Maurice Merleau-Ponty

George Berkeley's apparently strange view – that nothing exists without a mind except for minds themselves – is notorious. Also well known, and equally perplexing at a superficial level, is his insistence that his doctrine is no more than what is consistent with common sense. It was every bit as crucial for Berkeley that it be demonstrated that the colors are really in the tulip, as that there is nothing that is neither a mind nor something perceived by a mind. (...) In what follows, I shall attempt to re-examine Berkeley's argument in terms of what it appears to have meant to him. I am especially interested in the connection between Berkeley's thought concerning the relation between perception and metaphysics and that of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, with whom, perhaps surprisingly, Berkeley shared a great many intuitions and concerns. Thus part of my objective is to compare and contrast the work of two thinkers who had many common interests, and whose thought frequently led them down similar paths. I shall be especially interested in apparent points of departure, both those that turn out to reflect real divergences and those which reflect confusions of one kind or another. My main objective, however, is not mere textual analysis. Like both Berkeley and Merleau-Ponty, my main hope is to make progress in clarifying how things are. As odd as some of Berkeley's pronouncements may sound to contemporary ears – concerning especially the metaphysical consequences of what he regarded as perceptual facts – I shall argue that, in substance, he was often not far wrong at all – at least as measured by important strands of more contemporary work on the subject. More particularly, I shall contend that for going a long way down an extraordinarily fruitful path which has been subsequently explored more fully by (especially) Martin Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Nelson Goodman and Hilary Putnam, Berkeley deserves considerably more credit than he is usually accorded as a progenitor of contemporary approaches to metaphysical issues. (shrink)

My central research focus over the past 30 years has been the articulation of what I call a radically temporal approach to philosophy. In the papers below, written between 2001 and 2022, I treat the varying ways in which radically temporal thinking manifests itself in the phenomenological perspectives of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Eugene Gendlin. I also discuss Jacques Derrida's deconstructive project and George Kelly's personal construct theory as examples of radically temporal thinking. With the aim of clarifying and (...) further defining the nature of this family of orientations, I have delineated the important ways in which it differs from a range of interlinked approaches in philosophy and psychology that includes hermeneutic and radical constructivisms, social constructionism, 4EA (Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, Extended, and Affective) cognition, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of corporeal intersubjectivity, autopoietic self-organizing systems theory and American pragmatism. Among the authors whose work I have submitted to critique from the radically temporal perspective are: Francisco Varela (autopoietic self-organizing systems), Shaun Gallagher, Evan Thompson, Matthew Ratcliffe, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Dan Zahavi, Hanne De Jaegher, Michel Bitbol, Thomas Fuchs (enactive, embodied ('4EA') cognition), Gilles Deleuze (Deleuzian biopolitics), Ken Gergen and John Shotter ( social constructionism), Kym Maclaren ( critical phenomenology) and Jan Slaby (critical neuroscience). I argue that these authors' accounts of the relation between affect, motivation and intention, attention , reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness, the basis of mathematical naturalism and sensori-motor models of behavior, and the relation between the body, language and culture remain burdened by traditional presuppositions that the radically temporal philosophies of Heidegger et al put into question. (shrink)

Despite the diversity of viewpoints throughout the history of philosophy on the subject of blame, one thing philosophers appear to agree on is that blame is an irreducible feature of experience. That is to say , no philosophical approach makes the claim to have entirely eliminated the need for anger and blame. On the contrary, a certain conception of blameful anger is at the very heart of both modern and postmodern philosophical foundations. As a careful analysis will show, this is (...) true even for those philosophical arguments that pop up from time to time extolling the virtues of moving beyond blame and anger. In this paper, I assert that all forms of blame, including the cool, non-emotional, rational desire for accountability and justice and well as rageful craving for vengeance, are grounded in a spectrum of affective comportments that share core features. This affective spectrum includes irritation, annoyance, hostility, disapproval, condemnation, feeling insulted, taking umbrage, resentment, anger, exasperation, impatience, hatred, fury, ire, outrage, contempt, righteous indignation, ‘adaptive’ or rational anger, perceiving the other as deliberately thoughtless, rude, careless, negligent, complacent, lazy, self-indulgent, malevolent, dishonest, narcissistic, malicious, culpable, perverse, inconsiderate, intentionally oppressive, anti-social, hypocritical, repressive or unfair, disrespectful, disgraceful, greedy, evil, sinful, criminal, a miscreant. Blame is also implicated in cooly, calmly and rationally determining the other to have deliberately committed a moral transgression, a social injustice or injustice in general, or as committing a moral wrong. -/- I challenge the reader to recognize that every time you experience any of the blameful attitudes, emotions and assessments I mentioned above, you are displaying your own failure of understanding. I challenge you to do away with your need for concepts of blame, anger and punitive justice in any of their philosophical guises, and with them the equally unctuous discourses of forgiveness. -/- Anger is neither inherently immoral nor irrational and destructive, but represents a limited understanding of human behavior. To the extent that concepts of ethico-political justice imply appraisal of blameful, guilty intent, they also represent a failure of understanding and a form of violence and an impetus of conformity. There’s no such thing as adaptive, moral or righteous blame or anger. Modern legal concepts of justice, to the extent they imply blame, depend on an inadequate grasp of motivation and intent. (shrink)

Ce texte cherche à interroger l'œuvre de Merleau-Ponty à travers la métaphore de l'écriture: de la Phénoménologie de la perception jusqu'aux dernières notes du Visible et l'invisible, un même réseau conceptuel revient en effet, celui de la trace, du texte, de l'inscription, et nous avons tenté d'en cerner le sens et la fonction. L'écriture, le « texte du monde », c'est d'abord le sol fondamental, l'originaire dont la phénoménologie est en quête, et qu'elle tente de dévoiler sous les idéalités du (...) langage constitué; c'est ensuite, selon la lecture que Merleau-Ponty entreprend de Saussure, l'écart, la différence interne au procès des significations — l'écriture ou la trace n'étant plus alors ce « texte original » auquel il nous faudrait sans cesse revenir, mais l'épaisseur même du langage se reprenant sans cesse. Parce qu'elle est à la fois à la recherche de l'expérience première et qu'elle a renoncé à l'illusion d'une transparence du langage, d'une coïncidence muette, la philosophie est une bien étrange traduction: ce qu'elle écrit à son tour vise à « rendre » le visible ou le sensible, mais ce sensible « n'offre rien qu'on puisse dire si l'on n'est pas philosophe ou écrivain ». The aim of this text is to probe Merleau-Ponty's work through the metaphor of writing from the Phenomenology of Perception to the final notes of The Visible and The Invisible. A common conceptual system reoccurs, of trace, text, and inscription; we have striven to define its meaning and function, Writing, this « world text », is primarily the native ground which phenomenology attempts to reveal through the idealities of constituted language. Secondly, as Merleau-Ponty endeavours to read through Saussure, it would be the space, the internal difference between significations. In this sense, writing or traces would no longer be this original text to which we must endlessly refer, but the density of language itself. Since philosophy is simultaneously seeking out the primordial experience and has shed the illusion of language transparency, and unvoiced coincidence, its role is paradoxical: what it writes aims at restituting the visible or the sensible, though this sensible « offers nothing that could be said by him who his not a philosopher or a writer ». (shrink)

I begin by comparing and contrasting Merleau-Ponty’s metaphysical project with the views of philosophers, such as Wolff, Leibniz, Bergson, Sartre, and Heidegger. Focusing on Merleau-Ponty’s most striking “metaphysical question,” the one about “bringing into being” (faire-être), I then show how it contrasts with notions such as being, non-being, and “being-made” (être fait). Responding to three objections to this theory, I, first, show how “making” (faire) is distinct from “acting.” Second, I argue that “bringing into being” is only actualized in “metaphysical (...) consciousness”, when it shifts from wondering before the paradox to realizing that the contradiction can be fruitful. This is a critique of the foundation metaphysics in Aristotle and Plato. Third, I propose four arguments in order to counter the view that Merleau-Ponty’s metaphysics is just the unthinkable blind spot of his thought. I conclude by showing that his emphasis on consciousness allows us to distinguish three meanings of unconsciousness. (shrink)

生とは一体何か。また生はどのように現れるのか。それは、現象学において生活（としての）世界（Lebenswelt）として現れる。だが、フッサールが試みる生活世界の存在論は、狭義の生の現象学ではない。加え て、彼は生活世界を自我の超越論的生から理解する。この問題を解決するには、ハイデッガー、M.アンリ、レヴィナスによる様々な生の現象学があるが、それに対して徹底的な反論がある。生の現象学を凌駕するには、メ ルロ＝ポンティと共に、生きることの形而上学を取り上げる必要がある。それは、意識の様々な「段階」（驚き及び認識）、「豊かな矛盾」、「フェール（なす、作る、・・・させる）」（faire）等といった概念を通 じて可能になる。.

Feminist standpoint theory is a variety of feminist epistemology that has been active since the 1980s. Its two central tenets are (1) that knowledge is necessarily situated within a socio-political context, and (2) that certain socio-political positions or standpoints are epistemically privileged when it comes to “reveal[ing] the truth of social reality” (Hekman 1997). Over the course of its history, standpoint theory has encountered a number of problems which have revealed divisions among its supporters over certain fundamental philosophical commitments. In (...) this paper, I sketch out a phenomenological account of perception that can begin to address these problems, drawn largely from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. There are two major issues that I believe a Merleau-Pontyan view of perception can help alleviate. One is that there has never been a thorough articulation of a theory of perception underlying standpoint theory’s central claims. This is surprising, since arguments in favor of standpoint theory often emphasize that occupying a certain standpoint enables one to see the world differently (see Hartsock 1983, among others). The other problem is the complex tension between standpoint theory’s two central theses. Positing that knowledge is necessarily situated seems to make it difficult to account for one single reality about which some particular group could be epistemically privileged (Hekman 1997). Merleau-Ponty can help us resolve these issues by providing an account of perspectival perception wherein a multiplicity of different perceptual standpoints all nonetheless put us in touch with a single "external" world. Merleau-Ponty’s account also explains how it could be that some standpoints are better than others when it comes to accessing certain features of this world. For Merleau-Ponty, it is not a problem if each perspective is incomplete, partial, or even apparently conflicting with other perspectives. The proliferation of standpoints need not lead us into an unacceptably relativistic framework, as long as we are able to conceive of each of these standpoints as giving whoever occupies it access to some particular aspect of a singular, real, shared world. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between Merleau-Ponty's lectures on institution and his lectures on passivity. I argue that the relationship depends on Merleau-Ponty's internal critique of institution as outlined in Husserl's ouevre. That is, institution is not only human institution, which rests on temporality and time-consciousness, but also animal, biological and even virological, which rests on a certain, non-euclidian space of the body. Merleau-Ponty's focus in the course is animal institution: animal morphology, menstruation, puberty, etc. These are what tie institution (...) and passivity together, and especially the passivity that Merleau-Ponty calls the "symbolic matrix," the touchstone of which is the "implex." While the paper discusses, Merleau-Ponty's critique of Husserl and the consequent understanding of a passivity in institution, it opens the possibility that the virological may be yet another kind of passivity that has instituted a new trajectory in human institution. This is highlighted in the very word "pandemic.". (shrink)

This paper tracks the development of Merleau-Ponty's inquiries into language through the themes of institution, symbolism, and nature in his Collège de France lectures of 1953-1960. It seeks to show the continuity of Merleau-Ponty's inquiries over this period. The Problem of Speech course (1953-1954) constitutes his last extended treatment of speech, language, and expression, and it leaves many questions unanswered. Nonetheless, a careful study of the course reveals that the inquiries that follow into institution and symbolism, and later into nature, (...) do not mark a sharp rupture with his earlier thought. Rather, the later investigations are required by those into language and expression to clarify the underlying functions that support them. Ultimately, the themes of language and nature will be deeply interwoven in Merleau-Ponty's late thought, with institution and symbolism serving as important mediating concepts. (shrink)

In this article, I will pursue three aims. First, I would like to demonstrate the non-transcendental character of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, namely, his claim that a strict division between a priori and a posteriori is an abstraction that derives from a more primordial unity that is given in our lived experience. I will criticize authors such as H. Dreyfus and T. Carman who treat the body and bodily character of our existence as a classical Kantian a priori that functions as a (...) condition of experience without itself being a part of the experience. The claim I would like to defend in this regard is that reflections on the conditions of our experience must themselves be a part of our experience. The second task is to show how Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of temporality helps him to avoid this strict division between a priori and a posteriori. Based on this, I will elucidate some of the most obscure passages of Phenomenology of Perception. Finally, I will claim that the notion of optimal grip can neither be explained by the reference to our body, as Carman claims, or to brains, organisms and their copings with the environment, as Dreyfus argues. Instead, I will claim that the maximal grip is rather a consolidation or intensification of the temporal ecstasy. (shrink)

Theodor Adorno’s 1960–1961 lecture course Ontology and Dialectics, recently translated into English, provides the most systematic articulation of his critique of Martin Heidegger. When Adorno deliv...

Theodor Adorno’s 1960–1961 lecture course Ontology and Dialectics, recently translated into English, provides the most systematic articulation of his critique of Martin Heidegger. When Adorno deliv...

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print. Theodor Adorno’s 1960–1961 lecture course Ontology and Dialectics, recently translated into English, provides the most systematic articulation of his critique of Martin Heidegger. When Adorno delivered three of the lectures at the Collège de France, Maurice Merleau-Ponty was reportedly scandalised as he was at that time developing his own ontology, informed by Heidegger. However, this article problematises the assumption that Adorno’s negative dialectic and Merleau-Ponty’s late ontology are incompatible. First, Adorno’s criticism of Heidegger’s (...) ontology is delineated, with particular focus on how Adorno argues that Heidegger’s subordination of the human being to being is homologous with the logic of capitalism. Then, we turn to Merleau-Ponty’s own engagement with Heidegger, with particular focus on how Merleau-Ponty cannot be accused of denigrating ontic beings. Finally, it is argued that Merleau-Ponty’s indirect ontology has the same implications as those which allow Adorno to position his dialectical method as politically opposed to Heidegger’s ontology. (shrink)

Empruntée à Heidegger et devenue méthode d'histoire de la philosophie, la quête d'un impensé est aussi, chez Merleau-Ponty, ce qui anime et caractérise sa propre recherche. Appliquée à Bergson, une telle méthode dévoile un Bergson se faisant, plus riche et plus complexe que ne le laisse supposer le « bersonisme »; elle révèle en outre des aspects essentiels de la pensée de Merleau-Ponty qu'une référence exclusive à la phénoménologie ne pourrait qu'occulter. Heidegger entliehen und zur Methode der Philosophiegeschichte geworden, ist (...) die Suche nach einem Ungedachten auch bei Merleau-Ponty das, was seine eigene Suche vorantreibt und charakterisiert. Auf Bergson bezogen enthüllt eine solche Methode einen Bergson se faisant, der reicher und vielfältiger ist als der « Bergsonismus » es sonst vermuten läßt; Außerdem bringt sie wesentliche Merkmale von Merleau-Pontys Denken ans Licht, die eine exklusive Bezugnahme auf die Phänomenologie nur im Schatten lassen könnte. (shrink)

Disavowals such as "That's not who I am" are one way to distance ourselves from unsavory actions in order to try to mitigate our responsibility for them. Although such disclaimers can be what Harry Frankfurt calls "shabbily insincere devices for obtaining unmerited indulgence," they can also be a way to renew our commitments to new values as part of the processes of aspiration and moral improvement. What, then, separates backsliding aspirants from those in denial who seek unmerited indulgence? Drawing on (...) Christine Korsgaard, on the one hand, and Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, on the other, I propose a two-dimensional account of practical identity that makes sense of a certain kind of self-ignorance and helps us distinguish the aspirant from the superficially similar cases of denial and resignation. A key factor is how one responds to what I call residual practical identities. (shrink)

Die Phänomenologie stellt eine der Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie dar und findet in zahlreichen Wissenschaften sowie in Praxis und Therapeutik starke Resonanz. Nach 120 Jahren Wirkungsgeschichte füllt die Bibliothek phänomenologischer Werke zahllose Bücherregale und selbst für Expert:innen ist die Forschungsliteratur mittlerweile unüberschaubar geworden. An allgemeinen Einführungen sowie spezialisierter Fachliteratur mangelt es dabei keineswegs, wohl aber an einem Handbuch, in dem sowohl der Vielfalt der historischen Entwicklungen als auch dem berechtigten Wunsch nach innerer systematischer Kohärenz Rechnung getragen wird. Das Handbuch Phänomenologie schließt (...) diese Lücke. Ausgewiesene Autor:innen bereiten in eigens für diesen Band verfassten Artikeln komplexe sachliche Zusammenhänge übersichtlich auf. Durch seinen Aufbau eignet sich das Handbuch sowohl für Anfänger:innen als auch für Fortgeschrittene. Anhand bündig präsentierter Grundbegriffe und Verfahren konturiert das Handbuch die Spezifik der phänomenologischen Methode, spart dabei jedoch nicht die Kontroversen und methodologischen Neuausrichtungen aus, die von ihrer Lebendigkeit und Vielstimmigkeit zeugen. Ein umfangreicher Schlussteil ist der Rezeption und Anwendung in einzelnen Wirkfeldern gewidmet. Als Hilfsmittel zur eigenständigen Erschließung der phänomenologischen Denkrichtung und zu ihrer Anwendung auf aktuelle Probleme zeichnet sich das Handbuch durch seine Leser:innenfreundlichkeit und einen stark forschungspraktischen Bezug aus. Ein Kompendium, das sich bald als ABC der Phänomenologie etablieren dürfte. -/- . (shrink)

Embodied Idealism argues that Maurice Merleau-Ponty's early thought stands as a form of transcendental idealism. In spite of his overt criticisms of idealism, Merleau-Ponty holds that our experience is inextricably structured by our minds, and that reality is ontologically dependent on the mind.

This paper clarifies Merleau-Ponty’s original account of “higher-order” cognition as fundamentally embodied and enacted. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy inspired theories that deemphasize overlaps between conceptual knowledge and motor intentionality or, on the contrary, focus exclusively on abstract thought. In contrast, this paper explores the link between Merleau-Ponty’s account of motor intentionality and his interpretations of our capacity to understand and interact productively with cultural symbolic systems. I develop my interpretation based on Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of two neuropathological modifications of motor intentionality, the case (...) of the brain-injured war veteran Schneider, and a neurological disorder known as Gerstmann’s syndrome. Building on my analysis of Schneider’s sensorimotor compensatory performances in relation to his limitations in the domains of algebra, geometry, and language usage, I demonstrate a strong continuity between the sense of embodiment and enaction at all these levels. Based on Merleau-Ponty’s interpretations, I argue that “higher-order” cognition is impaired in Schneider insofar as his injury limits his sensorimotor capacity to dynamically produce comparatively more complex differentiations of any given phenomenal structure. I then show how Merleau-Ponty develops and specifies his interpretation of Schneider’s intellectual difficulties in relation to the ambiguous role of the body, and in particular the hand, in Gerstmann’s syndrome. I explain how Merleau-Ponty defends the idea that sensorimotor and quasi-representational cognition are mutually irreducible, while maintaining that symbol-based cognition is a fundamentally enactive and embodied process. (shrink)

[This paper is written in Czech.] The aim of this article is to briefly introduce and critically analyze the dialogue between phenomenology and contemporary theories of embodied cognition in relation to the study of affectivity. The author explains how these theoretical approaches interpret the dynamic relationship between affective experiences on the one hand and bodily behavior and intersubjectively observable processes taking place in the environment on the other. He first summarizes the positions of Joel Krueger and Giovanna Colombetti, who draw (...) on the theories of extended cognition and enactivism, and then compares them with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach. In this way, there are found to be inconsistencies in Krueger’s and Colombetti’s approaches, whose resolution, in the author’s opinion, requires the working out of a rigorously “relational” interpretation of affectivity. From this point of view, affectivity is not understood as an internal phenomenon causally linked to external material factors, but strictly as a dynamic relationship between a sense-making agent and his or her meaningful environment. (shrink)

A review of the English translation of Merleau-Ponty's course notes from the Collège de France, The Sensible World and the World of Expression, 1953.

Over the course of its history, feminist standpoint theory has encountered a number of problems which reveal divisions among its supporters over certain fundamental philosophical commitments. This chapter sketches a phenomenological account of perception that can begin to address these problems, drawn largely from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau-Ponty can help us resolve these issues by providing an account of perspectival perception wherein a multiplicity of different perceptual standpoints all nonetheless put us in touch with a single external world, (...) and in which some standpoints may be better than others when it comes to accessing certain features of this world. For Merleau-Ponty, the proliferation of standpoints need not lead us into an unacceptably relativistic framework, as long as we are able to conceive of each of these standpoints as giving whoever occupies it access to some particular aspect of a singular, real, shared world. (shrink)

In _The Visible and the Invisible_ Merleau-Ponty develops a notion of ‘sensible ideas’ that conceives general meaning as inseparable from its realization in sensible particulars. Such ideas – exemplified by music – are to capture the specificity of the meaning produced by embodied agency and serve as the foundation of all cognition. This article argues that, although Merleau-Ponty overgeneralizes their application, sensible ideas are philosophically important in enabling better understanding of the diverse forms and functions embodied-embedded practices and cognition can (...) take. It begins by outlining Merleau-Ponty’s conception of sensible ideas and showing how this late ‘ontological’ view takes up and refines themes from his earlier works. It then assesses sensible ideas’ assumed foundational role by considering several embodied practices (mathematics, music, painting), arguing that this does not hold generally and that painting better exemplifies sensible ideas than music. I show that whether a practice is accurately described by sensible ideas depends on how it relates the particular and general, and that sensible ideas have a distinctive philosophical role in understanding the non-identity-based meaning constitution characteristic of some embodied-embedded practices. Finally, a comparison with Kant’s aesthetic ideas is used to clarify the close but non-necessary relation between sensible ideas and art. (shrink)

This paper attempts to reconcile two ideas that seem fundamentally opposed to one another: the reality of the self and the doctrine of no-self. Buddhism offers a form of spiritual equanimity that turns on the denial of a self. Nonetheless, there seem to be good reasons to hold onto the reality of the self. The existence of a self enables us to account for praise and blame, the hopes for oneself that motivate actions, and attachments to the selves of others (...) in bonds of love and affection. I show how it may be possible to reconcile the reality of the self with a particular interpretation of the no-self doctrine by engaging with the work of thinkers from the phenomenological tradition such as Merleau-Ponty, Zahavi, Kimura, Gallagher, and Petitmengin. (shrink)

In order to explore the question of whether artists are phenomenologists, I consider the negative and affirmative answers defended by Edith Landmann-Kalischer and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, respectively. Through this comparison, I bring to light reasons why phenomenologists take themselves to share a subject-matter with artists, viz., lived experience. However, with this comparison I also highlight the ways in which the answer to this question turns on how we conceive of what phenomenologists do. If one endorses a more scientific conception of phenomenology, (...) as Landmann-Kalischer does, then it seems that the phenomenologist does something fundamentally different from the artist. But if one endorses a more aesthetic conception of phenomenology, as Merleau-Ponty does, then the phenomenologist’s efforts appear to be of a piece with those of the artist. In the end, I will not defend one position over the other; rather, my aim is to show that in order to answer the question, are artists phenomenologists, we must also answer the question, how should a phenomenologist be. (shrink)

Este artículo propone una recentralización del pensamiento político de Merleau-Ponty con el fin de dar cuenta, no solamente de un aspecto local de su filosofía, sino más bien de una clave interpretativa privilegiada para comprender el conjunto de sus trabajos. En ese sentido, argumentaremos en favor de la existencia de una relación íntima entre la reducción fenomenológica y la lógica interna de los procesos revolucionarios. De dicha relación se deriva, según nuestra lectura, el pensamiento crítico del autor sobre la historia (...) y el ser en el mundo. (shrink)

The chapter addresses the problem of the relationship between life (vitality) and mind (thought) by drawing on the resources available in Canguilhem’s and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies. It consists of six sections. In the first and second section, I outline the so-called ‘mind-life problem’ and two diametrically opposed responses to it: life philosophy (life subsumes mind) and transcendentalism (mind subsumes life). Against this background, I flesh out Canguilhem’s ‘slantwise’ resolution, which argues that, while it is true that life feeds into mind, it (...) is equally true that mind takes up and subl(im)ates life. In the third and fourth section, I focus on the first half of the proposed solution: I start by putting forward a non-reductionist account of life grounded on the idea of vital normativity, and then go on to show how this vital dynamism translates into human cognition via praktognosia (embodied and techn(olog)ical know-how). In the fifth section I tackle the second half of the solution: by delineating the idea of symbolic behavior and ex-centric positionality I try to indicate how mind, while grounded in life, is nonetheless able to transcend it. Finally, in the last section, I suggest that this Janus-faced dynamism between life and mind also holds true for the researcher investigating these topics, and hint at the broader philosophical implication of such a view for the practice of science and philosophy. (shrink)

현상학은 어떻게 자연과의 연속성 속에서 인간적인 것을 사유할 수 있으며 또 그럼에도 불구하고 창출(institution)의 관점에서는 실존의 통일성을 표현할 수도 있는 것일까? 메를로퐁티는 ‘자연주의적 양도’ 없이 그러나 그의 살의 개념과 연결된 ‘실재론적 옵션’을 통해 이것을 실현한다. 즉 존재하는바 그대로를 그냥 반복하거나 기술하는 것이 아니라, 생명체를 초과하는 세계를 믿는 것이고, 사태들 너머로 합당한 결과를 낳는 우주를 믿으며, 따라서 이 사태들을 초월하고 판단하는 우주를 믿는 것이다. 세계가 관념성과 이상성의 담지자인 것은 그것이 생명과는 다른 질서로부터이기 때문이 아니라 반대로 인간 생명체의 고안물이 되기 때문이다. 이렇게 (...) 하여 원초적인 ‘살의 미분화’는 새로운 차원에서 선험성의 역할을 하는 것이다. 요컨대 이 미분화는 문화와 정신의 세계를 지레 감지하는데, 이러한 세계는 육화의 특징을 띤 세계관계인 ‘살’에 미리 보여지는 역동성을 자신의 방식으로 회복하고 있다고 하겠다. (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 4, Page 520-530, July 2022.

The aim of this essay is to connect the notion of the Anthropocene with Merleau-Pontyan thought by drawing on two aspects of the author’s ontological reflection. First, I consider “the event of the Anthropocene” as an event that is part of an instituting dynamic, in reference to the ontological dimension of “Institution” that Merleau-Ponty borrows from Husserl and develops in an original way in his 1954-1955 lectures at the Collège de France. I then underline the difficulties that arise when multiple (...) names are employed to designate our “current geological era” in debates on the Anthropocene, a complex global event with political, ethical, and social dimensions. To conclude, I show that this multiplication of names is constitutive of the event of the Anthropocene. The Merleau-Pontyan idea of “a theme that constitutes itself through its variations,” introduced by Mauro Carbone in his work on sensible ideas and the “arche-screen” and closely linked to the element of “Institution,” can help us find philosophical advancements at the heart of this contemporary naming debate. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to connect the notion of the Anthropocene with Merleau-Pontyan thought by drawing on two aspects of the author’s ontological reflection. First, I consider “the event of the Anthropocene” as an event that is part of an instituting dynamic, in reference to the ontological dimension of “Institution” that Merleau-Ponty borrows from Husserl and develops in an original way in his 1954-1955 lectures at the Collège de France. I then underline the difficulties that arise when multiple (...) names are employed to designate our “current geological era” in debates on the Anthropocene, a complex global event with political, ethical, and social dimensions. To conclude, I show that this multiplication of names is constitutive of the event of the Anthropocene. The Merleau-Pontyan idea of “a theme that constitutes itself through its variations,” introduced by Mauro Carbone in his work on sensible ideas and the “arche-screen” and closely linked to the element of “Institution,” can help us find philosophical advancements at the heart of this contemporary naming debate. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to connect the notion of the Anthropocene with Merleau-Pontyan thought by drawing on two aspects of the author’s ontological reflection. First, I consider “the event of the Anthropocene” as an event that is part of an instituting dynamic, in reference to the ontological dimension of “Institution” that Merleau-Ponty borrows from Husserl and develops in an original way in his 1954-1955 lectures at the Collège de France. I then underline the difficulties that arise when multiple (...) names are employed to designate our “current geological era” in debates on the Anthropocene, a complex global event with political, ethical, and social dimensions. To conclude, I show that this multiplication of names is constitutive of the event of the Anthropocene. The Merleau-Pontyan idea of “a theme that constitutes itself through its variations,” introduced by Mauro Carbone in his work on sensible ideas and the “arche-screen” and closely linked to the element of “Institution,” can help us find philosophical advancements at the heart of this contemporary naming debate. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to connect the notion of the Anthropocene with Merleau-Pontyan thought by drawing on two aspects of the author’s ontological reflection. First, I consider “the event of the Anthropocene” as an event that is part of an instituting dynamic, in reference to the ontological dimension of “Institution” that Merleau-Ponty borrows from Husserl and develops in an original way in his 1954-1955 lectures at the Collège de France. I then underline the difficulties that arise when multiple (...) names are employed to designate our “current geological era” in debates on the Anthropocene, a complex global event with political, ethical, and social dimensions. To conclude, I show that this multiplication of names is constitutive of the event of the Anthropocene. The Merleau-Pontyan idea of “a theme that constitutes itself through its variations,” introduced by Mauro Carbone in his work on sensible ideas and the “arche-screen” and closely linked to the element of “Institution,” can help us find philosophical advancements at the heart of this contemporary naming debate. (shrink)