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  1. Reply to Commentators.Review author[S.]: William P. Alston - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):891-899.
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  2. The Nature of Epistemic Feelings.Santiago Arango-Muñoz - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (2):1-19.
    Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called ?epistemic feelings.? This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) describe the nature of these mental states as nonconceptual in the cases of animals and infants, and as conceptual mental states in the case of adult human beings. Finally, (3) the paper will contrast three accounts of the causes and (...)
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  3. Acategorial States in a Representational Theory of Mental Processes.Harald Atmanspacher - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (5-6):5 - 6.
    We propose a distinction between precategorial, acategorial and categorial states within a scientifically oriented understanding of mental processes. This distinction can be specified by approaches developed in cognitive neuroscience and the analytical philosophy of mind. On the basis of a representational theory of mental processes, acategoriality refers to a form of knowledge that presumes fully developed categorial mental representations, yet refers to nonconceptual experiences in mental states beyond categorial states. It relies on a simultaneous experience of potential individual representations and (...)
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  4. Characteristics of Spontaneous Musical Imagery.Imants Baruss & M. Wammes - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):37-61.
    This study follows upon Steven Brown's 2006 article in The Journal of Consciousness Studies about the ‘perpetual music track', a form of constant musical imagery. With Brown's assistance, a Musical Imagery Questionnaire was developed. The questionnaire was then administered to 67 participants with the intention of establishing relevant scales for quantifying the presence and extent of spontaneous musical imagery in individuals. In addition to the Musical Imagery Questionnaire, the Six Factor Personality Questionnaire, as well as the Transliminality Scale, which is (...)
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  5. Complex Visual Imagery and Cognition During Near-Death Experiences.Alexander Batthyany - 2015 - Journal of Near Death Studies 34 (2).
    Near-death experiences (NDEs) entail complex and structured conscious experience during conditions known to coincide with rapid loss of consciousness often associated with decline or disruption of the neurological correlates currently held to be causative factors of visual imagery and cognition. In this study, 653 NDE reports of cardiac and/or respiratory arrest patients were analyzed for unprompted, spontaneous references to quality of conscious visual imagery and mentation during an NDE. Results indicate that in a majority of NDEs, both figurative and abstract (...)
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  6. Mental States, Conscious and Nonconscious.Jacob Berger - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (6):392-401.
    I discuss here the nature of nonconscious mental states and the ways in which they may differ from their conscious counterparts. I first survey reasons to think that mental states can and often do occur without being conscious. Then, insofar as the nature of nonconscious mentality depends on how we understand the nature of consciousness, I review some of the major theories of consciousness and explore what restrictions they may place on the kinds of states that can occur nonconsciously. I (...)
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  7. Intentionality, Minds and Behavior.Robert Binkley - 1969 - Noûs 3 (1):49-60.
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  8. The Attitude of Mind Called Interest.Lucinda Pearl Boggs - 1904 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (16):428-434.
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  9. Acceptance Does Not Entail Belief.Andrei Buckareff - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2):255-261.
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  10. Phenomenal Consciousness Disembodied.Wesley Buckwalter & Mark Phelan - 2014 - In Justin Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 45-74.
    We evaluate the role of embodiment in ordinary mental state ascriptions. Presented are five experiments on phenomenal state ascriptions to disembodied entities such as ghosts and spirits. Results suggest that biological embodiment is not a central principle of folk psychology guiding ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness. By contrast, results continue to support the important role of functional considerations in theory of mind judgments.
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  11. Material Anamnesis and the Prompting of Aesthetic Worlds.Nicolas J. Bullot - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):85-109.
    Many scholars view artworks as the products of cultural history and arbitrary institutional conventions. Others construe art as the result of psychological mechanisms internal to the organism. These historical and psychological approaches are often viewed as foes rather than friends. Is it possible to combine these two approaches in a unified analysis of the perception and consciousness of artworks? I defend a positive answer to this question and propose a psycho-historical theory, which argues that artworks are historical and material artefacts (...)
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  12. Perception and Computation.Jonathan Cohen - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):96-124.
    Students of perception have long puzzled over a range of cases in which perception seems to tell us distinct, and in some sense conflicting, things about the world. In the cases at issue, the perceptual system is capable of responding to a single stimulus — say, as manifested in the ways in which subjects sort that stimulus — in different ways. This paper is about these puzzling cases, and about how they should be characterized and accounted for within a general (...)
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  13. Averroes and Aquinas on the Agent Intellect's Causation of Intelligibles.Therese Scarpelli Cory - 2015 - Recherches de Theologie Et Philosophie Medievales 82:1-60.
    This article examines two medieval thinkers—Averroes and Aquinas—on the kind of causation exercised by the agent intellect in “abstracting” or producing intelligibles from images in the imagination. It argues that abstraction in these thinkers should be interpreted in causal terms, as an act whereby images in the imagination, through the power of the agent intellect, educe their intelligible likeness in a receptive intellect. This Averroan-Thomistic causal approach to abstraction offers an intriguing alternative to the usual approach to abstraction as an (...)
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  14. On Mental Privacy: The Having of Mental States.Simon David Dembitzer - unknown
    In three chapters this thesis seeks to demonstrate that (i) there historically has been no consensus in the use of the term 'mental privacy' and that several problematic doctrines are based on confused accounts of this term; (ii) there are contemporary debates which are maintained, in large order, by the opposing sides subscribing to different notions of mental privacy; and (iii) a preliminary investigation makes clear that both mental states with propositional content and mental states with non-propositional content are private (...)
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  15. Where Rationality Is.Tamás Demeter - 2009 - In Barbara Merker (ed.), Verstehen: Nach Heidegger und Brandom. Meiner.
    The paper contrasts Robert Brandom’s account of rationality with that of Daniel Dennett. It argues that neither of them is tenable, and sketches an alternative outlook that avoids the problems. In spite of their fundamental differences, both Brandom and Dennett employ a robust, i.e. explanatory and predictive notion of rationality, and for different reasons they both fail to offer a plausible theory supporting it. The lesson offered here is that rationality should not be treated alongside other norms prescribing behaviour, as (...)
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  16. On an Argument From Analogy for the Possibility of Human Cognitive Closure.Erhan Demircioglu - 2016 - Minds and Machines 26 (3):227-241.
    In this paper, I aim to show that McGinn’s argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure survives the critique raised on separate occasions by Dennett and Kriegel. I will distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive closure and argue that the analogy argument from animal non-linguistic cognitive closure goes untouched by the objection Dennett and Kriegel raises.
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  17. Science and Consciousness: Models and Challenges.Assen Dimitrov - 2016 - Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria:
    The first part of the book offers a hypothetical answer to the following questions: What is intelligent behaviour? What is information? How does the intelligent subject extract energy and information from the external environment? What are the mental states? How do the mental states occur? Despite the immense diversity of disciplines, topics and issues relating to the structure and the dynamics of the nervous system, of human consciousness, of intelligence in a synchronous and evolutionary perspective, two main philosophical and theoretical (...)
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  18. Le fondement de l'espérance chez Ernst Bloch.Jörg Disse - 1987 - Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Theologie 34 (1-2):185-203.
  19. Fragmentation and Information Access.Adam Elga & Agustin Rayo - manuscript
    In order to predict and explain behavior, one cannot specify the mental state of an agent merely by saying what information she possesses. Instead one must specify what information is available to an agent relative to various purposes. Specifying mental states in this way allows us to accommodate cases of imperfect recall, cognitive accomplishments involved in logical deduction, the mental states of confused or fragmented subjects, and the difference between propositional knowledge and know-how .
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  20. Not Every Feeling is Intentional.Katalin Farkas - 2009 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):39 - 52.
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  21. Skill Learning and Conceptual Thought: Making Our Way Through the Wilderness.Ellen Fridland - 2014 - In Bana Bashour Hans Muller (ed.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its Implications. Routledge.
  22. Do Expectations Have Time Span?Miguel Garcia-Valdecasas - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (4):665-681.
    If it is possible to think that human life is temporal as a whole, and we can make sense of Wittgenstein’s claim that the psychological phenomena called ‘dispositions’ do not have genuine temporal duration on the basis of a distinction between dispositions and other mental processes, we need a compelling account of how time applies to these dispositions. I undertake this here by examining the concept of expectation, a disposition with a clear nexus to time by the temporal point at (...)
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  23. Amodal Completion and Knowledge.Grace Helton & Bence Nanay - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of perceived objects. We argue for the following three claims: First, at least some amodal completion-involved experiences can ground knowledge about the occluded portions of perceived objects. Second, at least some instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge are not sensitive, i.e., it is not the case that in the nearest worlds in which the relevant claim is false, that claim is not believed true. Third, at least some instances of amodal completion grounded knowledge (...)
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  24. Endorsing Non-Occurrent Beliefs: Why Standard Belief Functioning is Problematic for the Extended Mind.Eric Hochstein - 2009 - In Benoit Hardy-Vallée & Nicolas Payetter (eds.), Beyond the Brain: Embodied, Situated and Distributed Cognition. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 205-214.
  25. Emerging Issues in the Cross-Cultural Study of Empathy.Douglas Hollan - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (1):70-78.
    Especially since the discovery of mirror neurons, scholars in a variety of disciplines have made empathy a central focus of research. Yet despite this recent flurry of interest and activity, the cross-cultural study of empathy in context, as part of ongoing, naturally occurring behavior, remains in its infancy. In the present article, I review some of this recent work on the ethnography of empathy. I focus especially on the new issues and questions about empathy that the ethnographic approach raises and (...)
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  26. Cognitive Pluralism.Steven Horst - forthcoming - MIT Press.
    This book introduces an account of cognitive architecture, Cognitive Pluralism, on which the basic units of understanding are models of particular content domains. Having many mental models is a good adaptive strategy for cognition, but models can be incompatible with one another, leading to paradoxes and inconsistencies of belief, and it may not be possible to integrate the understanding supplied by multiple models into a comprehensive and self-consistent "super model". The book applies the theory to explaining intuitive reasoning and cognitive (...)
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  27. Faith.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2014 - In Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    A brief article on faith as a psychological attitude.
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  28. Nature and Nurture in Cognition.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2):251-272.
    This paper advocates a dispositional account of innate cognitive capacities, which has an illustrious history from Plato to Chomsky. The ?triggering model? of innateness, first made explicit by Stich ([1975]), explicates the notion in terms of the relative informational content of the stimulus (input) and the competence (output). The advantage of this model of innateness is that it does not make a problematic reference to normal conditions and avoids relativizing innate traits to specific populations, as biological models of innateness are (...)
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  29. Die seelische gegenwart.Maria Krudewig - 1962 - Kant-Studien 53 (1-4):309-313.
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  30. Inner Speech: New Voices -- Introduction.Peter Langland-Hassan & Agustin Vicente - 2018 - In Peter Langland-Hassan & Agustin Vicente (eds.), Inner Speech: New Voices. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This is the introductory chapter to the anthology: Inner Speech: New Voices, to be published in fall 2018 by OUP. It gives an overview of current debates in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience concerning inner speech, and situates the chapters of the volume with respect to those debates.
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  31. Inner Speech: New Voices.Peter Langland-Hassan & Agustin Vicente (eds.) - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    Much of what we say is never said aloud. It occurs only silently, as inner speech. We chastise, congratulate, joke and cajole, all without making a sound. This distinctively human ability to create public language in the privacy of our own minds is no less remarkable for its familiarity. And yet, until recently, inner speech remained at the periphery of philosophical and psychological theorizing. This essay collection, from an interdisciplinary group of leading philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, displays the rapidly growing (...)
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  32. Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective.Christian List & Franz Dietrich - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (2):249-281.
    Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in ‘revealed preference’ theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. (...)
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  33. Referential Dependencies Between Conflicting Attitudes.Emar Maier - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (2):141-167.
    A number of puzzles about propositional attitudes in semantics and philosophy revolve around apparent referential dependencies between different attitudes within a single agent’s mental state. In a series of papers, Hans Kamp offers a general framework for describing such interconnected attitude complexes, building on DRT and dynamic semantics. I demonstrate that Kamp’s proposal cannot deal with referential dependencies between semantically conflicting attitudes, such as those in Ninan’s puzzle about de re imagination. To solve the problem I propose to replace Kamp’s (...)
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  34. Mindreading Knowledge.Aidan McGlynn - 2017 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 72-94.
  35. Verstehen: Nach Heidegger Und Brandom.Barbara Merker (ed.) - 2009 - Meiner.
  36. The Nature of Doubt and a New Puzzle About Belief, Doubt, and Confidence.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1827-1848.
    In this paper, I present and defend a novel account of doubt. In Part 1, I make some preliminary observations about the nature of doubt. In Part 2, I introduce a new puzzle about the relationship between three psychological states: doubt, belief, and confidence. I present this puzzle because my account of doubt emerges as a possible solution to it. Lastly, in Part 3, I elaborate on and defend my account of doubt. Roughly, one has doubt if and only if (...)
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  37. Beliefs Do Not Come in Degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.
    Philosophers commonly say that beliefs come in degrees. Drawing from the literature, I make precise three arguments for this claim: an argument from degrees of confidence, an argument from degrees of firmness, and an argument from natural language. I show that they all fail. I also advance three arguments that beliefs do not come in degrees: an argument from natural language, an argument from intuition, and an argument from the metaphysics of degrees. On the basis of these arguments, I conclude (...)
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  38. Knowledge and Reliability.Jennifer Nagel - 2016 - In Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Alvin Goldman and his Critics. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 237-256.
    Internalists have criticised reliabilism for overlooking the importance of the subject's point of view in the generation of knowledge. This paper argues that there is a troubling ambiguity in the intuitive examples that internalists have used to make their case, and on either way of resolving this ambiguity, reliabilism is untouched. However, the argument used to defend reliabilism against the internalist cases could also be used to defend a more radical form of externalism in epistemology.
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  39. The Meanings of Metacognition.Jennifer Nagel - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):710-718.
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  40. Knowledge as a Mental State.Jennifer Nagel - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:275-310.
    In the philosophical literature on mental states, the paradigmatic examples of mental states are beliefs, desires, intentions, and phenomenal states such as being in pain. The corresponding list in the psychological literature on mental state attribution includes one further member: the state of knowledge. This article examines the reasons why developmental, comparative and social psychologists have classified knowledge as a mental state, while most recent philosophers--with the notable exception of Timothy Williamson-- have not. The disagreement is traced back to a (...)
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  41. Gendler on Alief. [REVIEW]Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):774-788.
    Contribution to a book symposium on Tamar Gendler's Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology.
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  42. Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs.Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan & Raymond A. Mar - 2013 - Cognition 129 (3):652-661.
    Intuitively, there is a difference between knowledge and mere belief. Contemporary philosophical work on the nature of this difference has focused on scenarios known as “Gettier cases.” Designed as counterexamples to the classical theory that knowledge is justified true belief, these cases feature agents who arrive at true beliefs in ways which seem reasonable or justified, while nevertheless seeming to lack knowledge. Prior empirical investigation of these cases has raised questions about whether lay people generally share philosophers’ intuitions about these (...)
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  43. Groundwork for an Emergentist Account of the Mental.Timothy O'Connor - 2003 - Progress in Complexity, Information, and Design 2:1-14.
    As striking as conscious experience, thought, and deliberate action are, their irreducibility to physical processes within their subjects is hotly debated. I shall ignore these debates entirely, as my purpose in this essay is constructive. Assuming that these mental qualities and processes are indeed irreducible to impersonal, non-purposive physical phenomena, I want to propose the very general form a non-reductive explanatory account of their underpinnings and dynamics should take. A suggestive label for my proposal is ontological emergence.
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  44. Contenido conceptual - contenido no conceptual: una distinción de tipo.Dany Mauricio González Parra - 2014 - Escritos 22 (49):369-397.
    La distinción entre contenidos conceptuales y no-conceptuales tiene claras repercusiones en el modo en que el hombre configura su mundo, así como en la posibilidad de atribuir pensamiento, en sentido estricto, a sistemas y organismos no humanos. Con el fin de clarificar dicha distinción, en el presente trabajo se plantea una noción básica de estado mental y, especialmente, una definición clara de lo que es un concepto y las características esenciales de los estados en que estos aparecen. Lo que se (...)
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  45. Przyczynowość stanów mentalnych w modelach naukowych. Próba alternatywnego uzasadnienia antynaturalizmu eksplanacyjnego Urszuli Żegleń.Kawalec Pawel - 2010 - In Muszyński Zbysław (ed.), Umysł. Natura i sposób istnienia. Wydawnictwo UMCS. pp. 45-57.
    An antinaturalist defense of causality of mental states. The argument is based on the properties of causal models in cognitive research. Bibliografia prac przywołanych w tekście -/- Damasio A., 1994/1999, Błąd Kartezjusza. Emocje, rozum i ludzki mózg, tłum. M. Karpiński, Poznań: Rebis. Davidson D., 1963/2001, „Actions, reasons, and causes”, w: (Davidson 2001), s. 3-19. Davidson D., 1967/2001, „Causal relations”, w: (Davidson 2001), s. 149-62. Davidson D., 1970/2001, „Mental events”, w: (Davidson 2001), s. 207-25. Davidson D., 1976/2001, „Hempel on explaining action”, (...)
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  46. Self-Deception and the Dolphin Model of Cognition.Iuliia Pliushch & Thomas Metzinger - 2015 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  47. Mental Concepts: Theoretical, Observational or Dispositional Approach?Marek Pokropski - 2017 - Hybris. Revista de Filosofía 38:58-73.
    In the article I discuss the conceptual problem of other minds and different approaches to mental concepts. Firstly, I introduce the conceptual problem and argue that solutions proposed by theory-theory and direct perception approach are inadequate. I claim that mental concepts are neither theoretical terms nor observational terms. Then, I consider third option which states that mental concepts are dispositional terms, i.e. they concern particular patterns (stereotypes) of behavior. Finally, I argue that dispositional approach is to some extent coherent with (...)
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  48. What Autism May Tell Us About Self-Awareness: A Commentary on Frith and Happé.Diana Raffman - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (1):23–31.
  49. The Upanishadic Art of Living.Varanasi Ramabrahmam - manuscript
    A human being though basically a physico-chemical and hence physiological being; is essentially a psychological being. Psychology is physiology, but “appears” separate to most humans and will be dealt with as here. But attempts will be made to intermittently connect with modern scientific understanding in terms of nervous system – the brain, spinal cord, nerves and neurons- to get a comprehensive picture of mind and its functions for academic purpose. -/- Psychology is human consciousness and mind and their functions manifested (...)
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  50. Concept of Guna in Indian Philosophical Systems: A Cognitive Science Perspective.Varanasi Ramabrahmam - manuscript
    Indian spiritual and philosophical systems are essentially cognitive scientific in nature. Having origin in the Upanishads all Indian philosophical systems supplemented and complemented one another to develop a comprehensive source book of cognitive science. The nature and form of consciousness, mind and its functions are extensively dealt with and discussed from Upanishads through Buddhism, Jainism, Viseshaka, Nyaya, Yoga, Samkhya, Poorva Meemamsa,and Uttara Meemaams, Sabdabrahma Siddhanta contributing to many concepts which have relevance to cognitive science and language acquisition and communication. In (...)
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