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225 found
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1 — 50 / 225
  1. added 2020-03-07
    Carl Stumpf, “Psychologie Und Erkenntnistheorie”.Jessica Leech & Mark Textor - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-36.
  2. added 2020-03-07
    Stumpf Between Criticism and Psychologism: Introducing ‘Psychologie Und Erkenntnistheorie’.Mark Textor - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-9.
  3. added 2020-02-23
    Certainty and Surface in Epistemology and Philosophical Method.Zeno Vendler - 1991 - Lewiston: Mellen Press.
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  4. added 2020-02-23
    Toward the Formulation of a Fundamental Epistemology.Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka - 1957 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 18 (1):88-95.
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  5. added 2020-02-03
    Epistemic Judgment and Motivation.Cameron Boult & Sebastian Köhler - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Is there an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism? The answer to this question has implications for our understanding of the nature of epistemic normativity. For example, some philosophers have argued from claims that epistemic judgment is not necessarily motivating to the view that epistemic judgment is not normative. This paper examines the options for spelling out an epistemic analogue of moral motivational internalism. It is argued that the most promising approach connects epistemic judgments to doxastic dispositions, which are related (...)
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  6. added 2020-01-21
    Varieties of Anti-Representationalism.Pietro Salis - 2020 - In Pedro G. Moreira (ed.), Revisiting Richard Rorty. Wilmington: Vernon Press. pp. 115-134.
    Anti-representationalism is the hallmark of Richard Rorty's critique of the epistemological tradition. According to it, knowledge does not "mirror" reality and the human mind is not a representational device. Anti-representationalism is a family of philosophical theses, respectively dealing with the notion of "representation" in different ways. Though prima facie one may feel entitled to think about anti-representationalism as a kind of uniform philosophical movement, things stand quite differently. In fact, among many anti-representationalist options, we can identify two main versions: a (...)
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  7. added 2020-01-08
    A Genesis of Speculative Empiricisms: Whitehead and Deleuze Read Hume.Russell J. Duvernoy - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (4):459-482.
    Deleuze’s “transcendental empiricism” and the “empirical side” of Whitehead’s metaphysics are paradoxical unless placed in the context of their unorthodox readings of empiricism. I explore this context focusing on their engagements with Hume. Both subvert presumptions of a categorical gap between external nature and internal human experience and open possibilities for a speculative empiricism that is non-reductive while still affirming experience as source for philosophical thinking. Deleuze and Whitehead follow Hume in beginning with events of sensation as primary but do (...)
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  8. added 2019-10-18
    Normative Reasons for Mentalism.Eva Schmidt - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism and Anti-Realism. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 97-120.
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  9. added 2019-10-03
    Scope or Focus? Normative Focus and the Metaphysics of Normative Relations.Nicholas Shackel - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (6):281-312.
    A prolonged debate about the nature of norms has been conducted in terms of the scope of a modal operator. Here I argue that the features of what I call Normative Focus are more fundamental than scope. We shall see limitations of scope contrasted with better analysis in terms of Normative Focus. Some authors address such limitations by extending what they mean by scope. I show that scope is still not doing the work: what does it is their elicitation of (...)
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  10. added 2019-09-24
    Erkenntnistheorie – eine Inventur. [REVIEW]Nicola Mößner - 2019 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (3):490-495.
    This is a review of Kuenzle, Dominique: Refurbishing Epistemology. A Meta-Epistemological Framework. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017.
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  11. added 2019-09-02
    The Bloomsbury Companion to Bertrand Russell.Russell Wahl (ed.) - 2018 - New York, USA: Bloomsbury.
    A founder of modern analytic philosophy and one of the most important logicians of the twentieth century, Bertrand Russell has influenced generations of philosophers. The Bloomsbury Companion to Bertrand Russell explores this influence in detail and responds to renewed interest in Russell's philosophical approach, presenting the best guide to research in Russell studies today. -/- Bringing new insights into Russell's relationship with his contemporaries, a team of experts explore his life-long battles with important philosophical issues. They consider how he influenced (...)
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  12. added 2019-08-17
    Theorizing Multiple Oppressions Through Colonial History: Cultural Alterity and Latin American Feminisms.Elena Ruíz - 2011 - APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy 2 (11):5-9.
  13. added 2019-06-06
    Intemalism, the Gettier Problem, and Metaepistemological Skepticism.Mylan Engel - 2000 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (1):99-117.
    When it comes to second-order knowledge, internalists typically contend that when we know that p, we can, by reflecting, directly know that we are knowing it. Gettier considerations are employed to challenge this internalistic contention and to make out a prima facie case for internalistic metaepistemological skepticism, the thesis that no one ever intemalistically knows that one internalistically knows that p. In particular, I argue that at the metaepistemological second-order level, the Gettier problem generates three distinct problems which, taken together, (...)
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  14. added 2019-06-06
    The Fragmentation of Reason: Precis of Two Chapters.Stephen P. Stich - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):179-183.
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  15. added 2019-06-06
    Suggestions Toward A Contemporary Epistemology: Part III.Harold N. Lee - 1965 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):3-9.
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  16. added 2019-06-05
    Epistemic Analysis and the Possibility of Good Informants.James MacBain - 2004 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 8 (2):193-211.
    Edward Craig has proposed that epistemology should eschew traditional conceptual analysis in favor of what he calls “conceptual synthesis.” He proposes we start not from the finding of necessary and sufficient conditions that match our intuitions; rather we start from considerations on what the concept of knowledge does for us. In this paper I will explore one aspect of Craig’s proposal – the good informant. It is this aspect that is central to Craig’s epistemic method and perhaps most problematic. I (...)
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  17. added 2019-05-31
    Ecumenical Epistemic Instrumentalism.Nathaniel Sharadin - forthcoming - Synthese:1-27.
    According to extant versions of epistemic instrumentalism, epistemic reasons are instrumental reasons. Epistemic instrumentalism is unpopular. I think it’s just misunderstood. Rather than saying epistemic reasons are instrumental reasons, epistemic instrumentalists should only say that if there is an epistemic reason, there is also an instrumental reason. This is the view I call ecumenical epistemic instrumentalism. In this paper, I first motivate, next sketch, and finally highlight the advantages of this version of epistemic instrumentalism.
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  18. added 2019-05-26
    Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2019 - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    This paper is about two topics: metaepistemological absolutism and the epistemic principles governing perceptual warrant. Our aim is to highlight – by taking the debate between dogmatists and conservativists about perceptual warrant as a case study – a surprising and hitherto unnoticed problem with metaepistemological absolutism, at least as it has been influentially defended by Paul Boghossian (2006a) as the principal metaepistemological contrast point to relativism. What we find is that the metaepistemological commitments at play on both sides of this (...)
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  19. added 2019-05-16
    Epistemic Norms: Truth Conducive Enough.Lisa Warenski - 2019 - Synthese:1-21.
    Epistemology needs to account for the success of science. In True Enough (2017), Catherine Elgin argues that a veritist epistemology is inadequate to this task. She advocates shifting epistemology’s focus away from true belief and toward understanding, and further, jettisoning truth from its privileged place in epistemological theorizing. Pace Elgin, I argue that epistemology’s accommodation of science does not require rejecting truth as the central epistemic value. Instead, it requires understanding veritism in an ecumenical way that acknowledges a rich array (...)
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  20. added 2019-05-10
    Peeking Inside the Black Box: A New Kind of Scientific Visualization.Michael T. Stuart & Nancy J. Nersessian - 2018 - Minds and Machines 29 (1):87-107.
    Computational systems biologists create and manipulate computational models of biological systems, but they do not always have straightforward epistemic access to the content and behavioural profile of such models because of their length, coding idiosyncrasies, and formal complexity. This creates difficulties both for modellers in their research groups and for their bioscience collaborators who rely on these models. In this paper we introduce a new kind of visualization that was developed to address just this sort of epistemic opacity. The visualization (...)
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  21. added 2019-04-30
    Induction and Epistemological Naturalism.Lars-Göran Johansson - 2018 - Philosophies 3 (4):31-0.
    Epistemological naturalists reject the demand for a priori justification of empirical knowledge; no such thing is possible. Observation reports, being the foundation of empirical knowledge, are neither justified by other sentences, nor certain; but they may be agreed upon as starting points for inductive reasoning and they function as implicit definitions of predicates used. Making inductive generalisations from observations is a basic habit among humans. We do that without justification, but we have strong intuitions that some inductive generalisations will fail, (...)
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  22. added 2019-04-30
    Is the End in Sight for Philosophical Knowledge?Zak Van Straaten - 1981
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  23. added 2019-02-10
    Modal Empiricism Made Difficult: An Essay in the Meta-Epistemology of Modality.Ylwa Sjölin Wirling - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
    Philosophers have always taken an interest not only in what is actually the case, but in what is necessarily the case and what could possibly be the case. These are questions of modality. Epistemologists of modality enquire into how we can know what is necessary and what is possible. This dissertation concerns the meta-epistemology of modality. It engages with the rules that govern construction and evaluation of theories in the epistemology of modality, by using modal empiricism – a form of (...)
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  24. added 2019-02-01
    The Need for a Revolution in the Philosophy of Science.Nicholas Maxwell - 2002 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 33 (2):381-408.
    There is a need to bring about a revolution in the philosophy of science, interpreted to be both the academic discipline, and the official view of the aims and methods of science upheld by the scientific community. At present both are dominated by the view that in science theories are chosen on the basis of empirical considerations alone, nothing being permanently accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence. Biasing choice of theory in the direction of simplicity, unity (...)
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  25. added 2019-01-08
    Pragmatic Encroachment and the Challenge From Epistemic Injustice.Mikkel Gerken - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    I present a challenge to epistemological pragmatic encroachment theories from epistemic injustice. The challenge invokes the idea that a knowing subject may be wronged by being regarded as lacking knowledge due to social identity prejudices. However, in an important class of such cases, pragmatic encroachers appear to be committed to the view that the subject does not know. Hence, pragmatic encroachment theories appear to be incapable of accounting for an important type of injustice – namely, discriminatory epistemic injustice. Consequently, pragmatic (...)
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  26. added 2019-01-07
    Behaviorism, Rorty, and the End of Epistemology.Robert L. Woolfolk - 1983 - Behavior and Philosophy 11 (2):111.
  27. added 2018-12-10
    Rationally Determinable Conditions.Ram Neta - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):289-299.
  28. added 2018-10-22
    Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism.Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.) - 2018 - Palgrave Macmillan.
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  29. added 2018-10-01
    “The Human Between the «Life-World»and Its Theoretical (Re)Construction”.Cecilia Tohaneanu - 2010 - Review of Research and Social Intervention/Revista de Cercetare Si Intervenţie Socială 31:95-105.
    The traditional split between rationality and historicity, concept and intuition, the form and content of knowledge has brought about an inappropriate approaching to humanities and social sciences. Presenting the main effects of such split, this paper aims at arguing the need to consider both the “empiric” and the “interpretive” as equally relevant for understanding our human world. It is eventually a meta-theoretical pleading for reconciling epistemology and ontology within a theory of humanities and social sciences able to avoid the two (...)
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  30. added 2018-10-01
    The Value of Epistemology: A Defense.James E. Taylor - 1999 - Philosophical Papers 28 (3):169-185.
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  31. added 2018-10-01
    Some Reflections on Contemporary Epistemology.Olaf Tollefsen - 1989 - Lyceum 1 (2):68-75.
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  32. added 2018-08-27
    Topical Epistemologies.Todd Stewart - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (1):23–43.
    What is the point of developing an epistemology for a topic—for example, morality? When is it appropriate to develop the epistemology of a topic? For many topics—for example, the topic of socks—we see no need to develop a special epistemology. Under what conditions, then, does a topic deserve its own epistemology? I seek to answer these questions in this article. I provide a criterion for deciding when we are warranted in developing an epistemological theory for a topic. I briefly apply (...)
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  33. added 2018-08-27
    The Fragmentation of Reason: Précis of Two Chapters.Review Author[S.]: Stephen P. Stich - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):179-183.
  34. added 2018-06-05
    Metaepistemology.Mikkel Gerken - 2018 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Metaepistemology may be partly characterized as the study of the nature, aims, methods and legitimacy of epistemology. Given such a characterization, most epistemological views and theories have an important metaepistemological aspect or, at least, a number of more or less explicit metaepistemological commitments. Metaepistemology is an important area of philosophy because it exemplifies that philosophy must serve as its own meta-discipline by continuously reflecting critically on its own methods and aims. Even though philosophical methodology may be regarded as a branch (...)
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  35. added 2018-05-30
    Knowledge, Reasons, and Errors About Error Theory.Charles Cote-Bouchard & Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Robin McKenna & Christos Kyriacou (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Palgrave Macmillan.
    According to moral error theorists, moral claims necessarily represent categorically or robustly normative facts. But since there are no such facts, moral thought and discourse are systematically mistaken. One widely discussed objection to the moral error theory is that it cannot be true because it leads to an epistemic error theory. We argue that this objection is mistaken. Objectors may be right that the epistemic error theory is untenable. We also agree with epistemic realists that our epistemological claims are not (...)
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  36. added 2018-05-25
    Truth‐Sensitivity and Folk Epistemology.Mikkel Gerken - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):3-25.
    Several studies have found a robust effect of truth on epistemic evaluation of belief, decision, action and assertion. Thus, truth has a significant effect on normative participant evaluations. Some theorists take this truth effect to motivate factive epistemic norms of belief, action, assertion etc. In contrast, I argue that the truth effect is best understood as an epistemic instance of the familiar and ubiquitous phenomenon of outcome bias. I support this diagnosis from three interrelating perspectives: (1) by epistemological theorizing, (2) (...)
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  37. added 2018-04-06
    Epistemic Schmagency?A. K. Flowerree - forthcoming - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Constructivist approaches in epistemology and ethics offer a promising account of normativity. But constructivism faces a powerful Schmagency Objection, raised by David Enoch. While Enoch’s objection has been widely discussed in the context of practical norms, no one has yet explored how the Schmagency Objection might undermine epistemic constructivism. In this paper, I rectify that gap. First, I develop the objection against a prominent form of epistemic constructivism, Belief Constitutivism. Belief Constitutivism is susceptible to a Schmagency Objection, I argue, because (...)
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  38. added 2018-03-27
    From Moral Fixed Points to Epistemic Fixed Points.Christos Kyriacou - forthcoming - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) argued that there are moral conceptual truths that are substantive in content, what they called ‘moral fixed points’. I argue that insofar as we have some reason to postulate moral fixed points, we have equal reason to postulate epistemic fixed points (e.g. the factivity condition). To this effect, I show that the two basic reasons Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) offer in support of moral fixed points naturally carry over to epistemic fixed points. In particular, epistemic fixed (...)
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  39. added 2018-03-26
    An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.
    White, Christensen, and Feldman have recently endorsed uniqueness, the thesis that given the same total evidence, two rational subjects cannot hold different views. Kelly, Schoenfield, and Meacham argue that White and others have at best only supported the weaker, merely intrapersonal view that, given the total evidence, there are no two views which a single rational agent could take. Here, we give a new argument for uniqueness, an argument with deliberate focus on the interpersonal element of the thesis. Our argument (...)
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  40. added 2018-03-22
    Leonard Nelson and Metaphysical Knowledge Against the Neo-Kantian Background.Tomasz Kubalica - 2017 - Diametros 52:64-80.
    Leonard Nelson is known primarily as a critic of epistemology in the Neo-Kantian meaning of the term. The aim of this paper is to investigate the presuppositions and consequences of his critique. I claim that what has rarely been discussed in this context is the problem of the possibility of metaphysics. By the impossibility of epistemology Nelson means the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. I intend to devote this paper to the analysis of this problem in relation to the Neo-Kantian background.
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  41. added 2018-03-13
    On How to Defend or Disprove the Universality Thesis.Cheng-Hung Tsai & Chinfa Lien - 2018 - In Masaharu Mizumoto, Stephen Stich & Eric McCready (eds.), Epistemology for the rest of the world. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 267-278.
    According to the universality thesis, the epistemic properties referred to by the English epistemic verb “know” contained in the expressions of the form “S knows that p” or “S knows how to φ‎” are shared by the translations of the epistemic verb in all other languages such as Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Russian, and so on. Some doubt that there is reason to think the universality thesis is true because little or nothing is shown about the meanings and uses of the (...)
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  42. added 2018-02-18
    Moderate Epistemic Relativism and Our Epistemic Goals.Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):66-92.
    Although radical forms of relativism are perhaps beyond the epistemological pale, I argue here that a more moderate form may be plausible, and articulate the conditions under which moderate epistemic relativism could well serve our epistemic goals. In particular, as a result of our limitations as human cognizers, we find ourselves needing to investigate the dappled and difficult world by means of competing communities of highly specialized researchers. We would do well, I argue, to admit of the existence of unresolvable (...)
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  43. added 2018-01-14
    Towards a Unified Concept of Reality.Steven James Bartlett - 1975 - ETC: A Review of General Semantics 32 (1):43-49.
    This is a study of the relativity of facts in relation to the frameworks of reference in terms of which those facts are established. In this early paper from 1975, intended for a less technical audience, the author proposes an understanding of facts and their associated frameworks in terms of complementarity. This understanding of facts leads to an integrated yet pluralistic concept of reality. In the Addendum, readers will find a partial listing of related publications by the author that extend (...)
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  44. added 2018-01-11
    Epistemological Closed Questions: A Reply to Greco.Charles Côte-Bouchard - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):97-111.
    ABSTRACT According to G.E. Moore’s ‘Open Question’ argument, moral facts cannot be reduced or analyzed in non-normative natural terms. Does the OQA apply equally in the epistemic domain? Does Moore’s argument have the same force against reductionist accounts of epistemic facts and concepts? In a recent article, Daniel Greco has argued that it does. According to Greco, an epistemological version of the OQA is just as promising as its moral cousin, because the relevant questions in epistemology are just as ‘open’ (...)
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  45. added 2018-01-11
    Belief's Own Metaethics? A Case Against Epistemic Normativity.Charles Cote-Bouchard - 2017 - Dissertation, King's College London
    Epistemology is widely seen as a normative discipline like ethics. Just like moral facts, epistemic facts – i.e. facts about our beliefs’ epistemic justification, rationality, reasonableness, correctness, warrant, and the like – are standardly viewed as normative facts. Yet, whereas many philosophers have rejected the existence of moral facts, few have raised similar doubts about the existence of epistemic facts. In recent years however, several metaethicists and epistemologists have rejected this Janus-faced or dual stance towards the existence of moral and (...)
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  46. added 2018-01-06
    What Can the Theory of Knowledge Learn From the History of Knowledge?Dudley Shapere - 1977 - The Monist 60 (4):488-508.
    In recent years, philosophers of science have been increasingly concerned with questions about scientific change, and, in connection with those concerns, to rest their claims more and more on an examination of cases in the history of science. During the 1960s and early 1970s, those concerns tended to revolve around the question of whether scientific change, or at least major scientific change, is or is not “rational.” It seems to me, as I shall argue in what follows, that that question (...)
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  47. added 2018-01-06
    Epistemology and the New Way of Words.Wilfred Sellars - 1947 - Journal of Philosophy 44 (24):645-660.
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  48. added 2017-12-04
    Ontological Entanglement in the Normative Web.Benjamin Winokur - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (3):483-501.
    Terence Cuneo has recently argued that we have to be committed to the existence of epistemic facts insofar as they are indispensable to theorizing. Furthermore, he argues that the epistemic properties of these facts are inextricably ‘ontologically entangled’ with certain moral properties, such that there exist ‘moral-epistemic’ facts. Cuneo, therefore, concludes that moral realism is true. I argue that Cuneo’s appeal to the existence of moral-epistemic facts is problematic, even granting his argument for the existence of indispensable epistemic facts. I (...)
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  49. added 2017-11-28
    The Epistemology of Neo-Gettier Epistemology.Robert Lockie - 2014 - South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):247-258.
    The paper begins by drawing a number of ‘levels’ distinctions in epistemology. It notes that a theory of knowledge must be an attempt to obtain knowledge . It is suggested that we can make sense of much of the work found in analytic theory of knowledge by seeing three framework assumptions as underpinning this work. First, that to have philosophical knowledge of knowledge requires us to have an analysis. Second, that much of what we require from a theory of knowledge (...)
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  50. added 2017-11-28
    Epistemology Idealized.R. Pasnau - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):987-1021.
    Epistemology today centrally concerns the conceptual analysis of knowledge. Historically, however, this is a concept that philosophers have seldom been interested in analysing, particularly when it is construed as broadly as the English language would have it. Instead, the overriding focus of epistemologists over the centuries has been, first, to describe the epistemic ideal that human beings might hope to achieve, and then go on to chart the various ways in which we ordinarily fall off from that ideal. I discuss (...)
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