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Meta-Ethics

Edited by Daniel Star (Boston University)
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  1. added 2017-01-14
    Voorhoeve Alex, Arnaldur Stefansson & Brian Wallace, Similarity and Moral Choice.
    How, and how reliably, do people make difficult moral trade-offs? We pursue this question through an experiment in which subjects must either save a larger number of people from a smaller harm or save a smaller number of people from a greater harm. Our results indicate widespread use of a similarity heuristic. When alternatives appear dissimilar in terms of the number of people that can be saved but similar in terms of the magnitude of harm from which they can be (...)
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  2. added 2017-01-13
    Steven Swartzer (forthcoming). A Challenge for Humean Externalism. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    Humean externalism is the view that moral motivation must be explained in terms of desires that are “external” to an agent’s motivationally-inert moral judgments. A standard argument in favor of Humean externalism appeals to the possibility of amoral or morally cynical agents—agents for whom moral considerations gain no motivational traction. The possibility of such agents seems to provide evidence for both the claim that moral judgments are themselves motivationally inert, and the claim that moral motivation has its source in desires (...)
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  3. added 2017-01-10
    Brendan Cline (forthcoming). The Tale of a Moderate Normative Skeptic. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    While Richard Joyce’s moral skepticism might seem to be an extreme metaethical view, it is actually far more moderate than it might first appear. By articulating four challenges facing his approach to moral skepticism, I argue that Joyce’s moderation is, in fact, a theoretical liability. First, the fact that Joyce is not skeptical about normativity in general makes it possible to develop close approximations to morality, lending support to moderate moral revisionism over moral error theory. Second, Joyce relies on strong, (...)
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  4. added 2017-01-10
    Mar Cabezas (2014). Ética y emoción: el papel de las emociones en la justificación de nuestros juicios morales. Madrid: Plaza y Valdés.
    Todas las personas estamos dotadas de una conciencia moral. Además, solemos pensar que si algo es bueno o malo, lo es para cualquier persona en cualquier lugar. Sin embargo, la interacción con miembros de otras culturas, los dilemas propios de sociedades interculturales y los retos diarios de la convivencia con otras personas nos confrontan en muchas ocasiones con una realidad: el desacuerdo moral. Todos parecemos saber por qué lo bueno es bueno y lo malo es malo, hasta que tratamos de (...)
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  5. added 2017-01-08
    Nicholas Southwood (forthcoming). Constructing Practical Normativity. In K. Jones & F. Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. Oxford University Press.
    Constructivists hold that truths about practical reasons are to be explained in terms of the exercise of practical reason in accordance with certain norms (rather than vice versa). But what is the normative status of the relevant norms of practical reason? The problem is that constructivism appears to presuppose the truth of two theses that seem hard to reconcile. First, the relevant norms have a special normative status that goes beyond the minimal normativity of, say, the rules of snakes and (...)
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  6. added 2017-01-06
    Emilia Alexandra Antonese (2015). Understanding Moral Judgments: The Role of the Agent’s Characteristics in Moral Evaluations. Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 2 (2): 203-213.
    Traditional studies have shown that the moral judgments are influenced by many biasing factors, like the consequences of a behavior, certain characteristics of the agent who commits the act, or the words chosen to describe the behavior. In the present study we investigated a new factor that could bias the evaluation of morally relevant human behavior: the perceived similarity between the participants and the agent described in the moral scenario. The participants read a story about a driver who illegally overtook (...)
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  7. added 2017-01-06
    Ana Maria Hojbotă (2014). Implicit Theories of Morality, Personality, and Contextual Factors in Moral Appraisal. Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (2):191-221.
    This article explores the implicit theories of morality, or the conceptions regarding the patterns of stability, continuity and change in moral dispositions, both in lay and academic discourses. The controversies surrounding these conceptions and the fragmentation of the models and perspectives in metaethics and moral psychology endangers the pursuit of adequate operationalizations of morally relevant constructs. The current debate between situationists, who deny that character is an useful concept for understanding human behavior, which is better explained by contextual factors (Doris (...)
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  8. added 2017-01-04
    Nieswandt Katharina (forthcoming). Authority and Interest in the Theory of Right. In David Plunkett, Scott Shapiro & Kevin Toh (eds.), Legal Norms, Moral Norms: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    I suggest a new role for authority and interest in the theory of right: Rights can be explicated as sets of prohibitions, permissions and commands, and they must be justified by interests. I argue as follows: (1) The two dominant theories of right—“Will Theory” and “Interest Theory”—have certain standard problems. (2) These problems are systematic: Will Theory’s criterion of the ability to enforce a duty is either false or empty outside of its original legal context, whereas Interest Theory includes in (...)
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  9. added 2017-01-04
    Shyam Ranganathan (2017). Interpretation, Explication and Secondary Sources. In The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Ethics. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 103-122.
    This chapter serves as a conclusion to the opening part of this book: Western Imperialism, Indology, and Ethics. The topics covered in this opening part traverse the issues involved in the study of philosophy: these pertain to the philosophy of thought, language, translation theory, moral semantics, culture, imperialism, and proper procedure for research.
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  10. added 2017-01-04
    Shyam Ranganathan (2017). Patañjali’s Yoga: Universal Ethics as the Formal Cause of Autonomy. In The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Ethics. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 177-202.
    Yoga is a nonspeciesist liberalism, founded in a moral non-naturalism, which identifies the essence of personhood as the Lord, defined by unconservative self-governance—an abstraction from each of us that is non-proprietary. According to Yoga, the right is defined as the approximation of the regulative ideal (the Lord) and the good is the perfection of this practice, which delivers us from a life of coercion into a personal world of freedom. It is an alternative to Deontology, Consequentialism, and Virtue Ethics, which (...)
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  11. added 2017-01-04
    Shyam Ranganathan (2016). Yoga and Sāṅkhya: Freedom Versus Determinism (Ethics-1, M38). In A. Raghuramaraju (ed.), Philosophy, E-PG Pathshala. Delhi: India, Department of Higher Education (NMEICT).
    The Yoga Sūtra (YS) is perhaps the most popular book of Indian philosophy today the world over. It is widely regarded by practitioners of Yoga as a conceptual manual for yoga and there are several competing translations of the work on the market. Yet, the Yoga Sūtra is also widely regarded as a difficult text to read. It is written in a dense, aphoristic, sūtra format. In the introductory section, I tackle the question of methodology in reading the Yoga Sūtra. (...)
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  12. added 2017-01-03
    Shyam Ranganathan (2016). Vedānta, Śaṅkara and Moral Irrealism (Ethics-1, M10). In A. Raghuramaraju (ed.), Philosophy, E-PG Pathshala. Delhi: India, Department of Higher Education (NMEICT).
    This and the following lessons cover the topic of Vedānta and ethics. Vedānta has two meanings. The first is the literal sense – “End of Vedas” – and refers to the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads—the latter part of the Vedas. The second sense of “Vedanta” is a scholastic one, and refers to a philosophical orientation that attempts to explain the cryptic Vedānta Sūtra (Brahma Sūtra) of Bādarāyaṇa, which aims at being a summary of the End of the Vedas. We shall pursue (...)
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  13. added 2017-01-03
    Shyam Ranganathan (2016). Ethics and Reality (Ethics-1, M06). In A. Raghuramaraju (ed.), Philosophy, E-PG Pathshala. Delhi: India, Department of Higher Education (NMEICT).
    In this lesson, I explore three areas of intersection between ethics and metaphysics: accounts of the self, the reality of value, and basic distinctions in ethical theory. I compare the account of the self as a chariot from the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (Deontology), early Buddhism from Questions of King Milinda (Consequentialism), and Plato's Phaedrus (Virtue Ethics). In each case, the metaphysical model is continuous with the moral theory of the same perspective and adopted to accommodate the moral theory. I also compare (...)
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  14. added 2017-01-03
    Shyam Ranganathan (2016). Vedānta – Rāmānuja and Madhva: Moral Realism and Freedom Vs. Determinism (Ethics 1, M11). In A. Raghuramaraju (ed.), Philosophy, E-PG Pathshala. Delhi: India, Department of Higher Education (NMEICT).
    Vedānta has two meanings. The first is the literal sense – “End of Vedas” – and refers to the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads—the latter part of the Vedas. The second sense of “Vedanta” is a scholastic one, and refers to a philosophical orientation that attempts to explain the cryptic Vedānta Sūtra (Brahma Sūtra) of Bādarāyaṇa, which aims at being a summary of the End of the Vedas. In the previous module, I review the ethics of the End of the Vedas and (...)
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  15. added 2017-01-03
    Shyam Ranganathan (2016). Ethics and Knowledge (Ethics-1, M05). In A. A. Raghuramaraju (ed.), Philosophy, E-PG Pathshala. Delhi: India, Department of Higher Education (NMEICT).
    In this lesson I explore the question of moral epistemology by way of the thought of Plato, Aristotle and the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā tradition.
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  16. added 2017-01-03
    Stratton-Lake Philip (2016). Intuition, Self-Evidence,and Understanding. In Russ Shafer Landau (ed.), Oxford Studes in Meta Ethics. Oxford: OUP. pp. 28-44.
    Here I criticise Audi's account of self-evidece. I deny that understanding of a proposition can justify belief in it and offfer an account of intuition that can take the place of understanding in an account of self-evidence.
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  17. added 2017-01-03
    Shyam Ranganathan (2016). Early Buddhism I: Metaethics (Ethics-1, M-30). In A. Raghuramaraju (ed.), Philosophy, E-PG Pathshala. Delhi: India, Department of Higher Education (NMEICT).
    Metaethics is that part of moral philosophy that is interested in the conceptual resolution of the relationship between the RIGHT and the GOOD. Metaethics is, hence, one step removed from practical questions of how to live—but not disconnected from them. Our investigation will begin with the early Buddhist account of language as meaningful for intersubjective reasons. This gives rise to a critical awareness of the correspondence between linguistic meaning and reality. The correspondence is outside of our control, but also structured (...)
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  18. added 2017-01-03
    Shyam Ranganathan (2016). Lao Tzu's Ethics: Taoism (Ethics-1, M35). In A. Raghuramaraju (ed.), Philosophy, E-PG Pathshala. Delhi: India, Department of Higher Education (NMEICT).
    This module is a review of the guiding ideas of Lao Tzu’s ethics of wu wei and the Tao, an account of Lao Tzu’s prioritisation of the feminine as a basic moral principle, the problem of masculinity for practical rationality, his criticism of language, doctrines and oppressive politics. Finally, we shall evaluate the moral import of Lao Tzu’s teachings, and close with some reflections on the synergy between Taoist and Madhyamaka Buddhist thought, which rendered the latter so easily received in (...)
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  19. added 2017-01-03
    Ranganathan Shyam (2016). Pūrva Mīmāṃsā: Non-Natural, Moral Realism (Ethics-1, M14). In A. Raghuramaraju (ed.), Philosophy, E-PG Pathshala. Delhi: India, Department of Higher Education (NMEICT).
    In this module I set out the Moral Non-Naturalism of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā as a version of Deontology that defines duty in terms of its beneficent properties. It elucidates the scheme of right living according to ordinance or command. Whereas natural accounts of moral terms suffer from circularity (by merely re-naming of a natural property with a moral term, which then serves to justify its moral appraisal), proponents of Mīmāṃsā defend their position by offering the Vedas as constituting independent evidence about (...)
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  20. added 2017-01-03
    Ranganathan Shyam (2007). Translating Evaluative Discourse: The Semantics of Thick and Thin Concepts. Dissertation, York University
    According to the philosophical tradition, translation is successful when one has substituted words and sentences from one language with those from another by cross-linguistic synonymy. Moreover, according to the orthodox view, the meaning of expressions and sentences of languages are determined by their basic or systematic role in a language. This makes translating normative and evaluative discourse puzzling for two reasons. First, as languages are syntactically and semantically different because of their peculiar cultural and historical influences, and as values and (...)
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  21. added 2016-12-27
    Caruso Gregg (forthcoming). Consciousness, Free Will, Moral Responsibility. In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. Routledge.
    In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. To properly assess what, if anything, these empirical advances can tell us about free will and moral responsibility, we first need to get clear on the following questions: Is consciousness necessary for free will? If so, what role or (...)
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  22. added 2016-12-22
    Arpaly Nomy (2015). Huckleberry FInn Revisited: Inverse Akrasia and Moral Ignorance". In Randolph Clarcke Michael Mckenna & Angela M. Smith (eds.), The Nature of Moral Responsibility. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 141-156.
    This paper argue that moral ignorance does not excuse. Nobody is off the hook for doing something bad simply because she did it believing ii to be right. The paper uses the Arpaly view that cases of Akrasia can be praiseworthy as one premise in the argument.
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  23. added 2016-12-21
    Brent G. Kyle (forthcoming). Courage, Cowardice, and Maher's Misstep. Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-23.
    Could a Nazi soldier or terrorist be courageous? The Courage Problem asks us to answer this sort of question, and then to explain why people are reluctant to give this answer. The present paper sheds new light on the Courage Problem by examining a controversy sparked by Bill Maher, who claimed that the 9/11 terrorists’ acts were ‘not cowardly.’ It is shown that Maher's controversy is fundamentally related to the Courage Problem. Then, a unified solution to both problems is provided. (...)
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  24. added 2016-12-21
    Brent G. Kyle (2016). Thick Concepts. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A term expresses a thick concept if it expresses a specific evaluative concept that is also substantially descriptive. It is a matter of debate how this rough account should be unpacked, but examples can help to convey the basic idea. Thick concepts are often illustrated with virtue concepts like courageous and generous, action concepts like murder and betray, epistemic concepts like dogmatic and wise, and aesthetic concepts like gaudy and brilliant. These concepts seem to be evaluative, unlike purely descriptive concepts (...)
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  25. added 2016-12-20
    Gunnar Björnsson (forthcoming). On Individual and Shared Obligations: In Defense of the Activist’s Perspective. In Mark Budolfson, Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), Philosophy and Climate Change. Oxford University Press.
    We naturally attribute obligations to groups, and take such obligations to have consequences for the obligations of group members. The threat posed by anthropogenic climate change provides an urgent case. It seems that we, together, have an obligation to prevent climate catastrophe, and that we, as individuals, have an obligation to contribute. However, understood strictly, attributions of obligations to groups might seem illegitimate. On the one hand, the groups in question—the people alive today, say—are rarely fully-fledged moral agents, making it (...)
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  26. added 2016-12-19
    Daniel Coren (forthcoming). On Young’s Version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Philosophia:1-10.
    Harry Frankfurt (1969) famously gave cases in which an agent lacks alternate possibilities and yet seems morally responsible. Such cases purportedly falsify the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, which states that the ability to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility. There is an enormous body of literature debating whether or not Frankfurt cases and their variants do in fact falsify PAP. In order to sidestep Frankfurt cases altogether, Garry Young (2016) argues for a different version of PAP, namely, PAP, on (...)
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  27. added 2016-12-15
    Starks Michael (2016). Altruism, Jesus and the End of the World—How the Templeton Foundation Bought a Harvard Professorship and Attacked Evolution, Rationality and Civilization. A Review of E.O. Wilson 'The Social Conquest of Earth' (2012) and Nowak and Highfield ‘SuperCooperators’ (2012). In Michael Starks (ed.), Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 by Michael Starks 662p (2016). Michael Starks. pp. 527-532.
    Famous ant-man E.O. Wilson has always been one of my heroes --not only an outstanding biologist, but one of the tiny and vanishing minority of intellectuals who at least dares to hint at the truth about our nature that others fail to grasp, or insofar as they do grasp, studiously avoid for of political expedience. Sadly, he is ending his long career in a most sordid fashion as a party to an ignorant and arrogant attack on science motivated at least (...)
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  28. added 2016-12-12
    John Anthony Raymaker (2013). Empowering Bernard Lonergan's Legacy. University Press of America.
    This work offers an interdisciplinary approach to Lonergan'swork. It strives to establish foundations for an interdisciplinary ethics and a method for interreligious dialogue. It examines many historical precedents as to how the data of human consciousness affect all human knowledge and activities.
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  29. added 2016-12-10
    Yael Loewenstein (2016). Why the Direct Argument Does Not Shift the Burden of Proof. Journal of Philosophy 113 (4):210-223.
    Peter van Inwagen's influential Direct Argument (DA) for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and causal determinism makes use of an inference rule he calls "Rule B." Michael McKenna has argued that van Inwagen's defense of this rule is dialectically inappropriate because it is based entirely on alleged “confirming” cases that are not of the right kind to justify the use of Rule B in DA. Here I argue that McKenna’s objection is on the right track but more must be said (...)
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  30. added 2016-12-09
    Diego E. Machuca (ed.) (2017). Moral Skepticism: New Essays. Routledge.
    Moral skepticism is at present a vibrant topic of philosophical inquiry. Particularly since the turn of the millennium, the metaethical study of skepticism has profited from advances in general epistemology and findings in empirical sciences, in light of which new arguments for and against moral skepticism have been devised, while the traditional ones have been reexamined. This collection of original essays by leading metaethicists will advance the ongoing debates about various forms of moral skepticism by drawing on recent innovative work (...)
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  31. added 2016-12-08
    Wisdom Jeff (forthcoming). Review of Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence by Jonas Olson. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly.
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  32. added 2016-12-08
    Shyam Ranganathan (2017). Beyond Moral Twin Earth: Beyond Indology. In The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Ethics. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 85-102.
    The Linguistic Account of Thought holds that thought is the meaning of declarative sentences. According to Linguistic Internalism, two languages can share sentential meanings and hence express the same thought. According to Linguistic Particularism, thought content is relative to languages and is not shared. We can contrast these two accounts of thought with a third: the intension of a thought is a common disciplinary use of differing meaningful claims, and the extension of a thought is the collection of sentences or (...)
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  33. added 2016-12-05
    Levy Arnon & Yair Levy (2016). The Debunking Challenge to Realism: How Evolution (Ultimately) Matters. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:1-8.
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  34. added 2016-12-01
    Jonathan Way (forthcoming). Creditworthiness and Matching Principles. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 7. Oxford University Press.
    You are creditworthy for φ-ing only if φ-ing is the right thing to do. Famously though, further conditions are needed too – Kant’s shopkeeper did the right thing, but is not creditworthy for doing so. This case shows that creditworthiness requires that there be a certain kind of explanation of why you did the right thing. The reasons for which you act – your motivating reasons – must meet some further conditions. In this paper, I defend a new account of (...)
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  35. added 2016-11-28
    Christian Miller (2016). In Defense of a Supernatural Foundation to Morality: Reply to Shermer. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences:91-96.
    In my original paper, I claimed that our moral obligations are real, objective, and grounded in the supernatural. In particular, I endorsed the claim that God's will is the basis or source of our moral obligations, where “God” is to be understood as the theistic being who is omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent, who created the universe, and who is still actively involved in the universe after creating it. In his critical article, Michael Shermer has raised a number of important challenges (...)
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  36. added 2016-11-28
    James Beebe, Runya Qiaoan, Tomasz Wysocki & Miguel A. Endara (2015). “Moral Objectivism in Cross-Cultural Perspective”. Journal of Cognition and Culture 15:386-401.
    Moral psychologists have recently turned their attention to the study of folk metaethical beliefs. We report the results of a cross-cultural study using Chinese, Polish and Ecuadorian participants that seeks to advance this line of investigation. Individuals in all three demographic groups were observed to attribute objectivity to ethical statements in very similar patterns. Differences in participants’ strength of opinion about an issue, the level of societal agreement or disagreement about an issue, and participants’ age were found to significantly affect (...)
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  37. added 2016-11-28
    James R. Beebe (2015). The Empirical Study of Folk Metaethics. Etyka 15.
    In this paper, I review recent attempts by experimental philosophers and psychologists to study folk metaethics empirically and discuss some of the difficulties that researchers face when trying to construct the right kind of research materials and interpreting the results that they obtain. At first glance, the findings obtained so far do not look good for the thesis that people are everywhere moral realists about every moral issue. However, because of difficulties in interpreting these results, I argue that better research (...)
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  38. added 2016-11-28
    James R. Beebe (2014). How Different Kinds of Disagreement Impact Folk Metaethical Judgments. In Jennifer Cole Wright & Hagop Sarkissian (eds.), Advances in Experimental Moral Psychology. Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 167-187.
    Th e present article reports a series of experiments designed to extend the empirical investigation of folk metaethical intuitions by examining how different kinds of ethical disagreement can impact attributions of objectivity to ethical claims.
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  39. added 2016-11-27
    Alfred Gierer (2008). Was ist der Mensch? In D. Ganten, V. Gerhardt, J. Nida-Rümelin & J. C. Heilinger (eds.), Was ist der Mensch? Humanprojekt der BBAW. de Gruyter. pp. 103-105.
    Der Text ist eines von achtzig Kurzessays zum Thema „Was ist der Mensch“, zu denen unsere Arbeitsgruppe „Humanprojekt“ der Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften eingeladen hat. So genau Aussagen inhaltlicher Naturwissenschaft oft sind, auf der metatheoretischen Ebene bleibt die Gesamtheit unseres Wissens, und damit auch die Stellung des Menschen in der Natur deutungsfähig und deutungsbedürftig; sie ist mit verschiedenen, natürlich nicht mit allen, philosophischen, kulturellen und religiösen Interpretationen vereinbar; erkenntnislogisch gesehen dürfen und können wir wählen. Worum es dabei eigentlich geht, ist (...)
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  40. added 2016-11-26
    Christian Miller (2016). On Shermer On Morality. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences:63-68.
    This paper is part of a six paper exchange with Michael Shermer. This is my critical commentary on Michael Shermer's paper “Morality is real, objective, and natural.” Shermer and I agree that morality is both real and objective. Here I raise serious reservations about both Shermer's account of where morality comes from and his account of what morality tells us to do. His approach to the foundations of morality would allow some very disturbing behaviors to count as moral, and his (...)
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  41. added 2016-11-25
    Christian Miller (forthcoming). Rationalism and Intuitionism. In Mark Timmons, Karen Jones & Aaron Zimmerman (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
    One of the liveliest areas in moral psychology in recent years has been research on the extent to which conscious reasoning leads to the formation of moral judgments. The goal of this chapter is to review and briefly assess three of the leading positions today on this topic - traditional rationalism, social intuitionism, and morphological rationalism - each of which has significant implications for moral epistemology.
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  42. added 2016-11-24
    Michael Ridge & Sean McKeever (2016). Moral Particularism and Moral Generalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  43. added 2016-11-22
    Robert J. Hartman (forthcoming). Accepting Moral Luck. In Ian Church (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Theories of Luck.
    I argue for the view that certain kinds of luck in results, circumstances, and constitutive properties can partially determine an agent’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. To make this view clearer, consider some examples. Two agents drive recklessly, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. Two corrupt judges would freely take a bribe if one were offered. But only one judge is offered a bribe, and so only one judge takes a bribe. Put in terms of these examples, I argue (...)
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  44. added 2016-11-19
    Nathan Stout (forthcoming). Salience, Imagination, and Moral Luck. Philosophical Papers.
    In this paper, I begin by addressing the way in which T.M. Scanlon's account of blame aims to solve the problem of moral luck by appealing to the significance of an agent’s actions. I then attempt to show that this solution to the problem fails in an important way insofar as there may be cases of outcome luck in which one’s being a member of a particular relationship with normative standards is itself a matter of luck. After presenting this challenge, (...)
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  45. added 2016-11-18
    Thomas Pölzler (forthcoming). Are Moral Judgements Adaptations? Three Reasons Why It Is so Difficult to Tell. South African Journal of Philosophy.
    An increasing number of scholars argue that moral judgements are adaptations, i.e., that they have been shaped by natural selection. Is this hypothesis true? In this paper I shall not attempt to answer this important question. Rather, I pursue the more modest aim of pointing out three difficulties that anybody who sets out to determine the adaptedness of moral judgments should be aware of (though some so far have not been aware of). First, the hypothesis that moral judgements are adaptations (...)
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  46. added 2016-11-10
    Douglas I. Campbell (forthcoming). Doxastic Desire and Attitudinal Monism. Synthese:1-23.
    How many attitudes must be posited at the level of reductive bedrock in order to reductively explain all the rest? Motivational Humeans hold that at least two attitudes are indispensable, belief and desire. Desire-As-Belief theorists beg to differ. They hold that the belief attitude can do the all the work the desire attitude is supposed to do, because desires are in fact nothing but beliefs of a certain kind. If this is correct it has major implications both for the philosophy (...)
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  47. added 2016-11-09
    Rune Lines & Marcus Selart (2013). Participation and Organizational Commitment During Change: From Utopist to Realist Perspectives. In Skipton Leonard, Rachel Lewis, Arthur Freedman & Jonathan Passmore (eds.), Handbook of the psychology of leadership, change, and organizational development. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 289-313.
    Trust has a great potential for furthering our understanding of organizational change and learning. This potential however remains largely untapped. It is argued that two reasons as for why this potential remains unrealized are: (i) A narrow conceptualization of change as implementation and (ii) an emphasis on direct and aggregated effects of individual trust to the exclusion of other effects. It is further suggested that our understanding of the effects of trust on organizational change, should benefit from including effects of (...)
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  48. added 2016-11-08
    Svein Tvedt Johansen, Marcus Selart & Kjell Grønhaug (2013). The Effects of Risk on Initial Trust Formation. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 43:1185-1199.
    This paper seeks to expand our understanding of initial trust by looking at how variation in risk influences the nature of trust and the process of initial trust formation. Four hypotheses were tested in two experiments involving participants with and without work experience. A first hypothesis suggested a positive relationship between a general propensity to trust and initial trust; a second hypothesis, a negative relationship between risk and initial trust; whereas a third hypothesis posited that risk would increase the importance (...)
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  49. added 2016-11-07
    Daniele Bertini (forthcoming). Introduction to Moral Heteronomy. History, Proposals, Arguments. Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia 2017.
    An introduction to how heteronomous views address the topic of moral autonomy. In the first section I provide a short history of the rise of the autonomy stance in meta ethics. Then I sketch the relationship between Kant and mainstream contemporary Kantians. I finally outline a summary of the papers in the special issue of Dialegesthai.
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  50. added 2016-11-07
    G. Cavallo (forthcoming). Genealogical Inquiry and Universal Moral Values. Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia 2017.
    Inspired by american pragmatism and Hans Joas' proposal of an affirmative genealogy, I argue in this paper that a genealogical inquiry (both on the biografical and on the historical level) can explain what motivates individuals to moral agency better than Kantian moral philosophy, without renouncing an historically-informed conception of universal moral values.
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