Meta-Ethics

Edited by Daniel Star (Boston University)
133 found
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1 — 50 / 133
  1. added 2020-08-14
    Speak No Evil: Understanding Hermeneutical (In)Justice.John Beverley - forthcoming - Episteme.
    Miranda Fricker’s original presentation of Hermeneutical Injustice left open theoretical choice points leading to criticisms and subsequent clarifications with the resulting dialectic appearing largely verbal. The absence of perspicuous exposition of hallmarks of Hermeneutical Injustice might suggest scenarios exhibiting some – but not all – such hallmarks are within its purview when they are not. The lack of clear hallmarks of Hermeneutical Injustice, moreover, obscures both the extent to which Fricker’s proposed remedy Hermeneutical Justice – roughly, virtuous communicative practices – (...)
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  2. added 2020-08-13
    Moral Self-Determination: The Nature, Existence, and Formation of Moral Motivation.Randall Curren & Richard M. Ryan - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Education:1-21.
    This paper addresses three basic questions about moral motivation. Concerning the nature of moral motivation, it argues that it involves responsiveness to both reasons of morality and the value of persons and everything else of value. Moral motivation is thus identified as reason-responsive appropriate valuing. Regarding whether it is possible for people to be morally motivated, the paper relies on self-determination theory (SDT) to show how moral motivation is a likely product of socialization that is need-supportive in modeling appropriate valuing (...)
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  3. added 2020-08-12
    (Draft) The Universe Doesn't Care: Against the Rationalist Defence of Moral Realism.Benjamin Davies - manuscript
    Evolutionary debunking accounts claim that the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs provide a problem for moral realists because evolutionary explanations of our moral beliefs have more plausibility than realist accounts. A certain kind of response, which I term ‘rationalist’ offers a dual response to evolutionary debunking. First, they offer a supposedly plausible account of how we acquire objective moral knowledge through use of our rationality. Second, they claim that certain moral beliefs are not amenable to evolutionary explanation. I argue (...)
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  4. added 2020-08-12
    Semantics for Reasons, by Bryan Weaver and Kevin Scharp. [REVIEW]Daniel Fogal & Peter Van Elswyk - forthcoming - Ethics.
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  5. added 2020-08-12
    N. T. Wright, History and Eschatology.Andrew I. Shepardson - 2020 - Philosophia Christi 22 (1):180-184.
  6. added 2020-08-10
    A Kantian Quality of Will Account of Excuses.Matthé Scholten - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1:1-27.
    It is a common picture that Kant is committed to an uncompromising account of moral responsibility that leaves no room for excuses. I argue that this picture is mistaken. More specifically, I reconstruct a Kantian quality of will account of excuses according to which an agent is excused for performing a morally wrong (or omitting a morally obligatory) action if and only if the action (or omission) does not manifest a lack of good will on the part of the agent. (...)
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  7. added 2020-08-10
    Ética de la conciencia, la imitación reflexiva como enfoque alternativo en el debate por una justificación plausible de los juicios morales.Jose David Bombiela Sepúlveda - 2018 - Dissertation, Universidad Tecnológica de Pereira
    La aclaración de la importancia de la conciencia fue crucial en el debate histórico entre los partidarios de la ética derivada de los movimientos racionalistas y los defensores de la ética derivada de las concepciones empiristas. Esta propuesta intenta considerar esta cuestión, demostrando a partir de los textos de Tugendhat la necesidad de una justificación plausible de los juicios morales. Esta forma de justificación se propone en esta monografía a través de una definición propia de la conciencia moral, con unas (...)
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  8. added 2020-08-09
    Descriptive and Normative Principle (Li) in Confucian Moral Metaphysics: Is/Ought From the Chinese Perspective.Joseph A. Adler - 1982 - Zygon 16 (3):285-293.
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  9. added 2020-08-08
    Naturalismo etico.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 1996 - In Virgilio Melchiorre (ed.), Enciclopedia della Filosofia e delle Scienze Umane. Novara, Italy: DeAgostini. pp. 658.
    A short reconstruction of the vicissitudes of the notion of ethical naturalism through American late nineteenth-century 'naturalism', Moore criticism of so-called naturalistic ethics, reaching Anscombe, Geach and Foot and their particular kind of anti-non-naturalism. The conclusion is that the notion of ethical naturalism is little more than a mere 'flatus vocis' used to indicate three heterogeneous kinds of ethical theories.
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  10. added 2020-08-07
    A Fundamental Failure of Frankfurt’s Agentic Counterfactual Intervention: No Agency.Joseph de la Torre Dwyer - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-10.
    Frankfurt’s “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” made an important intervention into the literature on moral responsibility via a classical Frankfurt-type example, arguing that “the principle of alternate possibilities” is false. This paper argues that classical Frankfurt-type examples fail due to the use of agentic counterfactual interventions who lack agency. Using finite state machines to illustrate, I show the models that classical Frankfurt-type examples must use and why they are incongruent with leeway incompatibilist beliefs—the motivating interlocutor for classical Frankfurt-type examples. I (...)
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  11. added 2020-08-06
    Why Moral Epistemology is Not Just Epistemology Applied to Moral Beliefs.Sushruth Ravish & Chaitanya Joshi - 2020 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy (AO):AO.
    The current discourse on moral epistemology (ME), has hardly paid any attention to the question concerning the demarcation of the domain of ME within epistemology. Neither is the subject matter of ME considered unique, nor is the methodology adopted in its investigations considered distinct. We attempt to show in this paper that this omission does not restrict itself to a mere taxonomical oversight but rather leads to certain deeper conceptual concerns. We argue that a casual and porous understanding of the (...)
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  12. added 2020-08-05
    Unscrutable Morality: Could Anyone Know Every Moral Truth?Marcus Hunt - 2020 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 59 (20):215-227.
    To begin to answer the question of whether every moral truth could be known by any one individual, this paper examines David Chalmers’ views on the scrutability of moral truths in Constructing the World. Chalmers deals with the question of the scrutability of moral truths ecumenically, claiming that moral truths are scrutable on all plausible metaethical views. I raise two objections to Chalmers’ approach. The first objection is that he confl ates the claim that moral truths are scrutable from PQTI (...)
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  13. added 2020-08-05
    Prudenza.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 1996 - In Virgilio Melchiorre (ed.), Enciclopedia della Filosofia e delle Scienze Umane. Novara, Italy: DeAgostini. pp. 782-783.
    A short reconstruction of the notion of phronesis in ancient Greek philosophy, the demise of the notion of prudence in modern philosophy and its rehabilitation by twwntieth-century neo-Aristotelianism.
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  14. added 2020-08-04
    If You're Quasi-Explaining, You're Quasi-Losing.Derek Baker - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 16. Oxford University Press.
    Normative discourse frequently involves explanation. For example, we tell children that hitting is wrong because it hurts people. In a recent paper, Selim Berker argues that to account for this kind of explanation, expressivists need an account of normative grounding. Against this, I argue that expressivists should eschew grounding and stick to a more pragmatic picture of explanation, one that focuses on how we use explanatory speech acts to communicate information. I propose that the standard form of a normative explanation (...)
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  15. added 2020-08-04
    Antimicrobial Footprints, Fairness, and Collective Harm.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2020 - In Euzebiusz Jamrozik & Michael Selgelid (eds.), Ethics and Drug Resistance: Collective Responsibility for Global Public Health. Springer. pp. 379-389.
    This chapter explores the question of whether or not individual agents are under a moral obligation to reduce their ‘antimicrobial footprint’. An agent’s antimicrobial footprint measures the extent to which her actions are causally linked to the use of antibiotics. As such, it is not necessarily a measure of her contribution to antimicrobial resistance. Talking about people’s antimicrobial footprint in a way we talk about our carbon footprint may be helpful for drawing attention to the global effects of individual behaviour (...)
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  16. added 2020-08-04
    Intuizionismo etico.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 1996 - In Virgilio Melchiorre (ed.), Enciclopedia della Filosofia e delle Scienze Umane. Novara, Italy: DeAgostini. pp. 467.
    A short reconstruction of the story of eighteenth-century ethical rationalism followed bu the nineteenth century controversy between utilitarianism and the 'intuitive system' reaching Sidgwick, Moore and David Ross.
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  17. added 2020-08-03
    (En)Joining Others.Eric Wiland - 2019 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 64-84.
    This paper argues that under some conditions, when one person acts on the direction of another person, the two of them thereby act together, and that this explains why both the director and the directee can be responsible for what is done. In other words, a director and a directee can be a joint agent, one whose members are responsible for what they together do. This is most clearly so when the directive is a command. But it is also sometimes (...)
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  18. added 2020-08-03
    Moral Advice and Joint Agency.Eric Wiland - 2018 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, 8. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 102-123.
    There are many alleged problems with trusting another person’s moral testimony, perhaps the most prominent of which is that it fails to deliver moral understanding. Without moral understanding, one cannot do the right thing for the right reason, and so acting on trusted moral testimony lacks moral worth. This chapter, however, argues that moral advice differs from moral testimony, differs from it in a way that enables a defender of moral advice to parry this worry about moral worth. The basic (...)
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  19. added 2020-08-03
    Rossian Deontology and the Possibility of Moral Expertise.Eric Wiland - 2015 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, 4. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 159-178.
    It seems that we can know moral truths. We are also rather reluctant to defer to moral testimony. But it’s not obvious how moral cognitivism is compatible with pessimism about moral testimony. If moral truths are knowable, shouldn’t it be possible for others to know moral truths you don’t know, so that it is wise for you to defer to what they say? Or, alternatively, if it’s always reasonable to refuse to defer to the wisest among us, doesn’t this show (...)
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  20. added 2020-08-03
    Williams on Thick Ethical Concepts and Reasons for Action.Eric Wiland - 2013 - In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 210-216.
    Bernard Williams argued that philosophers should pay more attention to the role thick ethical concepts play in our moral thinking, and, separately, that all reasons for action depend in the first place upon the agent's pre-exisitng motives. Here I argue that these two views are in tension. Much like the standard examples of thick ethical concepts, the concept REASONABLE is likewise thick, and the features of the world that guide its correct use have much less to do with the agent's (...)
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  21. added 2020-08-02
    How Can Necessary Facts Call for Explanation?Dan Baras - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    While there has been much discussion about what makes some mathematical proofs more explanatory than others, and what are mathematical coincidences, in this article I explore the distinct phenomenon of mathematical facts that call for explanation. The existence of mathematical facts that call for explanation stands in tension with virtually all existing accounts of “calling for explanation”, which imply that necessary facts cannot call for explanation. In this paper I explore what theoretical revisions are needed in order to accommodate this (...)
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  22. added 2020-08-01
    Addressed Blame and Hostility.Benjamin De Mesel - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 18 (1):111-119.
    Benjamin Bagley ('Properly Proleptic Blame', Ethics 127, July 2017) sets out a dilemma for addressed blame, that is, blame addressed to its targets as an implicit demand for recognition. The dilemma arises when we ask whether offenders would actually appreciate this demand, via a sound deliberative route from their existing motivations. If they would, their offense reflects a deliberative mistake. If they wouldn't, addressing them is futile, and blame's emotional engagement seems unwarranted. Bagley wants to resolve the dilemma in such (...)
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  23. added 2020-07-31
    Holding Responsible Reconsidered.Larisa Svirsky - forthcoming - Public Affairs Quarterly.
    Following Strawson, many philosophers have claimed that holding someone responsible necessitates its being appropriate to feel or express the negative reactive attitudes (e.g., resentment) toward her. This view, while compelling, is unable to capture the full range of cases in which we hold others responsible in ordinary life. Consider the parent who holds her five-year-old responsible for not teasing his sister, or the therapist who holds her patient responsible for avoiding self-injurious behavior. Holding responsible in such cases requires enforcing normative (...)
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  24. added 2020-07-30
    Compassionate Moral Realism, Written by Colin Marshall. [REVIEW]Joshua Blanchard - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
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  25. added 2020-07-30
    Agency in Mental Disorder: Exploring the Connections.Matt King & Joshua May (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
    How exactly do mental disorders affect one’s agency? How might therapeutic interventions help patients regain or improve their autonomy? Do only some disorders excuse morally inappropriate behavior, such as theft or child neglect? Or is there nothing about having a disorder, as such, that affects whether we ought to praise or blame someone for their moral success or failure? Our volume gathers together empirically-informed philosophers who are well equipped to tackle such questions. Contributors specialize in free will, agency, and responsibility, (...)
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  26. added 2020-07-30
    Principlism’s Balancing Act: Why the Principles of Biomedical Ethics Need a Theory of the Good.Matthew Shea - 2020 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 45 (4-5):441-470.
    Principlism, the bioethical theory championed by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, is centered on the four moral principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for autonomy, and justice. Two key processes related to these principles are specification—adding specific content to general principles—and balancing—determining the relative weight of conflicting principles. I argue that both of these processes necessarily involve an appeal to human goods and evils, and therefore require a theory of the good. A significant problem with principlism is that it lacks a (...)
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  27. added 2020-07-29
    Forms and Movements of Life.Zuzana Svobodová - 2020 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 25 (1):89-105.
    Based on an analysis of the theory of the movement of existence, this paper answers the following question: Where can one see the most important connections of philosophical and religious language in the most re-thought part of Jan Patočkaʼs thinking? The third movement of life is seen as a form of the true philosophical life, but also as a form with metaphysical responsibility. The movement of breakthrough, or actual self-comprehension, is the most important, because it leads to care for the (...)
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  28. added 2020-07-29
    Graham James McAleer. Erich Przywara and Postmodern Natural Law: A History of the Metaphysics of Morals. [REVIEW]Brian Besong - 2020 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 25 (1):195-197.
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  29. added 2020-07-29
    Religious Convictions and Moral Motivation.Andrei G. Zavaliy - 2020 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 25 (1):141-161.
    Adherence to certain religious beliefs is often cited as both an efficient deterrent to immoral behavior and as an effective trigger of morally praiseworthy actions. I assume the truth of the externalist theory of motivation, emphasizing emotions as the most important non-cognitive elements that causally contribute to behavioral choices. While religious convictions may foster an array of complex emotions in a believer, three emotive states are singled out for a closer analysis: fear, guilt and gratitude. The results of recent empirical (...)
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  30. added 2020-07-28
    Defusing the Regress Challenge to Debunking Arguments.Shang Long Yeo - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    A debunking argument contends that some target moral judgments were produced by unreliable processes and concludes that such judgments are unjustified. Debunking arguments face a regress challenge: to show that a process is unreliable at tracking the moral truth, we need to rely on other moral judgments. But we must show that these relied-upon judgments are also reliable, which requires yet a further set of judgments, whose reliability needs to be confirmed too, and so on. Some argue that the debunker (...)
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  31. added 2020-07-27
    Getting Our Act Together: A Theory of Collective Moral Obligations.Anne Schwenkenbecher - forthcoming - New York: Routledge.
    Together we can often achieve things that are impossible to do on our own. We can prevent something bad from happening or we can produce something good, even if none of us could do it by herself. But when are we morally required to do something of moral importance together with others? This book develops an original theory of collective moral obligations. These are obligations that individual moral agents hold jointly, but not as unified collective agents. To think of some (...)
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  32. added 2020-07-27
    A New Indifference Argument Against Motivational Internalism.Zhang Wan - 2017 - 4th BEIJING ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE.
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  33. added 2020-07-24
    Moral Responsibility for Concepts, Continued: Concepts as Abstract Objects.Rachel Fredericks - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    In Fredericks (2018b), I argued that we can be morally responsible for our concepts if they are mental representations. Here, I make a complementary argument for the claim that even if concepts are abstract objects, we can be morally responsible for coming to grasp and for thinking (or not thinking) in terms of them. As before, I take for granted Angela Smith's (2005) rational relations account of moral responsibility, though I think the same conclusion follows from various other accounts. My (...)
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  34. added 2020-07-24
    An Empirical Argument Against Moral Non-Cognitivism.Thomas Pölzler & Jen Wright - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    According to non-cognitivism, moral sentences and judgements do not aim to represent how things morally are. This paper presents an empirical argument against this view. We begin by showing that non-cognitivism entails the prediction that after some reflection competent ordinary speakers’ semantic intuitions favor that moral sentences and judgements do not aim to represent how things morally are. At first sight, this prediction may seem to have been confirmed by previous research on folk metaethics. However, a number of methodological worries (...)
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  35. added 2020-07-23
    When It is Not Logically Necessary for a Necessary Condition of Value to Be Valuable.Michael Kowalik - manuscript
    The premise that it is logically necessary for a necessary condition of value to be valuable is sometimes used in metaethics in support of the claim that agency, or some constitutive condition of agency or action, has value for all agents. I focus on the most recent application of this premise by Caroline T. Arruda and argue that the premise is false. Despite this defect the relevant evaluative step could still work just in case of agency if an additional condition (...)
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  36. added 2020-07-23
    Being Implicated: On the Fittingness of Guilt and Indignation Over Outcomes.Gunnar Björnsson - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    Under what conditions does an agent stand to a harmful outcome in such a way that it is fitting for others to be morally indignant with her over the outcome, or for her to feel guilt over it? A popular answer requires that the outcome happened because of the agent, or that the agent was a cause of the outcome. In this paper, I motivate a related but importantly different answer: An agent stands in the right way to the outcome—is (...)
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  37. added 2020-07-23
    Global Expressivism.Stephen Barker - 2020 - In Ricki Bliss & James Miller (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics. Routledge. pp. 270-283.
    In this chapter I consider the prospects of globalizing expressivism. Expressivism is a position in the philosophy of language that questions the central role of representation in a theory of meaning or linguistic function. An expressivist about a domain D of discourse proposes that utterances of sentences in D should not be seen, at the level of analysis as representing how things are, but as expression of non-representational states. So, in the domain of value-utterances, the standard idea is that speakers (...)
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  38. added 2020-07-23
    Stoicism and Frankfurtian Compatibilism.László Bernáth - 2018 - Elpis 2 (11):67-81.
    Although the free will debate of contemporary analytic philosophy lacks almost any kind of historical perspective, some scholars have pointed out a striking similarity between Stoic approaches to free will and Frankfurt’s well-known hierarchical theory. However, the scholarly agreement is only apparent because they disagree about the kind of similarity between the Stoic and the Frankfurtian theories. The main thesis of my paper is that so far, commentators have missed the crucial difference between the Stoics’ approach to free will and (...)
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  39. added 2020-07-23
    Self-Forming Acts and Other Miracles.László Bernáth - 2014 - Hungarian Philosophical Review 1 (58):104-116.
    Ferenc Huoranszki argues for two main claims in the ninth chapter of Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis (Huoranszki 2011). First, Huoranszki tries to show that libertarian restrictivism is false because self-determination in the libertarian sense is not necessary for our responsibility, even if motives, reasons or psychological characteristics can influence us relatively strongly to choose one or the other alternative. second, Huoranszki rejects the so-called manipulation argument.1 this is an argument for the conclusion that unless physical indeterminism is (...)
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  40. added 2020-07-22
    Moral Realism and Philosophical Angst.Joshua Blanchard - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15.
    This paper defends pro-realism, the view that it is better if moral realism is true rather than any of its rivals. After offering an account of philosophical angst, I make three general arguments. The first targets nihilism: in securing the possibility of moral justification and vindication in objecting to certain harms, moral realism secures something that is non-morally valuable and even essential to the meaning and intelligibility of our lives. The second argument targets antirealism: moral realism secures a desirable independence (...)
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  41. added 2020-07-22
    From Sufficient Health to Sufficient Responsibility.Ben Davies & Julian Savulescu - forthcoming - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry:1-11.
    The idea of using responsibility in the allocation of healthcare resources has been criticized for, among other things, too readily abandoning people who are responsible for being very badly off. One response to this problem is that while responsibility can play a role in resource allocation, it cannot do so if it will leave those who are responsible below a “sufficiency” threshold. This paper considers first whether a view can be both distinctively sufficientarian and allow responsibility to play a role (...)
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  42. added 2020-07-21
    Does False Consciousness Necessarily Preclude Moral Blameworthiness?: The Refusal of the Women Anti-Suffragists.Lee Wilson - forthcoming - Hypatia.
    Social philosophers often invoke the concept of false consciousness in their analyses, referring to a set of evidence-resistant, ignorant attitudes held by otherwise sound epistemic agents, systematically occurring in virtue of, and motivating them to perpetuate, structural oppression. But there is a worry that appealing to the notion in questions of responsibility for the harm suffered by members of oppressed groups is victim-blaming. Individuals under false consciousness allegedly systematically fail the relevant rationality and epistemic conditions due to structural distortions of (...)
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  43. added 2020-07-21
    The Ethics of Microaggression.Regina Rini - forthcoming - Abingdon UK: Routledge.
    Slips of the tongue, unwitting favoritism and stereotyped assumptions are just some examples of microaggression. Nearly all of us commit microaggressions at some point, even if we don’t intend to. Yet over time a pattern of microaggression can cause considerable harm by reminding members of marginalized groups of their precarious position. The Ethics of Microaggression is a much needed and clearly written exploration of this pervasive yet complex problem. What is microaggression and how do we know when it is occurring? (...)
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  44. added 2020-07-21
    Epoch Relativism and Our Moral Hopelessness.Regina Rini - 2019 - In Sophie Grace Chappell & Marcel van Ackeren (eds.), Ethics Beyond the Limits: New Essays on Bernard Williams' Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 168-187.
    When we look back upon people in past societies, such as slaveholders and colonialists, we judge their actions to have been morally atrocious. Yet we should give some thought to how the future will judge us. Here I argue that future people are likely to regard our behavior as no better than that of the past. If these future people are to be believed, then we are morally hopeless; we have little chance of working out the moral truth for ourselves. (...)
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  45. added 2020-07-20
    Reframing the Purpose of Business Education: Crowding-in a Culture of Moral Self-Awareness.Julian Friedland & Tanusree Jain - forthcoming - Journal of Management Inquiry.
    Numerous high-profile ethics scandals, rising inequality, and the detrimental effects of climate change dramatically underscore the need for business schools to instill a commitment to social purpose in their students. At the same time, the rising financial burden of education, increasing competition in the education space, and overreliance on graduates’ financial success as the accepted metric of quality have reinforced an instrumentalist climate. These conflicting aims between social and financial purpose have created an existential crisis for business education. To resolve (...)
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  46. added 2020-07-19
    Normative Explanation Unchained.Pekka Väyrynen - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    [This paper is available as open access from the publisher.] Normative theories aim to explain why things have the normative features they have. This paper argues that, contrary to some plausible existing views, one important kind of normative explanations which first-order normative theories aim to formulate and defend can fail to transmit downward along chains of metaphysical determination of normative facts by non-normative facts. Normative explanation is plausibly subject to a kind of a justification condition whose satisfaction may fail to (...)
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  47. added 2020-07-18
    The Place of Values in a World of Politics: Personality, Motivation, and Ideology.John Jost & Elvira Basevich - 2016 - In Oxford Handbook of Value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 351–374.
    The current chapter discusses on the place of values in a world of politics: personality, motivation, and ideology. There are similarly daunting questions of a political or philosophical nature. If it is the case that value pluralism—if not outright conflict—is inevitable, what are the implications for democratic and related forms of governance? How might political institutions be designed so that citizens and policy makers alike will be able to absorb and tolerate ideological and other sources of conflicts without perpetually devolving (...)
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  48. added 2020-07-17
    Modes of Following a Rule.Florian Richter - manuscript
    Rule-following is a normative doing and therefore needs to be reconsidered in a metaethical framework. Rule-following will be discussed in the light of cognitivism and non-cognitivism. It will be shown that neither cognitivism nor non-cognitivism are sufficiently good accounts for conceptualizing rule-following, because they are held captive by a quasi-mechanistical picture of rule-following. This idea stems from Stanley Cavell´s and John McDowell´s approach to rule-following. McDowell appeals to the idea that we participate in “shared forms of life” and therefore are (...)
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  49. added 2020-07-17
    Sentimentalist Virtue Ethics.Michael L. Frazer & Michael Slote - 2015 - In Lorraine L. Besser & Michael Slote (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 197-208.
    Moral sentimentalism can be understood as a metaethical theory, a normative theory, or some combination of the two. Metaethical sentimentalism emphasizes the role of affect in the proper psychology of moral judgment, while normative sentimentalism emphasizes the centrality of warm emotions to the phenomena of which these judgments properly approve. Neither form of sentimentalism necessarily implies a commitment to virtue ethics, but both have an elective affinity with it. The classical metaethical sentimentalists of the Scottish Enlightenment—such as David Hume and (...)
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  50. added 2020-07-16
    Admiration Over Time.Alfred Archer & Benjamin Matheson - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    In this paper, we investigate the diachronic fittingness conditions of admiration – that is, what it takes for a person to continue or cease to be admirable over time. We present a series of cases that elicit judgements that suggest different understandings of admiration over time. In some cases, admirability seems to last forever. In other cases, it seems that it can cease within a person’s lifetime if she changes sufficiently. Taken together, these cases highlight what we call the puzzle (...)
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