Meta-Ethics

Edited by Daniel Star (Boston University)
107 found
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1 — 50 / 107
  1. added 2018-08-15
    The Commitment Account of Hypocrisy.Benjamin Rossi - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-15.
    Hypocrisy is widely thought to be morally objectionable in a way that undermines the hypocrite’s moral standing to blame others. To wit, we seem to intuitively accept the “Nonhypocrisy Condition:” R has the standing to blame S for some violation of a moral norm N only if R’s blaming S is not hypocritical. This claim has been the subject of intensifying philosophical investigation in recent years. However, we can only understand why hypocrisy is morally objectionable and has an effect on (...)
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  2. added 2018-08-15
    Being Realistic About Motivation.Charlie Kurth - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    T.M. Scanlon’s ‘reasons fundamentalism’ is thought to face difficulties answering the normative question—that is, explaining why it’s irrational to not do what you judge yourself to have most reason to do (e.g., Dreier 2014a). I argue that this difficulty results from Scanlon’s failure to provide a theory of mind that can give substance to his account of normative judgment and its tie to motivation. A central aim of this paper is to address this deficiency. To do this, I draw on (...)
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  3. added 2018-08-14
    Kant, Ought Implies Can, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, and Happiness.Samuel J. M. Kahn - forthcoming - Lexington Press.
    Throughout his corpus, Kant repeatedly and resolutely denies that there is a duty to promote one’s own happiness, and most present-day Kantians seem to agree with him. In this book, I argue this denial rests on two main ideas: (1) a conception of duty that makes the principle of ought implies can (OIC) and the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) analytic, and (2) the claim that humans necessarily promote their own happiness. The book defends OIC and PAP but nonetheless attacks (...)
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  4. added 2018-08-13
    Evolutionary Debunking Arguments in Ethics.Diego E. Machuca - 2018 - Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy.
    There are at least three different genealogical accounts of morality: the ontogenetic, the sociohistorical, and the evolutionary. One can thus construct, in principle, three distinct genealogical debunking arguments of morality, i.e., arguments that appeal to empirical data, or to an empirical hypothesis, about the origin of morality to undermine either its ontological foundation or the epistemic credentials of our moral beliefs. The genealogical account that has been, particularly since the early 2000s, the topic of a burgeoning line of inquiry in (...)
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  5. added 2018-08-11
    Reply to Sam Harris.Paul Bali - manuscript
    my submission to the 2013 Moral Landscape Challenge: to find an error in his "case for a scientific understanding of morality".
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  6. added 2018-08-11
    Précis of Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind.Joshua May - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences:1-20.
    Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind argues that a careful examination of the scientific literature reveals a foundational role for reasoning in moral thought and action. Grounding moral psychology in reason then paves the way for a defense of moral knowledge and virtue against a variety of empirical challenges, such as debunking arguments and situationist critiques. The book attempts to provide a corrective to current trends in moral psychology, which celebrates emotion over reason and generates pessimism about the psychological (...)
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  7. added 2018-08-11
    Moral Reasoning and Emotion.Joshua May & Victor Kumar - forthcoming - In Karen Jones, Mark Timmons & Aaron Zimmerman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology. Routledge.
    This chapter discusses contemporary scientific research on the role of reason and emotion in moral judgment. The literature suggests that moral judgment is influenced by both reasoning and emotion separately, but there is also emerging evidence of the interaction between the two. While there are clear implications for the rationalism-sentimentalism debate, we conclude that important questions remain open about how central emotion is to moral judgment. We also suggest ways in which moral philosophy is not only guided by empirical research (...)
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  8. added 2018-08-11
    Amerikas ungerechter Krieg gegen die Drogen.Michael Huemer - 2015 - In Thomas Leske (ed.), Wider die Anmaßung der Politik. Gäufelden, Germany: Thomas Leske. pp. 85–102.
    Soll der Freizeitkonsum von Drogen wie Marihuana, Kokain, Heroin und LSD einem gesetzlichen Verbot unterliegen? Drogengegner sagen ja. Sie behaupten für gewöhnlich, Drogenkonsum sei sowohl für den Nutzer als auch für die Gesellschaft allgemein äußerst schädlich – vielleicht sogar unmoralisch, und sie glauben, diese Tatsachen seien als Verbotsgrund ausreichend. Freigabebefürworter sagen nein und berufen sich dabei für gewöhnlich auf eines oder mehrere von drei Argumenten: Erstens behaupten einige, Drogenkonsum sei nicht so schädlich, wie Drogengegner meinen, und sei gelegentlich sogar nützlich. (...)
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  9. added 2018-08-09
    Confessions of a Deluded Westerner.Michael Brent - forthcoming - Journal of Buddhist Ethics 25 (Special Issue).
    In this paper, I aim to make two general points. First, I claim that the discussions in Repetti (2017) assume different, sometimes conflicting, notions of free will, so the guiding question of the book is not as clear as it could be. Second, according to Buddhist tradition, the path to enlightenment requires rejecting the delusional belief in the existence of a persisting self. I claim that if there is no persisting self, there are no intentional actions; and, if there are (...)
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  10. added 2018-08-08
    Reasons, Oughts, and Requirements.Justin Snedegar - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11:155-181.
    This paper raises a challenge for the recently popular reasons first approach to normativity, according to which all normative notions can be explained in terms of reasons. The reasons first theorist owes us an account of how these explanations go for all other normative notions. I focus here on requirement, and to a lesser extent, permission. There is a very plausible, widely accepted account of the relationship between your reasons and what you ought to do|roughly, what you ought to do (...)
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  11. added 2018-08-07
    Should Environmental Ethicists Fear Moral Anti-Realism?Anne Schwenkenbecher & Michael Rubin - forthcoming - Environmental Values.
    Environmental ethicists have been arguing for decades that swift action to protect our natural environment is morally paramount, and that our concern for the environment should go beyond its importance for human welfare. It might be thought that the widespread acceptance of moral anti-realism would undermine the aims of environmental ethicists. One reason is that recent empirical studies purport to show that moral realists are more likely to act on the basis of their ethical convictions than anti-realists. In addition, it (...)
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  12. added 2018-08-06
    Nature and Excellence of Character in Aristotle.Gabriela Rossi - 2013 - In Nature and the Best Life. Exploring the Natural Bases of Practical Normativity in Ancient Philosophy. Hildesheim – Zürich – New York: pp. 155-181.
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  13. added 2018-08-05
    Skepticism About Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.John W. Robison - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    This article rejects Gideon Rosen's skeptical argument that attributions of blameworthiness are never epistemically justified. Granting Rosen's controversial claim that an act is blameworthy only if it is either akratic or the causal upshot of some akratic act, I show that we can and should resist his skeptical conclusion. I show, first, that Rosen's argument is, at best, hostage to a much more global skepticism about attributions of praiseworthiness, doxastic justification, and other phenomena which essentially involve causal‐historical facts about mental (...)
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  14. added 2018-08-04
    Val Dusek' Philosophy of Technology (Arabic Translation of the Introduction and Chapters III and IV) فلسفة التكنولوجيا - فال دوسيك (المقدمة والفصلين الثالث والرابع) - ترجمة وتعليق.Salah Osman - manuscript
    فلسفة التكنولوجيا - فال دوسيك (المقدمة والفصلين الثالث والرابع) - ترجمة وتعليق، في إطار مشروع لترجمة الكتاب بالكامل بالاشتراك مع آخرين.
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  15. added 2018-08-03
    Moral Growth Mindset is Associated with Change in Voluntary Service Engagement.Hyemin Han, Youn-Jeng Choi, Kelsie J. Dawson & Changwoo Jeong - 2018 - PLoS ONE 8 (13):e0202327.
    Incremental implicit theories are associated with a belief regarding it is possible to improve one’s intelligence or ability through efforts. Previous studies have demonstrated that incremental implicit theories contributed to better academic achievement and positive youth development. Our study aimed to examine whether incremental implicit theories of morality significantly influenced change in students’ engagement in voluntary service activities. In our study, 54 Korean college students for Study 1 and 180 Korean 8th graders for Study 2 were recruited to conduct two (...)
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  16. added 2018-08-02
    Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Meet Evolutionary Science.Arnon Levy & Yair Levy - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments appeal to selective etiologies of human morality in an attempt to undermine moral realism. But is morality actually the product of evolution by natural selection? Although debunking arguments have attracted considerable attention in recent years, little of it has been devoted to whether the underlying evolutionary assumptions are credible. In this paper, we take a closer look at the evolutionary hypotheses put forward by two leading debunkers, namely Sharon Street and Richard Joyce. We raise a battery of (...)
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  17. added 2018-07-31
    Introduction.Neil Sinclair - forthcoming - In The Naturalistic Fallacy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
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  18. added 2018-07-31
    Delineating The Moral Domain in Moral Psychology.Renatas Berniūnas - 2014 - Problemos 86:90-101.
    The aim of this paper is to review current debate about the moral domain in the moral psychological literature. There is some vagueness in respect to the usage of the very concept of ‘morality’. This conceptual problem recently has been re-addressed by several authors. So far, there is little agreement, nobody seems to agree about how to delineate the moral domain from other ‘non-moral’ normative domains. Currently, there are several positions that disagree about the scope of morality, ranging from complete (...)
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  19. added 2018-07-30
    The Naturalistic Fallacy and the History of Metaethics.Neil Sinclair - forthcoming - In The Naturalistic Fallacy. Cambridge University Press.
    This chapter -- the first in the edited collection "The Naturalistic Fallacy" (Cambridge University Press 2019) -- locates the naturalistic fallacy within the context of the other claims Moore defends in Principia Ethica. I explore the notions of “definition” and “analysis” as Moore understood them and set out in detail the multiple interpretations of the fallacy and open question argument. I then take a broad view of the influence of the fallacy on the Century of metaethics that came after Moore, (...)
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  20. added 2018-07-30
    Towards an Ecumenical Theory of Normative Reasons.Caj Sixten Strandberg - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):69-100.
    A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the dual nature of reasons. On the one hand, some reasons appear to depend on, and vary with, desires. On the other hand, some reasons appear categorical in the sense of being desire‐independent. However, it has turned out to be difficult to provide a theory that accommodates both these aspects. Internalism is able to account for the former aspect, but has difficulties to account for the latter, (...)
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  21. added 2018-07-30
    Are There Different Moral Domains? Evidence From Mongolia.Renatas Berniūnas, Vilius Dranseika & Paulo Sousa - 2016 - Asian Journal of Social Psychology 19:275–282.
    In this paper we report a study conducted in Mongolia on the scope of morality, that is, the extent to which people moralize different social domains. Following Turiel’s moral-conventional task, we characterized moral transgressions (in contrast to conventional transgressions) in terms of two dimensions: authority independence and generality of scope. Different moral domains are then defined by grouping such moral transgressions in terms of their content (following Haidt’s classification of morally relevant domains). There are four main results of the study. (...)
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  22. added 2018-07-29
    Psychopathy, Agency, and Practical Reason.Monique Wonderly - forthcoming - In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason. New York, USA: Routledge.
    Philosophers have urged that considerations about the psychopath’s capacity for practical rationality can help to advance metaethical debates. These debates include the role of rational faculties in moral judgment and action, the relationship between moral judgment and moral motivation, and the capacities required for morally responsible agency. I discuss how the psychopath’s capacity for practical reason features in these debates, and I identify several takeaway lessons from the relevant literature. Specifically, I show how the insights contained therein can illuminate the (...)
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  23. added 2018-07-28
    Evoluce morálky.Tomas Hribek - 2011 - In Vladimir Havlik & Tomas Hribek (eds.), Z evolučního hlediska: Pojem evoluce v současné filosofii. Praha, Česko: pp. 171-206.
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  24. added 2018-07-27
    Contraintes Globales Et Responsabilité Individuelle.Daniel Schulthess - 1996 - In La nature: thèmes philosophiques, thèmes d'actualité - Actes du XXVe Congrès de l'ASPLF, Lausanne, 25-28 août 1994. Lausanne, Genève, Neuchâtel: Cahiers de la Revue de théologie et de philosophie, no.18. pp. p.350-354..
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  25. added 2018-07-24
    Moral Twin Earth, Reference and Disagreements.Heimir Geirsson - 2018 - In Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 53. pp. 53-57.
    Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have written a number of articles where they use their Moral Twin Earth thought experiment to attack the new moral realism. The new moral realism is based on advances made in the philosophy of language that allows us to introduce synthetic definitions of moral terms. The Moral Twin Earth thought experiment relies in crucial ways on the use of intuitions. Specifically, it relies on the intuitions that were Earthers and Twin Earthers to meet, they would (...)
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  26. added 2018-07-24
    Darwinistická metaetika.Tomas Hribek - 2016 - In Jakub Jirsa (ed.), Přístupy k etice III. Praha, Česko: pp. 297-345.
    [Darwinian Metaethics] A critical analysis of the recent theories of metaethics that take the Darwinian picture of our origin seriously. The contents: 1. Evolution of altruism; 2. Biology in ethics; 3. Moore and a critique of naturalism; 4. Darwinian non-cognitivism; 5. Darwinian cognitivist realism and constructivism; 6. Darwinian cognitivist anti-realism; 7. Darwinian fictionalism.
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  27. added 2018-07-23
    Is the Debate Between Rawlsians and Liberal Perfectionists About Aesthetics?Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    Does the debate between Rawlsians and liberal perfectionists boil down to the following: for liberal perfectionists, the government should fund aesthetic projects that are in good taste; for Rawlsians, the government should be neutral on the aesthetic value of anything? If so, liberal perfectionists are committed to the view that there is objective aesthetic value. In this paper, I argue that within the Rawlsian system is a thesis that is difficult to reconcile with objectivity about aesthetics.
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  28. added 2018-07-22
    What Should Theists Say About Constructivist Positions in Metaethics?Christian Miller - 2018 - In Kevin Jung (ed.), Religious Ethics and Constructivism: A Metaethical Inquiry. New York: Routledge. pp. 82-103.
    Constructivist positions in meta-ethics are on the rise in recent years. Similarly, there has been a flurry of activity amongst theistic philosophers examining the relationship between God and normative facts. But so far as I am aware, these two literatures have almost never intersected with each other. Constructivists have said very little about God, and theists working on religious ethics have said very little about constructivist views in meta-ethics. In this paper, I draw some connections between the two literatures, and (...)
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  29. added 2018-07-22
    The Needs of the Many Do Not Outweigh the Needs of the Few: The Limits of Individual Sacrifice Across Diverse Cultures.Mark Sheskin, Coralie Chevallier, Kuniko Adachi, Renatas Berniūnas, Thomas Castelain, Martin Hulin, Hillary Lenfesty, Denis André Patrick Regnier, Aniko Sebesteny & Nicolas Baumard - 2018 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 18:205-223.
    A long tradition of research in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) countries has investigated how people weigh individual welfare versus group welfare in their moral judgments. Relatively less research has investigated the generalizability of results across non-WEIRD populations. In the current study, we ask participants across nine diverse cultures (Bali, Costa Rica, France, Guatemala, Japan, Madagascar, Mongolia, Serbia, and the USA) to make a series of moral judgments regarding both third-party sacrifice for group welfare and first-person sacrifice for group (...)
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  30. added 2018-07-22
    Ethische Wirklichkeit. Objektivität und Vernünftigkeit der Ethik aus pragmatistischer Perspektive.Matthias Kiesselbach - 2012 - Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.
    Das Buch "Ethische Wirklichkeit" liefert eine Verteidigung von zwei Grundannahmen des ethischen Diskurses, die schon immer philosophischen Zweifeln ausgesetzt waren: erstens der Annahme der Wahrheitsfähigkeit ethischer Urteile, zweitens der Annahme der Vernünftigkeit der Befolgung angemessener ethischer Forderungen. Hauptbezugspunkte der Arbeit sind dabei Ludwig Wittgenstein und Robert Brandom. Mit ihnen wird gezeigt, dass die Bedeutung propositional gehaltvoller Ausdrücke auf der fundamentalen Ebene in ihren internen Beziehungen mit weiteren Ausdrücken sowie mit nichtsprachlichen Verrichtungen besteht. Mit dieser Idee wird nicht nur der ethische (...)
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  31. added 2018-07-21
    Responsibility and the Limits of Good and Evil.Robert H. Wallace - 2018 - Philosophical Studies (Online):1-23.
    P.F. Strawson’s compatibilism has had considerable influence. However, as Gary Watson has argued in “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil” (1987/2008), his view appears to have a disturbing consequence: extreme evil exempts an agent from moral responsibility. This is a reductio of the view. Moreover, in some cases our emotional reaction to an evildoer’s history clashes with our emotional expressions of blame. Anyone’s actions can be explained by his or her history, however, and thereby can conflict with our present blame. (...)
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  32. added 2018-07-20
    A Dual-Process Account of Moral Judgment: What Psychopaths Can Teach Us About Morality.Deirdre Kelly - 2016 - Dissertation, Carleton University
    Researchers who argue that moral judgment is based on emotions (`emotion-backers') and those who believe that it is based on reasoning and deliberation (`reasoning-backers') have both struggled to account for the notorious moral deviance of incarcerated psychopaths. Emotion-backers, such as Jonathan Haidt, focus on psychopaths' lack of a affect,or defciencies in particular emotions, such as sympathy. Reasoning-backers, such as Lawrence Kohlberg, focus instead on psychopaths' de cient reasoning. Both accounts offer separate descriptions of what goes wrong in the disorder, but (...)
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  33. added 2018-07-18
    Whose Metaethical Minimalism?Noell Birondo - forthcoming - Southwest Philosophy Review.
    T. M. Scanlon’s ‘Reasons Fundamentalism’ rejects any naturalistic reduction of normative truths and it also rejects the type of non-naturalism that invokes a ‘special metaphysical reality.’ Here I argue that this still does not commit Scanlon—as some have thought—to an extreme ‘metaethical minimalism’ according to which there are no ‘truth makers’ at all for normative truths. I emphasize that the issue here is not just about understanding Scanlon, since the actual position defended by Scanlon might, more significantly, point the way (...)
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  34. added 2018-07-17
    Contextualism, Moral Disagreement, and Proposition Clouds.Jussi Suikkanen - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    According to contextualist theories in metaethics, when you use a moral term in a context, the context plays an ineliminable part in determining what natural property will be the semantic value of the term. Furthermore, on subjectivist and relativist versions of these views, it is either the speaker's own moral code or her moral community's moral code that constitutes the reference-fixing context. One standard objection to views of this type is that they fail to enable us to disagree in ordinary (...)
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  35. added 2018-07-17
    Moral Responsibility for Concepts.Rachel Fredericks - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy.
    I argue that we are sometimes morally responsible for having and using (or not using) our concepts, despite the fact that we generally do not choose to have them or have full or direct voluntary control over how we use them. I do so by extending an argument of Angela Smith's; the same features that she says make us morally responsible for some of our attitudes also make us morally responsible for some of our concepts. Specifically, like attitudes, concepts can (...)
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  36. added 2018-07-16
    Effective Altruism and Collective Obligations.Alexander Dietz - forthcoming - Utilitas:1-10.
    Effective altruism (EA) is a movement devoted to the idea of doing good in the most effective way possible. EA has been the target of a number of critiques. In this article, I focus on one prominent critique: that EA fails to acknowledge the importance of institutional change. One version of this critique claims that EA relies on an overly individualistic approach to ethics. Defenders of EA have objected that this charge either fails to identify a problem with EA's core (...)
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  37. added 2018-07-15
    Who's Afraid of Trolleys?Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - In Jussi Suikkanen & Antti Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Lontoo, Yhdistynyt kuningaskunta:
    Recent empirical studies of philosophers by Eric Schwitzgebel and others have seriously called into question whether professional ethicists have any useful expertise with thought experiments, given that their intuitions appear to be no more reliable than those of lay subjects. Drawing on such results, sceptics like Edouard Machery argue that normative ethics as it is currently practiced is deeply problematic. In this paper, I present two main arguments in defense of the standard methodology of normative ethics. First, there is strong (...)
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  38. added 2018-07-15
    Companions in Guilt: Entailment, Analogy and Absorption.Hallvard Lillehammer - forthcoming - In Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge.
    In this paper, I do three things. First, I say what I mean by a ‘companions in guilt’ argument in meta-ethics. Second, I distinguish between two kinds of argument within this family, which I call ‘arguments by entailment’ and ‘arguments by analogy’. Third, I explore the prospects for companions in guilt arguments by analogy. During the course of this discussion, I identify a distinctive variety of argument, which I call ‘arguments by absorption’. I argue that this variety of argument (at (...)
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  39. added 2018-07-14
    Disagreement and the Normativity of Truth Beneath Cognitive Command.Filippo Ferrari - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Aberdeen
    This thesis engages with three topics and the relationships between them: (i) the phenomenon of disagreement (paradigmatically, where one person makes a claim and another denies it); (ii) the normative character of disagreements (the issue of whether, and in what sense, one of the parties is “at fault” for believing something that’s untrue); (iii) the issue of which theory of what truth is can best accommodate the norms relating belief and truth. People disagree about all sorts of things: about whether (...)
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  40. added 2018-07-09
    Normative Reasons and Theism.Gerald K. Harrison - 2018 - Cham: Palgrave MacMillan.
  41. added 2018-07-07
    Learning, Acquired Dispositions and the Humean Theory of Motivation.Christos Douskos - 2018 - Philosophical Papers 47 (2):199-233.
    A central point of contention in the ongoing debate between Humean and anti-Humean accounts of moral motivation concerns the theoretical credentials of the idea of mental states that are cognitive and motivational at the same time. Humeans claim that this idea is incoherent and thereby unintelligible (M. Smith, The Moral Problem, Blackwell 1994). I start by developing a linguistic argument against this claim. The semantics of certain ‘learning to’ and ‘knowing to’ ascriptions points to a dispositional state that has both (...)
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  42. added 2018-07-03
    When is an Alternative Possibility Robust?Simon Kittle - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy:1-12.
    According to some, free will requires alternative possibilities. But not any old alternative possibility will do. Sometimes, being able to bring about an alternative does not bestow any control on an agent. In order to bestow control, and so be directly relevant qua alternative to grounding the agent's moral responsibility, alternatives need to be robust. Here, I investigate the nature of robust alternatives. I argue that Derk Pereboom's latest robustness criterion is too strong, and I suggest a different criterion based (...)
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  43. added 2018-07-02
    Fanaticism and Sacred Values.Paul Katsafanas - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    What, if anything, is fanaticism? Philosophers including Locke, Hume, Shaftesbury, and Kant offered an account of fanaticism, analyzing it as (1) unwavering commitment to an ideal, together with (2) unwillingness to subject the ideal (or its premises) to rational critique and (3) the presumption of a non-rational sanction for the ideal. In the first part of the paper, I explain this account and argue that it does not succeed: among other things, it entails that a paradigmatically peaceful and tolerant individual (...)
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  44. added 2018-07-01
    Review of Ethical Sentimentalism: New Perspectives, Edited by Remy Debes and Karsten Stueber. [REVIEW]Michael Milona - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2018:N/A.
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  45. added 2018-06-29
    Normative Commitments in Metanormative Theory.Pekka Väyrynen - forthcoming - In Jussi Suikkanen & Antti Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Routledge.
    First-order normative theories concerning what’s right and wrong, good and bad, etc. and metanormative theories concerning the nature of first-order normative thought and talk are widely regarded as independent theoretical enterprises. This paper argues that several debates in metanormative theory involve views that have first-order normative implications, even as the implications in question may not be immediately recognizable as normative. I first make my claim more precise by outlining a general recipe for generating this result. I then apply this recipe (...)
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  46. added 2018-06-29
    Taking Prudence Seriously.Guy Fletcher - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: volume 14. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers have long theorised about which things make people’s lives go well (and why) and the extent to which morality and self-interest can be reconciled. By contrast, we have spent little time on meta-prudential questions, questions about prudential discourse. This is surprising given that prudence is, prima facie, a normative form of discourse and, as such, cries out for further investigation of how exactly it functions and whether it has problematic commitments. It also marks a stark contrast from moral discourse, (...)
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  47. added 2018-06-29
    Consequentialism and the Evaluation of Action Qua Action.Andrew Sepielli - forthcoming - In Jussi Suikkanen & Antti Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral Philosophy.
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  48. added 2018-06-28
    Ethical Issues in Designing Interventions for Behavioural Change.Gyunchan Thomas Jun, Neil Sinclair & Fernando Carvalho - 2018 - Proceedings of Design Research Society 2018, Volume 1.
  49. added 2018-06-28
    Los Mitos Griegos En Los Medios Audiovisuales: Una Propuesta Didáctica Para la Educación de la Ciudadanía a Través de Dédalo E Ícaro.Hector Arevalo-Benito - 2015 - In L. Villagómez Peñaloza (ed.), Arrebatos de la Realidad (Psic. y Violencia). Mexico:
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  50. added 2018-06-27
    The Fundamentality of Fit.Christopher Howard - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 14. New York, NY, USA:
    Many authors, including Derek Parfit, T.M. Scanlon, and Mark Schroeder, favor a “reasons-first” ontology of normativity, which treats reasons as normatively fundamental. Others, most famously G.E. Moore, favor a “value-first” ontology, which treats value or goodness as normatively fundamental. I argue that both the reasons-first and value-first ontologies should be rejected because neither can account for all of the normative reasons that, intuitively, there are. I advance an ontology of normativity, originally suggested by Franz Brentano and A.C. Ewing, according to (...)
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