Meta-Ethics

Edited by Daniel Star (Boston University)
96 found
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  1. added 2017-04-25
    Review of Ethics and Culture. [REVIEW]Subhasis Chattopadhyay - 2017 - Prabuddha Bharata or Awakened India 122 (5):480.
    The reviewer finds the much obfuscated (sic) logos explained in this gem of an anthology. The reviewer picks up the notion of the logos and his review turns around this philosophical stonewall. The genius of one of the contributors is in connecting logos to the Tao.
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  2. added 2017-04-21
    LET'S FAKE MORALITY and ETHICS (the Pretence of Ethics and Morality in Philosophy and Life).de Balbian Ulrich - 2017 - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    Download FREE book here Fake Morality and Ethics (in philosophy and Life) https://www.academia.edu/32532069/LETS_FAKE_MORALITY_and_ETHICS_the_pretence_of_ethics_and_morality_ in_philosophy_and_life_ -/- Institutionalized and internalized,‭ ‬competence intersubjectivity contain many user-illusions and an imaginary or manifest image of reality,‭ ‬including of themselves‭ (‬Dennett and Sellars‭)‬,.‭ ‬This can be contrasted we a comprehension or comprehensive,‭ ‬understanding intersubjectivity.‭ ‬It is possible and perhaps even necessary to transform or replace the competence intersubjectivity to a comprehension or understanding‭ (‬scientific,‭ ‬Dennett and Sellars‭) ‬image of reality and themselves.Ethics and morality and studies of ethics (...)
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  3. added 2017-04-13
    Frankfurt’s Unwilling and Willing Addicts.Chandra Sripada - forthcoming - Mind:fzw013.
    Harry Frankfurt’s Unwilling Addict and Willing Addict cases accomplish something fairly unique: they pull apart the predictions of control-based views of moral responsibility and competing self-expression views. The addicts both lack control over their actions but differ in terms of expression of their respective selves. Frankfurt’s own view is that—in line with the predictions of self-expression views—the unwilling addict is not morally responsible for his drug-directed actions while the willing addict is. But is Frankfurt right? In this essay, I put (...)
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  4. added 2017-04-13
    Collective Moral Responsibility.Sohst Wolfgang (ed.) - 2017 - Berlin, Germany: xenomoi Verlag.
    This book explores a universal question of human social order: Under what circumstances and to what extent is the individual to be held morally responsible for collective events? This question reaches far beyond the intentions and actions of a particular business enterprise, state or a similar large-scale collective. The philosopher Wolfgang Sohst (Berlin, Germany) investigates the subject with unprecedented thoroughness, covering the whole range of contemporary discussion on this subject. He provides a detailed analysis of the functions of individual members (...)
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  5. added 2017-04-13
    Moral Judgments as Educated Intuitions.Hanno Sauer - 2017 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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  6. added 2017-04-13
    Pride and Moral Responsibility.Jeremy Fischer - 2015 - Ratio 30 (1).
    Having the emotion of pride requires taking oneself to stand in some special relation to the object of pride. According to agency accounts of this pride relation, the self and the object of pride are suitably related just in case one is morally responsible for the existence or excellence of the object of one's pride. I argue that agency accounts fail. This argument provides a strong prima facie defence of an alternate account of pride, according to which the self and (...)
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  7. added 2017-04-13
    Crossing the Line. Dostoevsky and Nietzsche on Moral Permissibility.Stellino Paolo - 2014 - Jahrbuch der Deutschen Dostojewskij-Gesellschaft 21:99-125.
  8. added 2017-04-13
    Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness: A Case Study.Matthew Broome, Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli - 2010 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 19 (2):179-187.
    Various authors have argued that progress in the neurocognitive and neuropsychiatric sciences might threaten the commonsense understanding of how the mind generates behavior, and, as a consequence, it might also threaten the commonsense ways of attributing moral responsibility, if not the very notion of moral responsibility. In the case of actions that result in undesirable outcomes, the commonsense conception—which is reflected in sophisticated ways in the legal conception—tells us that there are circumstances in which the agent is entirely and fully (...)
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  9. added 2017-04-13
    Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. [REVIEW]Fischer John - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):196-198.
    In Our Stories, John Martin Fischer offers readers a characteristically thoughtful and engaging presentation of his views on a variety of topics, most notably death, immortality and self-expression. Having come to this collection familiar primarily with Fischer's work on freedom and responsibility, I was impressed with the range of issues treated in this latest volume. While each essay is independently appealing, perhaps the most compelling aspect of Our Stories is its cohesiveness. Fischer discerns a variety of subtle connections among the (...)
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  10. added 2017-04-13
    Empirical Psychology, Common Sense, and Kant’s Empirical Markers for Moral Responsibility.Patrick Frierson - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 39 (4):473-482.
    This paper explains the empirical markers by which Kant thinks that one can identify moral responsibility. After explaining the problem of discerning such markers within a Kantian framework, I briefly explain Kant’s empirical psychology. I then argue that Kant’s empirical markers for moral responsibility—linked to higher faculties of cognition—are not sufficient conditions for moral responsibility, primarily because they are empirical characteristics subject to natural laws. Next, I argue that these markers are not necessary conditions of moral responsibility. Given Kant’s transcendental (...)
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  11. added 2017-04-13
    Comments on David Palmer's "Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Determinism: Begging the Question in the Frankfurt Cases".Eric Funkhouser - 2006 - Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (2):91-93.
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  12. added 2017-04-13
    Regulative Control and the Subjectivist’s View of Moral Responsibility.P. Eddy Wilson - 2006 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 13 (1):28-33.
    In this essay I focus upon John Martin Fischer’s notion of taking on responsibility. In his view moral actors must acquire a proper self-understanding to take on moral responsibility. I question whether Fischer steps out of his role as a subjectivist, when he maintains that having only guidance control is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. I suggest that subjectivists are committed to the notion that taking on responsibility includes the acquisition of a proper phenomenology of freedom. I compare actors (...)
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  13. added 2017-04-05
    Business Principles, Life Principles.Cruz Cora - manuscript
    This paper introduces (or reiterates) a paradox: if humanist (rational and egalitarian) principles of social organization are attendant upon the evolution of an educated, leisured class (be it feudal or bourgeois), how can these norms be applied from the “bottom up”? It is the paradox of democratic liberalism, the spectre behind the ideal of “participatory parity” which both entails and presupposes equality of capability, and hence of socioeconomic status. By way of a very brief genealogy of enlightenment values, against contemporary (...)
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  14. added 2017-04-05
    Review Of: Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, Intersections, and New Perspectives. [REVIEW]Lane Timothy - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Review 16:1-6.
    If we already had a periodic table of mental illness in hand, there would be less need for a book of this type. Although some psychiatrists do think of themselves as chemists, the analogy is without warrant. Not only does psychiatry lack an analogue of the periodic table, its principal tool -- the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) -- is a contentious document. Even subsequent to the publication of DSM-III in 1980, which was intended to serve as (...)
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  15. added 2017-04-04
    A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame.Patrick Todd - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Recently, philosophers have turned their attention to the question, not when a given agent is blameworthy for what she does, but when a further agent has the moral standing to blame her for what she does. Philosophers have proposed at least four conditions on having “moral standing”: -/- 1. One’s blame would not be “hypocritical”. 2. One is not oneself “involved in” the target agent’s wrongdoing. 3. One must be warranted in believing that the target is indeed blameworthy for the (...)
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  16. added 2017-04-04
    Old Wine in New Bottles.Michael Klenk - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 172 (12):1-15.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments purport to show that robust moral realism, the metaethical view that there are non-natural and mind-independent moral properties and facts that we can know about, is incompatible with evolutionary explanations of morality. One of the most prominent evolutionary debunking arguments is advanced by Sharon Street, who argues that if moral realism were true, then objective moral knowledge is unlikely because realist moral properties are evolutionary irrelevant and moral beliefs about those properties would not be selected for. However, (...)
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  17. added 2017-04-03
    Normativity All the Way Down: From Normative Realism to Pannormism.Einar Duenger Bohn - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In this paper, I provide an argument for pannormism, the view according to which there are normative properties all the way down. In particular, I argue for what I call the trickling down principle, which says that if there is a metaphysically basic normative property, then, if whatever instantiates it has a ground, that ground instantiates it as well.
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  18. added 2017-04-03
    Do We Reflect While Performing Skillful Actions? Automaticity, Control, and the Perils of Distraction.Juan Pablo Bermúdez - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    From our everyday commuting to the gold medalist’s world-class performance, skillful actions are characterized by fine-grained, online agentive control. What is the proper explanation of such control? There are two traditional candidates: intellectualism explains skillful agentive control by reference to the agent’s propositional mental states; anti-intellectualism holds that propositional mental states or reflective processes are unnecessary, since skillful action is fully accounted for by automatic coping processes. I examine the evidence for three psychological phenomena recently held to support anti-intellectualism (choking (...)
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  19. added 2017-04-01
    'Ought Implies Can': Not So Pragmatic After All.Alex King - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Those who want to deny the ‘ought implies can’ principle often turn to weakened views to explain ‘ought implies can’ phenomena. The two most common versions of such views are (a) that ‘ought’ presupposes ‘can’, and (b) that ‘ought’ conversationally implicates ‘can’. This paper will reject both views, and in doing so, present a case against any pragmatic view of ‘ought implies can’. Unlike much of the literature, I won’t rely on counterexamples, but instead will argue that each of these (...)
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  20. added 2017-04-01
    We Can't Get No Satisfaction.Teresa Marques - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos:1-15.
    Many authors agree that there is a dimension of conflict expressed through discourse that eludes purely semantic approaches. How and why do conative attitudes conflict? The latter question is the object of this paper. Conflicts of attitudes are typically modelled on one of two models. The first imposes a Subjective Rationality constraint on conflicting attitudes, and the second depends on the impossibility of Joint Satisfaction. This paper assesses whether either of the two conditions can account for conflicting attitudes. First, it (...)
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  21. added 2017-04-01
    On Killing as Causing Death.Cheng-Chih Tsai - 2016 - Prolegomena 15 (2):163-175.
    Common sense has that killing someone amounts to causing the death of someone. This makes killing a physical, biological, or, at best, metaphysical issue, and, as a consequence, the ethics of killing can be dealt with independently of the non-ethical issue of who the killer is. However, in this paper, we show that this is not the case. A physical/biological definition of death plus a metaphysical definition of causation does not exhaust the meaning of killing. Rather, the notion of killing (...)
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  22. added 2017-03-29
    Moral Fixed Points and Conceptual Deficiency: Reply to Ingram (2015).Kyriacou Christos - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2017:1-9.
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  23. added 2017-03-28
    Metaethics in Context of Engineering Ethical and Moral Systems.Klincewicz Michal & Frank Lily - 2016 - In AAAI Spring Series Technical Reports. Palo Alto, CA, USA: AAAI Press.
  24. added 2017-03-27
    A Limited Skeptical Threat. [REVIEW]Joshua May - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    Doris argues that our choices are heavily influenced by forces that we wouldn’t count as genuine reasons. This unsettling conclusion is motivated by a debunking argument so wide-ranging that it isn’t foisted upon us by the sciences. Doris sometimes seems to lower his ambitions when offering instead a skeptical hypothesis argument, but that conflicts with his aims in the book.
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  25. added 2017-03-24
    Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Guise of the Good.Francesco Orsi - forthcoming - Topoi:1-10.
    The paper presents a positive argument for a version of metaphysically light ethical non-naturalism from the nature of mental states such as desires. It uses as its premise the time-honoured, and recently rediscovered, doctrine of the guise of the good, whereby it is essential to desire that the object of desire be conceived as good or as normatively favoured under some description. The argument is that if the guise of the good is a correct theory of desire, then a certain (...)
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  26. added 2017-03-24
    Making Sense of Value.Adrian M. S. Piper - 1996 - Ethics 106 (3):525-537.
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  27. added 2017-03-23
    On Being ‘Rational’ About Norms.Rem B. Edwards - 1967 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):180-186.
    The theses of this paper i: I. that the attempt to found absolute norns on rationality presupposes the availability of a single universal absolute conception of rationality but that no such conception is available; and II. that any conception of rationality which might be available for justifying one's ultimate normative commitments is itself evaluative. “Rationality” itself is a value-laden concept, as are all its philosophical sub-divisions—logic, ethics, aesthetics, axiology, etc. Choosing ultimate value principles under conditions of freedom, enlightenment, and impartiality (...)
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  28. added 2017-03-21
    Amoris laetitia, à la lumière de la clarté.Tristan Casabianca - manuscript
    L’exhortation apostolique Amoris laetitia contient de nombreuses ambiguïtés, notamment concernant l’accès à la communion des divorcés civilement remariés, dont elle refuse de trancher explicitement la question à la lumière de la doctrine de l’Eglise Catholique. Ce manque de clarté est préjudiciable. Il est susceptible d’être utilisé à l’encontre du Magistère. Il est également révélateur d’une approche philosophique occidentale marquée par l’individualisme et le relativisme. Or cette approche est de plus en plus contestée par l’actuelle « révolution conservatrice ».
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  29. added 2017-03-21
    Why Value Values?Samuel Murray - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    Doris argues that an agent is responsible for her behavior only if that behavior expresses (a relevant subset of) the agent’s values. This view has problems explaining responsibility for mistakes or episodes of forgetfulness. These problems highlight a conceptual problem with Doris’s theory of responsible agency and give us reasons to prefer an alternative (non-valuational) theory of responsible agency.
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  30. added 2017-03-21
    Not Knowing Everything That Matters.Jonathan Dancy & Daniel Muñoz - 2014 - The Philosophers' Magazine 66:94-99.
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  31. added 2017-03-20
    Love Redirected: On Adam Smith's Love of Praiseworthiness.Sveinung Sundfør Sivertsen - 2017 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 15 (1):101-123.
    Why be moral? Why, in the language of Adam Smith, act on what you think is praiseworthy even when it does not get you praise from other people? Because, answers Smith, you love praiseworthiness. But what is this love of praiseworthiness, and where does it come from? In this article, 1) I argue that we start to love praiseworthiness when we redirect our love of praise away from other people toward the ‘impartial spectator’-aspect of ourselves, and 2) show how this (...)
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  32. added 2017-03-18
    Two Kinds of Ethical Intuitionism: Brentano’s and Reid's.Olson Jonas - 2017 - The Monist 100 (1):106-119.
    This paper explores Franz Brentano’s metaethics by comparing it to Thomas Reid’s. Brentano and Reid share a commitment to moral realism and they are both aptly classified as intuitionists concerning moral knowledge and the nature of moral judgment. However, their respective versions of intuitionism are importantly different, in ways that reflect more general differences between their respective epistemological views. Sections III and IV of the paper focus more exclusively on Brentano’s metaethics and some of its unorthodox features. These features tie (...)
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  33. added 2017-03-18
    Grounded Ethics: The Empirical Bases of Normative Judgments.Max Hocutt - 2003 - Behavior and Philosophy 31:203-207.
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  34. added 2017-03-16
    Why Expressivists About Value Should Not Love Minimalism About Truth.Divers John & Church Alonso - 1994 - Analysis 54 (1):12-19.
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  35. added 2017-03-16
    Why Expressivists About Value Should Love Minimalism About Truth.Smith Michael - 1994 - Erkenntnis 54 (1):1-11.
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  36. added 2017-03-15
    On Universalism: Communitarians, Rorty, and “Liberal Metaphysicians”.Andrew Jason Cohen - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):39-75.
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  37. added 2017-03-14
    What Ability Can Do.Ben Schwan - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    One natural way to argue for the existence of some subjective constraint on agents’ obligations is to maintain that without that particular constraint, agents will sometimes be obligated to do that which they lack the ability to do. In this paper, I maintain that while such a strategy appears promising, it is fraught with pitfalls. Specifically, I argue that because the truth of an ability ascription depends on an (almost always implicit) characterization of the relevant possibility space, different metaethical accounts (...)
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  38. added 2017-03-13
    Mouffes Wittgensteinianische Analyse radikalen Dissenses und darüber hinaus.Ebeling Martin - 2014 - Zeitschrift Für Politische Theorie 5 (2):234–251.
    In this article, I discuss the epistemological aspects of ‘radical disagreement’ with reference to Chantal Mouffe’s theory of democracy and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s late philosophy. Mouffe builds on the latter to provide the necessary epistemological foundation to her critique of ‘rationalistic’ political philosophy and to continue this critique on the epistemological register. I argue, however, that her reading of Wittgenstein misses aspects vital to his ‘deep contextualism’. If we remain faithful to his project, the existence of a plurality of forms of (...)
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  39. added 2017-03-13
    Moral Realism: A Defence. [REVIEW]Jason Kawall - 2005 - Review of Metaphysics 59 (1):204-205.
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  40. added 2017-03-09
    Humeanism Without Humean Supervenience: A Projectivist Account of Laws and Possibilities.Barry Ward - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (3):191-218.
    Acceptance of Humean Supervenience and the reductive Humean analyses that entail it leads to a litany of inadequately explained conflicts with our intuitions regarding laws and possibilities. However, the non-reductive Humeanism developed here, on which law claims are understood as normative rather than fact stating, can accommodate those intuitions. Rational constraints on such norms provide a set of consistency relations that ground a semantics formulated in terms of factual-normative worlds, solving the Frege-Geach problem of construing unasserted contexts. This set of (...)
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  41. added 2017-03-06
    Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, Edited by James Lenman and Yonatan Shemmer. [REVIEW]Mark LeBar - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):1135-1140.
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  42. added 2017-03-06
    Truth and Acceptance Conditions for Moral Statements Can Be Identical: Further Support for Subjective Consequentialism: Scott Forschler.Scott Forschler - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (3):337-346.
    One of Peter Railton's arguments against subjective consequentialism is that it would erase the distinction between truth conditions and acceptance conditions for moral statements. It is assumed that if moral statements describe objective facts, as do scientific facts, then there should be times when, as in science, we are wholly justified via our currently available evidence in accepting a statement which is actually false. This analogy does not hold, because ethics is about the justifiability of our responses to situations, not (...)
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  43. added 2017-03-05
    Expressivism, Question Substitution and Evolutionary Debunking.Kyriacou Christos - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Expressivism is a blossoming meta-semantic framework sometimes relying on -what Carter and Chrisman (2012:323) call- ‘the core expressivist maneuver’. That is, that instead of asking about the nature of a certain kind of value that we should be asking about the nature of the value judgment in question. According to expressivists, this question substitution opens theoretical space for the elegant, economical and explanatorily powerful expressivist treatment of the relevant domain. I argue, however, that experimental work from cognitive psychology can shed (...)
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  44. added 2017-03-02
    Galen Strawson is a Closet Existentialist; or, the Ballistics of Nothingness.Cruz Cora - forthcoming - Comparative and Continental Philosophy 9 (1).
  45. added 2017-03-02
    Galen Strawson is a Closet Existentialist; or, the Ballistics of Nothingness.Cruz Cora - forthcoming - Comparative and Continental Philosophy 9 (1).
  46. added 2017-03-02
    Galen Strawson is a Closet Existentialist; or, the Ballistics of Nothingness.Cruz Cora - forthcoming - Comparative and Continental Philosophy 9 (1).
    The subject of free will has suffered something of a renascence in recent popularized American philosophy. The issue is, of course, a Gordian knot of underlying metaphysical and ontological presupposition, in both the analytic and continental traditions. In this paper, I attempt a bit of an untangling, and in doing so, I find that the fundamental position of the contemporary champion of “no freedom” (Galen Strawson) is not only compatible with a radical Sartrean freedom, but that the two philosophers’ deeper (...)
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  47. added 2017-03-02
    Galen Strawson is a Closet Existentialist; or, the Ballistics of Nothingness.Cruz Cora - forthcoming - Comparative and Continental Philosophy 9 (1).
  48. added 2017-03-02
    Libertarian Personal Responsibility.Joshua Preiss - forthcoming - Philosophy and Social Criticism:019145371662971.
    While libertarians affirm personal responsibility as a central moral and political value, libertarian theorists write relatively little about the theory and practice of this value. Focusing on the work of F. A. Hayek and David Schmidtz, this article identifies the core of a libertarian approach to personal responsibility and demonstrates the ways in which this approach entails a radical revision of the ethics and American politics of personal responsibility. Then, I highlight several central implications of this analysis in the American (...)
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  49. added 2017-03-02
    Galen Strawson is a Closet Existentialist; or, the Ballistics of Nothingness.Cora Cruz - forthcoming - Comparative and Continental Philosophy 9 (1).
  50. added 2017-03-02
    Galen Strawson is a Closet Existentialist; or, the Ballistics of Nothingness.Cruz Cora - forthcoming - Comparative and Continental Philosophy 9 (1).
    The subject of free will has suffered something of a renascence in recent popularized American philosophy. The issue is, of course, a Gordian knot of underlying metaphysical and ontological presupposition, in both the analytic and continental traditions. In this paper, I attempt a bit of an untangling, and in doing so, I find that the fundamental position of the contemporary champion of “no freedom” (Galen Strawson) is not only compatible with a radical Sartrean freedom, but that the two philosophers’ deeper (...)
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