Mental Causation

Panqualityism is a form of panpsychism that distinguishes between conscious subjects (i.e., minds) and phenomenal qualities. Like panpsychism, it holds that the universe's physical ultimates are phenomenally qualitied. Unlike panpsychism, however, it argues that these phenomenally qualitied ultimates are not microsubjects and are therefore not experienced. By rejecting the idea that phenomenally qualitied ultimates are microsubjects, panqualityism escapes the subject combination problem. However, this creates a new challenge: explaining how conscious macrosubjects arise from non-experiential microqualities. Here I address this challenge (...) by proposing a trialistic form of panqualityism. According to this view, unexperienced phenomenally qualitied ultimates are the dual aspects of physical ultimates. These qualitied ultimates obey a distinct set of physics-like laws, which govern their structural organization in the mental realm. The third fundamental ontological category in trialistic panqualityism-alongside physical and phenomenal ultimates-is that of conscious subjects (minds). These are proposed to be irreducible entities that strongly emerge from an ensemble of physical ultimates when specific physical conditions are met; they experience the quality macrostructures formed from the phenomenal ultimates that are the duals of the physical ultimates in the ensemble. (shrink)

This is the introduction and table of contents to the collected volume "Top-Down Causation and Emergence". It honours George F.R. Ellis and explains the parts and chapters of the volume.

The paper critiques two recent suggestions, by Lei Zhong and Thomas Kroedel, about how to apply the interventionist theory of causation to cases where supervenient properties, particularly mental properties, are involved. According to both suggestions, we should hold variables corresponding to supervenient properties fixed when intervening on the subvenient properties with respect to a putative effect variable and vice versa. The paper argues that both suggestions are problematic. Zhong’s suggestion ultimately requires ad hoc exemptions from the holding-fixed requirement. Kroedel’s suggestion (...) entails severe constraints on the construction of causal models. Overall, retaining the holding-fixed requirements of interventionism for cases of supervenient properties comes at a significant price. (shrink)

Most proposals on the problem of mental causation or the exclusion problem come from two metaphysical camps: physicalism and dualism. However, a recent theory called “Russellian panpsychism” (PRM) offers a distinct perspective on the relationship between consciousness and the physical world. PRM posits that phenomenal consciousness is ubiquitous and fundamental. It suggests that consciousness and physical properties are not entirely separate but rather intertwined. Phenomenal consciousness serves as a categorical/intrinsic ground for the extrinsic/dispositional nature of physical properties. By doing so, (...) PRM proposes a novel solution to the exclusion problem, combining elements from both physicalism and dualism while addressing their inherent difficulties. Nonetheless, the success of PRM faces challenges, as argued by Howell (2015). In this paper, I argue that if PRM is formulated as a version of dual-aspect monism, it can offer a distinctive approach to tackling the exclusion problem. (shrink)

Krzysztof Poslajko offers a novel version of an anti-realist view about beliefs, rejecting the extreme proposal of eliminativism that claims beliefs do not exist. He argues we should rather say that beliefs exist, but they are not real. By arguing for the antirealist view as a revision of our common-sense view about the nature of mind, Poslajko makes the case for adopting a pragmatic metaphilosophy when we deal with philosophical questions about belief.

The suggestion of something akin to a ‘relativist solution to the Mind-Body problem’ has recently been held by some scientists and philosophers; either explicitly (Galadí, 2023; Lahav & Neemeh, 2022; Ludwig, 2015) or in more implicit terms (Solms, 2018; Velmans, 2002, 2008). In this paper I provide an argument in favor of a relativist approach to the Mind-Body problem, more specifically, an argument for ‘1st/3rd person relativism’, the claim that ‘The truth value of some sentences or propositions is relative to (...) 1st and 3rd person perspectives’. The argument for 1st/3rd person relativism is close to a forma proof. It is shown that, just by assuming the 1st/3rd person distinction itself and using first order logic and set theory, ‘1st/3rd person relativism’ follows as a theorem. Some consequences of ‘1st/3rd person relativism’ to the Mind-Body Problem are evaluated. It is shown that ‘1st/3rd person relativism’ predicts the existence of an (apparent) Explanatory Gap; explains why the Explanatory Gap is just apparent (and the origins of such illusion); dissolves the Hard-Problem; provides a possible solution the problem of Mental Causation; explains why Mental Causation looks like a problem in the first place and accurately predicts the actual empirically found correlation and covariation between conscious experiences and brain states. This explanatory power of ‘1st/3rd person relativism’ is particularly impressive since it was not designed as a possible solution to the Mind-Body problem in the first place. (shrink)

The paper replies to Matthew Rellihan’s recent criticism of Thomas Kroedel’s simple argument for downward causation. Rellihan argues that the simple argument equivocates between two notions of realizers of mental properties, namely total realizers and core realizers. According to Rellihan, one premise of the argument is false on each disambiguation. In response, this paper argues that the version of the argument in terms of total realizers is sound after all if we evaluate counterfactual conditionals about the non-occurrence of total realizers (...) correctly. (shrink)

Mind-body parallelism is the view that mind and body stand in the same “order and connection,” as Spinoza put it, or that corresponding mental and physical states have corresponding causal explanations in terms of other mental and physical states. This dissertation investigates the nature and role of mind-body parallelism, as well as other forms of parallelism, in Spinoza’s philosophy of mind. In doing so, it also considers how Spinoza’s views relate to current discussions. In present-day philosophy of mind, mind-body parallelism (...) is almost never defended. It is seen as a historical dead-end with insurmountable problems. By contrast, I argue that parallelism powerfully responds to the post-Cartesian mind-body problem (which remains with us today) and that it points a way forward in current debates. The dissertation contains five independent chapters. After an introduction that situates parallelism in relation to both Spinoza’s time and to present discussions, Chapter 1 presents an argument for parallelism aimed at a present-day audience. Chapter 2 discusses Spinoza’s own arguments for parallelism. Both chapters help to clarify what parallelism is, in part by distinguishing between several versions of the view. Chapter 3 discusses what is often considered parallelism’s most problematic feature, its rejection of mind-body interaction. I argue that by distinguishing between the post-Cartesian context in which Spinoza wrote and present-day discussions, we can see that parallelism is compatible with mental causation. Chapters 4 and 5, finally, discuss specific ways in which parallelism is at work in Spinoza’s view of the mind. In Chapter 4, I argue that parallelism is at work in Spinoza’s interesting and distinctive positions on the nature of agency and motivation. In Chapter 5, I show the role of parallelism in his representationalist theory of consciousness. A guiding thread throughout the dissertation is that parallelism presents a distinctive and interesting way to combine realism, non-reductionism and naturalism in relation to those features of human self-understanding that seem difficult to fit into a naturalistic worldview. (shrink)

Mere capacity views hold that agents who can intervene in an unfolding movement are performing an agentially controlled action, regardless of whether they do intervene. I introduce a simple argument to show that the noncausal explanation offered by mere capacity views fails to explain both control and action. In cases where bodily subsystems, rather than the agent, generate control over a movement, agents can often intervene to override non-agential control. Yet, contrary to what capacity views suggest, in these cases, this (...) capacity to intervene does not amount to agential control or action. I illustrate this with a case study of how passive breathing, a mere behavior, is misclassified by mere capacity views. I end by revisiting the central alternative to mere capacity views: causal control views. Advances in our understanding of how agents exert control over unfolding movements indicate that the nature of control is characterized by ubiquitous, small-scale causal interventions. (shrink)

This inquiry is addressed to two questions: (1) what if any logical relations might exist between the concepts of desire and action (as they and the distinctions to which they commit us are ensconced in ordinary parlance), and (2) what if any causal or significant non-causal (i.e., material) relations might ever exist between instances of desire and action? -/- It is held that any credible move to deal with such questions must initially, and at some length, specify the employment conditions (...) for the terms 'want' and 'desire'. This is accomplished in the first two chapters wherein a set of premises is generated for the argument of the inquiry which is presented in full and concluded in the third and final chapter. Premises generated devolve from treatment of the following major topics: (a) the grammar of 'want' and 'desire', (b) the ontological status of wants, (c) first-person and third-person want ascriptions, (d) the sorts of things which may be desired (desiderabilia), (e) wants and lacks, (f) wants and wishes, (g) the 'conflicts' of desires and reason and desire, (h) four major candidates for logical relations between wants and acts, (i) the issue of causation, and (j) the placement of Desire in an adequate ontology of persons. -/- It is argued that every major candidate for a logical relation between wants and acts (or our warrant for believing that such a connection exists) breaks down upon analysis; that little warrant exists for construing wants as causes of acts; that wants and acts are related in significant non-logical and non-causal (i.e., material) respects; and that any fully adequate theory of human action must undertake ontology, placing the category of Desire squarely in the foreground. This project represents neither a general theory of desire nor a general theory of human action. It is rather conceived as a propaedeutic to any such inquiry. It is essentially revisionist in intent, setting out on the one hand to challenge existing claims about wants and acts and, on the other hand, proposing a more satisfactory approach to the issue. In no sense is it suggested that recent Anglo-American contributions are without merit. It is rather argued that they are often inadequate contributions vis-a-vis the larger requirements for an adequate theory of human action. (shrink)

We examine Sophie Gibb’s emergent property-dualist theory of mental causation as double-prevention. Her account builds on a commitment to a version of causal realism based on a powers metaphysic. We consider three objections to her account. We show, by drawing out the implications of the ontological commitments of Gibb’s theory of mental causation, that the first two objections fail. But, we argue, owing to worries about cases where there is no double-preventive role to be played by mental properties, her account, (...) which solely affords mental properties a double-preventive role, is incomplete and vulnerable to a causal exclusion objection. We propose a friendly modification to her theory of mental causation that is consistent with her theory’s ontological commitments. Specifically, we sketch an account on which mental properties have a more pronounced causal-structuring role that is not exhausted by the role Gibb assigns them as double-preventers. The result is a novel emergentist theory of mental causation. (shrink)

The evolution of the human mind through natural selection mandates that our conscious experiences are causally potent in order to leave a tangible impact upon the surrounding physical world. Any attempt to construct a functional theory of the conscious mind within the framework of classical physics, however, inevitably leads to causally impotent conscious experiences in direct contradiction to evolution theory. Here, we derive several rigorous theorems that identify the origin of the latter impasse in the mathematical properties of ordinary differential (...) equations employed in combination with the alleged functional production of the mind by the brain. Then, we demonstrate that a mind--brain theory consistent with causally potent conscious experiences is provided by modern quantum physics, in which the unobservable conscious mind is reductively identified with the quantum state of the brain and the observable brain is constructed by the physical measurement of quantum brain observables. The resulting quantum stochastic dynamics obtained from sequential quantum measurements of the brain is governed by stochastic differential equations, which permit genuine free will exercised through sequential conscious choices of future courses of action. Thus, quantum reductionism provides a solid theoretical foundation for the causal potency of consciousness, free will and cultural transmission. (shrink)

Christian List has recently presented a compatibilist libertarian solution to the free will and determinism problem. He proposes the admixture of libertarianism, which endorses agential alternative possibilities, with physical determinism, which endorses the necessity of physical effects. In this paper, we argue that List's innovative proposal ultimately fails.

One of the most popular arguments in favor of dualism is the zombie-conceivability argument. It is often argued that the possibility of zombies would entail that mental properties are epiphenomenal. This paper attempts to defuse the argument, offering a model of dualist mental causation which can serve as a basis for a modified, interactionist-friendly zombie argument.

A familiar interpretation of quantum mechanics (one of a number of views sometimes labeled the "Copenhagen interpretation'"), takes its empirical apparatus at face value, holding that the quantum wave function evolves by the Schrödinger equation except on certain occasions of measurement, when it collapses into a new state according to the Born rule. This interpretation is widely rejected, primarily because it faces the measurement problem: "measurement" is too imprecise for use in a fundamental physical theory. We argue that this is (...) a weak objection, as there may be many ways of making "measurement" precise. However, measurement-collapse interpretations face a more serious objection: a dilemma tied to the quantum Zeno effect. Is measurement itself an observable that can enter superpositions? If yes, then the standard measurement-collapse dynamics is ill-defined. If no, then (at least if measurement is an observable), measurements can never start or finish. The best way out is to deny that measurement is an observable, but this leads to strong and revisionary consequences. This reinforces the view that there is no nonrevisionary interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Mind does not operate using sequence (also known, to ‘man,’ as ‘time’). Think: philosophical, and physical, fusion.

Why is there something rather than nothing? I don’t know. But ‘nothing’ may not be the correct default state. It may be that the existence of possibilities requires fewer (weaker) assumptions. In this case, arguably, we should start with the existence of possibilities and not ‘nothing’. In this case, there exists the possibility of (for example) red qualia. But the possible existence of a red quale does not delineate what it is the possibility of if the possibility contains only a (...) reference to red. Instead, the possibility must contain an actual instance of red to delineate what it is the possibility of. But, if possibilities are the weakest and (therefore) starting assumption, and the possibility of a red quale must itself contain an instance of red, then red exists necessarily. This argument would work for all qualia. Further, it could be that physical things and physical laws are (in some sense) instances of qualia. Incidentally, this would solve the problem of evil: pain, too, is made of qualia. These considerations align with some suggestions by Leibniz. (shrink)

Dualism holds that some mental events are fundamental and non-physical. I develop a prima facie plausible causal argument for dualism. The argument has several significant implications. First, it constitutes a new way of arguing for dualism. Second, it provides dualists with a parity response to causal arguments for physicalism. Third, it transforms the dialectical role of epiphenomenalism. Fourth, it refutes the view that causal considerations prima facie support physicalism but not dualism. After developing the causal argument for dualism and drawing (...) out these implications, I subject the argument to a battery of objections. Some prompt revisions to the argument. Others reveal limitations in scope. It falls out of the discussion that the causal argument for dualism is best used against physicalism as a keystone in a divide and conquer strategy. (shrink)

This paper presents a puzzle or antinomy about the role of properties in causation. In theories of properties, a distinction is often made between determinable properties, like red, and their determinates, like scarlet (see Armstrong 1978, volume II). Sometimes determinable properties are cited in causal explanations, as when we say that someone stopped at the traffic light because it was red. If we accept that properties can be among the relata of causation, then it can be argued that there are (...) good reasons for allowing that some of these are determinable properties. On the other hand, there are strong arguments in the metaphysics of properties to treat properties as sparse in David Lewis’s (1983) sense. But then it seems that we only need to believe in the most determinate properties: particular shades of colour, specific masses, lengths and so on. And if we also agree with Lewis that sparse properties are ‘the ones relevant to causal powers’ (1983: 13) it seems we must conclude that if properties are relevant to causation at all, then all of these are determinate properties. I call this ‘the antinomy of determinable causation’. On the one hand, we have a good argument for the claim that determinable properties can be causes, if any properties are. I call this the Thesis. But on the other hand, we have a good argument for the claim that only the most determinate properties can be causes, if any properties are. I call this the Antithesis. Clearly, we need to reject either the Thesis or the.. (shrink)

Reseña bibliográfica. Comentario y discusión del libro Monroy Nasr, Zuraya (2007). El problema cuerpo-mente en Descartes. Una cuestión semántica, México, UNAM, 186 pp -/- Es bien sabido que, ya en vida misma de Descartes, sus primeros objetores, incluso los más condescendientes y afines a su doctrina, acusaron como una flagrante contradicción de doble afirmación de la Meditación Sexta, en la que Descartes postula, primero, la distinción real entre las substancias extensa y pensante, y enseguida, la unión de dichas substancias en (...) un compuesto substancial, el hombre. Dicha objeción, cuya historia es tan larga y compleja como la del cartesianismo, no puede dejar de ver en aquella contradicción un "abandono de la partida", esto es de la filosofía, según la sentencia lapidaria de Leibniz, acusación que, por diversas razones (fracaso, renuncia o decisión metafísica) es vigente a lo largo de la éxegisis contemporánea. Monroy Nasr acomete y logra la empresa de otorgar una interpretación original del llamado dualismo cartesiano, consciente, en tanto tal, de lo marcos conceptuales en los que se incluye. Veamos sus lineamientos generales. (shrink)

Intentional mental states have causes and effects. Davidson has shown that this fact alone does not entail the existence of psycho‐physical laws, but his anomalism makes the connection between the content and causation of intentional states utterly mysterious. By defining intentional states in terms of their causes and effects, functionalism promises to explain this connection. If intentional states have their causes and effects in virtue of their contents, then there must be intrinsic states (of the people who have them) which (...) are ‘local causal surrogates’ for the propositions believed, desired, or whatever. We can define these intrinsic states in terms of the laws that govern them, but these laws alone are not sufficient to account for intentional content. To do that we need to invoke laws which link these intrinsic states with their contents. Such a ‘wide’ functional account is sketched; it combines a suggestion of Ramsey's about truth conditions with a ‘feedback’ account of the content of desires. (shrink)

This paper presents a puzzle or antinomy about the role of properties in causation. In theories of properties, a distinction is often made between determinable properties, like red, and their determinates, like scarlet (see Armstrong 1978, volume II). Sometimes determinable properties are cited in causal explanations, as when we say that someone stopped at the traffic light because it was red. If we accept that properties can be among the relata of causation, then it can be argued that there are (...) good reasons for allowing that some of these are determinable properties. On the other hand, there are strong arguments in the metaphysics of properties to treat properties as sparse in David Lewis’s (1983) sense. But then it seems that we only need to believe in the most determinate properties: particular shades of colour, specific masses, lengths and so on. And if we also agree with Lewis that sparse properties are ‘the ones relevant to causal powers’ (1983: 13) it seems we must conclude that if properties are relevant to causation at all, then all of these are determinate properties. I call this ‘the antinomy of determinable causation’. On the one hand, we have a good argument for the claim that determinable properties can be causes, if any properties are. I call this the Thesis. But on the other hand, we have a good argument for the claim that only the most determinate properties can be causes, if any properties are. I call this the Antithesis. Clearly, we need to reject either the Thesis or the.. (shrink)

Some authors have argued that, in order to give an account of weakness of the will, we must assume that the mind is divisible into parts. This claim is often referred to as the partitioning claim. There appear to be two main arguments for this claim. While the first is conceptual and claims that the notion of divisibility is entailed by the notion of non-rational mental causation (which is held to be a necessary condition of weakness of the will), the (...) second is explanatory and claims that the notion of divisibility is required for the causal explanation of weak-willed action. In this paper I want to argue that the partitioning claim remains unsupported, no matter how it is interpreted, and that weakness of the will can be made perfectly good sense of without the idea that the mind is divisible into parts. In fact, there are available various explanatory models each of which characterizes different psychological mechanisms that may be involved in weakness of will, none of which depends on any claims about mental division. I describe three familiar mechanisms and argue that weakness of will may occur as the result of any one of them. (shrink)

Psychological research and theory has been in the past, and is at present, vitiated by three groups of presuppositions and tendencies. Firstly, by a rigid ideal of preciseness, which produces in the mind of psychologists a biased predilection for selecting and emphasizing those facts which lend themselves best to a precise investigation, and for neglecting those facts with which this is not the case. Secondly, by certain psychological presuppositions rooted in the ideological background of the society to which the psychologist (...) himself belongs; these presuppositions induce him often to state, unwittingly, certain of his problems along the lines suggested by the predominant ideology. And thirdly, by the tendency to overlook, or to neglect, certain very important facts because these facts appear to be quite “obvious”. (shrink)

In this paper certain basic assumptions about causation will be made explicit and then an attempt will be made to show, on the basis of those assumptions, that causation must be supplemented by an extra-causal operation of a selective nature. It is hoped that our assumptions will have in their own right a certain general acceptability, but since assumptions or “postulate sets”, whether antecedently acceptable or not are usually chosen for the purpose of proving something already deemed desirable, a word (...) should be said as to why it was thought desirable to argue for selectivity. (shrink)

Since the late 1980’s Kim has presented some major reasons to abandon SC. In MIAPW at least four of these reasons are offered: under SC we lose mental causation, mental realism and psychological explanations. Moreover, supervenience cannot do the job as the cementing relation in SC.

Causality in the abstract is a grand theme. We take it up when we want to penetrate to the bottom of things to understand general laws that govern the working at the world of the deepest and most detailed level.In this essay, I argue for a more situated understanding of causality. To counter our desire for ever greater generality, I suggest that causal relations, even those that hold only on average, require context. To counter our desire for ever greater detail, (...) I suggest that causal relations may exist only at a certain level of granularity. (shrink)

En este artículo reevaluamos la tesis de la relatividad lingüística tomando corno referencia la vision de la mente que Fodor ha venido ofreciendo. Partiendo de su argumento clásico a favor del lenguaje del pensamiento, veremos como el desarrollo de su tesis de la modularidad y de su mas reciente teoria psicosemántica (el atomismo informacional), permiten compatibilizar su posición con, al menos, una variedad de relatividad, la relatividad léxica. Así mismo, examinaremos su ultimo argumento en favor de la prioridad explicativa del (...) pensamiento, basado en la composicionalidad que éste exhibe, a diferencia del lenguaje.This paper reevaluates the thesis of linguistic relativity in the context of Fodor’s views on the nature of mind. We begin with Fodor’s classical argument for the language of thought, and follow the development of his ideas as he adds a general account of the structure of mind (the modulariry thesis) and a psychosemantical theory (informational atomism). Finally, we examine his most recent altempt to support the explanatory prioriry of thought, based on the compositionaliry that thought, but not language, exhibits. We argue that Fodor’s position is compatible a variety of lexical relativiry. (shrink)

According to H-N. Castañeda, a guise - the very thin individual which lies at the bottom of the ontological furniture of the world - is indifferent to existence in a Meinongian way, in the sense that it remains the same whether it exists or not. Moreover, its existence does not alter its intentional character, as it is the very same individual which is thought of regardless of its being real or not1. In what follows, I will attempt to show that (...) with regards to guises both theses are illegitimate, unless one introduces the notion of an existentially-conditioned property as a counterfactual property which a guise has prior to its actual existence. To do so means to work out an amendment to Castañeda's Guise Theory, as the doctrine which supports his main ontological assumptions. (shrink)

Highlighting the preferential/comparative aspect of rationalization. Reasons that explain actions are putatively internal. But if one is compelled to decide between A and B and prefers to be exempt, that one pursues A is partially explained by the external factor causing the compulsory decision situation. The more pronounced the external factor, the less causal agency, and hence the less scrutiny and the more leniency in the process of charitable interpretation, the less hermeneutical sacrificial and the higher hidden utility. This paper (...) attempts to make explicit the nomological structure of possible worlds disclosing such hidden utility. (shrink)

Type-identity of mental and physical events is compatible with psychological anomalism. (1) Both in action and perceiving singular causal relations, two temporally distant physical events C and E (caused by C) instantiate a COMMON mental property securing "inter-event" continuity of mental content: the mental content when the room is illuminated shows a trace of familiarity with the mental content just before flipping the switch. (2) "Inter-event" continuity is possible if there is "intra-event" continuity in individual mental content: subsets of C (...) and E capable of functioning as both causal antecedent and consequent included. (3) Intra-event continuity means not just seamless adaptation to physical by role-depriving the double-role events but also enables physical shortcuts by being already equipped with pre-causal epistemic link to future (some causally efficacious knowledge of future mental property). --- Whatever causal effect mental may ever have in the physical domain can be reproduced by purely physical events (for example causally deviant chain set off by rare quantum or cosmological events) so it must be covered by strict laws. Mental brings the cause and the effect of such strict laws temporally closer. Illuminating the room takes remarkably shorter time if there is a relevant (temporally extended) mental content involved than if it is left to rare physical phenomena. -/- . (shrink)

Physical translation of a mental content must involve a set of causal antecedents A and a set of causal consequents B which instantiate properties that figure in strict laws as antecedent and consequent conditions respectively. Only if there are double-role events in common between A and B capable of migrating to purely A or to purely B in future depending on the role that the mental content play then, psychological anomalism can be established but without any need to give up (...) the type-identity of mental and physical events. This paper argues that belief and desire are explanatorily inextricable likewise. (shrink)

___MERGING of temporally distant events: One perceives a singular causal relation that c causes e whenever c instantiates a mental property C which anticipates a certain mental property E instantiated by e. Such a knowledge of future self is feasible by there being a common mental property D that is instantiated by both c and e. -/- ___SPLITTING to temporally distant events: In the action that is aimed to bring about E, the knowledge or perception or D (explained by the (...) anticipation of E by C) in turn causally explains an event cc instantiating C and then (via causing cc) event ee instantiating E. (shrink)

This paper considers Davidson's (1963) arguments for construing reasons as causes and attempts to show that he has failed to provide positive reasons for introducing causation into his analysis of rationalizing explanation. I consider various ways of spelling out his intuition that something is missing from explanation if we consider only the justificatory relation between reasons and action, and I argue that to the extent that there is anything missing, it should not be provided by construing reasons as causes. What (...) is ostensibly missing, and what I think Davidson is after, is some kind of determinate relation between explanans and explanandum. I argue that this is too strong a requirement to place on rationalizing explanation. (shrink)

A popular solution to the causal exclusion problem in the non-reductive physicalist camp is the trope identity solution. But this solution is haunted by the “quausation problem” which charges that the trope only confers causal powers qua physical, not qua mental. Although proponents of the trope solution have responded to the problem by denying the existence of properties of tropes, I do not find their reply satisfactory. Rather, I believe they have missed the core presupposition behind the quausation problem. I (...) will argue that the presupposition is the generalist notion of causation. Then, for the trope theorists to solve the quausation problem, they need to abandon the generalist notion and adopt the singularist notion of causation. However, making that move will lead them to a new quausation problem, rendering irreducible mental types causally irrelevant and mental causal explanations reducible. Either adopting a generalist notion or a singularist notion of causation, a quausation problem awaits the trope solution. Given this dilemma, my conclusion is that the trope identity solution cannot solve the exclusion problem in a non-reductive way. Moreover, the dilemma can be generalized, showing that token physicalism is a shaky position. (shrink)

En quoi consiste l’explication d’une action ? La question, fondamentale pour toute réflexion méthodologique sur les sciences de l’homme, renvoie d’abord à une pratique commune. Dans nos rapports à autrui, il arrive que la compréhension fasse défaut. C’est alors que surgit le besoin d’explication, afin de comprendre la conduite d’autrui ou encore éclairer les autres sur ce que nous faisons… Qu’est-ce qu’une action intentionnelle ? Les pensées d’un agent causent-elles son comportement ? Comment caractériser le savoir qu’un agent possède de (...) sa propre action ? Quel rapport l’explication d’une action entretient-elle avec ce savoir ? À quelles conditions est-il possible de comprendre autrui ? S’appuyant sur l’approche logico-grammaticale de Ludwig Wittgenstein et d’Elizabeth Anscombe, Rémi Clot-Goudard récuse les conceptions faisant des prédicats psychologiques les noms d’états ou d’événements internes aux agents et connus d’eux seuls. Il fait valoir que le caractère intentionnel des actions doit se comprendre à partir des règles qui gouvernent leur mode de description et qu’il faut rapporter les intentions au raisonnement pratique et à la connaissance pratique pour cerner leur force explicative. Il soutient ainsi que la maîtrise des concepts psychologiques est un savoir-faire enté sur l’expressivité naturelle du corps humain et la dimension intrinsèquement sociale et institutionnelle de la vie humaine – invitant ainsi ses lecteurs à se déprendre de l’illusion moderne d’un “sujet désengagé”. (shrink)

This article aims to provide a brief overview of mental causation problem and its current proposed solutions. Indeed, mental causation turns out as one of the most difficult philosophical conundrums in contemporary philosophy of mind. In the first two sections, we offer an outline of the problem and the philosophical debate about it, and show that mental causation problem is pivotal within the contemporary philosophy of mind. In the third section, we focus on the most popular models of mental causation, (...) namely Kim's and Davidson's accounts, also discussing the objections raised against them. In the final section, we take into consideration some recent proposals poised to solve the mental causation problem, including powerism. Given the logical and metaphysical plausibility of almost all these different options, our conclusion is that mental causation is still an open problem and it is far from being resolved. (shrink)

The center of this investigation is the ‘real hard problem’ of phenomenal perception (Chalmers), i.e. of the qualitative kind of perception presenting the subject with forms, colors, smell, pleasurable or negative feelings etc.; the problem of Human consciousness, however, will explicitly not be treated. The ‘explanatory gap’ (Levine) complained by the philosophy of mind, that is to say the failure of all attempts to supply a neuronal explanation of experiences, is emergence-theoretically treated: Systems own properties and laws different from their (...) components; so the emergence concept shows promise also for the explanatory potential with respect to neuronal systems. Here the phenomenal character of perception is explained from the systemic co-action of perception and behavior, whereby also an interpretation is opened to Davidson’s anomal monism. Qualitative feelings, as is further shown, are not to be understood as needless ‘epiphenomena’, but as a necessary completion of per-ception when, as in the case of higher animals, the behavior is primarily controlled by phenomenal perception. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore anomalous dualism about consciousness, a view that has not previously been explored in any detail. We can classify theories of consciousness along two dimensions: first, a theory might be physicalist or dualist; second, a theory might endorse any of the three following views regarding causal relations between phenomenal properties (properties that characterize states of our consciousness) and physical properties: nomism (the two kinds of property interact through deterministic laws), acausalism (they do not causally interact), and (...) anomalism (they interact but not through deterministic laws). I suggest that a kind of anomalous dualism, nonreductive anomalous panpsychism, promises to offer the best overall answer to two pressing issues for dualist views, the problem of mental causation and the mapping problem (the problem of predicting mind-body associations). (shrink)

O problema da causa mental é uma das questões filosóficas mais fascinantes na obra de Freud. A releitura neo-pragmática que Cláudia Passos-Ferreira faz sobre o tema se insere no interior de profícuos debates no campo da Psicanálise, Filosofia da Psicanálise e da Filosofia da Mente que têm contribuído para a inovação do pensamento nas teorizações psicanalíticas. Em A maquina semântica de Freud, Cláudia aborda a teoria causal do mental de Freud e seu uso na explicação do conflito psíquico. Diante dos (...) impasses do problema, Freud criou uma dupla dimensão da causalidade psíquica, que oscila da causa mecanicista à causa intencional. A hipótese de Cláudia é que a forma mais coerente de defender a tese da causalidade psíquica é descrevê-la como ‘causa intencional’, usando o vocabulário psicológico. Para dar suporte a essa ideia, a concepção estrita da causalidade sustentada por Wittgenstein é dispensada, e a ideia de causa mental em Davidson é endossada como aquela que pode ser mais facilmente articulável às hipóteses freudianas. Em Wittgenstein, busca-se, sobretudo, o apoio teórico para analisar os pontos fracos das teses causais freudianas; em Davidson, o suporte necessário a explicitação e validação lógicas do que Freud afirma sobre o tema. Claudia analisa três momentos da obra freudiana. Na primeira tópica, Freud usa um vocabulário híbrido, descrevendo o psiquismo tanto em termos de causas a-racionais quanto em termos intencionais. Na segunda tópica, o psiquismo assume, cada vez mais, uma descrição intencional, e a causa a-racional da energia pulsional, inicialmente apresentada como um motor do psiquismo, dá lugar a angústia como um afeto intencional que obriga o eu a encontrar uma solução para os conflitos psíquicos. Esse livro reúne tanto o interesse filosófico pelos problemas da causação mental e da relação mente-corpo quanto o refinamento do arcabouço teórico que guia a prática clínica. (shrink)

Stephen Morse’s illuminating scholarship on law and neuroscience relies on a “folk psychological” account of human behavior in order to defend the law’s foundations for ascribing legal responsibility. The heart of Morse’s account is the notion of “mental state causation,” in which mental states cause behavior. Morse argues that causation of this sort is necessary to support legal responsibility. We challenge this claim. First, we discuss problems with the conception of mental causation on which Morse appears to rely. Second, we (...) present an alternative account to explain the link between mental states, reasons, and actions. We argue that the alternative account avoids the conceptual problems that arise for Morse’s conception of mental causation and that it also undergirds ascriptions of legal responsibility. If the alternative succeeds, then Morse’s conception of “mental state causation” is not necessary to support legal responsibility. (shrink)

Nearly 30 years have passed since Donald Davidson first presented his ar- gument against the possibility of psychophysical laws in “Mental Events”. The argument applies to intentional rather than phenomenal properties, so whenever I refer to mental properties and to psychophysical laws it should be understood that I mean intentional properties and laws relating them to physical properties. No consensus has emerged over what the argument actually is, and the subsequent versions of it presented by Davidson show significant differences. But (...) many have been inclined to agree with the spirit of the argument and with its conclusion. (shrink)

Common sense and philosophical tradition agree that mind makes a difference. What we do depends not only on how our bodies are put together, but also on what we think. Explaining how mind can make a difference has proved challenging, however. Some have urged that the project faces an insurmountable dilemma: either we concede that mentalistic explanations of behavior have only a pragmatic standing or we abandon our conception of the physical domain as causally autonomous. Although each option has its (...) advocates, most theorists have sought a middle way that accommodates both the common-sense view of mind and the metaphysical conviction about the physical world. This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature. Contributors include Robert Audi, Lynne Rudder Baker, Tyler Burge, Donald Davidson, Fred Dretske, Ted Honderich, Jennifer Hornsby, Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Brian P. McLaughlin, Ruth Garrett Millikan, H. W. Noonan, Philip Pettit, Ernest Sosa, and Robert Van Gulick. (shrink)