Mathematical Truth

Edited by Mark Balaguer (California State University, Los Angeles)
Assistant editor: Sam Roberts (University of Sheffield)
About this topic
Summary

The topic of mathematical truth is importantly tied to the ontology of mathematics.  In particular, a central question is what kinds of objects we commit ourselves to when we endorse the truth of ordinary mathematical sentences, like ‘4 is even’ and ‘There are infinitely many prime numbers.’   But there are other important philosophical questions about mathematical truth as well.  For instance: Is there any plausible way to maintain that mathematical truths are analytic, i.e., true solely in virtue of meaning?  And given that most ordinary mathematical sentences (e.g., the two sentences listed above) follow from the axioms of our various mathematical theories (e.g., from sentences like ‘0 is a number’), how can we account for the truth of the axioms?  And how can we account for the objectivity of mathematics (i.e., for the fact that some mathematical sentences are objectively correct and others are objectively incorrect)?  Can we do this without endorsing the existence of mathematical objects?  Do mathematical objects even help?  And so on.

Key works

Some key works on these topics include the following: Carnap 1950; Benacerraf 1973; Putnam 1980; Field 1993; Field 1998; Wright & Hale 1992; Gödel 1964; Maddy 1988; and Maddy 1988.

Introductions

Introductory works include Shapiro 2000 and Colyvan 2012.

Related categories

192 found
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  1. The Access Problem for Knowledge of Logical Possibility.Sharon Berry - manuscript
    Accepting truth-value realism can seem to raise an explanatory problem: what can explain our accuracy about mathematics, i.e., the match between human psychology and objective mathematical facts? A range of current truth-value realist philosophies of mathematics allow one to reduce this access problem to a problem of explaining our accuracy about which mathematical practices are coherent -- in a sense which can be cashed out in terms of logical possibility. However, our ability to recognize these facts about logical possibility poses (...)
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  2. MANY 1 - A Transversal Imaginative Journey Across the Realm of Mathematics.Jean-Yves Beziau - 2017 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (2):259-287.
    We discuss the many aspects and qualities of the number one: the different ways it can be represented, the different things it may represent. We discuss the ordinal and cardinal natures of the one, its algebraic behaviour as a neutral element and finally its role as a truth-value in logic.
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  3. Structure and Categoricity: Determinacy of Reference and Truth Value in the Philosophy of Mathematics.Tim Button & Sean Walsh - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (3):283-307.
    This article surveys recent literature by Parsons, McGee, Shapiro and others on the significance of categoricity arguments in the philosophy of mathematics. After discussing whether categoricity arguments are sufficient to secure reference to mathematical structures up to isomorphism, we assess what exactly is achieved by recent ‘internal’ renditions of the famous categoricity arguments for arithmetic and set theory.
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  4. Cyberpunk Entre Literatura E Matemática: Processos Comunicacionais da Literatura Massiva Na Crítica Científica da Realidade.Rafael Duarte Oliveira Venancio - 2013 - Conexão 12 (23).
    O presente artigo busca definir o movimento literário cyberpunk a partir da sua influência teórica vinda do campo da matemática. Utilizando a teorização interna ao movimento, centrada em Rudy Rucker, o objetivo aqui é entender como os campos da análise e dos fundamentos da matemática criam uma importante distinção entre os cyberpunks e as demais distopias literárias. Com isso, há a pressuposição de um movimento de uma crítica sociomatemática feita pelos cyberpunks cujos conceitos matemáticos tornam possível criticar o tempo presente, (...)
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  5. Regel und Witz. Wittgensteinsche Perspektiven auf Mathematik, Sprache und Moral. [REVIEW]Ulf Hlobil - 2010 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 64 (3):416-419.
    Review of Timo-Peter Ertz's "Regel und Witz. Wittgensteinsche Perspektiven auf Mathematik, Sprache und Moral," Berlin & New York: de Gruyter, 2008.
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  6. Automated Theorem Proving and Its Prospects. [REVIEW]Desmond Fearnley-Sander - 1995 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 2.
    REVIEW OF: Automated Development of Fundamental Mathematical Theories by Art Quaife. (1992: Kluwer Academic Publishers) 271pp. Using the theorem prover OTTER Art Quaife has proved four hundred theorems of von Neumann-Bernays-Gödel set theory; twelve hundred theorems and definitions of elementary number theory; dozens of Euclidean geometry theorems; and Gödel's incompleteness theorems. It is an impressive achievement. To gauge its significance and to see what prospects it offers this review looks closely at the book and the proofs it presents.
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  7. What Mathematical Truth Could Not Be--1.Paul Benacerraf - 1998 - In Matthias Schirn (ed.), The Philosophy of Mathematics Today. Clarendon Press.
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  8. Truth and Mathematics (Prawda a Matematyka).Lemanska Anna - 2010 - Studia Philosophiae Christianae 46 (1):37-54.
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  9. On the Nature of Mathematical Truth.Carl G. Hempel - 1964 - In P. Benacerraf H. Putnam (ed.), Philosophy of Mathematics. Prentice-Hall. pp. 366--81.
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Analyticity in Mathematics
  1. Remarks on Wittgenstein, Gödel, Chaitin, Incompleteness, Impossiblity and the Psychological Basis of Science and Mathematics.Michael Richard Starks - 2019 - In Remarks on Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, Computability, Paradox, Uncertainty and the Limits of Reason in Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych, Berto, Floyd, Moyal. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 24-38.
    It is commonly thought that such topics as Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, Computability, Paradox, Uncertainty and the Limits of Reason are disparate scientific physical or mathematical issues having little or nothing in common. I suggest that they are largely standard philosophical problems (i.e., language games) which were resolved by Wittgenstein over 80 years ago. -/- Wittgenstein also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or language or our behavior in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather than as (...)
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  2. Is Geometry Analytic?David Mwakima - 2017 - Dianoia 1 (4):66 - 78.
    In this paper I present critical evaluations of Ayer and Putnam's views on the analyticity of geometry. By drawing on the historico-philosophical work of Michael Friedman on the relativized apriori; and Roberto Torretti on the foundations of geometry, I show how we can make sense of the assertion that pure geometry is analytic in Carnap's sense.
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  3. Is Hume’s Principle Analytic?Eamon Darnell & Aaron Thomas-Bolduc - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    The question of the analyticity of Hume's Principle is central to the neo-logicist project. We take on this question with respect to Frege's definition of analyticity, which entails that a sentence cannot be analytic if it can be consistently denied within the sphere of a special science. We show that HP can be denied within non-standard analysis and argue that if HP is taken to depend on Frege's definition of number, it isn't analytic, and if HP is taken to be (...)
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  4. Formal Analyticity.Zeynep Soysal - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2791-2811.
    In this paper, I introduce and defend a notion of analyticity for formal languages. I first uncover a crucial flaw in Timothy Williamson’s famous argument template against analyticity, when it is applied to sentences of formal mathematical languages. Williamson’s argument targets the popular idea that a necessary condition for analyticity is that whoever understands an analytic sentence assents to it. Williamson argues that for any given candidate analytic sentence, there can be people who understand that sentence and yet who fail (...)
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  5. Two Criticisms Against Mathematical Realism.Seungbae Park - 2017 - Diametros 52:96-106.
    Mathematical realism asserts that mathematical objects exist in the abstract world, and that a mathematical sentence is true or false, depending on whether the abstract world is as the mathematical sentence says it is. I raise two objections against mathematical realism. First, the abstract world is queer in that it allows for contradictory states of affairs. Second, mathematical realism does not have a theoretical resource to explain why a sentence about a tricle is true or false. A tricle is an (...)
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  6. A Case Study of Misconceptions Students in the Learning of Mathematics; The Concept Limit Function in High School.Widodo Winarso & Toheri Toheri - 2017 - Jurnal Riset Pendidikan Matematika 4 (1): 120-127.
    This study aims to find out how high the level and trends of student misconceptions experienced by high school students in Indonesia. The subject of research that is a class XI student of Natural Science (IPA) SMA Negeri 1 Anjatan with the subject matter limit function. Forms of research used in this study is a qualitative research, with a strategy that is descriptive qualitative research. The data analysis focused on the results of the students' answers on the test essay subject (...)
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  7. On Deductionism.Dan Bruiger - manuscript
    Deductionism assimilates nature to conceptual artifacts (models, equations), and tacitly holds that real physical systems are such artifacts. Some physical concepts represent properties of deductive systems rather than of nature. Properties of mathematical or deductive systems can thereby sometimes falsely be ascribed to natural systems.
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  8. Minimal Type Theory (MTT).Pete Olcott - manuscript
    Minimal Type Theory (MTT) is based on type theory in that it is agnostic about Predicate Logic level and expressly disallows the evaluation of incompatible types. It is called Minimal because it has the fewest possible number of fundamental types, and has all of its syntax expressed entirely as the connections in a directed acyclic graph.
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  9. Russell on Logicism and Coherence.Conor Mayo-Wilson - 2011 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 31 (1):89-106.
    According to Quine, Charles Parsons, Mark Steiner, and others, Russell's logicist project is important because, if successful, it would show that mathematical theorems possess desirable epistemic properties often attributed to logical theorems, such as a prioricity, necessity, and certainty. Unfortunately, Russell never attributed such importance to logicism, and such a thesis contradicts Russell's explicitly stated views on the relationship between logic and mathematics. This raises the question: what did Russell understand to be the philosophical importance of logicism? Building on recent (...)
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  10. Meaning, Presuppositions, Truth-Relevance, Gödel's Sentence and the Liar Paradox.X. Y. Newberry - manuscript
    Section 1 reviews Strawson’s logic of presuppositions. Strawson’s justification is critiqued and a new justification proposed. Section 2 extends the logic of presuppositions to cases when the subject class is necessarily empty, such as (x)((Px & ~Px) → Qx) . The strong similarity of the resulting logic with Richard Diaz’s truth-relevant logic is pointed out. Section 3 further extends the logic of presuppositions to sentences with many variables, and a certain valuation is proposed. It is noted that, given this valuation, (...)
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  11. In Carnap’s Defense: A Survey on the Concept of a Linguistic Framework in Carnap’s Philosophy.Parzhad Torfehnezhad - 2016 - Abstracta 9 (1):03-30.
    The main task in this paper is to detail and investigate Carnap’s conception of a “linguistic framework”. On this basis, we will see whether Carnap’s dichotomies, such as the analytic-synthetic distinction, are to be construed as absolute/fundamental dichotomies or merely as relative dichotomies. I argue for a novel interpretation of Carnap’s conception of a LF and, on that basis, will show that, according to Carnap, all the dichotomies to be discussed are relative dichotomies; they depend on conventional decisions concerning the (...)
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  12. Double Vision: Two Questions About the Neo-Fregean Program.John MacFarlane - 2009 - Synthese 170 (3):443-456.
    Much of The Reason’s Proper Study is devoted to defending the claim that simply by stipulating an abstraction principle for the “number-of” functor, we can simultaneously fix a meaning for this functor and acquire epistemic entitlement to the stipulated principle. In this paper, I argue that the semantic and epistemological principles Hale and Wright offer in defense of this claim may be too strong for their purposes. For if these principles are correct, it is hard to see why they do (...)
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  13. Against Mathematical Convenientism.Seungbae Park - 2016 - Axiomathes 26 (2):115-122.
    Indispensablists argue that when our belief system conflicts with our experiences, we can negate a mathematical belief but we do not because if we do, we would have to make an excessive revision of our belief system. Thus, we retain a mathematical belief not because we have good evidence for it but because it is convenient to do so. I call this view ‘ mathematical convenientism.’ I argue that mathematical convenientism commits the consequential fallacy and that it demolishes the Quine-Putnam (...)
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  14. New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul Benacerraf: Truth, Objects, Infinity (Fabrice Pataut, Editor).Fabrice Pataut Jody Azzouni, Paul Benacerraf Justin Clarke-Doane, Jacques Dubucs Sébastien Gandon, Brice Halimi Jon Perez Laraudogoitia, Mary Leng Ana Leon-Mejia, Antonio Leon-Sanchez Marco Panza, Fabrice Pataut Philippe de Rouilhan & Andrea Sereni Stuart Shapiro - forthcoming - Springer.
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  15. On the Quinean-Analyticity of Mathematical Propositions.Gregory Lavers - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):299-319.
    This paper investigates the relation between Carnap and Quine’s views on analyticity on the one hand, and their views on philosophical analysis or explication on the other. I argue that the stance each takes on what constitutes a successful explication largely dictates the view they take on analyticity. I show that although acknowledged by neither party (in fact Quine frequently expressed his agreement with Carnap on this subject) their views on explication are substantially different. I argue that this difference not (...)
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  16. The Syntheticity of Time.Stephen R. Palmquist - 1989 - Philosophia Mathematica (2):233-235.
    In a recent article in this journal Phil. Math., II, v.4 (1989), n.2, pp.? ?] J. Fang argues that we must not be fooled by A.J. Ayer (God rest his soul!) and his cohorts into believing that mathematical knowledge has an analytic a priori status. Even computers, he reminds us, take some amount of time to perform their calculations. The simplicity of Kant's infamous example of a mathematical proposition (7+5=12) is "partly to blame" for "mislead[ing] scholars in the direction of (...)
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  17. Inwiefern Sind Die Mathematischen Sätze Analytisch?Gerhard Frey - 1972 - Philosophia Mathematica (2):145-157.
    A SUMMARY IN ENGLISH [by Editor]The problem is to find out whether mathematical propositions are analytical, and if so, or if not, to what extent.Kant defined the analyticity in terms of Cartesian res extensa, exemplified by “A body is extended”, while he considered, because of such examples, mathematical propositions to be synthetic. The recent studies in set theory by Gödel, P.J.Cohen, etc., indicate, however, that such a proposition as the continuum hypothesis is certainly not “analytic (tautological)” in the strict sense (...)
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  18. Carnap and Quine on Some Analytic-Synthetic Distinctions.Lieven Decock - unknown
    I want to analyse the Quine-Carnap discussion on analyticity with regard to logical, mathematical and set-theoretical statements. In recent years, the renewed interest in Carnap’s work has shed a new light on the analytic-synthetic debate. If one fully appreciates Carnap’s conventionalism, one sees that there was not a metaphysical debate on whether there is an analytic-synthetic distinction, but rather a controversy on the expedience of drawing such a distinction. However, on this view, there can be no longer a single analytic-synthetic (...)
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  19. Analyticity and Conceptual Revision.Milton Fisk - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (20):627-637.
    The view that analytic propositions are those which are true in virtue of rules of use is basically correct. But there are many kinds of rules of use, and rules of some of these kinds do not generate truth. There is nothing like a grammatical analytic, though grammatical rules are rules of use. So, this rules-of-use view falls short of being an explanatory account. My problem is to find what it is that is special about those rules of use which (...)
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  20. Non-Analytic Conceptual Knowledge.M. Giaquinto - 1996 - Mind 105 (418):249-268.
  21. The Reason's Proper Study: Essays Towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics.Bob Hale (ed.) - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
    Here, Bob Hale and Crispin Wright assemble the key writings that lead to their distinctive neo-Fregean approach to the philosophy of mathematics. In addition to fourteen previously published papers, the volume features a new paper on the Julius Caesar problem; a substantial new introduction mapping out the program and the contributions made to it by the various papers; a section explaining which issues most require further attention; and bibliographies of references and further useful sources. It will be recognized as the (...)
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  22. Carnap, Gödel, and the Analyticity of Arithmetic.Neil Tennant - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (1):100-112.
    Michael Friedman maintains that Carnap did not fully appreciate the impact of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem on the prospect for a purely syntactic definition of analyticity that would render arithmetic analytically true. This paper argues against this claim. It also challenges a common presumption on the part of defenders of Carnap, in their diagnosis of the force of Gödel's own critique of Carnap in his Gibbs Lecture. The author is grateful to Michael Friedman for valuable comments. Part of the research (...)
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Axiomatic Truth
  1. Proof That Wittgenstein is Correct About Gödel.P. Olcott - manuscript
    When we sum up the results of Gödel's 1931 Incompleteness Theorem by formalizing Wittgenstein’s verbal specification such that this formalization meets Gödel's own sufficiency requirement: ”Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof." then we can see that Gödel's famous logic sentence is only unprovable in PA because it is untrue in PA because it specifies the logical equivalence to self contradiction in PA.
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  2. Conceptions of Set and the Foundations of Mathematics.Luca Incurvati - 2020 - Cambridge University Press.
    Sets are central to mathematics and its foundations, but what are they? In this book Luca Incurvati provides a detailed examination of all the major conceptions of set and discusses their virtues and shortcomings, as well as introducing the fundamentals of the alternative set theories with which these conceptions are associated. He shows that the conceptual landscape includes not only the naïve and iterative conceptions but also the limitation of size conception, the definite conception, the stratified conception and the graph (...)
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  3. Deductively Sound Formal Proofs.P. Olcott - manuscript
    Could the intersection of [formal proofs of mathematical logic] and [sound deductive inference] specify formal systems having [deductively sound formal proofs of mathematical logic]? -/- All that we have to do to provide [deductively sound formal proofs of mathematical logic] is select the subset of conventional [formal proofs of mathematical logic] having true premises and now we have [deductively sound formal proofs of mathematical logic].
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  4. Tarski Undefinability Theorem Terse Refutation.P. Olcott - manuscript
    Both Tarski and Gödel “prove” that provability can diverge from Truth. When we boil their claim down to its simplest possible essence it is really claiming that valid inference from true premises might not always derive a true consequence. This is obviously impossible.
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  5. Eliminating Undecidability and Incompleteness in Formal Systems.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    To eliminate incompleteness, undecidability and inconsistency from formal systems we only need to convert the formal proofs to theorem consequences of symbolic logic to conform to the sound deductive inference model. -/- Within the sound deductive inference model there is a (connected sequence of valid deductions from true premises to a true conclusion) thus unlike the formal proofs of symbolic logic provability cannot diverge from truth.
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  6. Conservative Deflationism?Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    Deflationists argue that ‘true’ is merely a logico-linguistic device for expressing blind ascriptions and infinite generalisations. For this reason, some authors have argued that deflationary truth must be conservative, i.e. that a deflationary theory of truth for a theory S must not entail sentences in S’s language that are not already entailed by S. However, it has been forcefully argued that any adequate theory of truth for S must be non-conservative and that, for this reason, truth cannot be deflationary :493–521, (...)
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  7. Reflection Principles and the Liar in Context.Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.
    Contextualist approaches to the Liar Paradox postulate the occurrence of a context shift in the course of the Liar reasoning. In particular, according to the contextualist proposal advanced by Charles Parsons and Michael Glanzberg, the Liar sentence L doesn’t express a true proposition in the initial context of reasoning c, but expresses a true one in a new, richer context c', where more propositions are available for expression. On the further assumption that Liar sentences involve propositional quantifiers whose domains may (...)
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  8. What Paradoxes Depend On.Ming Hsiung - 2018 - Synthese:1-27.
    This paper gives a definition of self-reference on the basis of the dependence relation given by Leitgeb (2005), and the dependence digraph by Beringer & Schindler (2015). Unlike the usual discussion about self-reference of paradoxes centering around Yablo's paradox and its variants, I focus on the paradoxes of finitary characteristic, which are given again by use of Leitgeb's dependence relation. They are called 'locally finite paradoxes', satisfying that any sentence in these paradoxes can depend on finitely many sentences. I prove (...)
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  9. Provably True Sentences Across Axiomatizations of Kripke’s Theory of Truth.Carlo Nicolai - 2018 - Studia Logica 106 (1):101-130.
    We study the relationships between two clusters of axiomatizations of Kripke’s fixed-point models for languages containing a self-applicable truth predicate. The first cluster is represented by what we will call ‘\-like’ theories, originating in recent work by Halbach and Horsten, whose axioms and rules are all valid in fixed-point models; the second by ‘\-like’ theories first introduced by Solomon Feferman, that lose this property but reflect the classicality of the metatheory in which Kripke’s construction is carried out. We show that (...)
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  10. Minimalism and the Generalisation Problem: On Horwich’s Second Solution.Cezary Cieśliński - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1077-1101.
    Disquotational theories of truth are often criticised for being too weak to prove interesting generalisations about truth. In this paper we will propose a certain formal theory to serve as a framework for a solution of the generalisation problem. In contrast with Horwich’s original proposal, our framework will eschew psychological notions altogether, replacing them with the epistemic notion of believability. The aim will be to explain why someone who accepts a given disquotational truth theory Th, should also accept various generalisations (...)
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  11. The Logical Strength of Compositional Principles.Richard G. Heck Jr - 2018 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 59 (1):1-33.
    This paper investigates a set of issues connected with the so-called conservativeness argument against deflationism. Although I do not defend that argument, I think the discussion of it has raised some interesting questions about whether what I call “compositional principles,” such as “a conjunction is true iff its conjuncts are true,” have substantial content or are in some sense logically trivial. The paper presents a series of results that purport to show that the compositional principles for a first-order language, taken (...)
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  12. Kurt Gödel, Paper on the Incompleteness Theorems (1931).Richard Zach - 2004 - In Ivor Grattan-Guinness (ed.), Landmark Writings in Mathematics. Amsterdam: North-Holland. pp. 917-925.
    This chapter describes Kurt Gödel's paper on the incompleteness theorems. Gödel's incompleteness results are two of the most fundamental and important contributions to logic and the foundations of mathematics. It had been assumed that first-order number theory is complete in the sense that any sentence in the language of number theory would be either provable from the axioms or refutable. Gödel's first incompleteness theorem showed that this assumption was false: it states that there are sentences of number theory that are (...)
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  13. Numbers and Functions in Hilbert's Finitism.Richard Zach - 1998 - Taiwanese Journal for History and Philosophy of Science 10:33-60.
    David Hilbert's finitistic standpoint is a conception of elementary number theory designed to answer the intuitionist doubts regarding the security and certainty of mathematics. Hilbert was unfortunately not exact in delineating what that viewpoint was, and Hilbert himself changed his usage of the term through the 1920s and 30s. The purpose of this paper is to outline what the main problems are in understanding Hilbert and Bernays on this issue, based on some publications by them which have so far received (...)
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  14. Deflationism, Arithmetic, and the Argument From Conservativeness.Daniel Waxman - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):429-463.
    Many philosophers believe that a deflationist theory of truth must conservatively extend any base theory to which it is added. But when applied to arithmetic, it's argued, the imposition of a conservativeness requirement leads to a serious objection to deflationism: for the Gödel sentence for Peano Arithmetic is not a theorem of PA, but becomes one when PA is extended by adding plausible principles governing truth. This paper argues that no such objection succeeds. The issue turns on how we understand (...)
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  15. On Deductionism.Dan Bruiger - manuscript
    Deductionism assimilates nature to conceptual artifacts (models, equations), and tacitly holds that real physical systems are such artifacts. Some physical concepts represent properties of deductive systems rather than of nature. Properties of mathematical or deductive systems can thereby sometimes falsely be ascribed to natural systems.
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  16. Minimal Type Theory (MTT).Pete Olcott - manuscript
    Minimal Type Theory (MTT) is based on type theory in that it is agnostic about Predicate Logic level and expressly disallows the evaluation of incompatible types. It is called Minimal because it has the fewest possible number of fundamental types, and has all of its syntax expressed entirely as the connections in a directed acyclic graph.
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  17. The Foundations of Mathematics in the Theory of Sets.Roy T. Cook - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):347-352.
  18. The Epistemic Lightness of Truth: Deflationism and its Logic.Cezary Cieśliński - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book analyses and defends the deflationist claim that there is nothing deep about our notion of truth. According to this view, truth is a 'light' and innocent concept, devoid of any essence which could be revealed by scientific inquiry. Cezary Cieśliński considers this claim in light of recent formal results on axiomatic truth theories, which are crucial for understanding and evaluating the philosophical thesis of the innocence of truth. Providing an up-to-date discussion and original perspectives on this central and (...)
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  19. The Kinds of Truth of Geometry Theorems.Michael Bulmer, Desmond Fearnley-Sander & Tim Stokes - 2001 - In Jürgen Richter-Gebert & Dongming Wang (eds.), LNCS: Lecture Notes In Computer Science. Springer Verlag. pp. 129-142.
    Proof by refutation of a geometry theorem that is not universally true produces a Gröbner basis whose elements, called side polynomials, may be used to give inequations that can be added to the hypotheses to give a valid theorem. We show that (in a certain sense) all possible subsidiary conditions are implied by those obtained from the basis; that what we call the kind of truth of the theorem may be derived from the basis; and that the side polynomials may (...)
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