Meta-Ethics

In this comment to Kehrer (2014) the relevance of atheistic argumentation in the domain of ethics as an important part of religion is sketched.

Interest in ethical aspects associated to product acquisition and consumption is a growing trend among consumers. In this context, the concept of “product with ethical attributes” has arisen to refer to products with explicit social and environmental characteristics. However, one of the factors that most hinders the purchasing of these products is certainly price. Given the difficulty of reducing price, the question that arises is the extent to which other product attributes can attenuate the negative impact of price on perceived (...) value. We assume that the special benefits associated to this type of products are, at a different level, attenuators of the relationship between price and perceived value. Focusing on Fair Trade organic coffee, hypotheses are tested regarding survey data from 407 customers. They were interviewed in an actual purchasing scenario. The models are tested using conventional Structural Equation Models and the Latent Moderated Structural Equation method. The results obtained shed some light on a highly generalised belief that the marketing of these products can only be improved by reducing their price. However, although a price reduction could be desirable, albeit complicated in this product category, its effects could be reduced by acting on other variables such as the ethical aspects, quality and healthiness of this product category. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

This dissertation explores arguments and questions related to moral error theory – the idea that morality inevitably involves a fundamental and serious error such that moral judgments and statements never come out true. It is suggested that the truth of error theory remains a non-negligible possibility, and that we for this reason should take a version of moral fictionalism seriously. I begin by defining error theory as the claim that moral judgments are beliefs with moral propositions as content, moral utterances (...) are assertions of moral propositions, and no positive moral proposition is true. Second, after giving an account of J.L. Mackie’s error theory, I argue that neither Richard Joyce’s nor Jonas Olson’s argument for error theory gives us strong reasons to believe it. According to Joyce, moral discourse presupposes non-institutional desire-transcendent reasons and non-institutional categorical requirements. I challenge this claim by arguing that morality can be understood as an institution, and that the assumption that there are non-institutional moral reasons and requirements can be understood as entering pragmatically into moral conversations. According to Olson, moral discourse involves a commitment to irreducibly normative favoring relations between facts and actions. I challenge this claim by challenging Olson’s response to Stephen Finlay’s argument against absolutist accounts of moral discourse. Third, I discuss two objections to error theory, and argue that neither gives us strong reasons to reject it. According to the first objection, which is suggested by Terence Cuneo, error theory entails epistemic error theory, which has problematic consequences. After indicating some possible responses on part of the epistemic error theorist, I challenge the entailment claim by defending Hilary Kornblith’s account of epistemic reasons as hypothetical reasons. According to the second objection, error theory entails normative error theory, which cannot be believed. Although he does not defend this objection, Bart Streumer has given an argument for the unbelievability claim. I challenge Streumer’s argument by suggesting that we might have hypothetical reasons to believe normative error theory and that, properly understood, Streumer’s conclusion is not as radical as it may first appear. Fourth, I discuss what practical implications the discovery that error theory is true would have for first-order moral thinking and discourse. I argue that if this practice is overall non-morally valuable to us, we ought to revise engagement in it on the model of role-playing in live action role-playing games if we find out that error theory is true. Some have claimed that Richard Joyce’s fictionalism encounters problems. I argue that by incorporating the suggestion that engagement in revised moral practice is modeled on role-playing, fictionalism can escape these problems and preserve the benefits of first-order moral practice. (shrink)

The 'moral problem', roughly, involves the inconsistency between the following three independently plausible claims: (1) that moral judgements express beliefs, (2) that rational agents who judge that an action is right have at least some desire to perform that action, and (3) that rational agents might combine their beliefs with any desires. Michael Smith seeks to solve the moral problem by arguing that (3) is false. He argues that rational agents who believe that an action is right must have some (...) desire to perform that action. In this paper we first reconstruct Smith's main argument for this claim. Second, we offer an argument for one of its key premises. The argument that we offer is the best one that we can extract from Smith's work. As far as we can see, the argument is sound, but it does rely upon two crucial assumptions about the rational agent in question: (a) that facts about this agent's desires are transparent to her, and (b) that the agent believes that she is rational. This means that if Smith has solved the moral problem then he has done so only for a restricted class of subjects ­­ those who satisfy these two assumptions. (shrink)

Philosophy of Science After Feminism is an important contribution to philosophy of science, in that it argues for the central relevance of advances from previous work in feminist philosophy of science and articulates a new vision for philosophy of science going in to the future. Kourany’s vision of philosophy of science’s future as “socially engaged and socially responsible” and addressing questions of the social responsibility of science itself has much to recommend it. I focus the book articulation of an ethical-epistemic (...) ideal for science, the Ideal of Socially Responsible Science, compare it to recent work in the same vein by Heather Douglas, and argue for some advantages of Kourany’s approach. I then ask some critical question about the view, particularly with respect to the source of values that are to be integrated into science and the status of values that are to be so integrated. I argue that Kourany is too sanguine about where the values that inquirers will use come from and that these values seem to be accorded too fixed a status in her account. (shrink)