagrees vigorously with many of the theses we advance about the connection between causation and manipulation. Although we are not persuaded by some of her criticisms, we shall confine ourselves to showing how our central argument can be reconstructed and to casting doubt (...)
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  41. Manipulation and the Causal Markov Condition.Daniel Hausman & James Woodward - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):846-856.
    This paper explores the relationship between a manipulability conception of causation and the causal Markov condition (CM). We argue that violations of CM also violate widely shared expectations—implicit in the manipulability conception—having to do with the absence of spontaneous correlations. They also violate expectations concerning the connection between independence or dependence relationships in the presence and absence of interventions.
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  42. Ceteris Paribus Conditions and the Interventionist Account of Causality.Tobias Henschen - 2015 - Synthese 192 (10):3297-3311.
    The paper uses a de-relativized variant of Woodward’s definition of direct type-level causation to develop an account of causal ceteris paribus laws. It argues that the relation between X and Y needs to satisfy three conditions in order to qualify as one of direct type-level causation, that satisfaction of these conditions guarantees the applicability of claims of direct type-level causation, that the context of applicability motivates referring to these conditions as cp conditions, and that claims of direct type-level causation qualify (...)
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  43. Making Things Happen.E. Hiddleston - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):545-547.
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  44. Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.C. Hitchcock - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (4):639-641.
    book reveiw van boek met gelijknamige titel van Judea Pearl.
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  45. Cause and Norm.Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.
    Much of the philosophical literature on causation has focused on the concept of actual causation, sometimes called token causation. In particular, it is this notion of actual causation that many philosophical theories of causation have attempted to capture.2 In this paper, we address the question: what purpose does this concept serve? As we shall see in the next section, one does not need this concept for purposes of prediction or rational deliberation. What then could the purpose be? We will argue (...)
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  46. Of Brains and Planets: On a Causal Criterion for Mind-Brain Identities.Vera Hoffmann-Kolss - 2016 - Synthese 193 (4):1177-1189.
    Whether mental properties are identical with neural properties is one of the central questions of contemporary philosophy of mind. Many philosophers agree that even if mental properties are identical with neural properties, the mind-brain identity thesis cannot be established on empirical grounds, but only be vindicated by theoretical philosophical considerations. In his paper ‘When Is a Brain Like the Planet?’, Clark Glymour proposes a causal criterion for local property identifications and claims that this criterion can be used to empirically establish (...)
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  47. Interventionism and Higher-Level Causation.Vera Hoffmann-Kolss - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (1):49-64.
    Several authors have recently claimed that the notorious causal exclusion problem, according to which higher-level causes are threatened with causal pre-emption by lower-level causes, can be avoided if causal relevance is understood in terms of Woodward's interventionist account of causation. They argue that if causal relevance is defined in interventionist terms, there are cases where only higher-level properties, but not the lower-level properties underlying them, qualify as causes of a certain effect. In this article, I show that the line of (...)
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  48. Relevance, Not Invariance, Explanatoriness, Not Manipulability: Discussion of Woodward’s Views on Explanatory Relevance.Cyrille Imbert - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):625-636.
    According to Woodward’s causal model of explanation, explanatory information is relevant for manipulation purposes and indicates by means of invariant causal relations how to change the value of certain target explanandum variables by intervening on others. Therefore, the depth of an explanation is evaluated through the size of the domain of invariance of the generalization involved. In this article, I argue that Woodward’s account of explanatory relevance is still unsatisfactory and claim that the depth of an explanation should be explicated (...)
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  49. Relevance, Not Invariance, Explanatoriness, Not Manipulability: Discussion of Woodward on Explanatory Relevance.Cyrille Imbert - unknown
    In Woodward's causal model of explanation, explanatory information is information that is relevant to manipulation and control and that affords to change the value of some target explanandum variable by intervening on some other. Accordingly, the depth of an explanation is evaluated through the size of the domain of invariance of the generalization involved. In this paper, I argue that Woodward's treatment of explanatory relevance in terms of invariant causal relations is still wanting and suggest to evaluate the depth of (...)
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  50. How Do Causes Depend on Us? The Many Faces of Perspectivalism.Jenann Ismael - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):245-267.
    Huw Price has argued that on an interventionist account of cause the distinction is perspectival, and the claim prompted some interesting responses from interventionists and in particular an exchange with Woodward that raises questions about what it means to say that one or another structure is perspectival. I’ll introduce his reasons for claiming that the distinction between cause and effect on an interventionist account is perspectival. Then I’ll introduce a distinction between different ways in which a class of concepts can (...)
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