Mental Disorders, Misc

Representing oneself as an existing entity and having intense fear of the unknown are human specificities. Self-consciousness and anxiety states are characteristics of our human minds. We propose that these two characteristics share a common evolutionary history during which they acted in synergy for the build-up of our human minds. We present that perspective by using an evolutionary scenario for self-consciousness in which anxiety management plays a key role. Such evolutionary background can introduce new relations between philosophy of mind and (...) psychology. The proposed evolutionary scenario starts at the Pan-Homo split time (about 6my ago) when our pre-human ancestors were able to manage representations while also being able to partly identify with their conspecifics. These identifications allowed our ancestors to merge the representations they had of parts of themselves with the corresponding representations they had of their conspecifics. The scenario proposes that such merger has led our ancestors to progressively build up a representation of their own entity as existing in the environment, like conspecifics were represented as existing. This evolutionary process is considered in the scenario as the source of an ancestral form of self-consciousness. The same process has also produced identifications with suffering or endangered conspecifics which have created in the minds of our ancestors some new anxieties coming in addition to the animal ones. The resulting psychological sufferings had to be limited for evolution to continue. The tools developed to that end by our ancestors (caring, collaboration, communication, ToM, ...) have also procured significant evolutionary benefits with positive feedbacks on identifications. Overall, the evolutionary scenario proposes that the combination of the anxiety management processes with the evolution toward self-consciousness has created an evolutionary engine that has accelerated the coming up of our human self-consciousness. As a result, our today human minds contain important anxieties interwoven with an evolutionary nature of self-consciousness. Such perspective brings to consider that many of our mental states may be unconsciously guided by these evolutionary sourced anxieties (which are still to be clearly understood). Corresponding anxiety management processes are then key contributors to our human feelings and motivations, and to our interpersonal relationship. For instance, the role of Pascalian type diversions can be understood as keeping consciousness away from psychological sufferings produced by too anxious mental states. Also, part of our human sexuality developed during human evolution can be considered as a multidimensional escape and refuge from anxiety. This also brings to look at our psychological well-being and to our mental health as much more related to anxiety management than assumed so far. Dis-functioning of anxiety management processes can then be source of mental disorders and illnesses. On that subject the evolutionary scenario proposes that avoidances of too anxious mental states can lead to evil behaviors. These subjects need more developments. Possible continuations are introduced. (shrink)

Philosophers have long been fascinated by the stream of consciousness––thoughts, images, and bits of inner speech that dance across the inner stage. Yet for centuries, such “mind-wandering” was deemed private and thus resistant to empirical investigation. Recent developments in psychology and neuroscience have reinvigorated scientific interest in the stream of thought, leading some researchers to dub this “the era of the wandering mind”. Despite this flurry of progress, scientists have stressed that mind-wandering research requires firmer philosophical foundations. The time is (...) therefore ripe for the philosophy of mind-wandering. Our review begins with a foundational question: what is mind-wandering? We then investigate the significance of mind-wandering for general philosophical topics, namely mental action, introspection, and the norms of thinking and attention. (shrink)

Disagreement about the nature of ‘addiction’, such as whether it is a brain disease, arises in part because the label is applied to a wide range of phenomena. This creates conceptual and definitional confusions and misunderstandings, often leading to researchers talking past one another. Ontologies have been successfully implemented in other fields to help solve these problems by creating unifying frameworks that can accommodate divergence while clarifying the basis for it. We argue that ontologies can help transform the way we (...) think and communicate about addiction as well, providing a basis for a shared understanding of the domain and a shared means for communicating and achieving that understanding. -/- We introduce the use of ontologies in science and medicine and show how they can unify differing perspectives on addiction. We also show how ontologies provide a practical tool for organizing our collective knowledge in this field, even, and especially, when that knowledge is garnered through distinct disciplinary approaches adopting disparate methodologies or perspectives (e.g., neurobiological, psychological, sociological, etc.). In the end, we believe that ontologies can help to avoid letting questions like “Is addiction a brain disease?” divide the field, hamper communication, or otherwise disrupt the ability to make meaningful progress. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s concepts shed light on the phenomenon of schizophrenia in at least three different ways: with a view to empathy, scientific explanation, or philosophical clarification. I consider two different “positive” wittgensteinian accounts―Campbell’s idea that delusions involve a mechanism of which different framework propositions are parts, Sass’ proposal that the schizophrenic patient can be described as a solipsist, and a Rhodes’ and Gipp’s account, where epistemic aspects of schizophrenia are explained as failures in the ordinary background of certainties. I argue that (...) none of them amounts to empathic-phenomenological understanding, but they provide examples of how philosophical concepts can contribute to scientific explanation, and to philosophical clarification respectively. (shrink)

Background: Treatment of psychotic disorders in pregnancy is often ethically and clinically challenging, especially when psychotic symptoms impair decision-making capacity. There are several competing ethical obligations to consider: the ethical obligation to maternal autonomy, the maternal and fetal beneficence-based obligations to treat peripartum psychosis, and the fetal beneficence-based obligation to minimize teratogenic exposure. Objective: This article outlines an ethical framework for clinical decision-making for the management of chronic psychosis in pregnancy, with an emphasis on special considerations in the previable and (...) periviable period. Case Presentation: A 31-year-old gravida 2, para 1 with intrauterine pregnancy at 12 weeks and 4 days gestation was brought to the emergency department by her husband seven months after delivering her first child, due to sudden onset of behavioral changes that included self-isolation, not eating, and not taking care of her child. Her past medical history included hypothyroidism and inflammatory bowel disease, but no prior psychiatric illness. After being admitted to the psychiatric hospital, she continued to have poor oral intake and weight loss despite initial inpatient treatment with antipsychotics, levothyroxine, and discontinuation of corticosteroids. Her pregnancy was also complicated by the diagnosis of multiple fetal anomalies at 20 weeks gestation, when the fetus was periviable. Conclusions: For previable or periviable pregnancies, the patient and/or surrogate should decide whether to pursue prenatal genetic screening and invasive diagnostic testing, as well as whether to continue or terminate the pregnancy. When the choice is made to continue the pregnancy, initiation of long-term psychiatric treatment should be based on shared decision-making between the physician and the patient and/or surrogate. Although some pharmacologic interventions may have potential adverse effects on the developing fetus, the use of psychotropic medications can be ethically justified, even if the patient herself does not have the capacity to consent and requires a surrogate, when the goal is to restore maternal autonomy and minimize the risks of maternal and fetal harm from untreated psychiatric illness. (shrink)

The question of whether mental disorders are disorders of the brain has led to a long- running and controversial dispute within psychiatry, psychology and philosophy of mind and psychology. While recent work in neuroscience frequently tries to identify underlying brain dysfunction in mental disorders, detractors argue that labelling mental disorders as brain disorders is reductive and can result in harmful social effects. This book brings a much- needed philosophical perspective to bear on this important question.

Night eating syndrome is currently classified as an Other Specified Feeding or Eating Disorder under the Diagnostic Statistical Manual−5. This systematic review aims to consolidate the studies that describe the sociodemographic, clinical and psychological features of NES in a population of patients with eating disorders, obesity, or those undergoing bariatric surgery, and were published after the publication of the DSM-5. A further aim was to compare, where possible, NES with BED on the aforementioned variables. Lastly, we aimed to appraise the (...) quality of the studies being included in the review. We conducted a systematic search on three databases which resulted in the selection of 22 studies for the review. We included the articles that studied patients with NES and their sociodemographic, clinical and psychological features in a clinical population, through a quantitative study design. Articles were excluded if the NES patients included in the study had a comorbid psychological disorder, and/or the sample was collected from a university/non-clinical population, and/or the study design was qualitative, and/or NES features were compared with any other disorder, except BED. Our study found that no conclusions about the link between any sociodemographic feature and an NES diagnosis could be made. Further, NES patients presented with elevated ED pathology and higher occurrence of depressive symptoms than controls. Contrary to the literature suggesting that NES and Binge Eating Disorder patients often report overlapping features, questioning the validity of NES as an ED diagnosis, we found that BED can be differentiated from NES by the higher occurrence of emotional eating, body related concerns and abnormal eating episodes. The review also suggested an overlap between NES and Sleep-Related Eating Disorder. We recommend that it is essential to study NES as an independent disorder to further develop its diagnostic criteria and treatment options, thereby, increasing the quality of life of the patients suffering from this syndrome. (shrink)

Fear to contamination is an easy-to-provoke, intense, hard-to-control, and extraordinarily persistent fear. A worsening of preexisting psychiatric disorders was observed during the COVID-19 outbreak, and several studies suggest that those with obsessive–compulsive disorder may be more affected than any other group of people. In the face of worsening OCD symptoms, there is a need for mental health professionals to provide the support needed not only to treat patients who still report symptoms, but also to improve relapse prevention. In this line, (...) it is recommended to improve alternative strategies such as online consultations and digital psychiatry. The aim of this study is to develop augmented reality stimuli that are clinically relevant for patients with cleaning OCD and assess their efficiency to obtain emotionally significant responses. Four AR stimuli were developed: a plastic bag full of garbage, a piece of bread with mold, a dirty sports shoe, and a piece of rotten meat. All stimuli were shown to a clinical group and a control group. Relevant results were the design of the AR stimuli. These stimuli were validated with the statistical difference in perceived anxiety in the meat stimuli between the clinical and control groups. Nevertheless, when looking at effect sizes, all stimuli present effect sizes from small to large, with both shoe and bread between small and medium effect sizes. These results are a valuable support for the clinical use of these AR stimuli in the treatment of cleaning OCD. (shrink)

In this paper I review how the notion of gender is understood in psychiatry, specifically in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5). First, I examine the contraposition between sex and gender, and argue that it is still retained by DSM-5, even though with some caveats. Second, I claim that, even if genderqueer people are not pathologized and gender pluralism is the background assumption, some diagnostic criteria still conceal a residue of gender dualism and (...) essentialism. Third, I consider gender dysphoria, which is characterized by an incongruence between one’s experienced or expressed gender and one’s assigned gender; since this condition pertains to distress and disability, not to the incongruence per se, it does not pathologize transgender people. Still, I contend that it should be removed from DSM-5 for theoretical reasons. (shrink)

Although not identical, this article suggests that complex posttraumatic stress disorder, depersonalization and schizophrenia share at least one feature: in all these cases, the body becomes a defective tool, an IT. In turn, those suffering from them can no longer be-in-the-world through the living body but rather experience their body as an object; they manage their lives on the level of body image.The next section outlines some cognitive and phenomenological concepts such as body schema, body image, body-as-subject and body-as-object. Thereafter, (...) the article explores the phenomenology of C-PTSD, depersonalization, and schizophrenia, finally suggesting that in each of these cases the body... (shrink)

In her 2006 book The Jumbled Jigsaw, Donna Williams, an autistic author and poet, presents an example of a list of traits associated with autism—one of many such lists commonly found in text books, academic publications, and information leaflets. Her list includes the following: a tendency to stick to well-tried routines and avoid change, a tendency to have a narrow range of interests, a tendency to develop irrational fears and anxieties, a tendency not to develop a sense of danger, a (...) tendency to demonstrate bizarre behaviors and mannerisms, a tendency to copy speech parrot fashion, and isolated areas of ability. "The problem with such a list," Williams explains, "is that the features of each of these areas can be... (shrink)

We are pleased with the thought-provoking discussion that our article has stimulated. All of the discussants agree that the state of education and infusion of ethical principles and practices into psychiatric decision making is currently suboptimal. The ethical questions raised by the discussants, writ large, have been analyzed, reduced to a seemingly manageable 'core,' or expanded to capture nuance and subtlety, and it is invaluable for clinicians, patients, and others to explore them together.In modern times, where the prevailing Western ethical (...) theories were developed, the aim of ethics was to do the right thing. For example, we ought to aim to maximize overall usefulness based on consequences of actions, or to... (shrink)

The principles that usually direct ethical decision making are not easily or straightforwardly applicable to the care and treatment of anorexia nervosa, particularly the care and treatment of severe and enduring anorexia nervosa, where the sufferer seems to be recalcitrant to treatment and where the condition has become life-threatening.There are exceptional circumstances that characterize this puzzling and still scarcely understood condition; I suggest that these exceptional circumstances provide moral reasons for partial derogation from the usual principles of ethical decision making.In (...) what follows I argue... (shrink)

Understanding Mental Disorders aims to help current and future psychiatrists, and those who work with them, to think critically about the ethical, conceptual, and methodological questions that are raised by the theory and practice of psychiatry. It considers questions that concern the mind’s relationship to the brain, the origins of our norms for thinking and behavior, and the place of psychiatry in medicine, and in society more generally. With a focus on the current debates around psychiatry’s diagnostic categories, the authors (...) ask where these categories come from, if psychiatry should be looking to find new categories that are based more immediately on observations of the brain, and whether psychiatrists need to employ any diagnostic categories at all. (shrink)

Although clinical understandings of self-injury, the deliberate mutilation of body tissue, have developed significantly since the phenomenon was first studied, the predominant stereotype of who self-injures is still White, teenage girls.1 White girls as well as White women are, indeed, at risk for SI, and sociocultural explanations appealing to oppressive socialization—particularly the influence of Western beauty norms—have been offered to explain their high rates of SI. Yet evidence exists to challenge this conception that SI is exclusively a White, female issue: (...) Black women, South... (shrink)

Recent literature has suggested that generics can harbor and propagate worrying ideologies in a manner which is often not appreciated by speakers. In this article, I argue that the use of generics to convey information about mental illness is unhelpful, whether the knowledge structure conveyed by the generic is 'accurate' or not. Inaccurate generics contribute to insidious forms of social stereotyping and stigma by encouraging us to simplistically generalize characteristics found in very few category members to other members of that (...) kind.Yet, even where the knowledge structure underlying the generic is accurate, generics remain an unhelpful way of talking about mental illness. This is because... (shrink)

Psychiatry uncomfortably spans biological, psychological, and social perspectives on mental illness. As a branch of medicine, psychiatry is under pressure to conform to a biomedical model, according to which diseases are characterized primarily in biological terms. But psychiatry also draws on the psychotherapeutic tradition, which explains mental distress in terms of life experience and social influences.These approaches ought to complement each other, but historically this has not happened. With no theory creating global, systematic links between the two approaches, psychiatry is (...) divided... (shrink)

The network approach to psychopathology posits that mental disorders can be conceptualized and studied as causal systems of mutually reinforcing symptoms. This approach, first posited in 2008, has grown substantially over the past decade and is now a full-fledged area of psychiatric research. In this article, we provide an overview and critical analysis of 363 articles produced in the first decade of this research program, with a focus on key theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions. In addition, we turn our attention (...) to the next decade of the network approach and propose critical avenues for future research in each of these domains. We argue that this program of research will be best served by working toward two overarching aims: (a) the identification of robust empirical phenomena and (b) the development of formal theories that can explain those phenomena. We recommend specific steps forward within this broad framework and argue that these steps are necessary if the network approach is to develop into a progressive program of research capable of producing a cumulative body of knowledge about how specific mental disorders operate as causal systems. (shrink)

People with Scrupulosity have rigorous, obsessive moral beliefs that lead to extreme and compulsive moral acts. These fascinating outliers raise profound questions about human nature, mental illness, moral belief, responsibility, and psychiatric treatment. Clean Hands? Uses a range of case studies to examine this condition and its philosophical implications.

The article discusses the actual problem of social support for people with mental health problems, which has an important place in the study field of social psychology and social work.The article also deals with the definition of the concept of “mental health”, the problem of introducing the term “mental health problems” as a way to avoid stigmatization, and the spread of a humanistic attitude to persons with a psychiatric diagnosis. It also discussed modern theoretical approaches that offer an understanding of (...) the contribution of biological, social, and psychological factors into the cause of mental health problems. -/- The problem of mental illness is common to all countries of the world, as WHO data evidenced the number of people with mental disorders among the world’s population, ranging from 4–5 %. According to researchers P. Voloshin and N. Maruta, the spread of mental and behavioral disorders in Ukraine is characterized by a slow increase of about 2.9 % in every 10 years. Researchers argue that in subsequent years, according to the prognostic data, there will be an increase in these indicators. The issue of providing social support to people with PDS in Ukrainian society is very relevant, which is complicated by their social isolation in the process of recovery after the treatment. The results of scientific research in the context of different cultures and relatively diverse life events (hospitalization, mental illness, unemployment, old age) generally confirm the positive results of using social support to promote mental and physical health. Instead, there are no studies in Ukrainian science related to the phenomenon of social support of people with mental health problems. -/- It is important to define the concepts of “mental health” and “mental health problems” in the process of studying the features of social support for people with mental health problems. The term “mental health” combines the medical and psychological fields of science and practice, but modern psychology offers a comprehensive approach to assessing the psychological health of a person, the psychological norm, its limits, taking into account the criteria of mental health. The description of the mental health given by the Psychological Dictionary points out the components of awareness and the sense of continuity, continuity and identity of their physical and mental “I”; sense of continuity and identity of experiences in similar situations; critical to yourself and your mental activity and its results; the adequacy of psychic reactions of force and frequency of environmental influences; the ability to manage their behavior in accordance with social norms; planning personal activities and implementing them; changing the way of behavior depending on the changing circumstances of life. -/- The concept of “mental health problem” was taken as a term that denotes all the symptoms classified in ICD-10 and DSM-IV, which are recommended by experts to clients for appropriate treatment and care. Scientists and mental health practitioners point out that mental health problems can affect the way an individual thinks, feels, and behaves; affects self-service, fulfills professional duties, social, family roles, and household behavior, which is usually deeply affected by the quality of life of the individual. Numerous results of the research show that there are specific psychological and personality factors apart from the biological causes of mental disorders (genetic factors that contribute to the imbalance of chemicals in the brain) that make people vulnerable to occurrences of the mental health problems. -/- Several modern theoretical approaches offer an understanding of the contribution of biological, social, and psychological factors to the induction of mental health problems: the traditional medical model, the rehabilitation model, the interface model, the social model, and the biopsychosocial approach. Only biopsychosocial and social models are consistent with the definition of WHO disability and emphasize the impact social aspects of mental health and the quality of life of people with mental health problems. -/- Individuals with PPP, as a social community, have specific needs that differentiate them from other members of society, one of which is the need for constant socio-psychological support. So, the contribution of psychology and social work to the quality of life of people with mental disorder lies in the application of professional approaches and methods based on the biopsychosocial (social) model, which emphasize the need for socio-psychological support. An example of such a technique is the model of modern social work practice “people-in-environment”, which serves as a guiding principle of social work and emphasizes the importance of understanding the persons with disorder and their behavior in the light of the multiple context of the social environment in which these persons live and act. Specialists of social work and psychology make interventions at three levels: individual, at the family level, and at the community level, by means of intensifying the support of the environment within the cognitive-behavioral and other approaches, which contribute to the process of reintegrating people with mental health problems into community. (shrink)

Background and Objective: Understanding how trauma impacts the self-structure of individuals suffering from the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms is a complex matter and despite several attempts to explain the relationship between trauma and the “Self”, this issue still lacks clarity. Therefore, adopting a new theoretical perspective may help understand PTSD deeper and to shed light on the underlying psychophysiological mechanisms. Methods: In this study, we employed the “three-dimensional construct model of the experiential selfhood” where three major components of selfhood (...) (phenomenal first-person agency, embodiment, and reflection/narration) are related to three Operational Modules (OMs) of the self-referential brain network. These modules can be reliably estimated through operational synchrony analysis of the Electroencephalogram (EEG). Six individuals with PTSD symptoms and twenty-nine sex-, age- and demographic- (race, education, marital status) matched healthy controls underwent resting state EEG signal acquisition with the following estimation of the synchrony strength within every OM. Results: Our results indicate that subjects with PTSD symptoms had significantly stronger EEG operational synchrony within anterior and right posterior OMs as well as significantly weaker EEG operational synchrony within left posterior OM compared to healthy controls. Moreover, increased the functional integrity of the anterior OM was positively associated with hyperactivity symptoms, reduced synchrony of the left posterior OM was associated with greater avoidance, and increased right posterior OM integrity was positively correlated with intrusion and mood symptoms. Conclusion: The results are interpreted in light of the triad model of selfhood and its theoretical and clinical implications (including a new treatment approach) are discussed. (shrink)

One of the most remarkable implications of psychological medicine in the transition from the 18th to the 19th century was the advent of a new way of looking at the human being and new tools for analysing not only behaviour and individual experience, but also historical events, collective behavioural patterns or complex cultural achievements. Unsurprisingly, the deployment of this gaze could not advance without there being a series of disputes and controversies about its reach and the limits to its indiscriminate (...) application. Focusing on the figure of French alienist Alexandre Brierre de Boismont and on the controversial cases of hallucinations and suicide, this article addresses the conflicts generated by the use of certain emblematic concepts and categories present in French psychological medicine throughout the central decades of the 19th-century, as well as the essentially ambivalent relationship of the psychopathological point of view with the criticism of a culture that was made responsible, then, as now, for a great number of psychological disorders and illnesses. (shrink)

Thanks to Barton Palmer and John McMillan for these thoughtful commentaries. We found much to agree with and it is striking how so many of the issues relating to decision-making capacity assessment find resonances outside of an English jurisdiction. California and New Zealand are clearly grappling with a very similar set of issues and the commentaries speak to the international nature of these discussions.We will pick up on some main points the commentaries raise.As Palmer notes, DMC law is vulnerable to (...) the criticism that it does not attend to the authenticity of a decision. In ordinary language, this is the idea that someone is deciding while “not their self” or that it is the “illness speaking.” There is a... (shrink)

There is an apparent epidemic of mental illness. At the end of 2011, untreated mental disorders accounted for 13% of the total global burden of disease, and for 25.3% and 33.5% of all years lived with a disability in low-and middle-income countries, respectively. Depression affects 350 million people globally and is the leading cause of disability. One in five U.S. adults takes psychiatric medication. One study found that by age 32, 50% of people surveyed qualified for an anxiety disorder, more (...) than 40% for a mood disorder, and more than 30% for substance dependence. Another study reported that... (shrink)

Emotions might contribute to our being rational cognitive agents. Anxiety – and more specifically epistemic anxiety – provides an especially interesting case study into the role of emotion for adaptive cognition. In this paper, I aim at clarifying the epistemic contribution of anxiety, and the role that ill-calibrated anxiety might play in maladaptive epistemic activities which can be observed in psychopathology. In particular, I argue that this emotion contributes to our ability to adapt our cognitive efforts to how we represent (...) the practical factors relevant to the task at hand, by sig- naling the need for increased cognitive processing and evidence gathering in high- stakes situations. I hypothesize that dysfunctional or ill-calibrated epistemic anxiety might play an important role in the motivation driving persons with obsessive- compulsive disorder (OCD) to invest high amounts of cognitive resources into the resolution of apparently simple and innocuous questions. As I argue, OCD might be conceived as a case in which epistemic anxiety is inappropriately elicited, represent- ing these as high-stakes questions, and inadequately signaling a need for cognition. In this paper, I thus make use of the concept of (epistemic) anxiety as developed in the philosophy of emotion and in epistemology, to propose an account of the role of anxiety in the pathological doubt that is central to obsessive-compulsive disorder. (shrink)

Although generally supportive of our overall position, both Zachar and Gala and Laughon raise questions about our research design. Herein, we respond to these questions by presenting counterarguments that support the soundness of this design.Subsequent to stating some broad agreement with our central thesis that mental disorder is best viewed as a disability concept and not a behavioral one, Dr. Zachar expresses a number of reservations about our work. We focus on the following discussion on what seem to be the (...) most significant of these.Dr. Zachar states the following : “In 8 of their 12 conditions, the dependent variable is evaluation of problematic behavior and the independent variable is disability... (shrink)

Tamara Browne proposes a provocative idea: She argues that philosophers, sociologists, and bioethicists should act as an independent editorial panel for future editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Her paper depends on some well-versed claims in philosophy of psychiatry: She argues that psychiatric classifications are inherently value laden and philosophers, sociologists, and ethicists are best placed to discern the values are that embedded within scientific descriptions of mental disorders, and to speculate on the effects of any (...) such classifications on individuals and the populace at large as a result of these classifications.I agree with Browne that the DSM (and... (shrink)

It sometimes seems to us that our judgments about what we ought to believe diverge from what we in fact believe. I may be perfectly aware that I am not particularly risking my life by flying, for instance, and yet, as I tighten my seatbelt in preparation for takeoff, I may nevertheless embrace the seemingly paradoxical thought that I am likely to die in a matter of mere seconds. In moments like this, it can feel to us like we are (...) experiencing a failure of rationality, as we seem to embrace a belief that we ourselves judge to be unreasonable. That is why philosophers have characterized these kinds of cases as akratic believing. Certainly, they leave us with that same funny feeling, that familiar dread that... (shrink)

Over the last years, self-management has become a central value in the practice of mental health care. Patients are positioned as expertclients who are actively involved in the management of their disease. Some of the ideas that are implied in the concept of self-management may raise important and intriguing questions. For instance, in the context of psychiatry impaired agency and altered self-experience are often part of the psychopathological process itself. The capacity to manage oneself may be impeded by the very (...) problem that needs to be managed. Therefore, how should self-management be conceived in... (shrink)

This paper aims to discuss selected issues related to the effect exerted by the financial aspects of psychotherapy on a psychotherapeutic relationship. At the beginning, I consider the effect that remuneration received by the therapist directly from the customer can have on their therapeutic relationship. Then I discuss the issues related to the compensation for psychotherapy services and show the consequences which the criteria of compensating for specific therapeutic methods have for the quality of psychotherapeutic relationships, as well as the (...) influence which the requirement to study the effectiveness of psychotherapy in the natural science paradigm has on psychotherapeutic services. The arguments I put forward lead to the conclusion that the criteria of the compensation for psychotherapeutic services can change the psychotherapeutic relationship into a business relationship and, as a result, the therapist can start to treat the customer instrumentally. (shrink)

In psychiatry there is no sharp boundary between the normal and the pathological. Although clear cases abound, it is often indeterminate whether a particular condition does or does not qualify as a mental disorder. For example, definitions of ‘subthreshold disorders’ and of the ‘prodromal stages’ of diseases are notoriously contentious. -/- Philosophers and linguists call concepts that lack sharp boundaries, and thus admit of borderline cases, ‘vague’. Although blurred boundaries between the normal and the pathological are a recurrent theme in (...) many publications concerned with the classification of mental disorders, systematic approaches that take into account philosophical reflections on vagueness are rare. This book provides interdisciplinary discussions about vagueness in psychiatry by bringing together scholars from psychiatry, psychology, philosophy, history, and law. It draws together various lines of inquiry into the nature of gradations between mental health and disease and discusses the individual and societal consequences of dealing with blurred boundaries in medical practice, forensic psychiatry, and beyond. -/- Part I starts with an overview chapter that helps readers to navigate through the philosophy of vagueness and through the various debates surrounding demarcation problems in the classification and diagnosis of mental illness. Part II encompasses historical and recent philosophical positions on gradualist approaches to health and disease. Part III approaches the vagueness of present psychiatric classification systems, and the debates concerning their revisions by scrutinizing controversial categories, such as posttraumatic stress disorder, and the difficulties of day-to-day diagnostic and therapeutic practice. Part IV finally focuses on social, moral, and legal implications that arise when being mentally ill is a matter of degree. (shrink)

Cognitive Behavioral Therapy has become the dominant form of psychotherapy in North America. The CBT model is theoretically based on the idea that all external and internal stimuli are filtered through meaning-making, consciously accessible cognitive schemas. The goal of CBT is to identify dysfunctional or maladaptive thoughts and beliefs, and replace them with more adaptive cognitive interpretations. While CBT is clearly effective as a treatment, there is good reason to be skeptical that its efficacy is due to the causal mechanisms (...) posited by the CBT model. This paper will argue that the specific cognitive schemas posited by the CBT model likely do not play a direct role in the development or treatment of psychological illness. Cognitive schemas, as identified in CBT interventions, are likely to be the result of patient confabulation and epistemically under-supported practitioner-based identification. CBT interventions appear to impose coherence on patients’ psychological states, rather than identifying and modifying preexistent causally efficacious core beliefs. (shrink)

Ginger Hoffman and Jennifer Hansen’s study of gender dynamics in psychiatric disability memoirs makes several fruitful moves for the study of psychic diversity. Perhaps the most important is that the article encourages analytic philosophers to contribute to understanding how individual mental life is affected by the larger cultural context—which we can think of as the “mind/culture” problem. This is an important move because, for the most part, analytic philosophers have paid more attention to the mind/body problem than they have to (...) the mind/culture problem. Hoffman and Hansen are right that it would be valuable for analytic philosophy to join in the study of this equally complicated conceptual problem.... (shrink)

I thoroughly enjoyed Dr. Freedman’s paper on “Akratic Believing.” Often, philosophy of psychiatry offers insights to clarify psychological and psychiatric concepts. Less frequently, it involves a real dialogue between philosophy and psychological science. Dr. Freedman’s account of what is bothersome, rather than just philosophically wrong-headed, about the concept of epistemic akrasia demonstrates that, at least where anxiety is concerned, the a posteriori world may have a great deal to offer theoretical philosophy. Freedman argues that understanding somatic responses to trauma, or (...) more broadly construed, to anxiety, dissolves the problem of why there seems to be more to the problem of epistemic... (shrink)

Do our diagnostic terms refer? If they do not, what implications does this have for our understanding of the practice of validation in psychiatry? These are the questions raised and addressed in the main part of John Campbell’s contribution to this volume, and the ones we will focus on in our reply. While we are sympathetic to Campbell’s contentions that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) style of validation needs reassessment, and that causality should play a more (...) prominent role in nosological revisions, we think his picture of reference and validation is misconceived. In this short comment, we first address Campbell’s question about the reference of our diagnostic terms, before briefly sketching an alternative view of validation. (shrink)

We undergo a traumatic experience, such as a life-threatening accident or a brutal attack. We survive a period of relentless stress, perhaps because we are in a war zone and witness or commit atrocities. Raised by parents who are alcoholic or mentally ill, we endure traumatic experiences on a daily basis. Or, we are ignored, neglected, or treated as playthings by narcissistic parents, who themselves were ignored and neglected, and on and on through generations. To survive these experiences, perhaps we (...) dissociate. This can take various forms. In the extreme form, we remove ourselves, psychically speaking, from the situation, perhaps by adopting the role... (shrink)

In cases where one sense-modality is stimulated by another, we speak of synesthesia, i.e., of a subjective experience of multiple distinct sensations as being quite literally conjoined. The term “synesthesia” is derived indirectly from the Greek words “syn,” meaning “together,” and “aisthesis,” meaning “sensation.” This article focuses on the question of whether synesthesia is in fact a mental disorder or a creative gift. Both the commonsense views that have emerged in recent times, and neurological research, demonstrate that our knowledge of (...) this relatively uncommon phenomenon is slowly but constantly expanding. Proper experimental research conducted with the right sorts of synesthete, and philosophically and scientifically nuanced conceptual studies of synesthesia, can all be helpful when seeking answers to the question posed above, while also confirming general claims about the extent to which our perceptions are really subjective. Most synesthetes see themselves as gifted, and claim that this “conjoining of the senses” enriches the quality of their lives. (shrink)

To consider power as not only the direct physical oppression of others, but as a production of authority through discursive knowledge and a claimed ‘expertise’ of the world, has been one of Foucault’s great legacies to critical work on mental health and illness. As arbiters of the ‘truth’ on what is and what is not mental pathology, I agree with Swerdfager that the privileged knowledge of the mental health professions and the consequential marginalization of other forms of knowledge on distress (...) can be better theorized through an investigation of the power/knowledge nexus. Practically, scholars and researchers can begin to address these... (shrink)

In their 2013 study of traumatic flashback formation, Bourne, Mackay and Holmes raise the question of whether the propensity of a traumatic experience to produce flashbacks is determined by the emotions that are felt at the time of that experience. They suggest that it is not, but the grounds on which they make this suggestion are flawed. Further research is required. That research will need to overcome a significant methodological difficulty — one which is hard to avoid when fMRI data (...) and introspective reports are combined in a single causal inference. (shrink)

This chapter has two aims. The first aim is to compare and contrast three different conceptual-explanatory models for thinking about mental illness with an eye towards identifying the assumptions upon which each model is based, and exploring the model’s advantages and limitations in clinical contexts. Major Depressive Disorder is used as an example to illustrate these points. The second aim is to address the question of what conceptual-theoretical framework for thinking about mental illness is most likely to facilitate the discovery (...) of causes and treatments of mental illness in research contexts. To this end, the National Institute of Mental Health’s Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Project is briefly considered. (shrink)

Suicidal ideation would often appear to relate to ideas about life’s meaninglessness. In this chapter, I consider the suicidal thoughts of an elderly person in light of the recent philosophical discussion on the meaning of life. I start by distinguishing between two importantly different questions about life’s meaning and explaining how they differ from certain other issues sometimes treated as questions about the meaning of life. Then I address the two questions about life’s meaning in turn, connecting them to the (...) example case. After that, I briefly consider how the elderly person’s committing suicide would appear from the viewpoint of the philosophical debate on life’s meaning. I conclude by summing up how the philosophical discussion on the meaning of life I have referred to might help a person like the one in the example case. (shrink)

This article examines the development of koro’s epistemic status as a paradigm for understanding culture-specific disorders in modern psychiatry. Koro entered the DSM-IV as a culture-bound syndrome in 1994, and it refers to a person’s overpowering belief that his genitalia is retracting and even disappearing. I focus in particular on mental health professionals’ competing views of koro in the 1960s—as an object of psychoanalysis, a Chinese disease, and a condition predisposed by culture. At that critical juncture, transcultural psychiatrists based outside (...) of continental China—namely, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore—appropriated ideas from traditional Chinese culture to consolidate the clinical diagnosis of koro as culture-bound. This new global meaning of koro was made possible by a cohort of medical experts who encountered the phenomenon and its sufferers in Sinophone communities, but placed their contributions within the broader contours of the global reach of Anglophone psychiatric science. (shrink)