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Meta-Ethics

Edited by Daniel Star (Boston University)
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  1. added 2017-01-22
    Alex Voorhoeve (forthcoming). Balancing Small Against Large Burdens. Behavioural Public Policy.
    Common principles for resource allocation in health care can prioritize the alleviation of small health burdens over lifesaving treatment. I argue that there is some evidence that these principles are at odds with a sizable share of public opinion, which holds that saving a life should take priority over any number of cures for minor ailments. I propose two possible explanations for this opinion, one debunking and one vindicatory. I also outline how well-designed surveys and moral inquiry could help decide (...)
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  2. added 2017-01-20
    Markus Rüther (2016). Normative Wahrheiten Ohne Ontologie? Derek Parfit Und der „Neue“ Non-Naturalismus. Zeitschrift Für Praktische Philosophie 3 (2):187-220.
    Das Thema des Beitrages bildet der „neue“ Non-Naturalismus, welcher exemplarisch am metaethischen Ansatz von Derek Parfit untersucht wird. Parfits Ansatz zeichnet sich durch das Ziel aus, eine neue Theorienoption zu ermöglichen, die einerseits von der Existenz normativer Tatsachen ausgeht, ohne jedoch andererseits auf die ontologischen Verpflichtungen der klassischen Vertreter des Non-Naturalismus festgelegt zu sein. Hierfür wird der Begriff der „nicht-ontologischen Existenz“ eingeführt und von robusten ontologischen Existenzweisen unterschieden. In diesem Beitrag wird dafür argumentiert, dass Parfit bisher nur Explikationen dieses zentralen (...)
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  3. added 2017-01-20
    Kay Hüwelmeyer (2016). Parfit Über Intuitionismus Und Die Herausforderung Moralischer Uneinigkeit. Zeitschrift Für Praktische Philosophie 3 (2):287-324.
    In On What Matters verbindet Parfit einen nicht-naturalistischen normativen Realismus –die Auffassung, es gebe objektive normative Wahrheiten – mit einer intuitionistischen Erkenntnistheorie bezüglich des Normativen, die davon ausgeht, wir hätten intuitiven epistemischen Zugriff auf jene normativen Wahrheiten. Beide Theorien sieht er durch ein Argument bedroht, das von moralischer Uneinigkeit ausgeht. Um diesem Argument zu entgehen, vertritt Parfit die These, dass unsere normativen Überzeugungen unter Idealbedingungen konvergieren. Dieser Aufsatz macht anhand des Beispiels meta-normativer Uneinigkeiten zunächst deutlich, dass Parfit die Plausibilität seiner (...)
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  4. added 2017-01-20
    Martin Sticker (2016). Parfit Und Kant Über Vernünftige Zustimmung ​. Zeitschrift Für Praktische Philosophie 3 (2):221-254.
    Nach Parfit konvergieren die systematisch stärksten Versionen von Kantianismus, Regel-Konsequentialismus und Kontraktualismus in einer Triple Theory. Ich konzentriere mich auf eine der zentralen Schwierigkeiten, Kantianismus und Konsequentialismus zusammenzubringen: die Rolle von Zustimmung, welche ihren deutlichsten Ausdruck in Kants Zweck-an-sich-Formel findet. Ich zeige zunächst, wie die Einführung unparteilicher, nichtmoralischer Gründe, auf der viel Gewicht in Parfits Zustimmungsprinzip liegt, in einigen Fällen die Zweck-an-sich-Formel zu dem intuitiv richtigen Ergebnis führen kann. Anschließend wende ich mich kritisch gegen Parfit. Ich diskutiere zwei Einwände gegen (...)
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  5. added 2017-01-20
    David Roth-Isigkeit (2016). Parfit über Konvergenz und moralischen Fortschritt. Zeitschrift Für Praktische Philosophie 3 (2):255-286.
    Dieser Beitrag widmet sich der Hauptthese in Derek Parfits On What Matters, dass kantianische, konsequentialistische und kontraktualistische Theorien in der Moralphilosophie richtig verstanden zu gleichen Ergebnissen bei der Beurteilung moralischer Fragen gelangen. Anhand einer Diskussion von Parfits Reformulierung des kontraktualistischen Arguments wird gezeigt, dass die Akzeptanz dieser These entscheidend von einer Akzeptanz des Parfit’schen Gründebegriffs abhängt. Während es On What Matters nicht gelingen wird, diejenigen zu überzeugen, die Parfits objektiv-wertbasierte Gründetheorie nicht teilen, verweist selbst eine schwache Version der Konvergenzthese auf (...)
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  6. added 2017-01-19
    Hayward Max (forthcoming). Practical Reason, Sympathy and Reactive Attitudes. Noûs.
  7. added 2017-01-19
    Antti Kauppinen (forthcoming). Empathy As the Moral Sense? Philosophia.
    In his recent work, Michael Slote argues that empathy is what Hutcheson called 'the moral sense'. The most innovative argument he offers for this claim is that our empathic reactions play a crucial role in fixing the reference of moral terms. I argue that Slote's bold proposal faces all the main problems of analytical naturalism, as well as some of its own. I suggest that empathy may nevertheless play a more modest and indirect role in acquiring moral knowledge.
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  8. added 2017-01-17
    Jade Schiff (forthcoming). Political Responsibility: Responding to Predicaments of Power. Contemporary Political Theory.
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  9. added 2017-01-17
    Cole Mitchell (forthcoming). Mixed Up About Mixed Worlds? Understanding Blackburn’s Supervenience Argument. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Simon Blackburn’s supervenience argument—focusing on the mysterious “ban on mixed worlds”—is still subject to a variety of conflicting interpretations. In this paper, I hope to provide a defense of the argument that clarifies both the argument and the objections it must overcome. Many of the extant objections, I will argue, fail to engage the argument in its true form. And to counter the more compelling objections, it will be necessary to bring in additional argumentation that Blackburn himself does not clearly (...)
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  10. added 2017-01-17
    Hallvard Lillehammer (forthcoming). Projection, Indeterminacy and Moral Skepticism. In Diego Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York, USA: Routledge.
  11. added 2017-01-17
    William J. FitzPatrick (forthcoming). Ontology for an Uncompromising Ethical Realism. Topoi:1-11.
    I begin by distinguishing two general approaches to metaethics and ontology. One in effect puts our experience as engaged ethical agents on hold while independent metaphysical and epistemological inquiries, operating by their own lights, deliver metaethical verdicts on acceptable interpretations of our ethical lives; the other instead keeps engaged ethical experience in focus and allows our reflective interpretation of it to shape our metaphysical and epistemological views, including our ontology. While the former approach often leads to deflationary views, the latter (...)
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  12. added 2017-01-17
    Justin Horn (forthcoming). Moral Realism, Fundamental Moral Disagreement, and Moral Reliability. Journal of Value Inquiry:1-19.
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  13. added 2017-01-17
    Alice Baderin (2017). Reflective Equilibrium. Social Theory and Practice 43 (1):1-28.
    The paper explores whether the method of reflective equilibrium (RE) in ethics and political philosophy should be individual or public in character. I defend a modestly public conception of RE, in which public opinion is used specifically as a source of considered judgments about cases. Public opinion is superior to philosophical opinion in delivering judgments that are untainted by principled commitments. A case-based approach also mitigates the methodological problems that commonly confront efforts to integrate philosophy with the investigation of popular (...)
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  14. added 2017-01-17
    Seyed Ali Kalantari & Alexander Miller (2017). Believing In Twin Earth: New Evidence for the Normativity of Belief. European Journal of Philosophy 24 (3).
    According to many philosophers, the notion of belief is constitutively normative ; Shah ; Shah and Velleman (); Gibbard (); Wedgwood ). In a series of widely discussed papers, Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have developed an ingenious ‘Moral Twin Earth’ argument against ‘Cornell Realist’ metaethical views which hold that moral terms have synthetic natural definitions in the manner of natural kind terms. In this paper we shall suggest that an adaptation of the Moral Twin Earth argument to the doxastic (...)
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  15. added 2017-01-17
    Micah Lott (2016). Moral Implications From Cognitive (Neuro)Science? No Clear Route. Ethics 127 (1):241-256.
    Joshua Greene argues that cognitive (neuro)science matters for ethics in two ways, the “direct route” and the “indirect route.” Greene illustrates the direct route with a debunking explanation of the inclination to condemn all incest. The indirect route is an updated version of Greene’s argument that dual-process moral psychology gives support for consequentialism over deontology. I consider each of Greene’s arguments, and I argue that neither succeeds. If there is a route from cognitive (neuro)science to ethics, Greene has not found (...)
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  16. added 2017-01-17
    Rockmore Tom (2016). Epistemic Constructivism, Metaphysical Realism and Parmenidean Identity. Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 48 (2):59-74.
    The cognitive problem, which is a main modern theme, arises early in the Greektra- dition. Parmenides, who formulates one ofthe first identifiably "modern" approaches to epistemology, points toward identity as the only acceptable cognitive standard. The paper, which leaves epistemic skepticism for another occasion, reviews versions of metaphysicalrealism identified with Plato in ancient philosophy and Descartes in the modern tradition in suggesting that for different reasons both fail. The paper reviews German idealist versions of epistemic constructivism formulated by Kant, Fichte (...)
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  17. added 2017-01-17
    E. M. Dadlez (2016). Comment on “Standing Conditions and Blame” by Amy McKiernan. Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (2):49-52.
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  18. added 2017-01-17
    Loy H. -C., Justification and Debate: Thoughts on Moist Moral Epistemology.
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  19. added 2017-01-17
    Terence Cuneo (2016). Destabilizing the Error Theory. In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 71-94.
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  20. added 2017-01-17
    Scott F. Aikin (2016). Mention Problems for Expressivism. Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (2):73-75.
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  21. added 2017-01-17
    Christopher B. Kulp (2016). Disagreement and the Defensibility of Moral Intuitionism. International Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):487-502.
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  22. added 2017-01-17
    Jack Woods (2016). Chrisman, Matthew. "The Meaning of ‘Ought’: Beyond Descriptivism and Expressivism in Metaethics.". [REVIEW] Ethics 127 (1):272-277.
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  23. added 2017-01-17
    Jihan Lyou (2016). A Critical Study on A. J. Ayer’s Emotivism. Journal of Ethics 1 (111):1-30.
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  24. added 2017-01-17
    Blake D. Dutton (2016). 6. The Error of the Academics. In Augustine and Academic Skepticism: A Philosophical Study. Cornell University Press. pp. 120-138.
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  25. added 2017-01-17
    Anna Elisabetta Galeotti (2016). The Attribution of Responsibility to Self‐Deceivers. Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (4):420-438.
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  26. added 2017-01-17
    Lavinia Andreea Bejan (2015). From Moral Responsibility to Legal Responsibility in the Conduct of War. Symposion 2 (3):347-362.
    Different societies came to consider certain behaviors as morally wrong, and, in time, due to a more or less general practice, those behaviors have also become legally prohibited. While, nowadays, the existence of legal responsibility of states and individuals for certain reprehensible acts committed during an armed conflict, international or non-international, is hard to be disputed, an inquiry into the manner in which the behavior of the belligerents has come to be considered reveals long discussions in the field of morals (...)
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  27. added 2017-01-17
    Simkulet William (2015). On the Signpost Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Why Contemporary Frankfurt-Style Cases Are Irrelevant to the Free Will Debate. Filosofiska Notiser 2 (3):107-120.
    This article contends that recent attempts to construct Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) are irrelevant to the debate over free will. The principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) states that moral responsibility requires indeterminism, or multiple possible futures. Frankfurt's original case purported to demonstrate PAP false by showing an agent can be blameworthy despite not having the ability to choose otherwise; however he admits the agent can come to that choice freely or by force, and thus has alternate possibilities. Neo-FSCs attempt to show (...)
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  28. added 2017-01-17
    Massimo Reichlin (2014). 4. Neuroethics and the Rationalism/Sentimentalism Divide. In Christoph Lumer (ed.), Morality in Times of Naturalising the Mind. De Gruyter. pp. 127-144.
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  29. added 2017-01-17
    Anna Strhan, Art and Responsibility.
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  30. added 2017-01-17
    J. Mizzoni (2014). Evolution and Moral Relativism. Social Science Information 53 (4):483-499.
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  31. added 2017-01-17
    Bart Streumer, Are Normative Properties Descriptive Properties?
    Some philosophers think that normative properties are identical to descriptive properties. In this paper, I argue that this entails that it is possible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I argue that Frank Jackson’s argument to show that this is possible fails, and that the objections to this argument show that it is impossible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I conclude that normative properties are not identical to descriptive properties. I then (...)
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  32. added 2017-01-17
    Ţuţui Viorel (2011). Democracy and Moral Conflict. [REVIEW] Logos and Episteme 2 (2):313-318.
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  33. added 2017-01-17
    Jonathan Dancy, Andreas Lind & Johan Brannmark, Particularism in Question: An Interview with Jonathan Dancy.
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  34. added 2017-01-17
    Arto Laitinen (2008). 9. Moral Realism and Personal Variations. In Strong Evaluation Without Moral Sources: On Charles Taylor's Philosophical Anthropology and Ethics. Walter de Gruyter.
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  35. added 2017-01-17
    Dancy Jonathan, Review: Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge, Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. [REVIEW]
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  36. added 2017-01-17
    Josep Corbí (2004). Normativity, Moral Realism, and Unmasking Explanations. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 19 (2):155-172.
    Moral Projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume that there are moral properties in the world in order to fix the content of our moral judgements. To show this, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism, which is, nowadays, the most promising version of moral projectivism. In this context, I call into question both (...)
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  37. added 2017-01-17
    Jonathan Dancy, Review of 'Ethical Particularism: An Essay on Moral Reasons' by U. Kihlbom. [REVIEW]
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  38. added 2017-01-17
    Jonathan Dancy, From Intuitionism to Emotivism.
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  39. added 2017-01-17
    Lilian Alweiss (2003). Collective Guilt and Responsibility. European Journal of Political Theory 2 (3):307-318.
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  40. added 2017-01-17
    F. Salter (1995). Comments on the Naturalistic Fallacy, Biology and Politics. Social Science Information 34 (2):333-345.
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  41. added 2017-01-17
    Blackburn Simon (1992). Gibbard on Normative Logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):947-952.
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  42. added 2017-01-17
    Charles Wei - Hsun Fu (1971). Hare's Prescriptivism. NTU Philosophical Review 1:25-62.
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  43. added 2017-01-17
    O. P. A. M. Crofts (1960). Moral Philosophy. Its General Principles.
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  44. added 2017-01-16
    Emilian Mihailov (2015). The Argument From Self-Defeating Beliefs Against Deontology. Ethical Perspectives 22 (4):573-600.
    There is a tendency to use data from neuroscience, cognitive science and experimental psychology to rail against philosophical ethics. Recently, Joshua Greene has argued that deontological judgments tend to be supported by emotional responses to irrelevant features, whereas consequentialist judgments are more reliable because they tend to be supported by cognitive processes. In this article, I will analyse the evidence used by Greene to suggest a different kind of argument against deontology, which I will call the argument from self-defeating beliefs. (...)
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  45. added 2017-01-14
    Alex Voorhoeve, Arnaldur Stefansson & Brian Wallace, Similarity and Moral Choice.
    How, and how reliably, do people make difficult moral trade-offs? We pursue this question through an experiment in which subjects must either save a larger number of people from a smaller harm or save a smaller number of people from a greater harm. Our results indicate widespread use of a similarity heuristic. When alternatives appear dissimilar in terms of the number of people that can be saved but similar in terms of the magnitude of harm from which they can be (...)
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  46. added 2017-01-13
    Steven Swartzer (forthcoming). A Challenge for Humean Externalism. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    Humean externalism is the view that moral motivation must be explained in terms of desires that are “external” to an agent’s motivationally-inert moral judgments. A standard argument in favor of Humean externalism appeals to the possibility of amoral or morally cynical agents—agents for whom moral considerations gain no motivational traction. The possibility of such agents seems to provide evidence for both the claim that moral judgments are themselves motivationally inert, and the claim that moral motivation has its source in desires (...)
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  47. added 2017-01-10
    Brendan Cline (forthcoming). The Tale of a Moderate Normative Skeptic. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    While Richard Joyce’s moral skepticism might seem to be an extreme metaethical view, it is actually far more moderate than it might first appear. By articulating four challenges facing his approach to moral skepticism, I argue that Joyce’s moderation is, in fact, a theoretical liability. First, the fact that Joyce is not skeptical about normativity in general makes it possible to develop close approximations to morality, lending support to moderate moral revisionism over moral error theory. Second, Joyce relies on strong, (...)
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  48. added 2017-01-10
    Mar Cabezas (2014). Ética y emoción: el papel de las emociones en la justificación de nuestros juicios morales. Madrid: Plaza y Valdés.
    Todas las personas estamos dotadas de una conciencia moral. Además, solemos pensar que si algo es bueno o malo, lo es para cualquier persona en cualquier lugar. Sin embargo, la interacción con miembros de otras culturas, los dilemas propios de sociedades interculturales y los retos diarios de la convivencia con otras personas nos confrontan en muchas ocasiones con una realidad: el desacuerdo moral. Todos parecemos saber por qué lo bueno es bueno y lo malo es malo, hasta que tratamos de (...)
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  49. added 2017-01-08
    Nicholas Southwood (forthcoming). Constructing Practical Normativity. In K. Jones & F. Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. Oxford University Press.
    Constructivists hold that truths about practical reasons are to be explained in terms of the exercise of practical reason in accordance with certain norms (rather than vice versa). But what is the normative status of the relevant norms of practical reason? The problem is that constructivism appears to presuppose the truth of two theses that seem hard to reconcile. First, the relevant norms have a special normative status that goes beyond the minimal normativity of, say, the rules of snakes and (...)
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  50. added 2017-01-06
    Emilia Alexandra Antonese (2015). Understanding Moral Judgments: The Role of the Agent’s Characteristics in Moral Evaluations. Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 2 (2): 203-213.
    Traditional studies have shown that the moral judgments are influenced by many biasing factors, like the consequences of a behavior, certain characteristics of the agent who commits the act, or the words chosen to describe the behavior. In the present study we investigated a new factor that could bias the evaluation of morally relevant human behavior: the perceived similarity between the participants and the agent described in the moral scenario. The participants read a story about a driver who illegally overtook (...)
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