Meta-Ethics, General Works

The author contends that classifying theories in the field of meta-ethics along a single dimension misses important nuances in each theory. With the increased sophistication and complexity of meta-ethical analyses in the modern era, the traditional cognitivist–non-cognitivist and realist–anti-realist categories no longer function adequately. The author categorizes the various meta-ethical theories along three dimensions. These dimensions focus on the linguistic analysis offered by each theory, its metaphysical commitments and its degree of normative tolerance.

Meta-ethics is the area of philosophy in which thinkers explore the language and nature of moral discourse and its relations to other non-moral areas of life. In this introduction to the discipline written explicitly for novices, Leslie Allan outlines the key questions and areas of analysis in contemporary meta-ethics. In clear, tabular format, he summarizes the core concepts integral to each of the major meta-ethical positions and the strengths of each view. To prompt further thinking and reading, Allan explains briefly (...) the major objections to each theory and lists each view's best known advocates. (shrink)

Humans were once purely animal, the same as all the other animal species, implying that the practice of ethics must have been nonexistent until quite recently in human history. It has been during the species’ turn towards behavioral modernity that ethical precepts and systems have been formed, eventually becoming an integral part of modern human existence. This essay will explore the cause for this transition, emphasizing the idea that there are now two different sources of modern human behavior. On the (...) one hand, modern humans are still animal, and they must still engage in biologically driven behaviors. At the same time, modern humans have become increasingly influenced and guided by the many artificial constructions that have been accruing over time and are now saturating the human landscape, with the response to these artificial constructions producing a wide range of behaviors heretofore unwitnessed on the planet Earth. These two aspects of modern humanity—the animal aspect and the constructed aspect—they find themselves often in conflict, each striving to gain ascendency over each individual and over the species as a whole. It is the tension at the heart of this inherent conflict that has engendered ethics and morality. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss five meta-ethical challenges to Naturalistic Moral Realism, which includes secular moral codes such as Secular Humanism that, in my view, naturalists need to address to keep their commitment to moral realism from looking like special pleading. The five challenges are as follows: 1. The Ontological Problem (OP): How do such moral principles exist? 2. The Epistemic Problem (EP): How does our moral sense/intuition track such principles? 3. The Influence Problem (IP): What authority does the existence (...) of such principles have to supervene on our behavior? 4. The Axiological Problem (AP): What entities have moral value and deserve moral consideration? 5. Methodological Problem (MP): How do we go about arbitrating between moral claims when they conflict? (shrink)

A virtual reality translation of Robert Nozick's "Experience Machine" thought experiment from his "Anarchy, State, and Utopia" (1974). These modules are free to download and use in the classroom and for research/x-phi purposes. NPCs are randomized for gender during startup of each run. *Requires an Oculus Rift or HTC Vive and VR capable computer. To open the files, uncompress the downloaded .zip folder and run the executable (.exe) file. -/- V1.2 Fixed missing projector video footage during experience machine sales pitch.

Under review at Canadian Journal of Philosophy. This paper does five things: (1) It provides an analysis of meta-ethical Non-Realist Cognitivism. (2) It assesses two arguments in favour of the view which have been largely overlooked in analyses so far. (3) It argues that different proponents of the view offer crucially different strategies for vindicating moral objectivity without the metaphysical commitments of traditional non-naturalism. (4) Contrary to other commentators, it argues for the no-truthmaker interpretation of Parfit’s view. (5) It argues (...) that each version of Non-Realist Cognitivism is unlikely to be able to do the explanatory work that seemed to call for an ontologically committal non-naturalism. (shrink)

Michael Huemer claims to give an ontological proof of robust moral realism, the influential view that we have non-selfish, categorical, observer-independent reasons for action. This paper argues that one of Huemer’s premises – that knowing that baby torture is not objectively wrong would provide us with no first-person reasons to torture babies – is false of agents with sadistic desires. This in turn falsifies Huemer’s further premise that the premises of his “Antitorture Argument” are true independent of interests, desires, or (...) other attitudes. My refutation is then shown to not only deepen extant doubts about whether robust realists can adequately account for the first-person normative authority of morality. It also suggests that realists about categorical moral reasons must either complete a project – moral constructivism – which has never clearly succeeded, or else defend views on the nature of categorical reasons that strain credulity and beg the question against their opponents. (shrink)

I make some basic observations about hard takeoff, value alignment, and coherent extrapolated volition, concepts which have been central in analyses of superintelligent AI systems.

This chapter provides a comparative assessment of anti-theory discussions in ethics and philosophy of science. Despite the differences between moral and scientific practices, normative theorizing in ethics and philosophy of science faces a common underlying problem. Namely the conflict between the features of a universal normative philosophical theory for guiding moral or scientific practices, on the one hand, with the complexity, variability, and historicity of these practices, as shown in descriptive and historical accounts, on the other. Anti-theory movements in ethics (...) and philosophy of science in the 1970s and 1980s arrived independently at the identification of this problem and at the realization that a universal normative theory for guiding moral and scientific practices is impossible, unnecessary, and undesirable. They differed, however, in the specific arguments they advanced for it being so and, even more radically, in their suggestions about the proper way of conducting moral and scientific practices. More recent developments in history and philosophy of science provide some concrete suggestions on how to integrate descriptive and historical accounts of scientific practice with normative philosophizing. These newer suggestions can provide fertile ground for a fruitful interaction between (history and) philosophy of science and ethics. (shrink)

Aristotle’s interest in ethics was first and foremost practical—studying ethics should help us to become good. Two millennia later, Francis Bacon’s interest in the philosophy of science was also motivated by practical aspirations—to guide scientists in their quest for empirical knowledge. To this end, he sought to formulate The Scientific Method. The apparent success of science suggests that moral philosophy might do well to take a page from the philosophy of science and to seek a “moral method” to guide the (...) process of becoming good. But if we wish to use the scientific method as a model for practical success in ethics, we might benefit from examining how philosophical thoughts on the scientific method have changed over time. This chapter argues that tracing philosophical reflections on the scientific method reveals that if we are to use the scientific method as our model, we will need to rethink the way we engage in moral theorizing. Moreover, we will need to curb our expectations regarding the kind of practical guidance moral philosophy is likely to provide. It is then suggested that rather than using the scientific method as a model for moral guidance, philosophy of science might do well to take a page from Aristotle’s moral philosophy and to seek practical guidance akin to that found in Aristotle’s Ethics. (shrink)

In this introductory chapter we present the central motivations and rationales for this volume. We begin by identifying two radical anti-theory movements that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, one in philosophy of science and the other in ethics. Each of these movements was domain-specific—that is, each criticized the aspirations of philosophical theories within its own domain and advanced arguments aimed at philosophers within their own specific subfield. The guiding thought of this volume is that insights gleaned from the anti-theory (...) movement in one domain can shed light on the other and that both can illuminate the limits of philosophical theorizing in general. This introduction also offers a brief overview of the essays collected in this volume and highlights ways in which they touch on its central themes. (shrink)

This book brings together scholars from ethics and philosophy of science in order to identify ways in which insights gleaned from one subfield can shed light on the other. The book focuses on two radical Anti-Theory movements that emerged in the 1970’s and 1980’s, one in philosophy of science and the other in ethics. Both movements challenged attempts to supply general, systematized philosophical theories within their domains and thus invited the reconsideration of what philosophical theorizing can and should offer. Each (...) of these movements was domain-specific – that is, each criticized the aspirations to philosophical theories within its own domain and advanced arguments aimed at philosophers within their own specific subfield. The innovative systematic comparative examination of these movements by scholars from each domain sheds new light on some familiar debates, offers new and exciting paths of research to pursue in each domain, provides insight into the place of science and ethics in contemporary life and culture, and enables a fresh view on the longstanding and alluring philosophical aspiration for a fully general, absolute theory of reality and an ultimate objective foundational theory of knowledge. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that by eliminating the subjective dimension from moral deliberation, orthodox, theory-oriented approaches to animal ethics overlook the importance of self-examination in navigating the complexity of our moral life. This is accomplished by depicting agents as rational beings, other animals as abstract beings bearing morally relevant properties and moral thinking as limited to rational argumentation. Instead, by following David J. Velleman and authors influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Iris Murdoch, I discuss the importance of the subjective (...) outlook on a moral situation. I argue that ordinary ways in which a subject perceives and describes other animals—for example, as ‘pets’, ‘patients’, ‘fellow creatures’, and so forth—are essential because they mirror how agents think of themselves. For instance, when subjects describe animals as ‘pets’, they implicitly conceive of themselves as ‘pet-owners’. I argue that as self-reflecting beings, we can engage in self-examination, which is the process of reflecting and recognising the relationships between how we look at other animals and how we portray ourselves. (shrink)

Many contemporary philosophers have presumed that the doctrine of evil as privation simply means that there can be no evils that count as positive realities. However, this interpretation is naive, and does not cohere well with the Christian theological tradition, especially the work of Augustine, who is widely regarded as the touchstone proponent of the doctrine. The goal of this paper is to clarify the more nuanced, teleological meaning of the doctrine of “evil as privation,” as well as to establish (...) a useful conceptual division between genuine evils of privation (“depraved privations”) and harmless privations (“mere privations”). Additionally, I discuss four challenges to evil as privation: that it entails the inherent evil of all creatures, that the normative property “evil” is itself a positive reality, that it makes no sense to speak of non-existence as a deprivation, and that any attempt to refine the doctrine renders it trivial and vacuous. Finally, I close out the paper by showing that there is still a fifth, unresolved problem facing the more nuanced, teleological version of the doctrine: that it requires us to make significant recalibrations to very tender-hearted and loving moral intuitions. (shrink)

What is the place of interpretation in ethical theory? What are the implications of interpretive understanding for moral understanding? Developing the notion of “Interpretive Realism,” I explore two central ideas: (1) that moral judgments are best understood as interpretations of meaning, and (2) that a hermeneutic approach to ethics supports, rather than undermines, moral realism. To counter the idea that moral language aims to describe independent moral facts, it is argued that moral interpretation shapes ethical intelligibility itself. The resulting view (...) is a historically informed yet objective view of morality that respects contextual differences while still allowing for normative critique. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein suggested that in philosophy explanation should be replaced by description. I want to explore what this might mean in ethics. I first consider Wittgenstein and reasons to doubt that he supported a fact/value distinction as strongly or straightforwardly as is sometimes believed. Next I look at Iris Murdoch’s work as an example of what I take to be a good approach to ethics, and one that is consistent with Wittgenstein’s thought, as well as turning to recent work by (...) some Wittgensteinian or post-Wittgensteinian ethicists and what it has to say about the value and importance of description. Finally, I try to add something new to this discussion, drawing on work by Donna Haraway and some work in virtue epistemology. Specifically, I suggest that ethics and virtue epistemology are more than merely parallel, I add to the defense of Alice Crary’s Wittgensteinian notion of wider rationality, and I show description of reality to be complicated but possibly a significant tool in moral philosophy. (shrink)

This article proposes a metaethical route from neo-Aristotelian naturalism, as developed in particular by Philippa Foot, to virtue-ethical longtermism. It argues that the metaethical assumptions of neo-Aristotelian naturalism inherently imply that a valid description of the life-form of a species must satisfy a formal requirement of internal sustainability. The elements of a valid life-form description then serve as a normative standard. Given that humans have the ability to influence the fate of future generations and know about their influence, this article (...) posits that our future as a species becomes a part of the description of the human life-form. Consequently, in our case, the sustainability requirement is extended into the future, leading to a minimal and humanist version of longtermism. As in Rosalind Hursthouse’s naturalistic virtue ethics, the focus of the proposed virtue-ethical longtermism remains on developing virtues as the only reliable way for the agent to achieve the good life. However, since what can count as virtue must be compatible with a life-form description that, taken as a whole, facilitates the long-term survival of our species, this position still implies a genuine longtermism, although it contrasts with the quantifying and maximizing logic of consequentialism. (shrink)

Michael Huemer argues that cross-cultural convergence toward liberal moral values is evidence of objective moral progress, and by extension, evidence for moral realism. Nathan Cofnas claims to debunk Huemer’s argument by contending that convergence toward liberal moral values can be better explained by ‘two related non-truth-tracking processes’: self-interest and its long-term tendency to result in social conditions conducive to greater empathy. This article argues that although Cofnas successfully debunks Huemer’s convergence argument for one influential form of moral realism – Robust (...) Moral Realism, which holds that moral facts are non-natural, stance-independent normative facts – Cofnas’s debunking argument broadly supports a second type of moral realism: Enlightened Self-Interest Realism, the view that moral facts are reducible to stance-dependent requirements of instrumental (‘means-end’) rationality. Finally, this article argues that insofar as different Enlightened Self-Interest Realist theories make specific predictions about the intra- and inter-personal mechanisms behind moral convergence toward liberalism, empirical observations of cross-cultural convergence can provide independent support for Enlightened Self-Interest Realism. I conclude that this is an important mark in favor of Enlightened Self-Interest Realism over Robust Moral Realism. (shrink)

This chapter details three sources of normative moral disagreement and surveys 11 approaches to understanding its implications for normative ethics. Section 2 explains how normative moral disagreement can emerge from first-order commonsense moral disagreement, second-order metaethical disagreement over moral concepts and methods of ethics, and third-order metaphilosophical disagreement over the merits of different philosophical methods. Section 3 then details how moral disagreement has been argued to support either moral error theory (Section 3.1), moral skepticism (Section 3.2), moral relativism (Section 3.3), (...) common moral foundations beneath areas of disagreement (Section 3.4), empirical approaches to ethics (Section 3.5), considerations of peer-disagreement (Section 3.6), convergence of moral frameworks (Section 3.7), moral compromise (Section 3.8), moral pluralism (Section 3.9), moral pragmatism (Section 3.10), or metaphilosophical examination of the epistemic merits of different philosophical methods (Section 3.11). (shrink)

Despite the plethora of freedom of religion literature (under section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), the corresponding literature on the freedom of conscience is minimal. To further the discussion on the freedom of conscience, I rely heavily on the philosophical literature to make an important distinction; the difference between individual- based and communal-based conceptions of conscience. Whereas the former is plagued with subjectivity, making it difficult to conceptualize a working framework for the Charter right, the latter (...) offers a promising foothold to rise above subjectivity and find a firm footing based on communal relations. In emphasizing the importance of the dialogical nature of human beings and the relational necessity undergirding moral judgements, I argue that the concept of conscience should be understood and practiced in community, rather than individually. (shrink)

Contemporary scholarship is divided over whether Anselm maintains a version of Eudaemonism. The debate centers on the question of whether the will for justice only moderates the will for happiness or, instead, provides a distinct end for which to act. Because of two key passages, various scholars hold that Anselm maintained elements of medieval Eudaemonism. In this article, I argue that Anselm separates morality from happiness, and I provide a sketch of his alternative view. First, I argue against some recent (...) perspectives that Anselm maintained Eudaemonism. To do so, I provide a non-Eudaemonist reading of the two key passages and show how Eudaemonist readings are lacking in different respects. Second, I examine what this argument means for Anselm’s understanding of happiness and moral obligation. While there are some Eudaemonist themes in Anselm’s thinking, he flatly denies and revises aspects of the system. (shrink)

I argue for a distinction between two varieties of disvalue (“evil”), natural and practical evil. Pain, premature death, and maiming are examples of natural evil; breaches of moral duty are cases of practical evil. I contend that natural evil is a property of people and other things (states of affairs, properties, objects, events, anything you like) considered as part of the natural world governed by laws of nature. Furthermore, natural evils are evil in virtue of natural facts. By contrast, practical (...) evil is a property of people or actions when the former are considered as free agents capable of acting for reasons. A parallel grounding claim holds for practical badness as well: what makes it the case that people and their actions are practically bad will appear only when the former are looked on as free agents who can act for reasons. After establishing what makes practical evil different from natural evil, I will argue that the former is more serious than the latter because the defect in the use of freedom that grounds it degrades the agent, who in doing what she must not do, acts like an unfree, natural thing determined by laws external to herself. (shrink)

In “Normative Reasons from a Naturalistic Point of View”, Marko Jurjako explores the foundational concept of normative reasons through the lens of methodological naturalism. Departing from traditional analytic or purely conceptual approaches, this philosophical inquiry navigates the terrain of reasons, rationality, and normativity—concepts with a long philosophical pedigree—within a framework rooted in our understanding of the natural and social world. By aligning the exploration with scientifically based theorizing, the book seeks a synoptic view that bridges the gap between relatively isolated (...) philosophical discussions of the nature of normative reasons and their grounding in human intrapersonal and interpersonal interactions that can be understood and explained by an array of scientifically inspired models. (shrink)

This book is a scholarly synthesis of the current state-of-play in ethics, with a focus on normative and applied ethics. Kahn asks readers to consider even the most contentious of topics like abortion, capital punishment, and euthanasia, from their most basic questions.

Eine neutrale Einführung in die Tugendethik – den ältesten ethischen Ansatz in der Philosophiegeschichte, der auf Aristoteles und Platon zurückgeht, aber seit der Aufklärung an Bedeutung verlor. Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts erlebte die Tugendethik eine Renaissance und gilt heutzutage, neben dem Konsequentialismus und der Deontologie, als eines der drei großen Paradigmen der normativen Ethik. Die Rolle der Tugend im Sinne der Vortrefflichkeit des Charakters und des Verstandes lässt sich dabei von verschiedenen (meta-)ethischen Positionen aus begründen. Die vorliegende Einführung führt im (...) Rahmen einer neuen Systematik in die Vielzahl der tugendethischen Ansätze ein – verständlich, übersichtlich und mit einem Fokus auf moderne Ansätze. (shrink)

How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and ethics. Yet its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It has five main goals. First, it (...) reinterprets the problem of responsibility for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality. Second, it connects substantive and structural rationality by drawing on debates about responsibility. Third, it supports recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by explicitly defending the view that epistemic reasons and other ‘right-kind’ reasons are genuine normative reasons. Fourth, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by proposing a hybrid view. Finally, it argues that irrationality can warrant moral blame, thus revealing an unnoticed normative force of rational requirements. Length of manuscript: 85,000 words. (shrink)

Este artigo analisa a discussão sobre o Dilema Darwiniano para o realismo metaético, proposto por Sharon Street (2006), e entende o seu “debunking” como estruturas aporéticas. Street desenvolve um dilema específico para o realismo metaético em que as verdades avaliativas pressupostas porela estariam em desarmonia com uma perspectiva evolutiva-darwiniana da moralidade. Street mostra que o realismo não consegue fornecer uma explicação boa o suficiente sobre a relação entre o processo evolutivo e nossos juízos morais verdadeiros. Ela propõe uma explicação metaética (...) antirrealista alternativa, coerente com a explicação evolutiva da moralidade. Da perspectiva de Nicholas Rescher (1985), mostraremos que o Dilema Darwiniano para o realismo moral, apontado por Street, pode ser analisado de forma aporética. De acordo com Rescher, aporias se apresentam como inconsistências dentro de um conjunto de comprometimentos teóricos, que formarão estruturas aporéticas que demandarão ou a rejeição ou a justificação destes comprometimentos teóricos responsáveis pelas aporias no conjunto total. Indicaremos que a perspectiva antirrealista de Street também engendra aporias, assim como o realismo, e pelas mesmas bases, poderá ser rejeitada. Por fim iremos propor uma abordagem pluralista para a metaética, na qual os méritos explicativos das teorias devem ser utilizados para esclarecer o fenômeno moral. (shrink)

Gli approcci della tradizione filosofica alla morale si fondano prevalentemente su concetti e teorie metafisiche e teologiche. Tra i concetti etici tradizionali, il più importante è la Teoria del Comando Divino (DCT). Secondo la DCT, Dio dà fondamenti morali all’umanità attraverso la sua creazione e attraverso la Rivelazione. Moralità e Divinità sono inseparabili fin dalle civiltà più remote. Questi concetti si inseriscono in un quadro teologico e sono accettati principalmente dalla maggior parte dei seguaci delle tre tradizioni abramitiche: ebraismo, cristianesimo (...) e islam: la parte più considerevole della popolazione umana. Tenendo come fondamento la fede e la Rivelazione, le Teorie del Comando Divino non sono strettamente soggette alla dimostrazione. Gli oppositori alla concezione della morale del Comando Divino, fondata sull'impossibilità di dimostrare i suoi presupposti metafisici e religiosi, hanno tentato per molti secoli (anche se senza successo) di sminuirne l'importanza. Sostenevano che esso non presenta prove materiali e coerenza logica e, per questo motivo, non può essere preso in considerazione per scopi scientifici o filosofici. È solo una convinzione e, come tale, dovrebbe essere intesa. Oltre a queste opposizioni estreme, molti altri concetti contravvengono alle teorie del Comando Divino, in un modo o nell'altro, in parte o del tutto. Dalla filosofia greca classica fino ai giorni nostri, molti filosofi e scienziati sociali sostengono che la moralità è solo un costrutto e quindi culturalmente relativo e culturalmente determinato. Tuttavia, ciò apre la strada a molte altre discussioni e impone la sfida di determinare il significato della cultura, quali elementi della cultura siano moralmente determinanti e, infine, i confini di tale relatività. I deterministi morali affermano che tutto ciò che riguarda il comportamento umano, inclusa la moralità, è determinato una volta che il libero arbitrio non esiste. Più recentemente, i pensatori moderni hanno sostenuto che esiste una scienza rigorosa della moralità. Tuttavia, pur spiegando numerosi fatti e prove, il metodo scientifico da solo non può illuminare l’intero contenuto e il pieno significato dell’etica. La comprensione della morale richiede una percezione più ampia e un accordo tra i filosofi, cosa che essi non hanno mai raggiunto. Queste domande hanno molte configurazioni diverse a seconda di ciascun filone filosofico e danno origine ad analisi complesse e dibattiti infiniti finché molti di essi sono reciprocamente conflittuali. L'universo e l'atmosfera che coinvolgono questa ricerca sono i domini di tutti questi conflitti concettuali, osservati da un punto di vista oggettivo ed evolutivo. Indipendentemente da questa circostanza e dalla sua intrinseca importanza; tuttavia, queste domande sono lontane dall’approccio metodologico di una discussione analitica sulla morale oggettiva, che è, in effetti, lo scopo e la portata di questo lavoro. Dovremmo rivisitare brevemente queste importanti teorie tradizionali perché questo lavoro ospita uno studio comparativo e i suoi presupposti differiscono profondamente da tutte le teorie tradizionali. -/- Diventa quindi necessario offrire al lettore elementi di confronto diretti e specifici per una critica valida, dispensando ricerche interruttive. Tuttavia, anche rivisitando le teorie tradizionali, a questo scopo di esposizione comparativa e critica, esse verranno tenute ai margini delle nostre preoccupazioni primarie come “aliena materia”. Indipendentemente dalla validità di alcuni o tutti gli elementi di questa discussione e dal loro significato come universo filosofico della nostra ricerca, lo scopo di questo lavoro è dimostrare e giustificare l’esistenza e il significato degli archetipi morali preistorici sorti direttamente dal contesto sociale fondamentale e corrispondenti bisogni e sforzi per la sopravvivenza. Tali archetipi sono la definizione del fondamento essenziale dell'etica, la sua aggregazione all'inconscio collettivo e la corrispondente logica di organizzazione e trasmissione agli stadi evolutivi del genoma umano e dei diversi rapporti spazio-temporali, indipendentemente da qualsiasi esperienza contemporanea dei singoli individui. Il sistema definito da questi archetipi compone un modello sociale umano evolutivo. È questa una posizione meta etica? Sì. Inoltre, come in ogni ragionamento meta etico, bisognerebbe cercare attentamente i percorsi migliori e più coerenti, come offre la Filosofia Analitica. Pertanto, questo lavoro dovrebbe ragionevolmente dimostrare che la morale non è un prodotto culturale degli uomini civilizzati o delle società moderne. Pur essendo soggetto a molteplici aggregazioni e sottrazioni culturali, i suoi fondamenti essenziali sono archetipici e non sono mai strutturalmente mutati. Questo ragionamento induce che la moralità sia un primo attributo dell'“homo sapiens”; non è una proprietà né un accidente: integra l'essenza umana e appartiene all'identità ontologica umana. I fenomeni umani sono un processo continuo, che gioca il suo ruolo tra determinazione casuale e libero arbitrio, e dobbiamo chiederci come è iniziata la moralità e come è arrivata a noi nel presente. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to reject what I call the entitlement model of directed obligation: the view that we can conclude from X is obligated to Y that therefore Y has an entitlement against X. I argue that rejecting the model clears up many otherwise puzzling aspects of ordinary moral interaction. The main goal is not to offer a new theory of obligation and entitlement. It is rather to show that, contrary to what most philosophers have assumed, directed (...) obligation and entitlement are not the same normative concept seen from two different perspectives. They are two very different concepts, and much is gained by keeping them distinct. (shrink)

Книга представляет собой первый на русском языке систематический обзор метаэтики – дисциплины, которая пытается ответить на наиболее важные и глубокие вопросы относительно морали. Существуют ли моральные ценности? Какова их природа? Объективны ли они? Что означают наши моральные высказывания? При ответе на данные вопросы затрагиваются семантические, метафизические, эпистемологические и психологические аспекты морали. Дается подробный обзор наиболее известных метаэтических теорий: нон-натурализма, натурализма, конструктивизма, релятивизма, моральной теории ошибки, фикционализма и различных разновидностей нонкогнитивизма – эмотивизма, прескриптивизма, квазиреализма, норм-экспрессивизма и других. Книга предполагает некоторое первоначальное (...) знакомство с философией и может быть использована в качестве учебного пособия для студентов философских факультетов высших учебных заведений. (shrink)

This volume brings together essential essays by an important but neglected thinker in early twentieth-century German philosophy, Edith Landmann-Kalischer. As the first English translation of her writings, this volume represents a landmark step in the effort to restore to its rightful place her philosophy and, in particular, its methodologically unified approach to aesthetic, moral, and epistemic value. The three essays translated - “On the Cognitive Value of Aesthetic Judgments: A Comparison of Sensory Judgments and Value Judgments” (1905), “On Artistic Truth” (...) (1906), and “Philosophy of Values” (1910) - demonstrate a philosophical mind at home with the then emerging disciplines of phenomenology and psychology during one of the most fecund eras of philosophy in German-speaking lands. -/- Drawing on the ferment of this period and engaging with its leading thinkers (e.g., Brentano, Husserl), Landmann-Kalischer crafts a unique and powerful contribution to aesthetics, the philosophy of art, and value theory. And far from speaking simply to the concerns of her day, in these essays she tackles questions that remain as pressing for us today as they were in her time. Are beauty, goodness, and truth real or merely subjective? How do we experience these values? Does our experience of value lead to judgments that can be true or false? Can those experiences lead to knowledge? Is a science of value possible at all? In Landmann-Kalischer's essays, we find rigorously argued and compelling answers to these questions. (shrink)

Henry Richardson’s _Articulating the Moral Community_ develops an account of moral innovation, the process by which new moral norms come to be authoritatively binding and new ethical judgments come to be objectively true. In this essay, I argue Richardson’s proposed process of moral innovation is likely to be exceedingly rare, unnecessary for solving the problems posed by what he calls “objective moral gaps,” and not necessarily more desirable than moral innovation via local convention.

On the traditional approach to metaethics, theories are expected to be faithful to ordinary normative discourse—or at worst (if we think the ordinary discourse is metaphysically unsound) to deviate from it as little as possible. This paper develops an alternative, “conceptual engineering” approach to metaethical enquiry, which is not in this way restricted by our present discourse. On this approach, we will seek to understand the psychology, semantics, metaphysics and epistemology, not just of our present concepts, but also of other (...) possible normative concepts. The ultimate point of the enquiry is to choose between the available alternatives: to decide what kinds of normative concepts to use, going forward. The paper aims to make this suggestion precise, in a way that (a) answers worries about circularity, (b) answers worries about “changing the subject”, (c) retains metaethics as a truth-seeking enquiry, and (d) leads to an independently plausible methodology. (shrink)

There is a family of metaethical views according to which (i) there are no objectively correct moral standards and (ii) whether a given moral claim is true depends in some way on moral standards accepted by either an individual (forms of subjectivism) or a community (forms of relativism). This chapter outlines the three most important versions of this type of theories: old-fashioned subjectivism and relativism, contextualism and new wave subjectivism and relativism. It also explores the main advantages of these views (...) and the key objections to them. (shrink)

Aristotelian theory, as found in Michael Thompson and Philippa Foot, claims that to be good is to be good as a member of that kind. However, I contend that something can satisfy kind-relative standards but nonetheless be bad—I propose a hypothetical Ebola-like microbe that meets its kind-standards of being destructive for its own sake, but it would plausibly be bad for doing so. I anticipate an Aristotelian objection that evaluations should only be made from "within" the lifeform conception rather than (...) from without. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against Analytic Normative Naturalism by suggesting that the view cannot capture the way that normative concepts figure in advice. To establish this conclusion, I identify several links between normative concepts and advice and argue that, if Analytic Normative Naturalism were true, these links would not obtain.

The dominant theory of the evolution of moral cognition across a variety of fields is that moral cognition is a biological adaptation to foster social cooperation. This chapter argues, to the contrary, that moral cognition is likely an evolutionary exaptation: a form of cognition where neurobiological capacities selected for in our evolutionary history for a variety of different reasons—many unrelated to social cooperation—were put to a new, prosocial use after the fact through individual rationality, learning, and the development and transmission (...) of social norms. This chapter begins with a brief overview of the emerging behavioral neuroscience of moral cognition. It then outlines a novel theory of moral cognition that I have previously argued explains these findings better than alternatives. Finally, it shows how the evidence for this theory of moral cognition and human evolutionary history together suggest that moral cognition is likely not a biological adaptation. Instead, like reading sheet music or riding a bicycle, moral cognition is something that individuals learn to do—in this case, in response to sociocultural norms created in our ancestral history and passed down through the ages to enable cooperative living. (shrink)

The dominant theory of the evolution of moral cognition across a variety of fields is that moral cognition is a biological adaptation to foster social cooperation. This chapter argues, to the contrary, that moral cognition is likely an evolutionary exaptation: a form of cognition where neurobiological capacities selected for in our evolutionary history for a variety of different reasons—many unrelated to social cooperation—were put to a new, prosocial use after the fact through individual rationality, learning, and the development and transmission (...) of social norms. This chapter begins with a brief overview of the emerging behavioral neuroscience of moral cognition. It then outlines a novel theory of moral cognition that I have previously argued explains these findings better than alternatives. Finally, it shows how the evidence for this theory of moral cognition and human evolutionary history together suggest that moral cognition is likely not a biological adaptation. Instead, like reading sheet music or riding a bicycle, moral cognition is something that individuals learn to do—in this case, in response to sociocultural norms created in our ancestral history and passed down through the ages to enable cooperative living. (shrink)

I contend there exists a platonistic good that all other good (excellent) things must resemble, supplementing this theory with Aristotelian features. Something’s goodness holds in virtue of the thing’s own properties being such as to satisfy its kind-based standards, and those K-standards resembling the platonic good. As for the latter condition, the K-standards resemble it firstly with respect to requiring activities, and secondly also at the level of what teleology those activities are directed towards.

My paper is concerned with the relation between ought-statements and intentions in Wilfrid Sellars’s philosophy. According to an entrenched view in Sellars scholarship, Sellars considers ought-statements as expressions of we-intentions. The aim of my paper is to question this reading and to propose an alternative. According to this alternative reading of Sellars, ought-statements are metalinguistic statements about the implication relations between intentions. I show that the entrenched understanding faces many unacknowledged problems and generates incompatibilities with Sellars’s commitments about intentions. I (...) argue that the alternative account can help to resolve these problems. A second reason in support of the alternative understanding of Sellars is provided by historical considerations. I argue that my alternative account can be discerned in Sellars’s most developed views about intentions and ought-statements. I also discuss problems and questions which the alternative reading itself faces. (shrink)

Moral constitutivism purports to explain moral normativity by appeal to the nature of either agency or rational powers. Ambitious constitutivism aspires to ground the categorical authority of morality and to derive the content of the basic moral norms while avoiding the problems of moral realism. As a general strategy, moral constitutivism faces three serious challenges. First, the shmagency challenge. The worry is that the authority of the norms derived from the nature of agency is only conditional on having a reason (...) to be an agent rather than some other kind of subject, a shmagent or an alienated agent. Constitutivists usually reply by appealing to the inescapability of agency. Second, there is a worry that agency is too thin a basis for the derivation of the substantive content of moral norms. Finally, there is the worry that constitutivism might be unable to make room for bad actions. The entry considers possible responses by moral constitutivism to these concerns and whether, if these responses are unsatisfactory, moral constitutivism might still have some explanatory power but of a less ambitious sort. (shrink)

Philosophical Investigations, Volume 45, Issue 1, Page 77-90, January 2022.

The Euthyphro Dilemma is named after a particular exchange between Socrates and Euthyphro in Plato‟s dialogue Euthyphro. In a famous passage, Socrates asks, “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” (Plato 1981: 10a), and proceeds to advance arguments which clearly favor the first of these two options (see PLATO). The primary interest in the Euthyphro Dilemma over the years, however, has primarily concerned the relationship between (...) God and morality in the monotheistic religious tradition, where God is taken to be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, having created the universe initially and still actively involved in it today. But as we will see at the end of this entry, there has also been a recent surge of interest in a version of the Dilemma which applies to so-called response-dependent accounts of normative properties in meta-ethics. (shrink)

Are philosophers moral experts, and if so, what does this imply for their proper role in moral decision-making? The dominant view on this subject argues that philosophers have superior moral understanding, but they are not better judges of what is morally right. Consequently, philosophers cannot and should not have an authoritative role in moral decision-making. In this article, I challenge this view and argue that an examination of the intimate connection between two capacities – to understand and to judge – (...) reveals that it is both inconsistent and simplistic. It is inconsistent because, all things being equal, if philosophers better understand moral problems, they are also better judges of them. It is simplistic because it adopts an all-or-nothing approach to moral expertise, while expertise is in fact conditional. Inspired by the psychological literature on expertise, I claim that we should not ask whether philosophers are moral experts but rather under which conditions they successfully execute their expertise. The conclusion of the dominant view needs to be reconsidered to reflect the conditional nature of philosophers' expertise. Although more empirical research is required, I offer several hypotheses for future endeavours that demonstrate what a conditional view of philosophers' moral expertise could look like. -/- . (shrink)

"The arc of the moral universe is long but it bends towards justice." (Martin Luther King) -/- A moral explanation is an explanation of a particular or type of event (or fact or state of affairs) that features moral terms in the explaining phrase. Here are some examples. First, one way of the above quote is as the claim that, in the broad sweep of history, societies tend toward more just institutions, and that they do so precisely because these institutions (...) are just. This is a moral explanation of social development. Second, historians might claim that “The injustice of slavery contributed to its demise”: this is a moral explanation of a historical event. Third, I might say that “I believe that Hitler was morally depraved because he was morally depraved”: this is a moral explanation of a moral belief. Finally, philosophers sometimes say things like “In the original Trolley case, it is morally right to flick the switch, because this will lead to the morally best outcome”: this is a moral explanation of a particular moral fact. -/- The issue of the availability of moral explanations of these types is relevant to both normative ethics and metaethics. In normative ethics the availability of moral explanations is bound up with the possibility of general normative theories. In metaethics the issue of moral explanations is closely tied to the doctrine of moral realism. In what follows I first trace the relevance of moral explanations to normative ethics and metaethics, before considering some examples in detail. (shrink)

This paper develops a form of moral actualism that can explain the procreative asymmetry. Along the way, it defends and explains the attractive asymmetry: the claim that although an impermissible option can be self-conditionally permissible, a permissible option cannot be self-conditionally impermissible.

Pragmatism is typically understood as a philosophy embedded in scientific inquiry. Thinkers, like Charles Peirce (1877), C.I. Lewis (1923) and Susan Haack (1998) envisioned pragmatism and its scientific inquiry as a method of systematizing our beliefs and acquiring knowledge. They thought that scientific practice and its implied standards, techniques, and values is the only source of hope for scientific and philosophical progress. In this dissertation, I construct a pragmatic approach to the meta-ethical questions of our moral truths, beliefs and principles (...) that proposes a normative systematization of ethics grounded in moral practice, development and experimentation. I argue that maintaining a pragmatic faith in the origination and formation of our moral constitutions will provide us with a realist, cognitivist and objective view of reality subject to the capacities of our human cognition and empirical evidence and not subject to metaphysical and universal methods of reasoning. (shrink)