About this topic
Summary Mathematical platonism is the view on which mathematical objects exist and are abstract (aspatial, atemporal and acausal) and independent of human minds and linguistic practices. According to mathematical platonism, mathematical theories are true in virtue of those objects possessing (or not) certain properties. One important challenge to platonism is explaining how biological organisms such as human beings could have knowledge of such objects. Another is to explain why mathematical theories about such objects should turn out to be applicable in sciences concerned with the physical world. 
Key works One of the most famous platonists was Frege (see e.g. Frege & Beaney 1997) and his line of thought is currently continued by neologicists (Wright 1983Hale 2001). Other famous platonists were Quine 2004 and Gödel 1947. Another group of platonists are structuralists, see the category summary for mathematical structuralism.
Introductions It's good to start with Linnebo 2009 and references therein. 
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  1. From Platonism to Neoplatonism. [REVIEW]R. A. - 1956 - Review of Metaphysics 9 (4):707-708.
  2. Ontological and Epistemological Dimensions of Gödel's Platonism.Miloš Adžić - 2010 - Theoria: Beograd 53 (2):41-52.
  3. What Do Symbols Symbolize?: Platonism.Alan Ross Anderson - 1974 - Philosophia Mathematica (1-2):11-29.
    The dispute between nominalists and Platonic realists has been with us for a long time — long enough to have assumed many forms. I don't want to rehearse the history of these various debates, or even to look at the matter from a historical point of view. But I would like to begin by distinguishing two quite different skirmishes in the general battle, one of which is new, and one of which is very old. We begin with the new one, (...)
  4. « Un autre ordre du monde » : Science et mathématiques d'après les commentateurs de Proclus au Cinquecento.Annarita Angelini - 2006 - Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 2 (2):265-283.
    «Mettre les faits d’accord avec la philosophie de Platon»: voilà une maxime qui remonte au Commentaire de Proclus au premier livre des Éléments d’Euclide, oeuvre centrale pour la constitution du savoir au Cinquecento et plus particulièrement pour la définition du statut opératoire des mathématiques. Au cours du XVIe siècle, Euclide apparaît en effet comme le véritable médiateur entre platonisme et aristotélisme, au demeurant moins par son oeuvre de géomètre que par son geste épistémologique qui semble tracer l’unique voie possible pour (...)
  5. Neokantianism and Platonism in Neohellenic Philosophy.Georgia Apostolopoulou - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Research 40 (Supplement):325-338.
  6. The Semantic Plights of the Ante-Rem Structuralist.Bahram Assadian - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):1-20.
    A version of the permutation argument in the philosophy of mathematics leads to the thesis that mathematical terms, contrary to appearances, are not genuine singular terms referring to individual objects; they are purely schematic or variables. By postulating ‘ante-rem structures’, the ante-rem structuralist aims to defuse the permutation argument and retain the referentiality of mathematical terms. This paper presents two semantic problems for the ante- rem view: (1) ante-rem structures are themselves subject to the permutation argument; (2) the ante-rem structuralist (...)
  7. Gnostic Platonism.Harold W. Attridge - 1991 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 7 (1):1-30.
  8. Proof Theory. Gödel and the Metamathematical Tradition.Jeremy Avigad - 2010 - In Kurt Gödel, Solomon Feferman, Charles Parsons & Stephen G. Simpson (eds.), Kurt Gödel: Essays for His Centennial. Association for Symbolic Logic.
  9. A Cause for Concern: Standard Abstracta and Causation.Jody Azzouni - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):397-401.
    Benjamin Callard has recently suggested that causation between Platonic objects—standardly understood as atemporal and non-spatial—and spatio-temporal objects is not ‘a priori’ unintelligible. He considers the reasons some have given for its purported unintelligibility: apparent impossibility of energy transference, absence of physical contact, etc. He suggests that these considerations fail to rule out a priori Platonic-object causation. However, he has overlooked one important issue. Platonic objects must causally affect different objects differently, and different Platonic objects must causally affect the same objects (...)
  10. No Reservations Required? Defending Anti-Nominalism.Alan Baker - 2010 - Studia Logica 96 (2):127-139.
    In a 2005 paper, John Burgess and Gideon Rosen offer a new argument against nominalism in the philosophy of mathematics. The argument proceeds from the thesis that mathematics is part of science, and that core existence theorems in mathematics are both accepted by mathematicians and acceptable by mathematical standards. David Liggins (2007) criticizes the argument on the grounds that no adequate interpretation of “acceptable by mathematical standards” can be given which preserves the soundness of the overall argument. In this discussion (...)
  11. Can We Know That Platonism is True?M. Balaguer - 2003 - Philosophical Forum 34 (3):459-475.
    ? Mark BALAGUER Philosophical forum 34:3-43-4, 459-475, Blackwell, 2003.
  12. Platonism in Metaphysics.Mark Balaguer - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 (1):1.
  13. Mathematical Platonism.Mark Balaguer - 2008 - In Bonnie Gold & Roger Simons (eds.), Proof and Other Dilemmas: Mathematics and Philosophy. Mathematical Association of America. pp. 179--204.
  14. Platonism in Metaphysics.Mark Balaguer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Platonism is the view that there exist such things as abstract objects — where an abstract object is an object that does not exist in space or time and which is therefore entirely non-physical and nonmental. Platonism in this sense is a contemporary view. It is obviously related to the views of Plato in important ways, but it is not entirely clear that Plato endorsed this view, as it is defined here. In order to remain neutral on this question, the (...)
  15. Reply to Dieterle.Mark Balaguer - 2000 - Philosophia Mathematica 8 (3):310-315.
    In this paper, I respond to an objection that Jill Dieterle has raised to two arguments in my book, Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. Dieterle argues that because I reject the notion of metaphysical necessity, I cannot rely upon the notion of supervenience, as I in fact do in two places in the book. I argue that Dieterle is mistaken about this by showing that neither of the two supervenience theses that I endorse requires a notion of metaphysical necessity.
  16. Non-Uniqueness as a Non-Problem.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Philosophia Mathematica 6 (1):63-84.
    A response is given here to Benacerraf's (1965) non-uniqueness (or multiple-reductions) objection to mathematical platonism. It is argued that non-uniqueness is simply not a problem for platonism; more specifically, it is argued that platonists can simply embrace non-uniqueness—i.e., that one can endorse the thesis that our mathematical theories truly describe collections of abstract mathematical objects while rejecting the thesis that such theories truly describe unique collections of such objects. I also argue that part of the motivation for this stance is (...)
  17. Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism. He does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible views. Introducing a form of platonism ("full-blooded platonism") that solves all problems traditionally associated with the view, he proceeds to defend anti-platonism (in particular, mathematical fictionalism) against various attacks, most notably the Quine-Putnam indispensability attack. He concludes by arguing that it is not simply that we do not currently have any good argument (...)
  18. A Platonist Epistemology.Mark Balaguer - 1995 - Synthese 103 (3):303 - 325.
    A response is given here to Benacerraf's 1973 argument that mathematical platonism is incompatible with a naturalistic epistemology. Unlike almost all previous platonist responses to Benacerraf, the response given here is positive rather than negative; that is, rather than trying to find a problem with Benacerraf's argument, I accept his challenge and meet it head on by constructing an epistemology of abstract (i.e., aspatial and atemporal) mathematical objects. Thus, I show that spatio-temporal creatures like ourselves can attain knowledge about mathematical (...)
  19. Against (Maddian) Naturalized Platonism.Mark Balaguer - 1994 - Philosophia Mathematica 2 (2):97-108.
    It is argued here that mathematical objects cannot be simultaneously abstract and perceptible. Thus, naturalized versions of mathematical platonism, such as the one advocated by Penelope Maddy, are unintelligble. Thus, platonists cannot respond to Benacerrafian epistemological arguments against their view vias Maddy-style naturalization. Finally, it is also argued that naturalized platonists cannot respond to this situation by abandoning abstractness (that is, platonism); they must abandon perceptibility (that is, naturalism).
  20. Knowledge of Mathematical Objects.Mark Augustan Balaguer - 1992 - Dissertation, City University of New York
    This dissertation provides a refutation of the epistemological argument against mathematical platonism; that is, it provides an epistemology of abstract objects, in particular, of mathematical objects. ;After an introductory first chapter, I formulate what I argue is the strongest version of the epistemological argument against platonism. It is stronger than Paul Benacerraf's version because the only plausible way for a platonist to respond to it is to actually provide an epistemology of mathematical objects. ;In chapters three and four, I argue (...)
  21. Reviews-Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics.Mark Balaguer & J. M. Dieterle - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4):775-780.
  22. Inference to the Best Explanation and Mathematical Realism.Sorin Ioan Bangu - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):13-20.
    Arguing for mathematical realism on the basis of Field’s explanationist version of the Quine–Putnam Indispensability argument, Alan Baker has recently claimed to have found an instance of a genuine mathematical explanation of a physical phenomenon. While I agree that Baker presents a very interesting example in which mathematics plays an essential explanatory role, I show that this example, and the argument built upon it, begs the question against the mathematical nominalist.
  23. Our Reliability is in Principle Explainable.Dan Baras - 2017 - Episteme 14 (2):197-211.
    Non-skeptical robust realists about normativity, mathematics, or any other domain of non- causal truths are committed to a correlation between their beliefs and non- causal, mind-independent facts. Hartry Field and others have argued that if realists cannot explain this striking correlation, that is a strong reason to reject their theory. Some consider this argument, known as the Benacerraf–Field argument, as the strongest challenge to robust realism about mathematics, normativity, and even logic. In this article I offer two closely related accounts (...)
  24. A Reliability Challenge to Theistic Platonism.Dan Baras - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):479-487.
    Many philosophers believe that when a theory is committed to an apparently unexplainable massive correlation, that fact counts significantly against the theory. Philosophical theories that imply that we have knowledge of non-causal mind-independent facts are especially prone to this objection. Prominent examples of such theories are mathematical Platonism, robust normative realism and modal realism. It is sometimes thought that theists can easily respond to this sort of challenge and that theism therefore has an epistemic advantage over atheism. In this paper, (...)
  25. Optimisation and Mathematical Explanation: Doing the Lévy Walk.Sam Baron - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3).
    The indispensability argument seeks to establish the existence of mathematical objects. The success of the indispensability argument turns on finding cases of genuine extra- mathematical explanation. In this paper, I identify a new case of extra- mathematical explanation, involving the search patterns of fully-aquatic marine predators. I go on to use this case to predict the prevalence of extra- mathematical explanation in science.
  26. A Truthmaker Indispensability Argument.Sam Baron - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2413-2427.
    Recently, nominalists have made a case against the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism by taking issue with Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. In this paper I propose and defend an indispensability argument founded on an alternative criterion of ontological commitment: that advocated by David Armstrong. By defending such an argument I place the burden back onto the nominalist to defend her favourite criterion of ontological commitment and, furthermore, show that criterion cannot be used to formulate a plausible form of (...)
  27. Can Indispensability‐Driven Platonists Be (Serious) Presentists?Sam Baron - 2013 - Theoria 79 (3):153-173.
    In this article I consider what it would take to combine a certain kind of mathematical Platonism with serious presentism. I argue that a Platonist moved to accept the existence of mathematical objects on the basis of an indispensability argument faces a significant challenge if she wishes to accept presentism. This is because, on the one hand, the indispensability argument can be reformulated as a new argument for the existence of past entities and, on the other hand, if one accepts (...)
  28. Existential Claims and Platonism.Jc Beall - 2001 - Philosophia Mathematica 9 (1):80-86.
    This paper responds to Colin Cheyne's new anti-platonist argument according to which knowledge of existential claims—claims of the form such-tmd-so exist—requires a caused connection with the given such-and-so. If his arguments succeed then nobody can know, or even justifiably believe, that acausal entities exist, in which case (standard) platonism is untenable. I argue that Cheyne's anti-platonist argument fails.
  29. Prom Full Blooded Platonism to Really Full Blooded Platonism.Jc Beall - 1999 - Philosophia Mathematica 7 (3):322-325.
    Mark Balaguer argues for full blooded platonism (FBP), and argues that FBP alone can solve Benacerraf's familiar epistemic challenge. I note that if FBP really can solve Benacerraf's epistemic challenge, then FBP is not alone in its capacity so to solve; RFBP—really full blooded platonism—can do the trick just as well, where RFBP differs from FBP by allowing entities from inconsistent mathematics. I also argue briefly that there is positive reason for endorsing RFBP.
  30. Halfway Up To the Mathematical Infinity I: On the Ontological & Epistemic Sustainability of Georg Cantor’s Transfinite Design.Edward G. Belaga - manuscript
    Georg Cantor was the genuine discoverer of the Mathematical Infinity, and whatever he claimed, suggested, or even surmised should be taken seriously -- albeit not necessary at its face value. Because alongside his exquisite in beauty ordinal construction and his fundamental powerset description of the continuum, Cantor has also left to us his obsessive presumption that the universe of sets should be subjected to laws similar to those governing the set of natural numbers, including the universal principles of cardinal comparability (...)
  31. Zašto 2+2=4?Boran Berčić - 2005 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 25 (4):945-961.
    The starting point of this article is the ontological question: What makes it true that2+2=4?, that is, what are the truth makers of mathematical propositions? Of course,the satisfactory theory in the philosophy of mathematics has to answer semantical question: What are mathematical propositions about? Also, epistemological question:How do we know them?, as well. Author compares five theories in the philosophy of mathematics, that is, five accounts of the nature of truth makers in mathematical discourse: fictionalism ; nominalism ; physicalism ; (...)
  32. Logic with Platonism.George Berry - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):215 - 249.
  33. The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist's Philosophy of Mathematics.John Bigelow - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
    Challenging the myth that mathematical objects can be defined into existence, Bigelow here employs Armstrong's metaphysical materialism to cast new light on mathematics. He identifies natural, real, and imaginary numbers and sets with specified physical properties and relations and, by so doing, draws mathematics back from its sterile, abstract exile into the midst of the physical world.
  34. Science and Necessity.John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter - 1991 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book espouses a theory of scientific realism in which due weight is given to mathematics and logic. The authors argue that mathematics can be understood realistically if it is seen to be the study of universals, of properties and relations, of patterns and structures, the kinds of things which can be in several places at once. Taking this kind of scientific platonism as their point of departure, they show how the theory of universals can account for probability, laws of (...)
  35. Review: Gottlob Frege, J. L. Austin, The Foundations of Arithmetic. A Logico-Mathematical Enquiry Into the Concept of Number. [REVIEW]Max Black - 1951 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 16 (1):67-67.
  36. The Self in Logical-Mathematical Platonism.Ulrich Blau - 2009 - Mind and Matter 7 (1):37-57.
    A non-classical logic is proposed that extends classical logic and set theory as conservatively as possible with respect to three domains: the logic of natural language, the logcal foundations of mathematics, and the logical-philosophical paradoxes. A universal mechanics of consciousness connects these domains, and its best witness is the liar paradox. Its solution rests formally on a subject-object partition, mentally arising and disappearing perpetually. All deep paradoxes are paradoxes of consciousness. There are two kinds, solvable ones and unsolvable ones. The (...)
  37. Platonism and Mathematics.H. J. Blumenthal - 1991 - The Classical Review 41 (01):101-.
  38. Platonic Number in the Parmenides and Metaphysics XIII.Dougal Blyth - 2000 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (1):23 – 45.
    I argue here that a properly Platonic theory of the nature of number is still viable today. By properly Platonic, I mean one consistent with Plato's own theory, with appropriate extensions to take into account subsequent developments in mathematics. At Parmenides 143a-4a the existence of numbers is proven from our capacity to count, whereby I establish as Plato's the theory that numbers are originally ordinal, a sequence of forms differentiated by position. I defend and interpret Aristotle's report of a Platonic (...)
  39. Benacerraf's Dilemma Revisited.Crispin Wright Bob Hale - 2002 - European Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):101-129.
  40. Strukturalizm jako alternatywa dla platonizmu w filozofii matematyki.Izabela Bondecka-Krzykowska - 2004 - Filozofia Nauki 1.
    The aim of this paper is to analyze structuralism as an alternative view to platonism in the philosophy of mathematics. We also try to find out if ontological and epistemological problems of platonism can be avoided by admitting the principles of structuralism. Structuralism claims that mathematical objects are merely positions in structures and have no identity or in general any important features outside these structures. Such view allows to avoid problems of the nature of numbers and other mathematical objects. But (...)
  41. Mathematical Structuralism is a Kind of Platonism.B. Borstner - 2002 - Filozofski Vestnik 23 (1):7-24.
  42. III *-on the Meaning of the Word 'Platonism' in the Expression 'Mathematical Platonism'.Jacques Bouveresse - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):55-79.
    The expression 'platonism in mathematics' or 'mathematical platonism' is familiar in the philosophy of mathematics at least since the use Paul Bernays made of it in his paper of 1934, 'Sur le Platonisme dans les Math?matiques'. But he was not the first to point out the similarities between the conception of the defenders of mathematical realism and the ideas of Plato. Poincar? had already stressed the 'platonistic' orientation of the mathematicians he called 'Cantorian', as opposed to those who (like himself) (...)
  43. On the Meaning of the Word 'Platonism' in the Expression 'Mathematical Platonism'.Jacques Bouveresse - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):55–79.
    The expression 'platonism in mathematics' or 'mathematical platonism' is familiar in the philosophy of mathematics at least since the use Paul Bernays made of it in his paper of 1934, 'Sur le Platonisme dans les Mathématiques'. But he was not the first to point out the similarities between the conception of the defenders of mathematical realism and the ideas of Plato. Poincaré had already stressed the 'platonistic' orientation of the mathematicians he called'Cantorian', as opposed to those who (like himself) were (...)
  44. Platonism, Metaphor, and Mathematics.Glenn G. Parsons And James Robert Brown - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):47-66.
  45. Marco Panza and Andrea Sereni. Plato's Problem: An Introduction to Mathematical Platonism. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. ISBN 978-0-230-36548-3 (Hbk); 978-0-230-36549-0 (Pbk); 978-1-13726147-2 (E-Book); 978-1-13729813-3 (Pdf). Pp. Xi + 306. [REVIEW]James Robert Brown - 2013 - Philosophia Mathematica (1):nkt031.
  46. Platonism, Naturalism, and Mathematical Knowledge.James Robert Brown - 2011 - Routledge.
    This study addresses a central theme in current philosophy: Platonism vs Naturalism and provides accounts of both approaches to mathematics, crucially discussing Quine, Maddy, Kitcher, Lakoff, Colyvan, and many others. Beginning with accounts of both approaches, Brown defends Platonism by arguing that only a Platonistic approach can account for concept acquisition in a number of special cases in the sciences. He also argues for a particular view of applied mathematics, a view that supports Platonism against Naturalist alternatives. Not only does (...)
  47. Kitcher's Mathematical Naturalism.James Robert Brown - 2003 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-20.
    Recent years have seen a number of naturalist accounts of mathematics. Philip Kitcher’s version is one of the most important and influential. This paper includes a critical exposition of Kitcher’s views and a discussion of several issues including: mathematical epistemology, practice, history, the nature of applied mathematics. It argues that naturalism is an inadequate account and compares it with mathematical Platonism, to the advantage of the latter.
  48. Platonic Explanation: Or, What Abstract Entities Can Do for You.James Robert Brown - 1988 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3 (1):51 – 67.
    (1988). Platonic explanation: Or, what abstract entities can do for you. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 51-67. doi: 10.1080/02698598808573324.
  49. From Platonism to Neo-Platonism.Robert S. Brumbaugh & Philip Merlan - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (2):318.
  50. Referring to Mathematical Objects Via Definite Descriptions.Stefan Buijsman - 2017 - Philosophia Mathematica 25 (1):128-138.
    Linsky and Zalta try to explain how we can refer to mathematical objects by saying that this happens through definite descriptions which may appeal to mathematical theories. I present two issues for their account. First, there is a problem of finding appropriate pre-conditions to reference, which are currently difficult to satisfy. Second, there is a problem of ensuring the stability of the resulting reference. Slight changes in the properties ascribed to a mathematical object can result in a shift of reference (...)
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