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  1. Epistemology and the Regress Problem.Scott Aikin - 2010 - Routledge.
    In the last decade, the familiar problem of the regress of reasons has returned to prominent consideration in epistemology. And with the return of the problem, evaluation of the options available for its solution is begun anew. Reason’s regress problem, roughly put, is that if one has good reasons to believe something, one must have good reason to hold those reasons are good. And for those reasons, one must have further reasons to hold they are good, and so a regress (...)
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  2. Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy.Joshua Alexander & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):56–80.
    It has been standard philosophical practice in analytic philosophy to employ intuitions generated in response to thought-experiments as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims. In part as a response to this practice, an exciting new movement—experimental philosophy—has recently emerged. This movement is unified behind both a common methodology and a common aim: the application of methods of experimental psychology to the study of the nature of intuitions. In this paper, we will introduce two different views concerning the relationship that (...)
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  3. Can We Protect Traditional Knowledge?Margarita Florez Alonso - 2007 - In Boaventura de Sousa Santos (ed.), Another Knowledge is Possible: Beyond Northern Epistemologies. Verso.
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  4. Metaepistemology.Iep Author - 2016
    Metaepistemology Metaepistemology is, roughly, the branch of epistemology that asks questions about first-order epistemological questions. It inquires into fundamental aspects of epistemic theorizing like metaphysics, epistemology, semantics, agency, psychology, responsibility, reasons for belief, and beyond. So, if as traditionally conceived, epistemology is the theory of knowledge, metaepistemology is the theory of the theory of knowledge. … Continue reading Metaepistemology →.
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  5. Cognitive Values, Theory Choice, and Pluralism: On the Grounds and Implications of Philosophical Diversity.Guy Stanwood Axtell - 1991 - Dissertation, University of Hawai'i
    This dissertation focuses on the development of a pragmatic account of normative discourse. The approach taken to the subject of study is metaphilosophical. Prevalent contemporary treatments of norm governance and cognitive evaluation, are examined in light of background metaphilosophical views adopted by such schools as logical empiricism, pragmatism, and schools associated with contemporary sociology of scientific knowledge. I examine metaphilosophical assumptions that pre-structure treatment of conceptual issues such as belief-modification, theory choice, and explanation, pursuing these issues across a wide range (...)
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  6. Warrant is Unique.Andrew M. Bailey - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):297-304.
    Warrant is what fills the gap between mere true belief and knowledge. But a problem arises. Is there just one condition that satisfies this description? Suppose there isn’t: can anything interesting be said about warrant after all? Call this the uniqueness problem. In this paper, I solve the problem. I examine one plausible argument that there is no one condition filling the gap between mere true belief and knowledge. I then motivate and formulate revisions of the standard analysis of warrant. (...)
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  7. Part IV Must Science Validate All Knowledge?Lynne Rudder Baker - 2003 - In A. J. Sanford & P. N. Johnson-Laird (eds.), The Nature and Limits of Human Understanding. T & T Clark.
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  8. Common Sense Remonstrates.John F. Bannon - 1928 - Modern Schoolman 4 (5):75-76.
    Mr. Bannon, a philosopher of Maison St. Louis, Isle of Jersey, sends us this lively treatment of the problem of color sensation. Regardless of your own convictions on the subject, we feel that you will finish his paper with a feeling of satisfaction at his explanation of the via media of the question.
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  9. The Old Problem of Induction and the New Reflective Equilibrium.Jared Bates - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (3):347–356.
    In 1955, Goodman set out to 'dissolve' the problem of induction, that is, to argue that the old problem of induction is a mere pseudoproblem not worthy of serious philosophical attention. I will argue that, under naturalistic views of the reflective equilibrium method, it cannot provide a basis for a dissolution of the problem of induction. This is because naturalized reflective equilibrium is -- in a way to be explained -- itself an inductive method, and thus renders Goodman's dissolution viciously (...)
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  10. Reflective Equilibrium and Underdetermination in Epistemology.Jared Bates - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (32):45-64.
    The basic aim of Alvin Goldman’s approach to epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is naturalistic; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition aim to identify the naturalistic, nonnormative criteria on which justified belief supervenes (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). The basic method of Goldman’s epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is the reflective equilibrium test; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition are tested against our intuitions about cases of justified and unjustified belief (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). I will argue (...)
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  11. The Nature of Cognition: Minimum Requirements for a Personalistic Epistemology.Peter A. Bertocci - 1954 - Review of Metaphysics 8 (1):49 - 60.
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  12. Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment.Michael A. Bishop & J. D. Trout - 2005 - Oup Usa.
    Bishop and Trout here present a unique and provocative new approach to epistemology (the theory of human knowledge and reasoning). Their approach aims to liberate epistemology from the scholastic debates of standard analytic epistemology, and treat it as a branch of the philosophy of science. The approach is novel in its use of cost-benefit analysis to guide people facing real reasoning problems and in its framework for resolving normative disputes in psychology. Based on empirical data, Bishop and Trout show how (...)
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  13. The Pathologies of Standard Analytic Epistemology.Michael Bishop & J. D. Trout - 2005 - Noûs 39 (4):696-714.
    Standard Analytic Epistemology (SAE) names a contingently clustered class of methods and theses that have dominated English-speaking epistemology for about the past half-century. The major contemporary theories of SAE include versions of foundationalism (Chisholm 1981, Pollock 1974), coherentism (Bonjour 1985, Lehrer 1974), reliabilism (Dretske 1981, Goldman 1986) and contextualism (DeRose 1995, Lewis 1996). While proponents of SAE don’t agree about how to define naturalized epistemology, most agree that a thoroughgoing naturalism in epistemology can’t work. For the purposes of this paper, (...)
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  14. Is Epistemology Possible in Diamat?Thomas J. Blakeley - 1962 - Studies in East European Thought 2 (2):95-103.
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  15. What is Epistemic Discourse About?Radu J. Bogdan - 2004 - In D. Kolak & J. Symons (eds.), Quantifiers, Questions and Quantum Physics. Springer. pp. 49--60.
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  16. Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought.Anthony Robert Booth - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):529-539.
    I argue that the claim that epistemic ought is incommensurable is self-defeating. My argument, however, depends on the truth of the premise that there can be not only epistemic reasons for belief, but also non-epistemic reasons for belief. So I also provide some support for that claim.
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  17. The Theory of Epistemic Justification and the Theory of Knowledge: A Divorce.Anthony Robert Booth - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (1):37-43.
    Richard Foley has suggested that the search for a good theory of epistemic justification and the analysis of knowledge should be conceived of as two distinct projects. However, he has not offered much support for this claim, beyond highlighting certain salutary consequences it might have. In this paper, I offer some further support for Foley’s claim by offering an argument and a way to conceive the claim in a way that makes it as plausible as its denial, and thus levelling (...)
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  18. Categorical Norms and Convention‐Relativism About Epistemic Discourse.Cameron Boult - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):85-99.
    Allan Hazlett has recently developed an alternative to the most popular form of anti-realism about epistemic normativity, epistemic expressivism. He calls it “convention-relativism about epistemic discourse”. The view deserves more attention. In this paper, I give it attention in the form of an objection. Specifically, my objection turns on a distinction between inescapable and categorical norms. While I agree with Hazlett that convention-relativism is consistent with inescapable epistemic norms, I argue that it is not consistent with categorical epistemic norms. I (...)
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  19. Adhoccery in Epistemology.Berit Brogaard - 2003 - Philosophical Papers 32 (1):65-82.
    Abstract Ernest Sosa has argued that the relevant alternatives theory of knowledge has yet to overcome serious difficulties. The most serious difficulty is that of providing criteria for when a rival alternative to a claim is relevant. Without such criteria, the theory is ad hoc. I argue that most other externalist theories of knowledge, including Sosa's own, fall victim to this criticism. At the end of the paper I make a suggestion as to why Sosa's objection might not be as (...)
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  20. Observation And Objectivity.Harold I. Brown - 1987 - Oxford University Press.
    This book develops an explanation for the roles of observation and theory in scientific endeavor that occupies the middle ground between empiricism and rationalism, and captures the strengths of both approaches. Brown argues that philosophical theories have the same epistemological status as scientific theories and constructs an epistemological theory that provides an account of the role that theory and instruments play in scientific observation. His theory of perception yields a new analysis of objectivity that combines the traditional view of observation (...)
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  21. Introduction: Knowledge Ascriptions - Their Semantics, Cognitive Bases and Social Functions.Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-30.
  22. Metaepistemology and Divine Revelation.Andrei Buckareff - 2009 - Heythrop Journal 50 (1):85-90.
    In Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation,1 William Abraham offers a rich, subtle defense of an epistemology of divine revelation. While I believe there is much about Abraham’s work that is commendable, my remarks in this paper will be primarily critical. But the fact that Abraham’s work is worthy of critical comment should be evidence enough of the importance of Abraham’s book. My focus here will be on a cluster of metaepistemological claims made by Abraham. Specifically, I will argue that (...)
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  23. Strategic Reliabilism and the Replacement Thesis in Epistemology.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (3-4):425-.
    In their recent book, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, Michael Bishop and J.D. Trout have challenged Standard Analytic Epistemology (SAE) in all its guises and have endorsed a version of the "replacement thesis"--proponents of which aim at replacing the standard questions of SAE with psychological questions. In this article I argue that Bishop and Trout offer an incomplete epistemology that, as formulated, cannot address many of the core issues that motivate interest in epistemological questions to begin with, and (...)
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  24. Epistemology Dehumanized.Panayot Butchvarov - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 301.
    Fundamental disagreements in epistemology arise from legitimate differences of interest, not genuine conflict. It is because of such differences that there are three varieties of epistemology: naturalistic, subjective, and what I shall call epistemology-as-logic. All three have been with us at least since Socrates. My chief concern will be with the third, but I must begin with the first and second, which constitute standard epistemology.
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  25. Three Meta-Questions in Epistemology: Rethinking Some Metaphors in Zhuangzi.Derong Chen - 2005 - Journal of Chinese Philosophy 32 (3):493–507.
  26. The Problem of Th Ec Riterion.Roderick Chisholm - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard & Ram Neta (eds.), Arguing About Knowledge. Routledge. pp. 441.
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  27. The Status of Epistemic Principles.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1990 - Noûs 24 (2):209-216.
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  28. Epistemic Expressivism.Matthew Chrisman - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (2):118-126.
    Epistemic expressivism is the application of a nexus of ideas, which is prominent in ethical theory (more specifically, metaethics), to parallel issues in epistemological theory (more specifically, metaepistemology). Here, in order to help those new to the debate come to grips with epistemic expressivism and recent discussions of it, I first briefly present this nexus of ideas as it occurs in ethical expressivism. Then, I explain why and how some philosophers have sought to extend it to a version of epistemic (...)
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  29. From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism.Matthew Chrisman - 2010 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Recent philosophical debate about the meaning of knowledge claims has largely centered on the question of whether epistemic claims are plausibly thought to be context sensitive. The default assumption has been that sentences that attribute knowledge or justification have stable truth-conditions across different contexts of utterance, once any non-epistemic context sensitivity has been fixed. The contrary view is the contextualist view that such sentences do not have stable truth-conditions but can vary depending on the context of utterance. This debate manifestly (...)
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  30. Ought to Believe.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):346-370.
    My primary purpose in this paper is to sketch a theory of doxastic oughts that achieves a satisfying middle ground between the extremes of rejecting epistemic deontology because one thinks beliefs are not within our direct voluntary control and rejecting doxastic involuntarism because one thinks that some doxastic oughts must be true. The key will be appreciating the obvious fact that not all true oughts require direct voluntary control. I will construct my account as an attempt to surpass other accounts (...)
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  31. From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism.Matthew Chrisman - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):225-254.
    In this paper, I exploit the parallel between epistemic contextualism and metaethical speaker-relativism to argue that a promising way out of two of the primary problems facing contextualism is one already explored in some detail in the ethical case – viz. expressivism. The upshot is an argument for a form of epistemic expressivism modeled on a familiar form of ethical expressivism. This provides a new nondescriptivist option for understanding the meaning of knowledge attributions, which arguably better captures the normative nature (...)
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  32. 'Metaepistemology' Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Kyriacou Christos - 2016 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  33. Metaepistemology Oxford Bibliographies Online.Kyriacou Christos - 2016 - Oxford Bibliographies Online:0-0.
    A survey of basic metaepistemological positions and debates.
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  34. Metaepistemology.Kyriacou Christos - 2016 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An Introduction to basic metaepistemological debates and positions.
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  35. Epistemic Responsibility.Lorraine Code - 1987 - Published for Brown University Press by University Press of New England.
  36. Is Epistemic Normativity Value-Based?Charles Cote-Bouchard - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (3):407-430.
    What is the source of epistemic normativity? In virtue of what do epistemic norms have categorical normative authority? According to epistemic teleologism, epistemic normativity comes from value. Epistemic norms have categorical authority because conforming to them is necessarily good in some relevant sense. In this article, I argue that epistemic teleologism should be rejected. The problem, I argue, is that there is no relevant sense in which it is always good to believe in accordance with epistemic norms, including in cases (...)
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  37. Can the Aim of Belief Ground Epistemic Normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.
    For many epistemologists and normativity theorists, epistemic norms necessarily entail normative reasons. Why or in virtue of what do epistemic norms have this necessary normative authority? According to what I call epistemic constitutivism, it is ultimately because belief constitutively aims at truth. In this paper, I examine various versions of the aim of belief thesis and argue that none of them can plausibly ground the normative authority of epistemic norms. I conclude that epistemic constitutivism is not a promising strategy for (...)
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  38. Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):337-355.
    According to epistemic instrumentalism, epistemic normativity arises from and depends on facts about our ends. On that view, a consideration C is an epistemic reason for a subject S to Φ only if Φ-ing would promote an end that S has. However, according to the Too Few Epistemic Reasons objection, this cannot be correct since there are cases in which, intuitively, C is an epistemic reason for S to Φ even though Φ-ing would not promote any of S’s ends. After (...)
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  39. Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis.Edward Craig - 1990 - Oxford University Press.
    In this illuminating study Craig argues that the standard practice of analyzing the concept of knowledge has radical defects--arbitrary restriction of the subject matter and risky theoretical presuppositions. He proposes a new approach similar to the "state-of-nature" method found in political theory, building the concept up from a hypothesis about its social function and the needs it fulfills. Shedding light on much that philosophers have written about knowledge, its analysis and the obstacles to its analysis, and the debate over skepticism, (...)
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  40. XII—The Practical Explication of Knowledge.Edward Craig - 1987 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87 (1):211-226.
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  41. The Practical Explication of Knowledge.Edward Craig - 1986 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87:211 - 226.
  42. The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism.Terence Cuneo - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Moral realism of a paradigmatic sort -- Defending the parallel -- The parity premise -- Epistemic nihilism -- Epistemic expressivism : traditional views -- Epistemic expressivism : nontraditional views -- Epistemic reductionism -- Three objections to the core argument.
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  43. Defending the Moral/Epistemic Parity.Terence Cuneo & Christos Kyriacou - forthcoming - In C. McHugh J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology.
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  44. Historicism and Knowledge.Robert D'Amico - 1989 - Routledge.
    A critical account of the case for historicism from Popper to Foucault, this volume, originally published in 1989, shows the viability of an historicist account of knowledge by replying to traditional objections and the need for defenses of realism and reference at the heart of most alternatives to historicism. The book provides insights to those in philosophy as well as literary criticism, intellectual history, history of science, and cultural criticism.
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  45. Intuitionism in Meta-Epistemology.Jonathan Dancy - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 42 (3):395 - 408.
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  46. KNOWLEDGE, TRUTH, INSIGHT, WISDOM.Ulrich De Balbian - 2017 - Oxford: Academic Publications.
    An exploration of the umbrella notion‭ '‬knowledge‭' ‬and related notions,‭ ‬truth,‭ ‬wisdom,‭ ‬knowing,‭ ‬insights,‭ ‬understanding,‭ ‬perception,‭ ‬etc.‭ ‬The‭ ‬philosophical approach,‭ ‬such as that of Gettier,‭ ‬to this notion.
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  47. Epistemic Logic and Epistemology.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2008 - In Vincent F. Hendricks & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This paper contributes to an increasing literature strengthening the connection between epistemic logic and epistemology (Van Benthem, Hendricks). I give a survey of the most important applications of epistemic logic in epistemology. I show how it is used in the history of philosophy (Steiner's reconstruction of Descartes' sceptical argument), in solutions to Moore's paradox (Hintikka), in discussions about the relation between knowledge and belief (Lenzen) and in an alleged refutation of verificationism (Fitch) and I examine an early argument about the (...)
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  48. Epistemic Justification and Epistemic Luck.Job de Grefte - forthcoming - Synthese:1-16.
    Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other. In the present paper I investigate the relation between epistemic luck and prominent internalist and externalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that the dichotomy between internalist and externalist concepts of justification can be characterized in terms of epistemic (...)
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  49. Concerning a Vocabulary for Inquiry Into Knowledge.John Dewey & Arthur F. Bentley - 1947 - Journal of Philosophy 44 (16):421-434.
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  50. Transcendental Arguments, How-Possible Questions and the Aim of Epistemology.Daniel Dohrn - 2009 - Abstracta 5 (4):21-44.
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