Mental Causation

Das Buch verschafft einen Überblick über die neuere Willensfreiheitsdebatte, wobei es auch die Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung für das Freiheitsproblem erörtert. Ferner entwickelt der Autor eine eigene Position, die er 'fähigkeitsbasierten Libertarismus' nennt. Er widerspricht dem breiten philosophischen Konsens, dass jedenfalls eine Art von Freiheit mit einem naturwissenschaftlichen Weltbild unverträglich sei, nämlich die Fähigkeit, sich unter gegebenen Bedingungen so oder anders zu entscheiden. Im Buch wird argumentiert, dass der libertarischen Freiheitsauffassung, die wir im Alltag alle teilen, bei näherer Betrachtung keine Tatschen (...) entgegenstehen, sondern nur philosophische Doktrinen. Zwar können wir durch unser Handeln keine Naturgesetze abändern und sind auch keine ersten Beweger, aber für ein So-oder-Anderskönnen bedarf es dessen nicht. (shrink)

This article aims to provide a brief overview of mental causation problem and its current proposed solutions. Indeed, mental causation turns out as one of the most difficult philosophical conundrums in contemporary philosophy of mind. In the first two sections, we offer an outline of the problem and the philosophical debate about it, and show that mental causation problem is pivotal within the contemporary philosophy of mind. In the third section, we focus on the most popular models of mental causation, (...) namely Kim's and Davidson's accounts, also discussing the objections raised against them. In the final section, we take into consideration some recent proposals poised to solve the mental causation problem, including powerism. Given the logical and metaphysical plausibility of almost all these different options, our conclusion is that mental causation is still an open problem and it is far from being resolved. (shrink)

The center of this investigation is the ‘real hard problem’ of phenomenal perception (Chalmers), i.e. of the qualitative kind of perception presenting the subject with forms, colors, smell, pleasurable or negative feelings etc.; the problem of Human consciousness, however, will explicitly not be treated. The ‘explanatory gap’ (Levine) complained by the philosophy of mind, that is to say the failure of all attempts to supply a neuronal explanation of experiences, is emergence-theoretically treated: Systems own properties and laws different from their (...) components; so the emergence concept shows promise also for the explanatory potential with respect to neuronal systems. Here the phenomenal character of perception is explained from the systemic co-action of perception and behavior, whereby also an interpretation is opened to Davidson’s anomal monism. Qualitative feelings, as is further shown, are not to be understood as needless ‘epiphenomena’, but as a necessary completion of per-ception when, as in the case of higher animals, the behavior is primarily controlled by phenomenal perception. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore anomalous dualism about consciousness, a view that has not previously been explored in any detail. We can classify theories of consciousness along two dimensions: first, a theory might be physicalist or dualist; second, a theory might endorse any of the three following views regarding causal relations between phenomenal properties (properties that characterize states of our consciousness) and physical properties: nomism (the two kinds of property interact through deterministic laws), acausalism (they do not causally interact), and (...) anomalism (they interact but not through deterministic laws). I suggest that a kind of anomalous dualism, nonreductive anomalous panpsychism, promises to offer the best overall answer to two pressing issues for dualist views, the problem of mental causation and the mapping problem (the problem of predicting mind-body associations). (shrink)

Stephen Morse’s illuminating scholarship on law and neuroscience relies on a “folk psychological” account of human behavior in order to defend the law’s foundations for ascribing legal responsibility. The heart of Morse’s account is the notion of “mental state causation,” in which mental states cause behavior. Morse argues that causation of this sort is necessary to support legal responsibility. We challenge this claim. First, we discuss problems with the conception of mental causation on which Morse appears to rely. Second, we (...) present an alternative account to explain the link between mental states, reasons, and actions. We argue that the alternative account avoids the conceptual problems that arise for Morse’s conception of mental causation and that it also undergirds ascriptions of legal responsibility. If the alternative succeeds, then Morse’s conception of “mental state causation” is not necessary to support legal responsibility. (shrink)

Professor Davidson's anomalous monism has been subject to the criticism that, despite advertisements to the contrary, if it were true mental properties would be epiphenomenal. To this Davidson has replied that his critics have misunderstood his views concerning the extensional nature of causal relations and the intensional character of causal explanations. I call this his ‘extension reply’. This paper argues that there are two ways to read Davidson's ‘extension reply’; one weaker and one stronger. But the dilemma is that: the (...) weak extension reply on its own isn't sufficient to support the principle of the nomological character of causality, anything strong enough to support that principle under the weak extension reply would be strong enough to warrant the strong extension reply; but the strong extension reply threatens the very stability of anomalous monism by threatening the causal potency and reality of the mental. For these reasons, I claim that either version of the ‘extension reply’ is bad news for anomalous monism. I conclude by suggesting that a form of absolute idealism circumvents the very assumptions that generate these kinds of difficulty for committed monists. (shrink)

Nearly 30 years have passed since Donald Davidson first presented his ar- gument against the possibility of psychophysical laws in “Mental Events”. The argument applies to intentional rather than phenomenal properties, so whenever I refer to mental properties and to psychophysical laws it should be understood that I mean intentional properties and laws relating them to physical properties. No consensus has emerged over what the argument actually is, and the subsequent versions of it presented by Davidson show significant differences. But (...) many have been inclined to agree with the spirit of the argument and with its conclusion. (shrink)

Common sense and philosophical tradition agree that mind makes a difference. What we do depends not only on how our bodies are put together, but also on what we think. Explaining how mind can make a difference has proved challenging, however. Some have urged that the project faces an insurmountable dilemma: either we concede that mentalistic explanations of behavior have only a pragmatic standing or we abandon our conception of the physical domain as causally autonomous. Although each option has its (...) advocates, most theorists have sought a middle way that accommodates both the common-sense view of mind and the metaphysical conviction about the physical world. This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature. Contributors include Robert Audi, Lynne Rudder Baker, Tyler Burge, Donald Davidson, Fred Dretske, Ted Honderich, Jennifer Hornsby, Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Brian P. McLaughlin, Ruth Garrett Millikan, H. W. Noonan, Philip Pettit, Ernest Sosa, and Robert Van Gulick. (shrink)

Must mental properties figure in psychological causal laws if they are causally efficacious? And do those psychological causal laws give the essence of mental properties? Contrary to the prevailing consensus, I argue that, on the usual conception of laws that is in play in these debates, there are in fact lawless causally efficacious properties both in and out of the philosophy of mind. I argue that this makes a great difference to the philosophical relevance of empirical psychology. I begin by (...) making the case that revolutions and hurricanes are lawless phenomena, before arguing for a similar thesis about creativity, love, courage, dreams, daydreams, and musings. Furthermore, the empirical research on thesc phenomena suggests that the philosophical issues may be independent of what empirical psychology can tell us. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: J’examine en détail l’argument vaguement suggéré par Davidson selon lequel le holisme entraînerait l’irreductibilité du mental. Je défends cet argument contre deux objections souvent faites contre des arguments visant à dériver des thèses métaphysiques à partir de prémisses portant sur nos critères ordinaires d’application de nos termes. J’invoque la sémantique bidimensionnelle pour expliquer les liensentre ces critères et les questions touchant la référence et la réduction. Je montre comment l’irréductibilité du mental dérive du caractère holiste et flexible des critères (...) d’attribution de croyances et d’états intentionnels.ABSTRACT: I examine in detail the argument vaguely suggested by Davidson to the effect that holism entails the irreducibility of the mental. I defend this argument against two objections often made against arguments that attempt to derive metaphysical theses from premises that concern our ordinary criteria for applying terms. I appeal to two-dimensional semantics to explain the links between these criteria and issues about relerence and reduction. I show how the irreducibility of the mental follows from the holistic and flexible character of our criteria for attributing beliefs and intentional states. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Essay 1.

What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did? We may call such explanations rationalizations, and say that the reason rationalizes the action. In this paper I want to defend the ancient - and common-sense - position that rationalization is a species of ordinary causal explanation. The defense no doubt requires some redeployment, but not more or less complete abandonment of the position, as (...) urged by many recent writers. (shrink)

Given Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion (EE), it follows that in addition to the problem of mental causation, dualism faces a problem of mental explanation. However, the plausibility of EE rests upon the acceptance of a further principle concerning the individuation of explanation (EI). The two methods of defending EI—either by combining an internal account of the individuation of explanation with a semantical account of properties or by accepting an external account of the individuation of explanation—are both metaphysically implausible. This (...) is not, however, to reject the problem of mental explanation, for EE can be replaced with a far weaker principle, which does not require the acceptance of EI, but which generates a similar problem for dualism. (shrink)

Widespread causal overdetermination is often levied as an objection to nonreductive theories of minds and objects. In response, nonreductive metaphysicians have argued that the type of overdetermination generated by their theories is different from the sorts of coincidental cases involving multiple rock-throwers, and thus not problematic. This paper pushes back. I argue that attention to differences between types of overdetermination discharges very few explanatory burdens, and that overdetermination is a bigger problem for the nonreductive metaphysician than previously thought.

Este artigo reconstrói os argumentos de Donald Davidson (1970) em favor de sua teoria do monismo anômalo e revisa as principais críticas que recebeu. Essa teoria é amplamente rejeitada atualmente e, dadas as inúmeras críticas recebidas, é razoável concluir que qualquer tentativa de reabilitação tem um longo caminho pela frente. A diversidade dessas críticas sugere que não há consenso sobre por que exatamente o monismo anômalo fracassa, embora as dificuldades pareçam convergir sobre a justificação e possibilidade da tese monista, e (...) não sobre a anomalia do mental. (shrink)

Since Descartes’s division of the human subject into mental and physical components in the seventeenth century, there has been a great deal of discussion about how—indeed, whether or not—our mental states bring about our physical behavior. Through historical and contemporary readings, this collection explores this lively and important issue. In four parts, this anthology introduces the problem of mental causation, explores the debate sparked by Donald Davidson's anomalous monism, examines Frank Jackson's knowledge argument for the view that qualia are epiphenomenal, (...) and investigates attempts to employ the controversial concept of supervenience to explain mental causation. (shrink)

The classic question about mind-body interaction is now construed as a question about the causal relevance of mental properties. Beyond a materialist account of how reasons can be causes simpliciter, what we seek is a demonstration of how reasons can be causes in virtue of their contentful and rational features. This dissertation attempts to furnish such a demonstration. ;The demonstration falls into two parts: an account of how intentional properties are causally relevant in a metaphysically possible world and a separate (...) account of how they can be relevant in a world where materialism is true. The metaphysical possibility of mental relevance, it is argued, requires psychological laws. These are confirmable and counterfactual-supporting generalizations formulated in terms of beliefs, desires and actions. Mental relevance in a world like ours, on the other hand, requires, in addition to psychological laws, relations of psychophysical determination. These are supervenience relations that hold with metaphysical necessity. Laws and determination, then, are what secure the relevance of mental properties. ;The existence of these relations, however, requires defense from Donald Davidson's famous argument for anomalism. The anomalism thesis has as its target the possibility of both types of relations, and it is primarily motivated by the worry that were intentional properties to appear in relations of either type, then that which is constitutive of intentional properties, their normative character, would face the threat of elimination. ;It is argued that this worry is groundless on both fronts. To defend the existence of psychological laws, an argument is presented for the claim that thought still retains its essential normative character within the context of interesting psychological laws. For the reality of psychophysical determination, a separate argument is presented for the claim that radical interpretation, a theory that by its very nature guarantees the normative character thought, must endorse determination on pain of incoherence. Both arguments attest to the compatibility between the norms that are essential to thought and the laws that are necessary for its relevance. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;I deal with two themes: the idea that an account of thought should be given by giving an account of the ascription of thoughts by a radical interpreter--which I call interpretationism; and the idea that psychological concepts like action and perception are essentially causal. It has often been thought that these two themes conflict; or at least, that if they can co-exist, then they must be kept separate, and (...) associated with different perspectives on behaviour. But is that right? I discuss the character of interpretationism and the nature of causal theories, and examine the extent to which the two themes are compatible. ;Chapter I explains and argues for an interpretationist approach, distinguishing between different interpretationist views, and defending interpretationism against various common objections. ;Chapter II examines the links between interpretationism and the anomalousness of the mental. I discuss a number of different arguments and distinguish a range of theses about anomalousness and indeterminacy which they may support. ;Chapter III discusses the motivation for causal theories. I explain why it matters that we should give causal theories within an interpretationist perspective rather than treating the two themes as insights of different perspectives; and I examine the difficulties of doing so. ;Chapter IV considers the causal theory of vision. I argue against the view that the interpretationist's conception of experience undermines the causal theory. ;Chapter V considers the case of action. I develop a substantive causal theory of action which responds to the following argument: that if we accept the interpretationist's claim that the mental is anomalous, then we must concede that mental properties cannot be causally relevant. ;From the particular cases, and on general grounds, I conclude that it is possible to adopt an interpretationist perspective which simultaneously sees the mental in causal terms; and that such a perspective is essential for an adequate understanding of the mind. (shrink)

Donald Davidson's theory of the relationship between the mental and physical, anomalous monism, , has recently come under attack by a number of philosophers who have argued that the theory fails to allow adequate causal power to the mental. The mental, they say, has causal power only in virtue of its relationship to the physical; true causal power remains only with the physical properties of things on AM. I argue, contrary to these critics, that AM does allow adequate causal power (...) to the mental. The mental is no less causally efficacious than the physical on Davidson's theory. I present reasons for thinking that the difficulties that Davidson's critics see for AM arise largely from their own views, not from Davidson's. Much of the support that I provide for my argument is based on a close examination of Davidson's positions, especially in regards to his views on properties, causation, and supervenience. I argue that Davidson should be viewed as a predicate nominalist, whereas many of his critics are immanent realists. I trace the ramifications of accepting predicate nominalism through its consequences for Davidson's theory of causation and his concept of supervenience. In the last three chapters the concerns of some of Davidson's critics are more specifically addressed; in particular difficulties raised by Jerry Fodor, Ernest Sosa, and Jaegwon Kim are all discussed. My concern is not to demonstrate that anomalous monism is unproblematic. It is only to show that, properly understood, it does not treat the mental as causally inert. (shrink)

My project of giving a general physicalistic reduction of action contrasts with Donald Davidson's view that only individual actions can be explained in physicalistic terms. The main reason for his view is that he thinks the problem of internal causal deviance is insoluble. In the first chapter, I reconstruct the theory of action Davidson develops in Essays and Events and extend the theory to solve the deviance problem. The idea of the solution is that action requires "modulated movement," an ongoing (...) process of monitoring and modulating the movements in which actions consist. ;In the second chapter, I develop the theory of modulated movement in more detail and argue that it can explain a number of cases of defective agency. I defend my contention that the analysis of modulated movement solves the deviance problem against several objections. In doing so, one of the main points I argue is that "ballistic movements," movements the agent cannot modify, cannot be actions. ;The psychological states in terms of which I analyze modulated movement are belief and desire, and in the third chapter I develop a reductive physicalistic account of a component of belief, indication. I start with a theory of indication that Robert Stalnaker presents in Inquiry, and develop the theory to cope with some problems for it that I identify. In the second part of the chapter, I extend the theory to explain cases of indication in which indicators are combined so that together they indicate propositions more specific or precise than any of the propositions they indicate alone, thus reducing complex cases of indication to simpler ones. (shrink)

Non-reductive accounts of the mind appear to run into difficulties when it comes to accommodating our common sense intuitions about the nature of mental causation. Using Donald Davidson's response to his critics' charge of epiphenomenalism as my starting point, I argue that many non-reductive positions are still grounded on residual naturalistic presuppositions, and that our recognizing that such presuppositions are in fact groundless constitutes a first step towards the development of a sustainable non-reductive account of mental causation. I then make (...) efforts to draw connections between this issue and recent work in perception by 'natural realists' such as John McDowell and Hilary Putnam, arguing that in both cases it is a particular conception of what it is to be natural which is the source of our philosophical puzzlement about the mind. (shrink)

Donald Davidson is known for developing the token-token identity theory of the relation between the mental and the physical called "anomalous monism". According to this view, although each mental event is identical with some physical event, there are no strict causal laws relating the mental with the physical . There are three principles which are central to anomalous monism: At least some mental events causally interact with physical events; Events related as cause and effect fall under strict laws; and There (...) are no strict laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained . ;I respond on behalf of AM to objections that the view makes the mental causally inefficacious--i.e., that it makes the mental epiphenomenal. Such objections take one of two forms: Given PAM and NCC, since only those properties referred to by causal laws are relevant to an event's being the cause it is, on AM mental properties are never causally relevant, and Given CI and PAM, AM can give no adequate account of either the causal efficacy of mental properties or of the explanatory relevance of reference to such properties. The main response I given is that those arguments which seem most compelling rest on a misunderstanding of Davidson's ontological commitments. In particular, I argue that given the clearly Quinean ontological framework within which he works, Davidson does not admit properties into his ontology. But the charge of epiphenomenalism holds only if we take epiphenomenalism to be the view that mental properties are causally inefficacious. ;There are, however, some objections to AM which do not apparently rest on this assumption. In these cases, I offer alternative responses, pointing out how in each case the objection rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of some aspect of Davidson's view. I conclude that AM is defensible against those objections which charge it with making the mental epiphenomenal. (shrink)

Anthony Dardis shows how to unravel the knot. He traces its early appearance in the history of philosophical inquiry, specifically in the work of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and T. H. Huxley.

One of the main difficulties with contemporary materialism is the risk of epiphenomenalism: if mental properties systematically depend on physical properties, how can they have causal efficiency? Davidson's anomalous monism' only solves this problem through a "feeble" understanding of the individuation of events and with relative imprecision as to the pertinence of causal explanations formulated in psychological terms. Nor do other conceptions of the individuation of events and the causal power of mental states, as that of Kim and of Jackson (...) and Pettit, solve the problem. It will not then be solved by modifying the theory of the individuation of events. (shrink)

The paper argues against the widely accepted assumption that the causal laws of (completed) physics, in contrast to those of the special sciences, are essentially strict. This claim played an important role already in debates about the anomalousness of the mental, and it currently experiences a renaissance in various discussions about mental causation, projectability of special science laws, and the nature of physical laws. By illustrating the distinction with some paradigmatic physical laws, the paper demonstrates that only law schemata are (...) strict whereas causal laws are generally non-strict. Several potential replies to this argument are discussed and rejected as unsound. (shrink)

I present and defend here a thesis named vehicleless externalism for conceptual mental episodes. According to it, the constitutive relations there are between the production of conceptual mental episodes by an individual and the inclusion of this individual in social discursive practices make it non-necessary to equate, even partially, conceptual mental episodes with the occurrence of physical events inside of that individual. Conceptual mental episodes do not have subpersonal vehicles; they have owners: persons in interpretational practices. That thesis is grounded (...) on inferentialism and on the endorsement of the idea that "meaning is normative". After having recapitulated this heritage and after having presented that thesis, the paper especially attempts to articulate how, in that framework, we may then positively conceive the relations there are between conceptual mental episodes, intracranial events and inferential behaviour. (shrink)

This paper focuses some aspects of a debate which took place between Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim, about the problem of causal efficacy of mental properties in the physical world. The most famous expression of davidsoniannon reductive physicalism, the argument of Anomalous Monism, was criticized by Kim, because it tries to harmonize two allegations that can´t coexist in a physicalist thesis, and have to be considered as incompatible from a physicalistpoint of view. The first of these allegations is theAnomaly of (...) the Mental, whichdefines the mental as autonomous from the system of laws that rule physical phenomena. The second allegation is that mental events and human actions are part of causal flow of natural events. Anomalous Monism seems to be an epiphenomenalist thesis, because, in Anomalous Monism, anomaly of the mental rules out causal efficacy of the mental in physical world. (shrink)

In the text Jaegwon Kim's epiphenomenalist objection to anomalous monism is critically discussed and refuted. The author tries to show that the objection in question originates mainly on the basis of disregarding of Davidsonian ontology - particularly his views on properties and events. The main aim of the paper is to demonstrate that the epiphenomenalist objection does not arise, if we are prepared to take Davidson's ontology seriously.

The paper presents a rejoinder to Katarzyna Paprzycka's critique of my defence of Davidson's ontology. According to Paprzycka the epiphenomenalists objection to the doctrine of anomalous monism, considered as an internal objection, is unquestionably flawed, but when it comes to some external interpretations of the objection in question — it is justified. The text provides a couple of arguments and comments which are intended to show that in most cases the external objection to anomalous monism is in fact either uncharitable (...) or inaccurate, thus unsound one. (shrink)

The paper is a reaction to M. Grygianiec’s reply in a discussion sparked on by his paper on the status of the epiphenomenalism objection. I correct some misunderstandings. In addition I offer an intuitive summary of my reconstruction of the debate. I show that Grynianiec’s reply does not undermine the reconstruction. I argue that to the extent that (external) praise of Davidson’s ideas is possible, so is external criticism. Moreover, I argue that interpretative charity demands a charitable stance not only (...) to Davidson but also to his critics. (shrink)

This paper addresses two objections raised against anomalous monism. Firstly, on the basis of Davidson's assertion that all causal relations fall under strict laws, many critics conclude mental properties are causally inert since they are non-nomic. I argue that this conclusion follows only on the further assumption that all causally efficacious properties are nomic properties. It is perfectly consistent, however, to hold that there is a law covering each causal relation without each causal statement being the instantiation of a law. (...) Secondly, I countervail Kim's claim that the only option open to the physicalists is reductionism by showing how weak supervenience preserves both the dependence of the mental on the physical and the irreducibility of mental explanations to physical ones. (shrink)