Medieval Philosophy of Language

L'A. propone una lettura critica della questione De grammatico di Anselmo in contrasto con l'interpretazione già proposta da D.P. Henry, per il quale l'opera intende sviluppare una teoria del significato dei paronimi. Dopo un esame del testo e della teoria di Henry, l'A. propone la tesi che lo scritto sia un'introduzione alla lettura delle Categorie di Aristotele ad uso del lettore/studente. Una sezione dello studio verte sulla distinzione fra quaestio, lectio e disputatio nella seconda metà del sec. XII, che giustifica (...) la collocazione dell'opera esaminata. (shrink)

Nella prima parte del saggio l'A. esamina gli argomenti del Monologion sulla verità e il modo in cui si collegano allo studio ontologico della summa natura. Nella seconda parte passa all'analisi della teoria anselmiana della verità esposta nel De veritate, dove si definisce il significato della verità nel linguaggio , nelle azioni e nell'essenza delle cose. Nell'ultima parte si approfondisce il senso della convergenza dei tre approcci alla verità, si valuta la definizione di verità come giustizia percepibile dalla mente e (...) il rapporto fra suprema verità eterna e la verità degli esseri creati. (shrink)

[Marilyn McCord Adams] In this paper I begin with Aristotle's Categories and with his apparent forwarding of primary substances as metaphysically special because somehow fundamental. I then consider how medieval reflection on Aristotelian change led medieval Aristotelians to analyses of primary substances that called into question how and whether they are metaphysically special. Next, I turn to a parallel issue about supposits, which Boethius seems in effect to identify with primary substances, and how theological cases-the doctrines of the Trinity, the (...) Incarnation, and of the human soul's separate survival between death and resurrection-call into question how and to what extent supposits are metaphysically special. I conclude with some reflections on various senses of being metaphysically special and how they pertain to primary substances and supposits. /// [ Richard Cross] Scotus's belief that any created substance can depend on the divine essence and/or divine persons as a subject requires him to abandon the plausible Aristotelian principle that there is no merely relational change. I argue that Scotus's various counterexamples to the principle can be rebutted. For reasons related to those that arise in Scotus's failed attempt to refute the principle, the principle also entails that properties cannot be universals. (shrink)

A long philosophical tradition has regarded the use of metaphorical utterances as a stylistic figuration without any cognitive aspect. Metaphors are categorial mistakes diverting the ordinary usage of concepts, and therefore are in logical opposition to standard meaning. However, a metaphor can be regarded not only as a vague linguistic enunciation, but also as a significant process of thought. In other words, metaphor is a figure of the mind, a necessary way of thinking, because the language-world relation is not bijective. (...) Metaphorical truth implies meanings not initially perceived as rational, yet full of possible features which have to be historically and socially determined. This successive interpretation yields new concepts and produces a growth of knowledge. In addition, the metaphorical usage of language allows us to name what is outside the range of logically formalizable language: interior experiences, God and so forth. The metaphorical mind is capable of moulding different views of the world, including those selected in accordance with the current social needs of the human community. This essay suggests that the use of metaphors is already present in medieval philosophical thought, and it tries to ground this statement through the analysis of late-scholastic metaphorical reasonings in ontology, biology and theology. (shrink)

We describe the earliest occurrences of the Liar Paradox in the Arabic tradition. e early Mutakallimūn claim the Liar Sentence is both true and false; they also associate the Liar with problems concerning plural subjects, which is somewhat puzzling. Abharī (1200-1265) ascribes an unsatisfiable truth condition to the Liar Sentence—as he puts it, its being true is the conjunction of its being true and false—and so concludes that the sentence is not true. Tūsī (1201-1274) argues that self-referential sentences, like the (...) Liar, are not truth-apt, and defends this claim by appealing to a correspondence theory of truth. Translations of the texts are provided as an appendix. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas's account of the semantics of names is based on two fundamental distinctions: the distinction between a name's mode of signifying and the signified object, and that between the cause and the goal of a name's signification, i.e. that from which a name was instituted to signify and that which a name actually signifies. Thomas endows names with a two-layer signification: names are introduced into language to designate primarily conceptions of extramental things and secondarily the particular extramental things referred (...) to by such conceptions. On such a `conceptualistic' account of names' signification, Thomas recognizes that a generic acquaintance with external things is a sufficient condition for imposing names to signify things. Following this intuition, Thomas at times dwells on the role that pragmatic factors such as the common usage of names by a linguistic community ( usus loquendi ) and the speakers' intention ( intentio loquentium ) play in explaining both the formation and semantic function of conventional language. This paper will focus on what Thomas had to say about such factors. (shrink)

Aristotle’s definitions of truth and falsity, on the one hand, and the relational and cognitive account of truth entailed from its transcendental nature, on the other hand, naturally lead later medieval philosophers towards correspondence theories of truth. Nonetheless in the later Middles Ages at least three versions of the correspondence theory can be found. Thomas Aquinas, in particular, proposed a mixed interpretation, bringing together metaphysical and semantical considerations.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:I. William of Ockham and Mental SynonymyIn recent years an important point of discussion among the scholars of William of Ockham has been the possibility of accounting for a reductionist interpretation of Ockham's mental language. Especially, the debate focused on the legitimacy of eliminating connotative simple terms from mental language by reducing them to their nominal definition. The distinction between absolute and connotative terms plays an important role in (...) Ockham's philosophy of language. Ockham introduces it as a subdivision of the class of categorematic terms, i.e. of the terms provided with signification, and such a distinction overlaps that between concrete and abstract terms. In the Summa Logicae, Part I, chap. 10, devoted to the explanation of such a distinction, Ockham makes three major claims concerning connotative terms.First, unlike absolute simple terms, connotative simple terms signify something primarily and something else secondarily. Paradigmatic examples of connotative simple terms are 'white' and 'father,' while instances of absolute terms are 'animal,' 'man,' and 'whiteness.' The term 'white' is connotative for it signifies something primarily while co-signifying something else secondarily .Second, unlike absolute simple terms, connotative simple terms do not have a real definition but only a nominal one. While a real definition is intended to capture the real essence of the defined thing, a nominal definition is none other than a linguistic explication of a name's signification. Only concrete and abstract terms of the category of substance, and abstract terms of the category of quality, can have a real definition. The reason is that, for Ockham, only individual substances and qualities can exist outside the mind, therefore only such entities can be grasped immediately and directly, by means of acts of intelligible intuitive cognition. Any other term can have only a nominal definition, for each of them can make reference to nothing but to fictive or only putatively existent entities. A nominal definition, in particular, is made in such a way that something is expressed in recto and something else in obliquo . Ockham indicates 'something having whiteness' as the nominal definition of 'white': in it, 'something' is expressed in recto, while 'whiteness' in obliquo.Third and finally, Ockham says that a connotative term has only one nominal definition, while an absolute term can have several real definitions.According to these claims, the problem of the existence of connotative terms in mental language might be reconstructed as follows. Ockham holds to two fundamental tenets about mental language and connotation: first, synonymous terms cannot be found in mental language and second, each connotative simple term can have only one nominal definition, as was said. Ockham is unequivocal about these principles in his works. But if an interpreter also supposes Ockham subscribing to the view that connotative simple terms are synonymous with their nominal definitions, the interpreter must conclude that, for Ockham, connotative simple terms and their nominal definitions cannot both be present in mental language. Nonetheless, since Ockham seems to admit the existence of both connotative simple terms and their nominal definitions in mental language, one of the previous sentences needs to be revised.Up to this day many proposals of revision have been put on the table, but it seems to me that they can be reduced to three principal ones.The first proposal suggests reconsidering claim , while preserving the reasoning -, since - are claims Ockham indisputably states. As is known, this was Paul V. Spade's initial position. The gist of Spade's influential argument was that connotative simple terms cannot exist in mental language for if they did, they would be synonymous with their fully expanded nominal definitions. According to , though, synonymy cannot be found in mental language. But Ockham grants the.. (shrink)

Aristotle begins the third chapter of book VIII of the Metaphysics by claiming that sometimes it is not clear whether a name refers to the composite substance or to the actuality and the form, for instance whether «animal» refers to the soul in a body or simply to the soul. In solving this problem, Aristotle states that the name «animal» can refer to both, not, however, in one and the same sense but rather by expressing two different senses which are (...) nonetheless related to each other . Nevertheless, Aristotle does not say anything concerning which of these two senses the name «animal» primarily expresses. This text of the Metaphysics gives to the medieval Latin commentators the occasion to deal with the topic of the signification of substantial names and, more particularly, to assess Averroes’s interpretation of Aristotle’s semantics. In the paper I attempt to reconstruct some important patterns of argument elaborated by thirteenth- and fourteenth-century commentators on the Metaphysics in their endeavor to solve the problem and to explain Averroes’s interpretation. (shrink)

When Ockham's logic arrives in Italy, some Dominican philosophers bring into question Ockham's ontological reductionist program. Among them, Franciscus de Prato and Stephanus de Reate pay a great attention to refute Ockham's claim that no universal exists in the extra-mental world. In order to reject Ockham's program, they start by reconsidering the notion of 'real', then the range of application of the rational and the real distinction. Generally, their strategy consists in re-addressing against Ockham some arguments extracted from Hervaeus Natalis's (...) works. Franciscus's and Stephanus's basic idea is that some universals are not acts of cognition, but extra-mental, predicable things. Such things are not separable from singulars, nonetheless they are not the same as those singulars. Consequently, it is not necessary to allow, as Ockham does, that if two things are not really identical, they are really different and hence really separable. According to them, it is possible to hold that two things are not really identical without holding that they are also really non-identical and hence really different. Basically, their reply relies on a different notion of the relation of identity. Identity is regarded as an intersection of classes of things, so that it is possible to say that two things are really identical without saying that they also are the same thing. Franciscus and Stephanus, however, do not seem to achieve completely their aim. (shrink)

Il pensatore domenicano Francesco da Prato, attivo nel secondo quarto del XIV sec. tra Perugia, Siena e Firenze, rappresenta una delle prime testimonianze in Italia della ricezione di Ockham e di reazione tomista alla sua logica. Lo studio si articola in due sezioni: nella prima l'A. esamina la dottrina della significazione nelle fonti principali degli scritti di logica di Francesco: Tommaso d'Aquino, Herveus Natalis e Guglielmo di Ockham; nella seconda analizza la posizione di Francesco in scritti trasmessi nei seguenti mss: (...) Firenze, BNC., Conv. Soppr. J.5.31 ; Conv. Soppr. B.3.173 e Roma, Bibl. Angelica 1053. (shrink)

Dialectical reasoning comprises a large part of Aristotle's philosophical method. He has set down his theory of dialectic in a treatise called the Topics. The central feature of that theory is the dialectical topic, but nowhere in the Topics does he explain what the topic is. Modern Aristotelian scholarship has reached no consensus on this important matter. Although modern scholars have searched for a solution in many ancient and medieval commentators, for the most part they have failed to consult the (...) writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. ;My dissertation adds a Thomistic voice to the controversy surrounding the topic. Although St. Thomas did not write about the topic itself, he did give a detailed account of dialectical reasoning. Using his philosophical principles, I construct a Thomistic definition of the dialectical topic. I being by examining modern scholarship on this subject. I then examine the foundations of St. Thomas' logical theory. Next I look at St. Thomas' own account of dialectical logic by contrasting it with his account of analytical logic. I proceed to study accounts of the topic given by St. Albert and several Thomists. Next I assemble St. Thomas' views of definition, place, and the dignitates. Finally, I use the principles and clues that have been collected to construct the Thomistic definition of the topic. I conclude that the dialectical topic is a dignitas which finds the middle term of the dialectical syllogism by specifying the relations of predication and predictability that must occur between the middle term and the major and minor terms. (shrink)

This volume, surveying a narrow topic over a long expanse of time, is comprised of selections from a trio of international conferences on the title theme. It is an expensive book, but even its most valuable articles are marred by slovenly editing.Börje Bydén’s contribution begins the survey in Byzantium. By linking Photios’s (apparently) original criticism of Aristotle to Plotinus, Bydén gives an interesting hint of how neo-Platonism came to permeate Christianity. But Photios seems to have been “ignored by posterity” (31). (...) Bydén’s commendable remedy: more and updated critical editions of texts from Greek scholasticism. (The Hadot reference on 25n44, missing in the bibliography, is to Hadot’s 1990 French edition of .. (shrink)

This study comprises an analysis of the Categories commentary of Peter of Auvergne, based upon an edition from the manuscripts, and supplemented by a translation. Much information about other Categories commentaries has been included to place the work in its historical and philosophical perspective. ;Peter of Auvergne, active in Paris in the late thirteenth century, had a long career as an Aristotelian commentator and continuator of Thomas Aquinas. His Categories commentary provides me the occasion to survey the genre of Categories (...) commentaries from the early Middle Ages, with special emphasis on those few commentaries known to immediately precede Peter of Auvergne, and on those he influences. Peter is an early representative of the modistae, philosophers who stressed the parallel connections among being, understanding, and signifying, and who are typified by their use of the modi significandi as a tool of analysis. ;This study, the first full-length analysis of a medieval Categories commentary, serves as a guide to the issues generated by Aristotle's Categories. As a comparative study it shows that the genre of Categories commentaries, within a fairly invariant format, allows for a continuous adaptation and development of ideas. As a specific study of an individual commentary, it shows the details of Peter of Auvergne's interests in linguistic analysis, theology, and the exegesis of Aristotle. ;The questions in Peter of Auvergne's commentary are generalizably of two kinds: short, superficial questions which imitate earlier traditions, and more complex questions which attempt original interpretations. Not suprisingly, the latter sort of question finds more parallels in later commentators, including Simon of Faversham, Radulphus Brito, and John Duns Scotus. ;This dissertation, beginning from a thorough exegesis of a central figure, by tracing derivative and influencing themes, gives a dependable picture of the debates conducted in connection with the Categories in the High Middle Ages. I have had the responsibility of editing many of the primary sources I needed. The extensive appendices contain, besides an edition of Peter's Questiones super Praedicamentis, a transcription of another related commentary, Anonymus Matritensis: Questiones super Praedicamentis, and many relevant texts grouped by category. (shrink)

In dem bislang wenig beachteten Kodex Ms. lat. fol. 456 der Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz zu Berlin fanden wir unter den vielen, zumeist anonym überlieferten Werken des 13. Jahrhunderts eine interessante Quaestio, die ein Problem aus dem Bereich der Metaphysik und Sprachlogik zum Gegenstand hat. Der Verfasser dieser Abhandlung, ein gewisser Magister Guillelmus Anglicus, dessen Name wir aus dem Kolophon erfahren, greift die, wie er selbst betont, zu seiner Zeit viel und kontrovers diskutierte Frage auf: Ist der Terminus «Mensch» einem einzigen (...) Sinne nach unterschiedslos sowohl in bezug auf seine in Wirklichkeit seienden als auch nichtseienden Supposita? (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 53, Issue 2-4, pp 372 - 390 This paper investigates a series of Oxford _Obligationes_ texts, all of which can be associated with Richard Billingham. My study is based on eleven of the surviving manuscripts and two early printed texts. I focus on one aspect of their discussion, namely the rule for granting the initial _positum_ of an obligational disputation of the type called _positio_, and the six restrictions that could be placed on that rule. I explain (...) these restrictions with reference to several sophismata that were meant to illustrate the problems that the restrictions were intended to solve, and in particular, I discuss the fifth restriction ‘not inconsistent with the _positum_’. I also shed light on the final restriction, which has not always been well understood, namely the restriction ‘wherever there is no _obligatio_ relevant to the _positum_’. (shrink)

I examine the treatment of metaphor by medieval logicians and how it stemmed from their reception of classical texts in logic, grammar, and rhetoric. I consider the relation of the word 'metaphor' to the notions of translatio and transumptio, and show that it is not always synonymous with these. I also show that in the context of commentaries on the Sophistical Refutations metaphor was subsumed under equivocation. In turn, it was linked with the notion of analogy not so much in (...) the Greek sense of a similarity between two proportions or relations as in the new medieval sense of being said secundum prius et posterius. Whether or not analogy could be reduced to metaphor, or the reverse, depended on the controversial issue of the number of acts of imposition needed to produce an equivocal term. A spectrum of views is canvassed, including those found in the logic commentaries of John Duns Scotus. (shrink)