Max Scheler

Norm and deviation, who chose is oun destiny.

The text, known as Biologievorlesung, written by the German phenomenologist Max Scheler appeared in 1993 in volume XIV of the Schelerian Gesammelte Werke by M.S. Frings. It collects the surviving fragments of the notes on the “Gnoseological foundations of biology” elaborated by Scheler for the cycle of lectures, which were held as Privatdozent at the University of Munich in the winter semester of the academic year 1908-1909. Despite being interesting in many respects, the text is still largely unexplored to the (...) very day. In this article I intend to focus on two points: 1) demonstrate the relatively advanced state of progress of the proposal expressed therein by the author compared to his real first phenomenological production between the publication in 1912 of the long article Über Selbsttäuschungen and 1922, the year that marks Scheler's open detachment from the Catholic cultural horizon hitherto embraced, and 2) bring out the systematic unity of the epistemological, ontological and phenomenological themes, articulated here, in a first attempt to develop an ontology of modern science, understood as the product of a vision of a historically located world, through a descriptive analysis of the intentional structures of consciousness implicated in intellectual knowledge. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

This chapter explores the early phenomenological accounts of Ressentiment provided by Else Voigtländer, Max Scheler, and Adolf Reinach. In particular, it examines the self-deceptive processes that lead to the “inversion of values” inherent to Ressentiment, i.e., how an object previously felt as valuable is denuded of its worth when the subject realizes that she cannot achieve it. For the comparative analysis of the three accounts, attention is paid to three crucial issues: 1) the origins of Ressentiment (etiology); 2) its place (...) in the taxonomy of the affective mind (ontology); and 3) the psychological mechanisms responsible for the inversion of value (psychology). The early phenomenological accounts are then analyzed in the light of recent accounts of Ressentiment elaborated by authors close to the phenomenological tradition. It is argued that the early phenomenological accounts provide central insights on the interrelation between affectivity and value. (shrink)

This chapter explores the early phenomenological accounts of Ressentiment provided by Else Voigtländer, Max Scheler, and Adolf Reinach. In particular, it examines the self-deceptive processes that lead to the “inversion of values” inherent to Ressentiment, i.e., how an object previously felt as valuable is denuded of its worth when the subject realizes that she cannot achieve it. For the comparative analysis of the three accounts, attention is paid to three crucial issues: 1) the origins of Ressentiment (etiology); 2) its place (...) in the taxonomy of the affective mind (ontology); and 3) the psychological mechanisms responsible for the inversion of value (psychology). The early phenomenological accounts are then analyzed in the light of recent accounts of Ressentiment elaborated by authors close to the phenomenological tradition. It is argued that the early phenomenological accounts provide central insights on the interrelation between affectivity and value. (shrink)

This paper explores Max Scheler’s (1874–1928) essay “On Shame and Feelings of Modesty” (Über Scham und Schamgefühl) (1913). It analyzes Scheler’s view on shame as a specifically human self-conscious emotion in which the subject becomes aware of the positive values of the self, i.e., her self-worth. It is argued that, in the context of current research, Scheler should be regarded as defending a radical revisionary approach to this emotion. First, against today’s widespread view that shame is an intrinsically social emotion (...) that requires real or imagined others to take place and which emerges to guarantee compliance with social norms, Scheler argues that shame is an emotion about the self which requires neither a relation with others nor internalized social norms. Second, rather than regarding shame as having a negative impact on the individual and her interpersonal relations, for Scheler, shame accomplishes the valuable function of disclosing and protecting positive values of the self, even if this self is not one’s own. With both claims, Scheler challenges what Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni (2011) have labeled respectively “shame socialism” and “shame pessimism,” and offers an alternative to understand the nature, functions, and varieties of shame which remains as innovative today as it was in his own time. -/- . (shrink)

From the first awakening of his philosophical consciousness to his last philosophical work, Max Scheler pondered questions about the human being. He thought that the anthropological question provides unity to all philosophical inquiry. Scheler’s thought has not received attention in the English-speaking world as compared to those of his contemporaries due, among others, to the difficulty those new to him encounter in finding a common thread that facilitates understanding of his philosophy. Therefore, this book explores four prominent Schelerian conceptions of (...) the human being, proposes their unfolding as a key that opens the reader to a broader and unified view of Scheler’s philosophy, and offers a framework within which it could be understood. (shrink)

The question of what makes a life livable is linked with the question, what makes for an inhabitable world. This last was not Scheler’s question, but it follows from the world that he describes, the world that he claims is exhibited through the tragic. When the world is an object immersed in sorrow, how is it possible to inhabit such a world? What about the persistence of uninhabitable sorrow? The answer lies less in individual conduct or practice than in the (...) forms of solidarity that emerge, across whatever distance, to produce the conditions for inhabiting the world. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper compares the concept of the heart in the works of Max Scheler and María Zambrano. Both authors use the heart as a metaphor for distinct human affective phenomena that have a central anthropological, epistemological, and ontological significance. The comparison between authors’ use of the metaphor is organised around three main topics: the order of the heart; the idea of a primordial feeling and its place in the affective life; and the primacy of love in relation to negative (...) affective attitudes. Our aim is twofold: to investigate the influence of Scheler on Zambrano’s thought and to demonstrate how Scheler’s phenomenology of affectivity transformed in Spanish philosophy and, in particular, in Zambrano’s work. After introducing the topic, the paper focuses on Scheler’s model of affectivity, presents an overview of Scheler’s reception in Spain focusing on Zambrano’s knowledge of his works, and examines Zambrano’s notion of the heart tracing parallelisms in Scheler’s works. The paper concludes with a discussion on Zambrano’s extension and transformation of the metaphor of the heart in the context of Spanish philosophy. (shrink)

Listening is not an incorporeal experience; we do not listen with our non-extended minds. We listen with all our body, and music can change completely our personal structure. It is through sound experience that we change and asset ourselves. Studies in the doctrine of affects often use sonorous metaphors and concepts such as Stimmung, resonance, consonance, that refer to sound experience. In this paper, I try first of all to show how listening is rooted in body experience. Then, I argue (...) for a new consideration of the notion of person that takes into account the fundamental sonorous basis – psycho-acoustic – of its constitution. Thanks to sounds we can reach a new conceptualization of emotional relations between persons which we attain through the person’s ordo amoris. Additionally, with the analysis of sounds we grasp some aspects of emotional experience related to the singular person (intra-personal). So, if sounds are profoundly related to corporeal experience, so strongly involving affects as to modify our personal structure and form a person’s constitution, and affects can really do that, their relationship need to be inquired where both sound experience and affection are rooted: corporeity. (shrink)

This volume explores Max Scheler’s role within the philosophical and sociological debates of his time into the 21st century. Scheler was an interpreter, a transmitter of, and respondent to the philosophical and sociological tradition. He was an interlocutor for his contemporaries, and an inspiration for subsequent and current debates in philosophy, psychology, and political thought. Both young and established scholars shed light on central and less investigated aspects of Scheler’s thought, such as the question of moral facts, personal individuality, cosmopolitanism, (...) and opportunities for intercultural understanding. The contributors delve into Scheler’s influence on thinkers such as Tischner or Løgstrup, as well as his role as a key figure within Catholic thought. The book appeals to students and researchers while exploring how engaging with Scheler can benefit contemporary debates on embodiment, psychopathology, and value pluralism. (shrink)

The terms “destiny” and “fate” are often used interchangeably in common parlance. In the course of history, in its relation to morality and religion, fate has sometimes prevailed over destiny as an irrational law or necessity capable of determining the course of events according to an inscrutable order. Scheler— whose philosophy inspired this contribution on authenticity as a fundamental quality of one’s identity—excludes all possible forms of fatalism. In this regard, he phenomenologically distinguishes “destiny” from “individual destination” or “vocation” (individuelle (...) Bestimmung). On his view, it is only by identifying the first with the second, or rather by identifying a set of personal data, traditions, characters, and environments with the specific task that each of us has been called on to carry out in the moral cosmos, that fatalism can arise—where fatalism is linked to the necessity of the world and the absolute impossibility of carving out spheres of human freedom within it. This paper deals precisely with the link between the phenomenon of authenticity and the concept of a person’s vocation. How can we “be” or “become” our authentic selves if we do not know ourselves? If we do not feel what we really love or prefer? If we never feel the breath of freedom? This paper focuses on the role that otherness, understood as effective exemplarity, plays in the formation and moral growth of essential individuality. I will argue, from a Schelerian perspective, that the discovery of the “true” or “ideal” self and the exercise of freedom—as presuppositions of all authentic behavior—do not exclude but rather require the ability to establish meaningful interpersonal relationships. The aim of this work is to offer an axiological, dynamic-relational and embodied model of authenticity. (shrink)

Max Scheler’s Formalism – and other of his essays on the philosophy of psychology, such as The Idols of Self-Knowledge and Ressentiment – continues to be in dialogue with contemporary philosophers of mind, psychiatrists and neuroscientists. Moving essentially from Formalism and essays from the same period, this paper provides an outline of a genuine Schelerian philosophy of psychopathology, investigating the close connection between “identity” and “freedom”. Not only did Scheler contribute to phenomenological psychology, but he also took an original approach (...) to psychopathology. From this point of view, it is possible to shed further light on his fruitful cooperation with Kurt Schneider and to understand so-called ‘emotional blindness’ from a new perspective. Within this framework, what emerges is the crucial role, in the formation of certain affective disorders, of the modification of pulsions and tendencies. Insofar as it allows for the development of a Schelerian model of delusion and (self)-deception, this approach also has implications for the debate on delusion in the context of contemporary philosophy of psychiatry. (shrink)

This paper attempts to demonstrate Max Scheler’s anticipation of and continued relevance to a burgeoning trend of essence-based accounts of modality, chief among them being Kit Fine’s landmark 1994 “Essence and Modality.” I argue that Scheler’s account of the material a priori not only anticipates the picture of essence-based modality suggested by Fine, but moreover offers resources with the potential to resolve key challenges for the Finean program. In particular, Fine’s account runs into problems in explaining how formal logical necessities (...) are to be grounded in essences, challenges that put pressure on the essentialist to adopt a non-propositional account of the nature of logical principles. I argue that one such account can be found in Scheler’s notion of the material a priori, according to which all necessary propositional truth is grounded in a realm of experientially given yet a priori "phenomenological facts." After showing the general rapprochement between Scheler’s and Fine’s accounts of regional modality, I then turn to address Scheler’s attempt to ground formal logical principles in essences. On Scheler’s picture, propositions expressing formal logical truths are true in virtue of the domain of essences in two senses: In terms of what Scheler calls objective necessity, they are true insofar as they coincide with the essential facts and interconnections shared by all possible regions of being; In terms of what he calls subjective necessity, they are true in virtue of these same essential facts and interconnections insofar as they have become “functionalized” into law-like patterns of cognition. (shrink)

Max Scheler and Siegfried Kracauer met during World War I and remained in correspondence until the early phase of the Weimar Republic. The two exchanged ideas and plans, and at times Kracauer sent his early essays for Scheler’s comments on and recommendations for publishing them. The correspondence brings to light some revealing philosophical similarities between the two authors: both Scheler and Kracauer were interested in material phenomenology, the philosophy of emotions, formal sociology; moreover, they also enthusiastically supported the German war. (...) In 1921, the conversation broke off, presumably because of the sharp criticism of Scheler’s study “Vom Ewigen im Menschen,” which Kracauer published in the Frankfurter Zeitung that same year. But even after the end of the exchange, Scheler remained an intellectual point of reference in Kracauer’s thinking. This becomes evident from the detailed reviews he wrote of Scheler’s works until the end of the Weimar period. The essay attempts to historically situate and philosophically reconstruct the correspondence between Scheler and Kracauer presented in this issue. In this way, a constellation of thought in the 1910s and 1920s becomes visible – one that that has received little attention to date. (shrink)

The book’s core argument is that an artificial intelligence that could equal or exceed human intelligence—sometimes called artificial general intelligence (AGI)—is for mathematical reasons impossible. It offers two specific reasons for this claim: Human intelligence is a capability of a complex dynamic system—the human brain and central nervous system. Systems of this sort cannot be modelled mathematically in a way that allows them to operate inside a computer. In supporting their claim, the authors, Jobst Landgrebe and Barry Smith, marshal evidence (...) from mathematics, physics, computer science, philosophy, linguistics, and biology, setting up their book around three central questions: What are the essential marks of human intelligence? What is it that researchers try to do when they attempt to achieve "artificial intelligence" (AI)? And why, after more than 50 years, are our most common interactions with AI, for example with our bank’s computers, still so unsatisfactory? Landgrebe and Smith show how a widespread fear about AI’s potential to bring about radical changes in the nature of human beings and in the human social order is founded on an error. There is still, as they demonstrate in a final chapter, a great deal that AI can achieve which will benefit humanity. But these benefits will be achieved without the aid of systems that are more powerful than humans, which are as impossible as AI systems that are intrinsically "evil" or able to "will" a takeover of human society. (shrink)

This paper presents a detailed analysis of affective persistence and its significance – that is the persistence of affect in the face of countervailing or contradictory evaluative information. More specifically, it appeals to the phenomena of affective persistence to support the claim that a significant portion of the emotional experiences of adult humans involve a kind of normative phenomenology. Its central claim is that by appealing to a distinctive kind of normative phenomenology that emotions exhibit, we get a neat personal (...) level explanation of why affect persists. In doing so it introduces and explores an interesting claim that Ronald de Sousa makes concerning the distinctiveness of emotion, explicating it in terms of the idea of affective persistence. As such, the contribution of the paper is twofold: a thesis about emotional phenomenology qua its normative phenomenology is presented, and that thesis is used to explain something distinctive about our emotional experiences, namely that they often persist in the face of conflicting evaluative judgements and beliefs. (shrink)

Este artículo discute las considerables semejanzas entre las concepciones de la persona defendidas por Husserl, Scheler y Stein, según las cuales la persona es un valor absoluto que se ejercita en tomas de posición. Para los fenomenólogos clásicos, la ética concierne a la persona en su totalidad, incluyendo las dimensiones afectiva y racional, el intelecto y el corazón, así como la volición. Las personas se distinguen por su agencia libre, por su capacidad para reconocer normas, y por su habilidad para (...) interactuar responsablemente con otros agentes personales en el contexto del mundo-de-la-vida comunitario e histórico. (shrink)

Value in Modernity examines a historical paradigm in ethics that has hitherto not been identified as such: existential modernism. Peter Poellner discusses the central claims of this paradigm through detailed examination of the thought of four of its main exponents: Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Scheler, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Robert Musil. In the case of Nietzsche and Sartre, Poellner offers novel interpretations, reconstructing lines of thought in their work that have usually been neglected. He also offers a new assessment of Scheler's subtle (...) phenomenological version of affective value intuitionism, which is a crucial influence on Sartre's existentialism but has so far enjoyed virtually no reception in an anglophone context. Musil's philosophical novel The Man without Qualities is interpreted as contributing a highly original version of ethical perfectionism to the existential modernist paradigm. While Musil's thought on emotions and moods has begun to receive philosophical recognition in recent years, the significance of the philosophical core of his seminal work has so far not been fully appreciated. In Poellner's interpretation, what we find in the existential modernists is an approach in ethical philosophy that combines a qualified form of affective value intuitionism and a kind of ethical perfectionism. This book reconstructs and defends a version of this approach that integrates elements drawn from each of these thinkers, supplemented by an original elaboration of ideas only implicit in some of them. (shrink)

Scheler, dans sa période dite intermédiaire, critique le caractère logique de la réduction husserlienne dont la méthode serait sous le joug d’un paradigme intellectualiste. Cette critique constructive prend la forme d’une inclusion des actes intentionnels alogiques ou émotionnels obéissant à une « logique du cœur », ce qui implique une opération d’inversion du primat, supposé traditionnel et dominant jusqu’à Husserl compris, de la connaissance sur l’affectivité, et singulièrement sur l’« amour ». Dans les derniers travaux de Scheler, la « logique (...) du cœur » continue de commander la méthode et la pratique de la réduction, car la fonction du « cœur » se trouve amplifiée dans le mouvement de conversion propre à la réduction phénoménologique réintérprétée en « réduction ascétique ». (shrink)

This paper claims that phenomenon of empathy, described by Edith Stein, and phenomenon of sympathy, analysed by Max Scheler, offer complementary insights into the essence of intersubjective link and into the conditions of possibility for experiencing the Other. Stein’s and Scheler’s phenomenological analyses took place in the context of Husserlian researches on intersubjectivity problems, following a critical attitude towards modern theories of sympathy and towards Lipps’ psychology of empathy as well. However, Scheler’s and Stein’s standpoints got also together on the (...) basis of a philosophical affinity and a critical shared position with regard to Husserl’s transcendental constitution of phenomenology. According to Stein to empathize involves a particular kind of apperception that actualizes the original contents of living experiences of the alien body in a non-original way, whereas for Scheler to sympathize refers to the manner of feeling with others some shared emotions, in an original way, thanks to inner perception of the living life of the neighbour, as another condition of possibility for the Fremderfahrung. (shrink)

This paper explores Max Scheler’s metaphilosophical views. In particular, the paper seeks to reconstruct and assess Scheler’s thesis according to which philosophical knowledge presupposes a moral attitude which he describes as an “act of upsurge” on the part of the whole person of the philosopher toward the essential, an act which cannot be found in either the natural worldview or the sciences. After motivating the topic in the introduction (section 1), the paper explores how Scheler approaches the question about the (...) nature of philosophy by focusing on the type of person of the philosopher (section 2). It then examines Scheler’s claim according to which philosophy is fundamentally distinct from the sciences (section 3), before exploring the moral attitude of the philosopher by examining three of its constitutive attitudes: love, self-humbling, and self-mastery (section 4). The paper presents some challenges and objections against Scheler’s metaphilosophical thesis. In particular, critiques of its metaphysical implications and of the view of science implicit in it are provided (section 5). Finally, it is also argued that the thesis contains a grain of truth and as such a moderate interpretation of it could be defended (section 6). The main findings are summarized in the conclusion (section 7). (shrink)

This paper compares the concept of the heart in the works of Max Scheler and María Zambrano. Both authors use the heart as a metaphor for distinct human affective phenomena that have a central anthropological, epistemological, and ontological significance. The comparison between authors’ use of the metaphor is organised around three main topics: the order of the heart; the idea of a primordial feeling and its place in the affective life; and the primacy of love in relation to negative affective (...) attitudes. Our aim is twofold: to investigate the influence of Scheler on Zambrano’s thought and to demonstrate how Scheler’s phenomenology of affectivity transformed in Spanish philosophy and, in particular, in Zambrano’s work. After introducing the topic (section 1), the paper focuses on Scheler’s model of affectivity (section 2), presents an overview of Scheler’s reception in Spain focusing on Zambrano’s knowledge of his works (section 3), and examines Zambrano’s notion of the heart tracing parallelisms in Scheler’s works (section 4). The paper concludes with a discussion on Zambrano’s extension and transformation of the metaphor of the heart in the context of Spanish philosophy. (shrink)

During the first quarter of the twentieth century, the French philosopher Henri Bergson became an international celebrity, profoundly influencing contemporary intellectual and artistic currents. While Bergsonism was fashionable, L. Susan Stebbing, Bertrand Russell, Moritz Schlick, and Rudolf Carnap launched different critical attacks against some of Bergson’s views. This book examines this series of critical responses to Bergsonism early in the history of analytic philosophy. Analytic criticisms of Bergsonism were influenced by William James, who saw Bergson as an ‘anti-intellectualist’ ally of (...) American Pragmatism, and Max Scheler, who saw him as a prophet of Lebensphilosophie. Some of the main analytic objections to Bergson are answered in the work of Karin Costelloe-Stephen. Analytic anti-Bergsonism accompanied the earlier refutations of idealism by Russell and Moore, and later influenced the Vienna Circle’s critique of metaphysics. It eventually contributed to the formation of the view that ‘analytic’ philosophy is divided from its ‘continental’ counterpart. (shrink)

This book is an intellectual history of intuition.

The object of my inquiry is Max Scheler’s cognitive subjectivity conception, which in particular addresses the problem of subjectivity in science. Scheler introduces two kinds of subject: the first is the standard cognitive subject encountered in epistemological theories—an individual subject which really carries out cognitive acts. The second, collective subject, controls the first, imposing upon it the cognitive forms it has developed; I call this subject the creating subject. In Scheler’s theory, the creating subject is represented by the ethos of (...) groups that initiate cognition, which determines the validity criteria of cognition. Therefore, Scheler’s cognitive subject is dual; both its forms have different attributes and functions in cognition: the individual cognitive subject is nonautonomous and determined by a superior collective one. The Schelerian creating subject can be seen as a detranscendentalised equivalent of Kant’s transcendental subject, insofar as both shape cognitive forms and thereby determine the cognitive acts of the individual subject. (shrink)

This article aims to reconstruct Max Scheler’s conception of three types of knowledge, outlined in his late work Philosophical Perspectives (1928). Scheler distinguished three kinds of knowledge: empirical, used to exercise control over nature, eidetic (essential) and metaphysical. The author reviews the epistemological criteria that underlie this distinction, and its functionalistic assumptions. In the article’s polemic part he accuses Scheler of a) crypto-dualism in his theory of knowledge, which draws insufficient distinctions between metaphysical and eidetic knowledge; b) totally omitting the (...) status of the humanities in his classification of knowledge types; c) consistently developing a philosophy of knowledge without resort to the research tools offered by the philosophy of science, which takes such analyses out of their social and historical context (i.e. how knowledge is created in today’s scientific communities). (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to provide an account of Max Scheler’s notion of history and the growing influence that idealism had on its development. For much of this development, Scheler had sought to chart a middle course between Hegel and Marx, or as he expresses it in his later works, a course between idealism and realism. As my argument demonstrates, idealism comes to have an increasing impact on Scheler’s notion of history when he begins in his later work (...) to reflect on the end of history and in particular when he seeks to articulate a “new cosmopolitanism” and “balancing” of cultures at this end. (shrink)

En El puesto del hombre en el cosmos, Scheler presenta el instinto como una conducta predominante en el actuar de los animales y, de igual modo, observa que el hombre, en cuanto ser psicofísico, también lo posee y realiza acciones instintivas. La diferencia entre el hombre y el animal es el espíritu, ausente en el segundo y presente en el primero, por lo cual puede actuar racionalmente. Este artículo investiga la presencia del instinto en la constitución del hombre en cuanto (...) ser vivo, analizando cómo este se verfica en la conducta humana inteligente. (shrink)

Vom 6. bis 9. November 2019 wurde auf dem Campus der Universität zu Köln und in der Fritz Thyssen Stiftung unter dem Thema Philosophische Anthropologie als interdisziplinäre Praxis: Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner und Nicolai Hartmann in Köln – historische und systematische Perspektiven über Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft der philosophischen Anthropologie diskutiert. Gerahmt von einem einleitenden Workshop über Interdisciplinary Anthropology of the Future – Social, Political, and Ethical Dimensions und dem abschließenden Panel über Epistemische Praktiken des Edierens und Übersetzens sowie abgerundet (...) durch besondere Programmpunkte – wie den Besuchen der Kleinen Glocke, dem Treffpunkt des intellektuellen Kölns in den 20er Jahren und des Grabes von Max Scheler auf dem Kölner Südfriedhof –, führte der Versuch einer Standortbestimmung der philosophischen Anthropologie verbunden mit der Überprüfung der These der ‚Kölner Konstellation‘ zu zahlreichen neuen Erkenntnissen rund um das ‚kölsche Dreigestirn‘ Hartmann–Plessner–Scheler. Rückblickend betrachtet war das vom Research Lab der a.r.t.e.s. Graduate School for the Humanities Cologne angestoßene ‚Experiment‘, eine Tagung zusammen mit der Hartmann-, Plessner- und Scheler-Gesellschaft zu organisieren, in mehrfacher Hinsicht ein voller Erfolg. (shrink)

The article examines Cassirer's complete works as well as his posthumous writings with regard to Heinz Paetzold's thesis that Cassirer's philosophy undergoes a transformation to anthropology in his late work as well as Guido Kreis' thesis that such a transformation of the philosophy of symbols is not possible because it cannot guarantee its own ground. The author demonstrates a continuity in Cassirer's thinking with regard to the topic of anthropology, according to which Cassirer has been dealing with the problem of (...) a metaphysics of the symbolic since at least 1921 and already in 1928 makes an initial determination of man as a being capable of form. The resumption of the anthropological question occurs in 1939 and is in clear continuity with the previous works. The reconstruction of the genesis of An Essay on Man (1944) that follows on from this finally reveals a hitherto well-kept secret of Cassirer-research, namely an answer to the question of why history first appears as a symbolic form in Cassirer's last published work. (shrink)

Resumen Este artículo se ocupa de dos escritos de Max Scheler posteriores a El formalismo, en los cuales afirma la prioridad del valor, frente al ser teórico o neutral, pero aclara que dicha prioridad no debe confundirse con la negación de la tesis clásica de la fundamentación del valor en dicho ser teórico. Para ello, Scheler entiende la prioridad del valor como prioridad de la donación, frente a la prioridad ontológica del ser teórico. En el artículo, recurro a la noción (...) de conciencia actual, de Edmund Husserl, para mostrar que la prioridad del valor lo es de la actualidad de la donación, debida a la capacidad del valor para centrar el interés del sujeto. Luego, señalo que esta posición de Scheler puede rastrearse ya en El formalismo, lo cual permite interpretar de modo más interesante esta obra central del autor. Finalmente relaciono la prioridad del valor con la prioridad del amor, también defendida por Scheler.This article deals with two essays written by Max Scheler after Der Formalismus in which he affirms the priority of value over theoretical being, but clarifies that this priority should not be confused with the denial of the classical thesis of the foundation of value in theoretical being. To this end, Scheler understands the priority of value as a priority of givenness versus the ontological priority of theoretical being. In this article, I use Edmund Husserl’s notion of focused consciousness to show that value priority is a priority of focused givenness, due to the ability of value to focus the subject’s interest. Then, I show that Scheler’s position can already be traced back to Der Formalismus, which makes it possible to interpret this author’s central work in a more interesting way. Finally, I relate the priority of value with the priority of love, also advocated by Scheler. (shrink)

Today, many philosophers write on topics of contemporary interest, such as emerging technologies, scientific advancements, or major political events. However, many of these reflections, while philosophically valuable, fail to contribute to those who may benefit the most from them. In this article, we discuss our own experience of engaging with nursing researchers and practicing nurses. By drawing on the field of philosophical phenomenology, we intervene in a longstanding debate over the meaning of “empathy” in nursing, which has important implications for (...) nursing research, training, and practice. However, our intention is not only to introduce and discuss this philosophical intervention. Rather, we present this intervention as a model for how philosophers might successfully engage with the field of nursing, and perhaps with other fields as well, with the aim of effecting positive change in research or practice. The article proceeds in five parts. First, we introduce the problem of conceptual clarity in nursing and explain why many nursing concepts are still in need of refinement. Second, we discuss the origins of the concept of empathy in nursing and outline the challenges associated with borrowing theory from other fields. Third, we explain how nurses tend to conceptualize empathy today, drawing upon the psychological distinction between cognitive and emotional empathy. Fourth, we discuss our intervention in this debate and explain how we attempt to resolve existing conceptual confusions by developing the concept of empathy from the ground up. Fifth, we conclude by briefly reflecting upon some of the challenges of interdisciplinary engagement and providing some recommendations based upon our own experience. (shrink)

Scheler had always emphasized that he had developed his phenomenological method independently from Husserl. Even though references to Husserl in works such as Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik are surprisingly sparse, the critical remarks are balanced with ones that remain largely appreciative of Husserl’s philosophical project. This, however, seems to have changed significantly in Scheler’s later works. The following paper investigates Scheler’s position with respect to Husserl in the posthumously published work Idealismus - Realismus from the (...) year 1928. In critiquing the binary opposing positions of “Bewusstseinsidealismus” on the one hand and “kritischer Realismus” on the other, Scheler explicitly includes Husserl among those who are not able to solve the so-called problem of reality. He argues that Husserl, rather than investigating what we mean by this moment of reality and the acts through which reality is given to us, is content with the vague and erroneous statement that being real means “to have a place in time.” Husserl, according to Scheler, loses reality completely. Reconstructing Scheler’s position on reality not only gives insight into Scheler’s interpretation of Husserl but also sheds light on Scheler’s central philosophical concerns in his later work. (shrink)

The article analyzes the conceptual foundations of “prophetic” socialism by Max Scheler (1874–1928). The main principles of a new political and ideological doctrine at that time, designed to become, according to the plan of its creator, an “antidote” to Marxism, are considered. The author analyzes Scheler's argumentation, directed, on the one hand, against socialism in the Marxist interpretation, and on the other, at proving the legitimacy of using the terms “Christian socialism” and “Christian prophetic socialism”. Scheler opposes socialism, first of (...) all, to individualism, which he interprets in social and moral-philosophical senses, and only secondarily to liberalism and capitalism. Socialism and individualism, which now appear as antagonistic tendencies of sociocultural development, are for him two equally necessary and interrelated essential principles of the social being of a person, understood as a spiritual-bodily social being. Individualistic tendencies, according to Scheler, prevailed over socialist tendencies in the West in modern times, therefore socialism in its Marxist interpretation turned out to be so in demand in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. But the destruction of private property is contrary to Christianity. “Forced communism” does not bring with it heaven on earth, but catastrophe and cultural degradation, he foreshadows. Based on the teachings of the Church Fathers and starting from the Catholic social doctrine, Scheler offers his vision of an ideal society in the form of a “personal community” (Personengemeinschaft), corresponding to the true destiny of a person. In it, the individual and social principles are in harmony and interdependent development. Scheler opposes the “prophetic” method of comprehending socio-historical reality, applied proceeding from the Christian solidarism ideal, to the materialistic understanding of history. He points to three advantages of his methodology: it takes into account human freedom, the uniqueness of a historical event, combines all types and methods of human cognition, without absolutizing the scientific form of knowledge. The author reveals the deep content of Scheler's definition of Marxism as “the protest ideology of oppressed classes”, drawing on the analysis of the “sociological doctrine of idols” of the late Scheler. In it, he reveals the pre-reflexive prerequisites for the formation of class ideologies. The author points to the essential kinship of the class prejudices about which the German philosopher wrote, and the national-mental prejudices of the political elites of the leading Western countries. In conclusion, he raises the question of how relevant the problems raised in Scheler's article are today in the context of modern Russian realities. (shrink)

In this contribution I propose a contemporary reading of the ontological dimension of Max Scheler’s early phenomenology of sense perception. My examination will start with a brief informal explanation of this theory, and his scientific and philosophical sources. The second step will be the introduction of some elements of Formal Philosophy : this piece of research will focus on N. B. Cocchiarella’s interpretation of FP and it will allow me to introduce the concept of a Philosophical Formal Ontology in comparison (...) with the computational one. Finally, the third step will be the construction of a semi-formalized model of Scheler’s early phenomenology of sense perception. Here I will use a dynamic-epistemic version of the modal calculus KT5. (shrink)

Beginnen wir mit dem Wichtigsten: Gleich auf den ersten Seiten seiner Habilitationsschrift bestimmt Matthias Schloßberger den Begriff der „materialen Anthropologie“ als essentialistische Exposition einer „Grundstruktur der menschlichen Existenz“ bzw. des Menschen als „Lebewesen“ ; wobei der Begriff des ‚Lebewesens‘ nicht auf die „biologische[…] Gattung Homo sapiens“ verweisen soll. Stattdessen funktioniert die ‚materiale Anthropologie‘ im schloßbergerschen Sinne als „transzendentale Anthropologie“.

German philosopher and sociologist Max Scheler (1874–1928) puts forward the concept of “prophetic Christian socialism” as a means of political and ideological opposition to Marxism. The concept expresses his religious-philosophical views, developed in earlier works, primarily in the main work “Formalism in Ethics and Material Ethics of Values”. Scheler compares his own views on socialism, understanding of history, the possibility of foreseeing historical processes with the views of these realities of K. Marx. Scheler's criticism of Marx's teachings is interspersed with (...) the recognition of its partial correctness. (shrink)

In this text I argue that a phenomenological conception of reality cannot simply consider ‚reality’ to be a feature of the objects of our experience, nor can ‚reality’ be understood as a somehow subconscious experience of resistance, as Max Schelers notion of a „primary resistance“ tries to show. In opposition to these insufficient conceptions I suggest – following some husserlian inspirations – that the notion of ‚reality’ is to be understood as a elementary feature of our experience of objects – (...) not of the objects of our experience. Is this perspective accepted, a minimal ‚realism’ appears as a presupposition of the concept of intentionality. (shrink)

Due to the importance of the theory of values, elaborated by Max Scheler, this article aims to describe the essence and originality of the moral foundation, showing the absolute nature inherent to it, to erect an ethics of absolute moral values. This done, we will find, in fact, axiological foundations capable of showing the principles that permeate and make the basis of people's ethical and moral life full of value and meaning, within the responsive and responsible causality of their actions (...) and decisions that emanate from this human capacity and, that is latent in its essence. (shrink)