Matter

The goal of this note is to bring into wider attention the often neglected important work by Bertrand Russell on the foundations of physics published in the late 1920s. In particular, we emphasize how the book The Analysis of Matter can be considered the earliest systematic attempt to unify the modern quantum theory, just emerging by that time, with general relativity. More importantly, it is argued that the idea of what I call Russell space, introduced in Part III of that (...) book, is more fundamental than quantum theory, general relativity, and quantum gravity since the topological ordinal space proposed by Russell would naturally incorporate into its very fabric the emergent nature of spacetime by deploying event assemblages, and not spacetime or particles, as the fundamental building blocks of the world. (shrink)

We set out a fundamental ontology of atomism in terms of matter points. While being most parsimonious, this ontology is able to match both classical and quantum mechanics, and it remains a viable option for any future theory of cosmology that goes beyond current quantum physics. The matter points are structurally individuated: all there is to them are the spatial relations in which they stand; neither a commitment to intrinsic properties nor to an absolute space is required. The spatial relations (...) change. All that is needed to capture change is a dynamical structure, namely dynamical relations as expressed in terms of the dynamical parameters of a physical theory. (shrink)

The Humility Thesis is a persistent thesis in contemporary metaphysics. It is known by a variety of names, including, but not limited to, Humility, Intrinsic Humility, Kantian Humility, Kantian Physicalism, Intrinsic Ignorance, Categorical Ignorance, Irremediable Ignorance, and Noumenalism. According to the thesis, we human beings, and any knowers that share our general ways of knowing, are irremediably ignorant of a certain class of properties that are intrinsic to material entities … Continue reading Humility Regarding Intrinsic Properties →.

For Margaret Cavendish, every single part of matter has self-knowledge, and almost every part has perceptive knowledge. This paper asks what is at stake for Cavendish in ascribing self-knowing and perceptive properties to matter. Whereas many commentators take perception and self-knowledge to be guides to Cavendish’s epistemology, this paper takes them to be guides to her metaphysics, in that it shows that these categories account for individual specificity and for relationality. A part of matter is a unique individual insofar as (...) it is self-knowing – and it is a part in relation to other parts, and to the whole of matter, insofar as it is a perceptive part. This is so because self-knowledge is purely self-referential and complete, while perceptive knowledge is purely relational. (shrink)

William Gilbert’s 1600 book, De magnete, greatly influenced early modern natural philosophy. The book describes an impressive array of physical experiments, but it also advances a metaphysical view at odds with the soon to emerge mechanical philosophy. That view was animism. I distinguish two kinds of animism – Aristotelian and Platonic – and argue that Gilbert was an Aristotelian animist. Taking Robert Boyle as an example, I then show that early modern arguments against animism were often effective only against Platonic (...) animism. In fact, unacknowledged traces of Aristotelian animism can be found in Boyle’s mechanical account of nature. This was Gilbert’s legacy. (shrink)

This article discusses Hooke’s microscopy in the context of the nature of his explanations of natural phenomena. It illustrates that while Hooke’s particular conception of microscopy certainly cohered with his general framework of mechanical philosophy, he thought of his microscope as an artisanal tool that could help him examine unknown natural machinery. It seems, however, that he never used magnifying lenses with the hope of confirming mechanism by glimpsing fundamental particles. Indeed, through a consideration of sources spanning from his 1665 (...) Micrographia to a lecture delivered in the 1690s, it seems Hooke did not believe such particles existed and thought microscopic and macroscopic bodies arose through the same natural processes, though could have very different properties from one another. (shrink)

I present a developmental account of Aristotle’s concept of hê hylê (usually translated “the matter”), focused the earliest developments. I begin by analyzing fragments of some lost early works and a chapter of the Organon, texts which indicate that early in his career Aristotle had not yet begun to use he hylê in a technical sense. Next, I examine Physics II 3, a chapter in which Aristotle conceives of he hylê not as a kind of cause in its own right, (...) but merely as an example of the so-called “out of which” cause : the material is the cause out of which an artifact is made. Next, I examine Physics II 7, a chapter in which Aristotle names "the material" as one of the four kinds of cause in its own right. But Aristotle’s model of "the material" remains the material out of which an artifact is made. (shrink)

The concept of quantum information is introduced as both normed superposition of two orthogonal sub-spaces of the separable complex Hilbert space and in-variance of Hamilton and Lagrange representation of any mechanical system. The base is the isomorphism of the standard introduction and the representation of a qubit to a 3D unit ball, in which two points are chosen. The separable complex Hilbert space is considered as the free variable of quantum information and any point in it (a wave function describing (...) a state of a quantum system) as its value as the bound variable. A qubit is equivalent to the generalization of ‘bit’ from the set of two equally probable alternatives to an infinite set of alternatives. Then, that Hilbert space is considered as a generalization of Peano arithmetic where any unit is substituted by a qubit and thus the set of natural number is mappable within any qubit as the complex internal structure of the unit or a different state of it. Thus, any mathematical structure being reducible to set theory is re-presentable as a set of wave functions and a subspace of the separable complex Hilbert space, and it can be identified as the category of all categories for any functor represents an operator transforming a set (or subspace) of the separable complex Hilbert space into another. Thus, category theory is isomorphic to the Hilbert-space representation of set theory & Peano arithmetic as above. Given any value of quantum information, i.e. a point in the separable complex Hilbert space, it always admits two equally acceptable interpretations: the one is physical, the other is mathematical. The former is a wave function as the exhausted description of a certain state of a certain quantum system. The latter chooses a certain mathematical structure among a certain category. Thus there is no way to be distinguished a mathematical structure from a physical state for both are described exhaustedly as a value of quantum information. This statement in turn can be utilized to be defined quantum information by the identity of any mathematical structure to a physical state, and also vice versa. Further, that definition is equivalent to both standard definition as the normed superposition and in-variance of Hamilton and Lagrange interpretation of mechanical motion introduced in the beginning of the paper. Then, the concept of information symmetry can be involved as the symmetry between three elements or two pairs of elements: Lagrange representation and each counterpart of the pair of Hamilton representation. The sense and meaning of information symmetry may be visualized by a single (quantum) bit and its interpretation as both (privileged) reference frame and the symmetries of the Standard model. (shrink)

Recent work on quantum gravity suggests that neither spacetime nor spatiotemporally located entites exist at a fundamental level. The loss of both brings with it the threat of empirical incoherence. A theory is empirically incoherent when the truth of that theory undermines the empirical justification for believing it. If neither spacetime nor spatiotemporally located entities exist as a part of a fundamental theory of QG, then such a theory seems to imply that there are no observables and so no way (...) that the theory can be confirmed. The threat of empirical incoherence can be addressed by treating spacetime and spatiotemporally located entities as emergent. The question then arises as to what the metaphysical nature of this emergence might be. In this paper, I explore a functionalist approach to this kind of emergence in the context of loop quantum gravity. I begin by rehearsing the spacetime functionalist’s account of emergence, clarifying the view along the way. I proceed to sketch out a functionalist treatment of spatiotemporally located entities and combine the two forms of functionalism into a double functionalism, according to which both spacetime and matter have the same functional realisers. (shrink)

Being born into a family structure—being born of a mother—is key to being human. It is, for Jacques Lacan, essential to the formation of human desire. It is also part of the structure of analogy in the Thomistic thought of Erich Przywara. AI may well increase exponentially in sophistication, and even achieve human-like qualities; but it will only ever form an imaginary mirroring of genuine human persons—an imitation that is in fact morbid and dehumanising. Taking Lacan and Przywara at a (...) point of convergence on this topic offers important insight into human exceptionalism. (shrink)

O perspectivă contemporană asupra materiei, care ia în considerare toate entităţile ştiinţifice observabile, cu accent pe fenomene. În principiu, definiţia materiei se limitează la astfel de entităţi explorate de fizică. În funcţie de condiţiile termodinamice diferite, cum ar fi temperatura şi presiunea, materia poate exista în diferite “faze”, cele mai familiare fiind cele de solid, lichid, şi gaz. Alte faze pot fi cele de plasmă, superfluid, şi condensat Bose-Einstein. Atunci când materia trece dintr-o fază în alta, este supusă la ceea (...) ce este cunoscut ca tranziţie de fază, un fenomen studiat în termodinamică. -/- CUPRINS: -/- Natura atomică a materiei - Ipoteze atomice - Proprietățile atomilor - - Proprietăți nucleare - - Masa - - Forma și dimensiunea - - Dezintegrarea radioactivă - - Momentul magnetic - - Nivelurile energetice - - Valența și comportamentul legăturilor - - Stări - Imagistica atomică - Structura atomului - - Particule subatomice - - Nucleul - - Norul de electroni - Elemente chimice - - Descriere - - Originea elementelor - - Abundenţa - Tabelul periodic al elementelor - - Prezentare generală - - Metode de grupare - - - Grupe - - - Perioade - - - Blocuri - - - Metale, metaloide și nemetale - Izotopi (Variații, ocurența, aplicații) - - Proprietăți chimice și moleculare - - Proprietăți nucleare și stabilitatea - - Numere de izotopi per element - - Numerele de nucleoni pare și impare - - Existența în natură - - Aplicații ale izotopilor - - - Purificarea izotopilor - - - Utilizarea proprietăților chimice și biologice - - - Utilizarea proprietăților nucleare - Compuși și amestecuri - - Compuși chimici - - - Definiții - - - Legături și forțe - - Amestecuri - - - Caracteristicile amestecului - Molecule - - Legături - - - Covalente - - - Ionice - - Dimensiunea moleculară - - Geometria moleculară - - Spectroscopia moleculară - - Aspecte teoretice - Antimateria - - Definiție formală - - Istoria conceptului - - Notaţie - - Proprietăți - - Origine și asimetrie - Materia întunecată - - Definiție tehnică - - Compoziția materiei întunecate: barionică vs. nonbarionică - - - Materia barionică - - - Materia non-barionică - - - Agregarea materiei întunecate și obiectele dense de materie întunecată Solide - Microscopia cu ioni în câmp - - Introducere - - Design, limitări și aplicații - Structura cristalelor - - Celula unitară - - - Indicii Miller - - - Planuri și direcții - - - - Structuri cubice - Densitatea solidelor - - Istorie - - Măsurarea densității - - - Materiale omogene - - - Materiale heterogene - - - Materiale non-compacte - Elasticitatea - - Prezentare generală - - Elasticitatea liniară - - Aplicații - Rezistența materialelor - - Definiție - - Tipuri de sarcini - - Condiții de stres - - Condiții de rezistență - - Condiții de deformare - - Relațiile stres-deformare Lichide - Aplicații - Presiunea - - Definiție - - Unități - - Presiunea fluidelor - - Presiunea în lichid - - - Direcția presiunii lichidului - Flotabilitatea - Principiul lui Arhimede - - Formula - - Rafinare - Forțe în cazurile scufundării și plutirii - - Model simplificat - Stabilitatea statică - Flotarea - Principiul lui Pascal - - Definiție - - Explicaţie - - Butoiul lui Pascal - - Aplicațiile legii lui Pascal - Tensiunea superficială - - Cauze - - Efectele tensiunii de suprafață - - - Apa - - - Surfactanţi - Capilaritatea - - Fenomenul și fizica acțiunii capilare - - La plante și animale - - Exemple - - Înălțimea unui menisc - - Transportul lichidelor în medii poroase Gaze - Caracteristici fizice - Atmosfera - - Scurgeri de atmosferă - - Teren - - Compoziție - - Structura Pământului - - Circulație - - Importanța - - Presiunea atmosferică - - - Mecanism - - - Atmosfera standard - - - Presiunea medie a nivelului mării - - - Variația altitudinii - - - Variația locală - Barometru - - Tipuri - - - Barometre pe bază de apă - - - Barometre cu mercur - - - Barometru cu ulei de pompă de vid - - - Barometre aneroide - - - Barografe - - - Barometre MEMS - - Aplicații - - Barometre și calcularea presiunii atmosferice - Legea lui Boyle - - Istorie - - Definiție - - Relația cu teoria cinetică și gazele ideale - - Ecuaţia - - Sistemul respirator uman - Flotabilitatea în aer (Aerostate) - - Baloane - - Dirijabile - - Aerostate hibride - - Gaze flotante - - - Aer cald - Principiul lui Bernoulli - - Aplicații - - Efectul Coandă - - - Descoperire - - - Mecanismul efectului Coandă - - - Aplicații Plasma - Definiție - Proprietăți și parametri - - Grad de ionizare - - Temperaturi - - Plasme termice vs. nontermice - - Ionizare completă vs. incompletă - - Potențialul plasmei - - Magnetizare - - Comparația fazelor de plasmă și gaz - Plasma în natură, artificială și aplicații - - Plasmă în astronomie și astrofizică - - Plasma comună Schimbarea de fază - Clasificarea tranzițiilor de fază - - Clasificarea Ehrenfest - - Clasificarea modernă a tranzițiilor de fază - Proprietăți ale tranzițiilor de fază - - Puncte critice - - Simetria - - Exponenți critici și clase de universalitate - Evaporarea - - Teorie - - - Echilibru evaporativ - - Factorii care influențează rata de evaporare - Condensarea - - Inițiere - - Scenarii de reversibilitate - - Cele mai frecvente scenarii - - Cum este măsurată condensarea - - Aplicații ale condensării - - Adaptarea biologică - - Condensarea în construcția de clădiri - Ceaţa - - Definiție - - Formare - Nori - - Formarea și distribuția - - - Cum devine saturat aerul - - - Convergența de-a lungul zonelor cu presiune scăzută - - - Divergența de-a lungul zonelor de înaltă presiune - - Efecte asupra climei și atmosferei - Fierberea - - Tipuri - - - Nucleația - - - Fluxul de căldură critic - - - Tranziția - - - Filmul - - - Distilarea - - Fierberea vs. evaporarea - Înghețarea/Solidificarea - - Cristalizare - - Suprarăcirea - - Exotermicități - - Vitrificarea - - Expansiunea - - Înghețarea organismelor vii - - - Bacterii - - - Plante - - - Animale - - Conservarea alimentelor - Topirea - - Topirea ca o tranziție de fază de prim ordin - - Criteriile de topire - - Suprarăcirea - - Topirea solidelor amorfe (sticle) - Căldura latentă - - Folosire - - - Meteorologie - - Căldură latentă specifică Probleme nerezolvate - Fizica materiei condensate - Fizica plasmei Referințe Despre autor - Nicolae Sfetcu - - De același autor - - Contact Editura - MultiMedia Publishing. 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This chapter looks at Euler’s relation to Newton, and at his role in the rise of ‘Newtonian’ mechanics. It aims to give a sense of Newton’s complicated legacy for Enlightenment science, and to raise awareness that some key ‘Newtonian’ results really come from Euler.

The link between seen and unseen, matter and spirit, flesh and soul was always presumed, but never clarified enough, leaving room for debates and mostly controversies between the scientific domains and theologies of a different type; how could God, who is immaterial, have created the material world? Therefore, the logic of obtaining a result on this concern is first to see how religions have always seen the ratio between divinity and matter/universe. In this part, the idea of a world personality (...) is implied by many, so that nature itself was transformed into a person ; others have seen within the universe/the world a Spirit ruling all, connecting all and bending all to God’s commands. In a way or another, every culture has gifted the universe/nature with the capability of ruling all, seeing everything and controlling, even determining facts by connecting all together with a Great Spirit. What is this Great Spirit of all and where it resides? With the analogy of human body in relation to his Spirit we will try to figure out a place or vehicle for the Spirit to dwell the body, and the Great Spirit the matter. The Christianity names this linkage between God and matter as ‘the created grace of God’, which indwells matter and helps the Creator move and transform things. Is there any scientific argument to sustain such assertion? Can we argue somehow that God’s voice makes matter vibrate from within the way it can recombine primer elements into giant stars to the human body? If so, what should be the ratio between theology and science on this issue and with these assertions? How could God command to matter to bring things and beings out of it and what were the material leverages that was supposed to be operated to accomplish His will? However, if we can assume that God resides in the universe – as a whole, His body, or as in its very fabric – can we also figure out how is this even possible, without transforming our explanation into a pantheistic and immanent exclusive one? Through these ‘divine leverages within matter’ theory, there is no need for questioning evolutionism, creationism, pantheism, deism and many other cosmological hypotheses any longer. (shrink)

In the second part of this essay, I aim to show that Leibniz, in asserting that bodies are aggregates of substances, wants to affirm something about bodies insofar as they exist a parte rei or in reality: in reality a body is not a being, but a multitude of beings or substances. And this, on my view, is precisely what leads Leibniz to assert that bodies are phenomena: since a body is not in reality a being, but many beings, it (...) follows that a body, conceived as a being, is something that exists only objectively in the soul. That is, a body, conceived as a single thing, is not something real, but an imaginary being, a creature of the mind, a phenomenon. (shrink)

The existence of singularities alerts that one of the highest priorities of a centennial perspective on general relativity should be a careful re-thinking of the validity domain of Einstein’s field equations. We address the problem of constructing distinguishable extensions of the smooth spacetime manifold model, which can incorporate singularities, while retaining the form of the field equations. The sheaf-theoretic formulation of this problem is tantamount to extending the algebra sheaf of smooth functions to a distribution-like algebra sheaf in which the (...) former may be embedded, satisfying the pertinent cohomological conditions required for the coordinatization of all of the tensorial physical quantities, such that the form of the field equations is preserved. We present in detail the construction of these distribution-like algebra sheaves in terms of residue classes of sequences of smooth functions modulo the information of singular loci encoded in suitable ideals. Finally, we consider the application of these distribution-like solution sheaves in geometrodynamics by modeling topologically-circular boundaries of singular loci in three-dimensional space in terms of topological links. It turns out that the Borromean link represents higher order wormhole solutions. (shrink)

Western science claims to provide unique, objective information about the world. This is supported by the observation that peoples across cultures will agree upon a common description of the physical world. Further, the use of scientific instruments and mathematics is claimed to enable the objectification of science. In this work, carried out by reviewing the scientific literature, the above claims are disputed systematically by evaluating the definition of physical reality and the scientific method, showing that empiricism relies ultimately upon the (...) human senses for the evaluation of scientific theories and that measuring instruments cannot replace the human sensory system. Nativist and constructivist theories of human sensory development are reviewed, and it is shown that nativist claims of core conceptual knowledge cannot be supported by the findings in the literature, which shows that perception does not simply arise from a process of maturation. Instead, sensory function requires a long process of learning through interactions with the environment. To more rigorously define physical reality and systematically evaluate the stability of perception, and thus the basis of empiricism, the development of the method of dimension analysis is reviewed. It is shown that this methodology, relied upon for the mathematical analysis of physical quantities, is itself based upon empiricism, and that all of physical reality can be described in terms of the three fundamental dimensions of mass, length and time. Hereafter the sensory modalities that inform us about these three dimensions are systematically evaluated. The following careful analysis of neuronal plasticity in these modalities shows that all the relevant senses acquire from the environment the capacity to apprehend physical reality. It is concluded that physical reality is acquired rather than given innately, and leads to the position that science cannot provide unique results. Rather, those it can provide are sufficient for a particular environmental setting. (shrink)

This paper attempts to resolve the puzzle associated with the non-spatiality of monads by investigating the possibility that Leibniz employed a version of the extension of power doctrine, a Scholastic concept that explains the relationship between immaterial and material beings. As will be demonstrated, not only does the extension of power doctrine lead to a better understanding of Leibniz’ reasons for claiming that monads are non-spatial, but it also supports those interpretations of Leibniz’ metaphysics that accepts the real extension of (...) bodies. (shrink)

Quantum theory’s irreducible empirical core is a probability calculus. While it presupposes the events to which (and on the basis of which) it serves to assign probabilities, and therefore cannot account for their occurrence, it has to be consistent with it. It must make it possible to identify a system of observables that have measurement-independent values.What makes this possible is the incompleteness of the spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world. This is shown by applying a novel interpretive principle to interfering (...) alternatives involving distinctions between regions of space. Applying the same interpretive principle to alternatives involving distinctions between things makes it safe to claim that the macroworld comes into being through a progressive differentiation of a single, intrinsically undifferentiated entity. By entering into reflexive spatial relations, this entity gives rise to (1) what looks like a multiplicity of relata if the reflexive quality of the relations is not taken into account, and (2) what looks like a substantial expanse if the spatial quality of the relations is reified. The necessary distinction between two domains (classical and quantum, or macro and micro) and their mutual dependence is best understood as a distinction between the manifested world and its manifestation. [Paper presented at BergeFest, a conference celebrating the 60th birthday of Berge Englert, held at the Centre for Quantum Technologies, National University of Singapore, 22–25 April 2014]. (shrink)

This essay examines Hobbes’ philosophy of space, with emphasis placed on the variety of interpretations that his concept of imaginary space has elicited from commentators. The process by which the idea of space is acquired from experience, as well as the role of nominalism, will be offered as important factors in tracking down the elusive content of Hobbes’ conception of imaginary space.

We consider various effects that are encountered in matter wave interference experiments with massive nanoparticles. The text-book example of far-field interference at a grating is compared with diffraction into the dark field behind an opaque aperture, commonly designated as Poisson’s spot or the spot of Arago. Our estimates indicate that both phenomena may still be observed in a mass range exceeding present-day experiments by at least two orders of magnitude. They both require, however, the development of sufficiently cold, intense and (...) coherent cluster beams. While the observation of Poisson’s spot offers the advantage of non-dispersiveness and a simple distinction between classical and quantum fringes in the absence of particle wall interactions, van der Waals forces may severely limit the distinguishability between genuine quantum wave diffraction and classically explicable spots already for moderately polarizable objects and diffraction elements as thin as 100 nm. (shrink)

The natural histories contained in Francis Bacon's Historia naturalis et experimentalis seem to differ from the model presented in De augmentis scientiarum and the Descriptio globi intellectualis in that they are focused on the defining properties of matter, its primary schematisms and the spirits. In this respect, they are highly speculative. In this paper I aim to describe the Historia naturalis et experimentalis as a text about matter theory, the histories of which are ascending from what is most evident to (...) the senses to what is least accessible to them. Moreover, the Latin natural histories are parts of a methodological procedure in which the provisional rules and axioms obtained in one history can be used as theoretical assumptions for another history, thereby permitting one to delve ever more profoundly into the structure of nature. (shrink)

Ich thematisiere die beiden Konzeptionen als Varianten der wissenschaftlichen Weltsicht. Der Reiz des Vergleichs liegt aber weniger in den Gemeinsamkeiten als vielmehr in den Differenzen und den dabei hervortretenden Desideraten der beiden Konzeptionen. Heisenberg versteht sein Schichtenmodell nicht wie Hartmann als Fortsetzung und Zusammenfassung vorangehender philosophischer Bemühungen, sondern als einen Bruch mit den Hauptströmungen der philosophischen Tradition. In der geschichtlichen Entwicklung der Versuche um eine Bestimmung der Weltstruktur sieht er statt einer Generaltendenz, die langfristig auf eine Annäherung an die Wahrheit (...) hinausläuft, tiefgreifende Diskontinuitäten zwischen den aufeinanderfolgenden epochalen Thematisierungsmöglichkeiten. Heisenbergs Motivation für die Suche nach einer Weltordnung ist den Intentionen von Hartmann damit geradezu entgegengesetzt. Er fragt nicht nach einer epochenübergreifenden Orientierung, sondern nach einer epochenspezifischen Charakterisierung der Welt, deren zukünftig möglicher Geltungsverlust zum Maßstab neuer historischer Umbruchsphasen wird. -/- Die Desiderate der beiden Schichtenkonzeptionen gehen teils auf die nachfolgende Entwicklung der einzelwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis, teils auf den seitherigen Wandel der auch alltagspraktisch wirksamen kulturellen Selbstverständlichkeiten zurück. Einige Schwächen könnten durch Anpassung an veränderte Wissensbedingungen behoben werden. In diesem Zusammenhang schlage ich die Einführung zweier neuer Schichten vor: Die subatomare Schicht der Quantenobjekte und die Schicht der in kosmischen Dimensionen wirksamen Materie- und Energieformen. Es lassen sich aber auch grundlegende Bedenken formulieren, die in Richtung einer Ordnung der Wirklichkeit weisen, die keiner Schichtenauffassung mehr folgt. (shrink)

In this paper I intend to present the Dilemma of Continuity of Matter and a possible solution to it. This dilemma consists in choosing between two misfortunes in explaining the continuity of matter: or to say that material objects are infinitely divisible and not explain what constitutes the continuity of some kind of object, or to say that there is a certain kind of indivisible object and not explain what constitutes the continuity of such an object. The solution we provide (...) is precisely the thesis that material objects consists of points, a thesis we try to make clearer, although we have not developed it much. (shrink)

Seeking to derive the manifestly qualitative world of objects and entities without recourse to fundamental categoricity or qualitativity, I offer an account of how higher-order categorical properties and objects may emerge from a pure-power base. I explore the possibility of ‘fields’ whose fluctuations are force-carrying entities, differentiated with respect to a micro-topology of curled-up spatial dimensions. Since the spacetime paths of gauge bosons have zero ‘spacetime interval’ and no time-like extension, I argue that according them the status of fundamental entities (...) would support a pure-power ontology. Such entities, circulating within self-sustaining micro-topological ‘networks’, feasibly maintain definite spatial configurations of conserved physical quantities, including energy-momentum. Perceived as time-like and massy, and representing fermionic entities, they give rise to the manifest world. (shrink)

Speed of light can not be achieved independently by any Body even a Photon, unless it has a source, a thrust of that speed. Further, no amount of radiation or light form can be produced freely, unless some amount of (mass) rest energy is converted to dynamic liberated energy. With the investigation of above query and retrospection in mass- energy relation, a paradigm shift in understanding fundamental nature of Energy and Universe is presented.

In the history of early modern science, the ‘Journal’ of Isaac Beeckman (1588–1637) has been examined from the angle of Cartesian mechanicism, Lucretian atomism and pre–molecular theories of matter. However, by focusing on the traditional themes of the seventeenth–century “scientific revolution,” previous studies have failed to explore the medical side of Beeckman’s thinking and its debt to the Galenic tradition. The present article aims to fill this gap by examining how Beeckman considered the material structure of the living body in (...) his many commentaries on Galen between 1616 and 1627. Beeckman’s interpretation of Galenic medicine is examined following three topics: (1) Galenic teleology and its consistency with Beeckman’s Calvinist faith; (2) Galenic physiology and its accent on the natural faculties; (3) Galenic pathology and therapy in relation to the Hippocratic humors. (shrink)

This article documents the general tendency of seventeenth-century natural philosophers, irrespective of whether they were atomists or anti-atomists, to regard space, time and matter as magnitudes having the same internal composition. It examines the way in which authors such as Fromondus, Basson, Sennert, Arriaga, Galileo, Magnen, Descartes, Gassendi, Charleton as well as the young Newton motivated their belief in the isomorphism of space, time and matter, and how this belief reflected on their views concerning the relation between geometry and physics. (...) Special attention is paid to the fact that most of the authors mentioned above regarded rarefaction and condensation, on the one hand, and acceleration and deceleration, on the other hand, as analogous phenomena, which consequently had to be explained in similar terms. (shrink)

This paper is a critical response to Hylarie Kochiras’ “Gravity and Newton’s substance counting problem,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 40 267–280. First, the paper argues that Kochiras conflates substances and beings; it proceeds to show that Newton is a substance monist. The paper argues that on methodological grounds Newton has adequate resources to respond to the metaphysical problems diagnosed by Kochiras. Second, the paper argues against the claim that Newton is committed to two speculative doctrines attributed to (...) him by Kochiras and earlier Andrew Janiak: i) the passivity of matter and ii) the principle of local causation. Third, the paper argues that while Kochiras’ arguments about Newton’s metaphysical commitments are mistaken, it qualifies the characterization of Newton as an extreme empiricist as defended by Howard Stein and Rob DiSalle. In particular, the paper shows that Newton’s empiricism was an intellectual and developmental achievement that built on non trivial speculative commitments about the nature of matter and space.Keywords: Newton; Substance; Action at a distance; Space; Matter; Empiricism. (shrink)

The matter concept has had an extraordinarily complex history, dating back to the earliest days of the sort of reflective thought that came to be called ‘philosophy'. History here, as elsewhere, offers a valuable means of understanding the present, so it is with history that I will be concerned – history necessarily compressed into simplified outline. This story, like that of Caesar's Gaul, falls readily into three parts. First is the gradual emergence in early Greek thought of a factor indispensable (...) to the discussion of the changing world and the progressive elaboration of that factor (or, more exactly, cluster of factors) as philosophic reflection deepened and divided. Second is the radical shift that occurred in the seventeenth century as the concept of matter took on new meanings, gave its name to the emerging philosophy of materialism and yielded place to a derivative concept, mass, in the fast-developing new science of mechanics. Third is the further transformation of the concept in the twentieth century in the light of the dramatic changes brought about by the three radically new theories in physics: relativity, quantum mechanics, and expanding-universe cosmology, with which that century will always be associated. Matter began to be dematerialized, as it were, as matter and energy were brought into some sort of equivalence, and the imagination-friendly particles of the earlier mechanics yielded way to the ghostly realities of quantum theory that are neither here nor there. (shrink)

The concept of mass is one of the most fundamental notions in physics, comparable in importance only to those of space and time. But in contrast to the latter, which are the subject of innumerable physical and philosophical studies, the concept of mass has been but rarely investigated. Here Max Jammer, a leading philosopher and historian of physics, provides a concise but comprehensive, coherent, and self-contained study of the concept of mass as it is defined, interpreted, and applied in contemporary (...) physics and as it is critically examined in the modern philosophy of science. With its focus on theories proposed after the mid-1950s, the book is the first of its kind, covering the most recent experimental and theoretical investigations into the nature of mass and its role in modern physics, from the realm of elementary particles to the cosmology of galaxies.The book begins with an analysis of the persistent difficulties of defining inertial mass in a noncircular manner and discusses the related question of whether mass is an observational or a theoretical concept. It then studies the notion of mass in special relativity and the delicate problem of whether the relativistic rest mass is the only legitimate notion of mass and whether it is identical with the classical mass. This is followed by a critical analysis of the different derivations of the famous mass-energy relationship E = mc2 and its conflicting interpretations. Jammer then devotes a chapter to the distinction between inertial and gravitational mass and to the various versions of the so-called equivalence principle with which Newton initiated his Principia but which also became the starting point of Einstein's general relativity, which supersedes Newtonian physics. The book concludes with a presentation of recently proposed global and local dynamical theories of the origin and nature of mass.Destined to become a much-consulted reference for philosophers and physicists, this book is also written for the nonprofessional general reader interested in the foundations of physics. (shrink)

A striking feature of Newton’s thought is the very broad reach of his empiricism, potentially extending even to immaterial substances, including God, minds, and should one exist, a non-perceiving immaterial medium. Yet Newton is also drawn to certain metaphysical principles—most notably the principle that matter cannot act where it is not—and this second, rationalist feature of his thought is most pronounced in his struggle to discover ‘gravity’s cause’. The causal problem remains vexing, for he neither invokes primary causation, nor accepts (...) action at a distance by locating active powers in matter. To the extent that he is drawn to metaphysical principles, then, the causal problem is that of discovering some non-perceiving immaterial medium. Yet Newton’s thought has a third striking feature, one with roots in the other two: he allows that substances of different kinds might simultaneously occupy the very same region of space. I elicit the implications of these three features. For Newton to insist upon all three would transform the causal question about gravity into an insoluble problem about apportioning active powers. More seriously, it would undermine his means of individuating substances, provoking what I call ‘Newton’s Substance Counting Problem’. (shrink)

We present the bundle (Aff(3)⊗ℂ⊗Λ)(ℝ3), with a geometric Dirac equation on it, as a three-dimensional geometric interpretation of the SM fermions. Each (ℂ⊗Λ)(ℝ3) describes an electroweak doublet. The Dirac equation has a doubler-free staggered spatial discretization on the lattice space (Aff(3)⊗ℂ)(ℤ3). This space allows a simple physical interpretation as a phase space of a lattice of cells.We find the SM SU(3) c ×SU(2) L ×U(1) Y action on (Aff(3)⊗ℂ⊗Λ)(ℝ3) to be a maximal anomaly-free gauge action preserving E(3) symmetry and symplectic (...) structure, which can be constructed using two simple types of gauge-like lattice fields: Wilson gauge fields and correction terms for lattice deformations.The lattice fermion fields we propose to quantize as low energy states of a canonical quantum theory with ℤ2-degenerated vacuum state. We construct anticommuting fermion operators for the resulting ℤ2-valued (spin) field theory.A metric theory of gravity compatible with this model is presented too. (shrink)

We present an argument against physicalism in two steps: 1) Physics reduces the world to a mathematical structure; 2) The notion of 'structure' only makes sense when carried by something and interpreted by something else. Physicalism does not allow such a carrier and interpreter at a fundamental level, hence it must be wrong. An extended notion of Mind is presented as the fundamental 'hardware' which is necessary by the argument. In particular, qualia correspond to the 'monitor component' of mind. Some (...) ideas are presented on how to extend this mind-matter relation to a more elaborate picture: (1) A system of two complementary reductionisms (one physical, the other mental) may hint toward a deeper reality in which mind and the physical world are closely entangled. (2) A division of mind into a conscious 'monitor' and an unconscious 'processor' is suggested using the analogy of dreams. Finally, the problem of Solipsism and the existence of 'minds other than my own' is discussed. (shrink)

The late 19th century debate among German-speaking physicists about theoretical entities is often regarded as foreshadowing the scientific realism debate. This paper brings out differences between them by concentrating on the part of the earlier debate that was concerned with the conceptual consistency of the competing conceptions of matter—mainly, but not exclusively, of atomism. Philosophical antinomies of atomism were taken up by Emil Du Bois-Reymond in an influential lecture in 1872. Such challenges to the consistency of atomism had repercussions within (...) the physics community, as can be shown for the examples of Heinrich Hertz and Ludwig Boltzmann. The latter developed a series of counter-arguments, culminating in an ingenious attempt to turn the tables on the critics of atomism and prove the inconsistency of non-atomistic conceptions of nature. Underlying this controversy is a disagreement over specific goals of physical research which was considered crucially relevant to the further course of physical inquiry. It thereby exemplifies an attitude towards the realism issue that can be contrasted with a different, more neutral attitude of construing the realism issue as merely philosophical and indifferent with respect to concrete research programs in physics, which one also occasionally finds expressed in the 19th century controversy and which may be seen as the prevailing attitude of the 20th century debate. (shrink)

Unifying physics by describing a variety of interactions – or even all interactions – within a common framework has long been an alluring goal for physicists. One of the most ambitious attempts at unification was made in the 1910s by Gustav Mie. Mie aimed to derive electromagnetism, gravitation, and aspects of the emerging quantum theory from a single variational principle and a well-chosen Lagrangian. Mie’s main innovation was to consider nonlinear field equations to allow for stable particle-like solutions (now called (...) solitons), and he clarified the use of variational principles in the context of special relativity. The following brief introduction to Mie’s work has three main objectives. The first is to explain how Mie’s project fit into the contemporary development of the electromagnetic world view. Part of Mie’s project was to develop a relativistic theory of gravitation as a consequence of his generalized electromagnetic theory, and our second goal is to briefly assess this work, which reflects the conceptual resources available for developing a new account of gravitation by analogy with electromagnetism. Finally, Mie was a vocal critic of other approaches to the problem of gravitation. Mie’s criticisms of Einstein, in particular, bring out the subtlety and novelty of the ideas that Einstein used to guide his development of general relativity. (shrink)

We discuss the nature of reality in the ontological context of Penrose’s math-matter-mind triangle. The triangle suggests the circularity of the widespread view that math arises from the mind, the mind arises out of matter, and that matter can be explained in terms of math. Non-physicists should be wary of any claim that modern physics leads us to any particular resolution of this circularity, since even the sample of three theoretical physicists writing this paper hold three divergent views. Some physicists (...) believe that current physics has already found the basic framework for a complete description of reality, and only has to fill in the details. Others suspect that no single framework, from physics or other sources, will ever capture reality. Yet others guess that reality might be approached arbitrarily closely by some form of future physics, but probably based on completely different frameworks. We will designate these three approaches as the fundamentalist, secular and mystic views of the world, as seen by practicing physicists. We present and contrast each of these views, which arguably form broad categories capturing most if not all interpretations of physics. We argue that this diversity in the physics community is more useful than an ontological monoculture, since it motivates physicists to tackle unsolved problems with a wide variety of approaches. (shrink)

Interpretations of Einstein’s equation differ primarily concerning whether E = mc2 entails that mass and energy are the same property of physical systems, and hence whether there is any sense in which mass is ever ‘converted’ into energy. In this paper, I examine six interpretations of Einstein’s equation and argue that all but one fail to satisfy a minimal set of conditions that all interpretations of physical theories ought to satisfy. I argue that we should prefer the interpretation of Einstein’s (...) equation that holds that mass and energy are distinct properties of physical systems. This interpretation also carries along the view that while most cases of ‘conversion’ are not genuine examples of mass being ‘converted’ into energy, it is possible that the there are such ‘conversions’ in the sense that a certain amount of energy ‘appears’ and an equivalent of mass ‘disappears’. Finally, I suggest that the interpretation I defend is the only one that does not blur the distinction between what Einstein called ‘principle’ and ‘constructive’ theories. This is philosophically significant because it emphasizes that explanations of Einstein’s equation and the ‘conversion’ of mass and energy must be top‐down explanations. (shrink)

The foundations of Wesson’s induced matter theory are analyzed. It is shown that the empty—without matter—5-dimensional bulk must be regarded as a Weylian space rather than as a Riemannian one. Revising the geometry of the bulk, we have assumed that a Weylian connection vector and a gauge function exist in addition to the metric tensor. The framework of a Weyl–Dirac version of Wesson’s theory is elaborated and discussed. In the 4-dimensional hypersurface, one obtains equations describing both fields, the gravitational and (...) the electromagnetic. The result is a geometrically based unified theory of gravitation and electromagnetism with mass and current induced by the bulk. In special cases on obtains on the brane the equations of Einstein–Maxwell, or these of the original induced matter theory. (shrink)

Pierre Gassendi was a major factor in the revival of Epicureanism in early modern philosophy, not only through his contribution to the restoration and criticism of Epicurean texts, but also by his adaptation of Epicurean ideas in his own philosophy, which was itself influential on such important figures of early modern philosophy as Hobbes, Locke, Newton, and Boyle (to name just a few). Despite his vigorous defense of certain Epicurean ideas and ancient atomism, Gassendi goes to great lengths to differentiate (...) his philosophy from Epicureanism on certain key points. In this paper I argue that those key points on which Gassendi rejects and and criticizes the Epicurean view, such as the immortality of the soul and divine creation of the cosmos, are central not only to Epicureanism, but also to Gassendi's own philosophy. In order to see Gassendi's philosophy for what it is, and understand its role in the history of natural theology, we need accept and understand better why he rejected the central theses of Epicureanism. (shrink)