Mental Causation

ABSTRACT: A popular strategylor resolving Kim 's exclusion problem is to suggest that mental and physical property tropes are identical despite the non-identity of the mental and physical properties themselves. I argue that mental and physical tropes can be identified without losing the dispositional character of mentality only if a dual-character hypothesis regarding the intrinsic characters of tropes is endorsed. But even with this assumption, the causaI efficacy of the wrong dispositions is secured.RÉSUMÉ: On résout habituellement le problème de l'exclusion (...) de Kim en suggérant que les tropes de propriété mentale et physique sont identiques en dépit de la non-identité des propriétés mentales et physiques elles-mêmes. Je soutiens que les tropes mentaux et physiques peuvent être ramenés l'un à l'autre sans perdre le caractère dispositionnel de la pensée, à la condition d'approuver une hypothèse sur la nature double des caractères intrinsèques des tropes. Même en suivant cette proposition, l'efficacité causale des dispositions fausses est maintenue. (shrink)

There comes a time in every young philosopher.

Nonreductive physicalism provides an appealing solution to the nature of mental properties. But its success as a theory of mental properties has been called into doubt by claims that it cannot adequately handle the problems of mental causation, as it leads either to epiphenomenalism or to thoroughgoing overdetermination. I argue that these apparent problems for the nonreductivist are based in fundamental confusion about causation and explanation. I distinguish two different types of explanation and two different relations to which they appeal: (...) causation and determination. I argue that these types of explanation do not compete with one another, nor do these relations jointly result in overdetermination. In closing I develop a nonreductivist solution to mental causation which avoids both the hazards of epiphenomenalism and of overdetermination and so demonstrates a way to save nonreductive physicalism from the problems of mental causation. (shrink)

Two-dimensional coupled map lattices have global stability properties that depend on the coupling between individual maps and their neighborhood. The action of the neighborhood on individual maps can be implemented in terms of ‘‘causal’’ coupling (to spatially distant past states) or ‘‘non-causal’’ coupling (to spatially distant simultaneous states). In this contribution we show that globally stable behavior of coupled map lattices is facilitated by causal coupling, thus indicating a surprising relationship between stability and causality. The influence of causal versus non-causal (...) coupling for synchronous and asynchronous updating as a function of coupling strength and for different neighborhoods is analyzed in detail. r 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. (shrink)

There is no doubt that spatial relations aid us in pairing up causes and effects. But when we consider the possibility of qualitatively indiscernible things, it might seem that spatial relations are more than a mere aid – they might seem positively required. The belief that spatial relations are required for causal relations is behind an important objection to Cartesian Dualism, the pairing problem. I argue that the Cartesian can answer this objection by appeal to the possibility of primitive causal (...) relations, a possibility I defend. This topic is of importance beyond the philosophy of mind; the possibility that causal relations might sometimes hold brutely is of general metaphysical importance. I close with a discussion of what Cartesians should say about embodiment, and how that bears on issues of mental causation. (shrink)

I. the view that reasons cannot be causes. II. the view that the explanatory relevance of psychological states such as beliefs and intentions derives from their content, their explanatory role is not causal and we thus have no good reason to ascribe causal power to them. III. the idea that if the mental supervenes on the physical, then what really explains our actions is the physical properties determining our propositional attitudes, and not those attitudes themselves. IV. the thesis that since (...) there are no laws linking (intentional) mental states to actions, those states cannot be genuine causes of action. (shrink)

Having multiple explanations for an event without an understanding of how they are consistent with one another generates a sort of epistemic anxiety. The questions of why rationality compels us to feel this way and how we should go about resolving this competition between explanations combine to form the problem of explanatory compatibility. ;Jaegwon Kim proposes principled answers to both how and why explanatory competitions are to be resolved based upon his Metaphysical Principle of Explanatory Exclusion . I argue that (...) Kim's solution is not adequate because MXX is based upon a version of semantic realism that, while widely accepted, is nevertheless inconsistent with the fundamental axioms and the most basic goals of realism. ;Chapter 1 lays out the problem, defining terms and introducing the problems Kim seeks to resolve. Chapter 2 addresses the range of possible solutions, discussing examples of both principled solutions as well as empirical methods drawn from instances of explanatory competition that have arisen in the history of science. Chapter 3 is a more technical defense and generalization of Kim's argument intended to demonstrate that if you grant Kim the strong, traditional representational version of explanatory realism he favors, MXX does indeed follow. ;Chapter 4 presents the high cost of accepting MXX. The principle is inconsistent with our common sense views of mind, choice, and even the intuitive account of self-understanding that Kim himself espouses. In Chapter 5, I argue that a realist need not pay this price. In fact, a realist should not adopt either MXX or the traditional realist semantics that imply MXX as each is inconsistent with the mind- and language-independence of the world that is the hallmark of realism. I conclude the essay by first arguing that these problems stem from traditional representational semantics, already known to lead to paradox, and second that there is a plausible way for a realist to develop a semantics and answer the problem of explanatory compatibility that promises to avoid these difficulties. (shrink)

En este artículo se hace una crítica de los enfoques teóricos, aquí llamados por analogía o analógicos, que pretenden abstraer conceptos darwinistas del sustrato biológico para aplicarlos a dominios ontológicos (parcialmente) distintos, estrategia adoptada por versiones de la epistemología evolutiva y, sobre todo, por la teoría memética. Para ello se utiliza el argumento de la exclusión causal, tomado en préstamo de la filosofía de la mente; se hace evidente la existencia de un paralelismo entre causalidad mental y memética, y se (...) muestra cómo cualquier posible caracterización de la segunda a partir de la primera conduce a graves problemas metafísicos y epistemológicos. En las conclusiones se esbozan, sin intención de exhaustividad, algunas ideas sobre cómo evitar posiciones reduccionistas sin adoptar una postura teórica analógica. The main purpose of this paper is criticize theoretical approaches -here called by analogy, or analogical- which aim to extract Darwinian concepts from a biological substrate to apply them to (partially) different ontological domains. This strategy is adopted by some versions of evolutionary epistemology and, especially, by memetics theory. An argument borrowed from philosophy of mind, namely, the argument of causal exclusion, is used to carry out the critique. The existence of a parallelism between memetics and mental causation will be shown, and it will be argued that any possible characterization of the first in terms of the second implies serious metaphysical and epistemological problems. In the conclusions, with no intention of completeness, some ideas on how to avoid reductionist positions, without taking an analogical posture, will be outlined. (shrink)

The epistemic argument against physicalism supports the claim that if physicalism is true, then none of our beliefs are rationally justified. The argument relies on two major premises. The first places a constraint on rationally justified belief, according to which S's believing that p is rationally justified only if there is some reason for p, r, which S believes and S's believing that r is part of a true causal explanation for S's believing that p. The second advances the conceptual (...) claim that if physicalism is true, then no reason r can be part of a true explanation for S's believing that p. ;This dissertation constitutes an effort to clarify and to defend the two major premises of the epistemic argument against physicalism, with a special emphasis on the second premise. I begin with a critical appraisal of work by William Hasker and Norman Malcolm, who offer arguments similar to mine. In doing so, I offer a set of thought experiments to motivate my proposed constraint on rationally justified belief. Subsequently, I consider two physicalist models of mental causation, a nonreductive token identity theory and a reductive functionalism, as instances of how the proposed constraint might be met, given physicalism. I argue that the former fails for reasons of causal-explanatory exclusion, and that the latter "succeeds" at the expense of mental realism, a consequence I take to count decisively against such a model. I conclude by considering the ramifications for the physicalist if the conditional conclusion the main argument is established. (shrink)

It has been argued that nonreductive physicalism leads to epiphenominalism about mental properties: the view that mental events cannot cause behavioral effects by virtue of their mental properties. Recently, attempts have been made to develop accounts of causal relevance for irreducible properties to show that mental properties need not be epiphenomenal. In this paper, I primarily discuss the account of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit. I show how it can be developed to meet several obvious objections and to capture our (...) intuitive conception of degrees of causal relevance. However, I argue that the account requires large-scale miraculous coincidence for there to be causally relevant mental properties. I also argue that the same problem arises for two apparently very different accounts of causal relevance. I suggest that this result does not show that these accounts, on appropriate readings, are false. Therefore, I tentatively conclude that we have reason to believe that irreducible mental properties are causally irrelevant. Moreover, given that there is at leastprima facie evidence that mental properties can be causally relevant, my conclusion casts doubt on nonreductive physicalist theories of mental properties. (shrink)

This dissertation is concerned with whether mental properties can be causally relevant to behavior, that is, whether a mental event can cause a piece of behavior by virtue of its mental properties. Since it seems that my behavior is not just a causal consequence of my beliefs and desires, but is caused by those beliefs and desires precisely because they are those beliefs and desires, an affirmative answer to this question is commonly taken to be required for a successful philosophical (...) defense of commonsense psychology. My discussion proceeds from two widely held, if controversial, views of the nature of mental properties, that they are irreducible to physical properties, and that they are relational/historical properties having components outside the head. I give separate arguments for the causal irrelevance of mental properties from each of these views. I then consider the implications of my views for commonsense psychology. I argue that it is possible to give a plausible account of rationalizing explanation of action without presupposing the causal relevance of the mental. Moreover, I argue that even if scientific psychology has reason to eschew causally irrelevant properties, it is nonetheless possible for scientific psychology to be said to have vindicated our common sense psychological practices. Thus, I defend the claim that causal relevance of the mental is in fact not necessary for a philosophical defense of commonsense psychology. (shrink)

I think that there is an awful lot wrong with the exclusion problem. So, it seems, does just about everybody else. But of course everyone disagrees about exactly _what_ is wrong with it, and I think there is more to be said about that. So I propose to say a few more words about why the exclusion problem is not really a problem after all—at least, not for the nonreductive physicalist. The genuine _dualist_ is still in trouble. Indeed, one of (...) my main points will be that the nonreductive physicalist is in a rather different position vis à vis the exclusion problem than the dualist is. Properly understanding nonreductive physicalism—and clearly recognizing that it is, after all, a form of _physicalism_—goes a long way toward solving the exclusion problem. (shrink)

Concerns about ‘mental causation’ are concerns about how it is possible for mental states to cause anything to happen. How does what we believe, want, see, feel, hope, or dread manage to cause us to act? Certain positions on the mind-body problem—including some forms of physicalism—make such causation look highly problematic. This entry sketches several of the main reasons to worry, and raises some questions for further investigation.

Sven Bernecker presents a new causal theory of memory, examining a number of metaphysical and epistemological issues crucial to the understanding of propositional or factual memory. This book provides sophisticated and comprehensive coverage of a much neglected area of philosophy, and will also appeal to cognitive scientists and psychologists.

This book investigates central issues in the philosophy of memory. Does remembering require a causal process connecting the past representation to its subsequent recall and, if so, what is the nature of the causal process? Of what kind are the primary intentional objects of memory states? How do we know that our memory experiences portray things the way they happened in the past? Given that our memory is not only a passive device for reproducing thoughts but also an active device (...) for processing stored thoughts, when are thoughts sufficiently similar to be memory-related? -/- The Metaphysics of Memory defends a version of the causal theory of memory, argues for direct realism about memory, proposes an externalist response to skepticism about memory knowledge, and develops a contextualist account of the factivity constraint on memory. (shrink)