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  1. Funcionalismo e causação mental. Abrantes, Paulo E. Amaral & Felipe - 2005 - Manuscrito 25 (3).
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  2. Explanations of Human Action.Robert Ackermann - 1967 - Dialogue 6 (1):18-28.
  3. Knowledge and the Causal Principle.Anne Donchin Adams - 1970 - Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin
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  4. Mental Causality.E. M. Adams - 1966 - Mind 75 (300):552-563.
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  5. Reply to Russow's Fodor, Adams and Causal Properties.Frederick R. Adams - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63-65.
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  6. The Mental and the Physical as a Problem for Philosophy.R. F. Alfred Hoernle - 1917 - Philosophical Review 26 (3):297-314.
  7. The Effect of Some Transition Metal Oxides on the Physical Properties of K0.5Na0.5Nb0.95Ta0.05O3ceramics.Ahmed I. Ali, M. M. Ahmed & A. Hassen - forthcoming - Philosophical Magazine:1-13.
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  8. Mopes, Dopes, and Tropes: A Critique of the Trope Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation.Peter Alward - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (01):53-.
    ABSTRACT: A popular strategylor resolving Kim 's exclusion problem is to suggest that mental and physical property tropes are identical despite the non-identity of the mental and physical properties themselves. I argue that mental and physical tropes can be identified without losing the dispositional character of mentality only if a dual-character hypothesis regarding the intrinsic characters of tropes is endorsed. But even with this assumption, the causaI efficacy of the wrong dispositions is secured.RÉSUMÉ: On résout habituellement le problème de l'exclusion (...)
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  9. Making Mind Matter More or Less.Peter Alward - manuscript
    There comes a time in every young philosopher.
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  10. A Nonreductivist Solution to Mental Causation.Amie Thomasson - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 89 (2):181-195.
    Nonreductive physicalism provides an appealing solution to the nature of mental properties. But its success as a theory of mental properties has been called into doubt by claims that it cannot adequately handle the problems of mental causation, as it leads either to epiphenomenalism or to thoroughgoing overdetermination. I argue that these apparent problems for the nonreductivist are based in fundamental confusion about causation and explanation. I distinguish two different types of explanation and two different relations to which they appeal: (...)
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  11. The Mental and the Physical.Louise Anthony - 2009 - In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge.
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  12. Mental Causation.Louise M. Antony - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):564.
  13. The Causal Relevance of the Mental.Louise M. Antony - 1991 - Mind and Language 6 (4):295-327.
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  14. Reduction with Autonomy.Louise M. Antony & Joseph Levine - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):83-105.
  15. The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'.Gavin Ardley - 1969 - Philosophical Studies 18:227-228.
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  16. 12 The Causal Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 80.
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  17. Motives as Causes.Magda B. Arnold - 1971 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 1 (2):185-192.
  18. Stabilization of Causally and Non-Causally Coupled Map Lattices.H. Atmanspacher - unknown
    Two-dimensional coupled map lattices have global stability properties that depend on the coupling between individual maps and their neighborhood. The action of the neighborhood on individual maps can be implemented in terms of ‘‘causal’’ coupling (to spatially distant past states) or ‘‘non-causal’’ coupling (to spatially distant simultaneous states). In this contribution we show that globally stable behavior of coupled map lattices is facilitated by causal coupling, thus indicating a surprising relationship between stability and causality. The influence of causal versus non-causal (...)
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  19. Primitive Causal Relations and the Pairing Problem.Paul Audi - 2011 - Ratio 24 (1):1-16.
    There is no doubt that spatial relations aid us in pairing up causes and effects. But when we consider the possibility of qualitatively indiscernible things, it might seem that spatial relations are more than a mere aid – they might seem positively required. The belief that spatial relations are required for causal relations is behind an important objection to Cartesian Dualism, the pairing problem. I argue that the Cartesian can answer this objection by appeal to the possibility of primitive causal (...)
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  20. Tuomela on the Explanation of Human Action. [REVIEW]Robert Audi - 1980 - Synthese 44 (2):285-306.
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  21. Intentionalistic Explanations of Action.Robert Audi - 1971 - Metaphilosophy 2 (3):241–250.
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  22. Mental Causation: Sustaining and Dynamic.Robert N. Audi - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
    I. the view that reasons cannot be causes. II. the view that the explanatory relevance of psychological states such as beliefs and intentions derives from their content, their explanatory role is not causal and we thus have no good reason to ascribe causal power to them. III. the idea that if the mental supervenes on the physical, then what really explains our actions is the physical properties determining our propositional attitudes, and not those attitudes themselves. IV. the thesis that since (...)
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  23. Eidolons: An Argument Against Explanatory Exclusion.Jeffrey David Auker - 2000 - Dissertation, Brown University
    Having multiple explanations for an event without an understanding of how they are consistent with one another generates a sort of epistemic anxiety. The questions of why rationality compels us to feel this way and how we should go about resolving this competition between explanations combine to form the problem of explanatory compatibility. ;Jaegwon Kim proposes principled answers to both how and why explanatory competitions are to be resolved based upon his Metaphysical Principle of Explanatory Exclusion . I argue that (...)
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  24. Rational Credibility and Causal Explanations of Belief.William H. Austin - 1984 - Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 26 (2-3):116-133.
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  25. Should the Standard Model of Mental Causation Be Abandoned?Emmanuel Baierle - 2013 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 120 (1):124-130.
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  26. Body & Mind: Past, Present And Future.David Bakan - 1980 - New York: Academic Press.
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  27. On Effect of Mind on Matter.David Bakan - 1980 - In Body & Mind: Past, Present And Future. New York: Academic Press.
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  28. Macdonald, Coin Types.Charles Baldwin - 1907 - Classical World: A Quarterly Journal on Antiquity 1:204.
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  29. Self-Efficacy: The Foundation of Agency1.Albert Bandura - 2000 - In Walter J. Perrig & Alexander Grob (eds.), Control of Human Behavior, Mental Processes, and Consciousness: Essays in Honor of the 60th Birthday of August Flammer. Erlbaum. pp. 16.
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  30. La venganza de Wilson: Una crítica a los enfoques seleccionistas analógicos de la evolución cultural.Lorenzo Baravalle - 2013 - Dianoia 58 (70):113-132.
    En este artículo se hace una crítica de los enfoques teóricos, aquí llamados por analogía o analógicos, que pretenden abstraer conceptos darwinistas del sustrato biológico para aplicarlos a dominios ontológicos (parcialmente) distintos, estrategia adoptada por versiones de la epistemología evolutiva y, sobre todo, por la teoría memética. Para ello se utiliza el argumento de la exclusión causal, tomado en préstamo de la filosofía de la mente; se hace evidente la existencia de un paralelismo entre causalidad mental y memética, y se (...)
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  31. Rationally Justified Belief and Mental Causation: An Epistemic Argument Against Physicalism.Justin Daniel Barnard - 2002 - Dissertation, The Florida State University
    The epistemic argument against physicalism supports the claim that if physicalism is true, then none of our beliefs are rationally justified. The argument relies on two major premises. The first places a constraint on rationally justified belief, according to which S's believing that p is rationally justified only if there is some reason for p, r, which S believes and S's believing that r is part of a true causal explanation for S's believing that p. The second advances the conceptual (...)
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  32. Explanation of Human Action.Ronald Lee Barnette - 1972 - Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
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  33. Causal Relevance and Nonreductive Physicalism.J. Barrett - 1995 - Erkenntnis 42 (3):339-62.
    It has been argued that nonreductive physicalism leads to epiphenominalism about mental properties: the view that mental events cannot cause behavioral effects by virtue of their mental properties. Recently, attempts have been made to develop accounts of causal relevance for irreducible properties to show that mental properties need not be epiphenomenal. In this paper, I primarily discuss the account of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit. I show how it can be developed to meet several obvious objections and to capture our (...)
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  34. Rationalizing Explanation and Causally Relevant Mental Properties.J. Barrett - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 74 (1):77-102.
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  35. Mental Causation.Jonathan Barrett - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Southern California
    This dissertation is concerned with whether mental properties can be causally relevant to behavior, that is, whether a mental event can cause a piece of behavior by virtue of its mental properties. Since it seems that my behavior is not just a causal consequence of my beliefs and desires, but is caused by those beliefs and desires precisely because they are those beliefs and desires, an affirmative answer to this question is commonly taken to be required for a successful philosophical (...)
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  36. Whitehead's Ontology and Davidson's Anomalous Monism.Pierfrancesco Basile - 2005 - Process Studies 34 (1):3-9.
  37. On Causal Irregularity: A Reply to Dretske and Snyder.Tom L. Beauchamp - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (2):285-287.
  38. States, State Types, and the Causation of Behavior.Ansgar Beckermann - 1992 - Erkenntnis 36 (3):267-282.
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  39. The Nomological Principle and the Argument for Anomalous Monism.Hagit Benbaji - 2005 - Iyyun 54 (January):90-108.
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  40. Exclusion Again.Karen Bennett - 2008 - In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press.
    I think that there is an awful lot wrong with the exclusion problem. So, it seems, does just about everybody else. But of course everyone disagrees about exactly _what_ is wrong with it, and I think there is more to be said about that. So I propose to say a few more words about why the exclusion problem is not really a problem after all—at least, not for the nonreductive physicalist. The genuine _dualist_ is still in trouble. Indeed, one of (...)
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  41. Mental Causation.Karen Bennett - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316-337.
    Concerns about ‘mental causation’ are concerns about how it is possible for mental states to cause anything to happen. How does what we believe, want, see, feel, hope, or dread manage to cause us to act? Certain positions on the mind-body problem—including some forms of physicalism—make such causation look highly problematic. This entry sketches several of the main reasons to worry, and raises some questions for further investigation.
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  42. Explanation and Interpretation of Action.Lars Bergstr - 1990 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (1):3 – 15.
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  43. Précis of Memory: A Philosophical Study.Sven Bernecker - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):61-64.
  44. Memory: A Philosophical Study.Sven Bernecker - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Sven Bernecker presents a new causal theory of memory, examining a number of metaphysical and epistemological issues crucial to the understanding of propositional or factual memory. This book provides sophisticated and comprehensive coverage of a much neglected area of philosophy, and will also appeal to cognitive scientists and psychologists.
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  45. The Metaphysics of Memory.Sven Bernecker - 2008 - Springer.
    This book investigates central issues in the philosophy of memory. Does remembering require a causal process connecting the past representation to its subsequent recall and, if so, what is the nature of the causal process? Of what kind are the primary intentional objects of memory states? How do we know that our memory experiences portray things the way they happened in the past? Given that our memory is not only a passive device for reproducing thoughts but also an active device (...)
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  46. Review of Sophie Gibb, E. J. Lowe, and R. D. Ingthorsson (Eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. [REVIEW]Sara Bernstein - 2013 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 1 (1):1.
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  47. The Physical Basis of Mind: And the Diagnosis of Mental Deficiency.R. J. A. Berry - 1930 - The Eugenics Review 22 (3):171.
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  48. An Explanation.Pierre Beziau - 1908 - The Monist 18 (4):624-625.
  49. Mental Concepts: Causal Because Anomalous.Peter Bieri - 1993 - In Ralf Stoecker (ed.), Reflecting Davidson. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
  50. Some Causal Factors in Mental Blocking.A. G. Bills - 1935 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 18 (2):172.
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