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Summary Is it possible to have philosophical knowledge, or justified beliefs about philosophy? Are there reasons to be skeptical about philosophy itself? There are two key kinds of questions here: first, is there something about the study of philosophy that makes it especially difficult to attain philosophical knowledge? (Maybe reliance on intuition is problematic.) Second, are general skeptical strategies applicable to philosophy? (Could there be an 'evil demon' scenario for our philosophical beliefs, the way there could about our perceptual ones?)
Key works Many experimental philosophers have challenged our access to philosophical truths; see for example Weinberg et al 2001 and Weinberg 2007. Harman 1977 gives a general form of critique to intuition-based philosophical inquiry, especially in ethics; see Pust 2001 for an overview and response. Beebe 2011 considers whether one can develop skeptical scenarios for a priori realms, the way one can for perceptual ones.
Introductions Pust 2012 lays out many of the central issues about whether philosophers should trust intuitions.
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185 found
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1 — 50 / 185
  1. added 2020-06-29
    Philosophical Proofs Against Common Sense.Bryan Frances - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Many philosophers are sceptical about the power of philosophy to refute commonsensical claims. They look at the famous attempts and judge them inconclusive. I prove that even if those famous attempts are failures, there are alternative successful philosophical proofs against commonsensical claims. After presenting the proofs I briefly comment on their significance.
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  2. added 2020-03-10
    Review: Philosophical Progress: In Defence of a Reasonable Optimism. [REVIEW]Derek Ball - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):846-847.
    Volume 97, Issue 4, December 2019, Page 846-847.
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  3. added 2019-12-28
    The Beauty of Philosophy.Bryan Frances - forthcoming - Philosophy is Awesome.
  4. added 2019-12-04
    Scientismo sobre los esteroides: un resena de ‘Freedom Evolves’ (Libertad Evoluciona) por Daniel Dennett (2003) (revisión revisada 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2019 - In Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el Siglo 21 La filosofía, la naturaleza humana y el colapso de la civilización Artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 4a Edición. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 189-204.
    "La gente dice una y otra vez que la filosofía no progresa realmente, que todavía estamos ocupados con los mismos problemas filosóficos que los griegos. Pero la gente que dice esto no entiende por qué tiene que ser así. Es porque nuestro lenguaje ha permanecido igual y nos sigue seduciendo para que hagan las mismas preguntas. Mientras siga habiendo un verbo "ser" que parezca como si funciona de la misma manera que "comer y beber", siempre y cuando todavía tengamos los (...)
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  5. added 2019-09-27
    Tales From an Apostate.Kristie Dotson - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):69-83.
  6. added 2019-09-07
    Why Disagreement-Based Skepticism Cannot Escape the Challenge of Self-Defeat.Thomas Grundmann - 2019 - Episteme:1-18.
    Global meta-philosophical skepticism (i.e. completely unrestricted skepticism about philosophy) based upon disagreement faces the problem of self-defeat since it undercuts its motivating conciliatory principle. However, the skeptic may easily escape this threat by adopting a more modest kind of skepticism, that will be called “extensive meta-philosophical skepticism”, i.e., the view that most of our philosophical beliefs are unjustified, except our beliefs in epistemically fundamental principles. As I will argue in this paper, this kind of skepticism is well-motivated, does not undercut (...)
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  7. added 2019-07-03
    Why the Empirical Study of Non-Philosophical Expertise Does Not Undermine the Status of Philosophical Expertise.Theodore Bach - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-25.
    In some domains experts perform better than novices, and in other domains experts do not generally perform better than novices. According to empirical studies of expert performance, this is because the former but not the latter domains make available to training practitioners a direct form of learning feedback. Several philosophers resource this empirical literature to cast doubt on the quality of philosophical expertise. They claim that philosophy is like the dubious domains in that it does not make available the good, (...)
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  8. added 2019-06-06
    Extensive Philosophical Agreement and Progress.Bryan Frances - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (1-2):47-57.
    This article argues, first, that there is plenty of agreement among philosophers on philosophically substantive claims, which fall into three categories: reasons for or against certain views, elementary truths regarding fundamental notions, and highly conditionalized claims. This agreement suggests that there is important philosophical progress. It then argues that although it's easy to list several potential kinds of philosophical progress, it is much harder to determine whether the potential is actual. Then the article attempts to articulate the truth that the (...)
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  9. added 2019-06-06
    Philosophy and Disagreement.Brian Ribeiro - 2011 - Critica 43 (127):3-25.
    Disagreement as we find it in both the history and the contemporary practice of philosophy is an inadequately understood phenomenon. In this paper I outline and motivate the problem of disagreement, arguing that "hard cases" of disagreement confront us with an unresolved, and seemingly unresolvable, challenge to the rationality of philosophical discourse, thereby raising the specter of a worri-some form of metaphilosophical skepticism. A variety of responses and attempted evasions are considered, though none are found to be particularly satisfying: Thus, (...)
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  10. added 2019-06-06
    In Defence of Sceptical Theism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy.Michael Rea & Michael Bergmann - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):241.
    Some evidential arguments from evil rely on an inference of the following sort: ‘If, after thinking hard, we can't think of any God-justifying reason for permitting some horrific evil then it is likely that there is no such reason’. Sceptical theists, us included, say that this inference is not a good one and that evidential arguments from evil that depend on it are, as a result, unsound. Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy have argued that Michael Bergmann's way of developing the (...)
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  11. added 2019-06-06
    Intemalism, the Gettier Problem, and Metaepistemological Skepticism.Mylan Engel - 2000 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (1):99-117.
    When it comes to second-order knowledge, internalists typically contend that when we know that p, we can, by reflecting, directly know that we are knowing it. Gettier considerations are employed to challenge this internalistic contention and to make out a prima facie case for internalistic metaepistemological skepticism, the thesis that no one ever intemalistically knows that one internalistically knows that p. In particular, I argue that at the metaepistemological second-order level, the Gettier problem generates three distinct problems which, taken together, (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-06
    Ignorance; a Case for Scepticism. [REVIEW]G. W. - 1976 - Review of Metaphysics 29 (4):751-751.
    The analysis presented here covers a vast number of aspects, or sub-questions, of the maddeningly frustrating general question, How can I be sure that, every time I believe something, such as that there are rocks, I am not deceived into so believing by a modern version of Descartes’ evil demon, i.e., a mad scientist who, by means of electrodes implanted in my brain, manipulates my beliefs? Numerous aspects are also analyzed of the standard objections to scepticism, such as G. E. (...)
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  13. added 2019-06-05
    Precis of Metaepistemology and SkepticismMetaepistemology and Skepticism. [REVIEW]Richard Fumerton - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):905.
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  14. added 2019-06-05
    Fumerton on Metaepistemology and SkepticismMetaepistemology and Skepticism. [REVIEW]Stewart Cohen & Richard Fumerton - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):913.
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  15. added 2019-03-11
    The Ordinary and the Experimental: Cook Wilson and Austin on Method in Philosophy.Guy Longworth - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (5):939-960.
    To what extent was ordinary language philosophy a precursor to experimental philosophy? Since the conditions on pursuit of either project are at best unclear, and at worst protean, the general question is hard to address. I focus instead on particular cases, seeking to uncover some central aspects of J. L. Austin’s and John Cook Wilson’s ordinary language based approach to philosophical method. I make a start at addressing three questions. First, what distinguishes their approach from other more traditional approaches? Second, (...)
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  16. added 2019-02-13
    Philosophical Equilibrism, Rationality, and the Commitment Challenge.Michele Palmira - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (3):377-385.
    Helen Beebee (2018) defends a view of the aims of philosophy she calls ‘equilibrism’. Equilibrism denies that philosophy aims at knowledge and maintains that the collective aim of philosophy is ‘to find what equilibria there are that can withstand examination’ (Beebee 2018, p. 3). In this note, I probe equilibrism by focusing on how disagreement challenges our doxastic commitment to our own philosophical theories. Call this the Commitment Challenge. I argue that the Commitment Challenge comes in three varieties and that (...)
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  17. added 2019-02-13
    Groundless Belief: An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology.Frederick L. Will - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (3):483.
  18. added 2019-02-11
    Academic Philosophy = Death: Long Live Philosophizing.Ulrich De Balbian - 2019 - Oxford: Academic.
  19. added 2019-01-03
    The Problem of the Criterion and Hegel's Model for Epistemic Infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2010 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (4).
  20. added 2018-12-20
    A Formal Apology for Metaphysics.Samuel Baron - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    There is an old meta-philosophical worry: very roughly, metaphysical theories have no observational consequences and so the study of metaphysics has no value. The worry has been around in some form since the rise of logical positivism in the early twentieth century but has seen a bit of a renaissance recently. In this paper, I provide an apology for metaphysics in the face of this kind of concern. The core of the argument is this: pure mathematics detaches from science in (...)
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  21. added 2018-12-20
    Philosophical Insights Original Vs Factual Derivative: (Original, Creative Vs Academic, Factual Ideas).Ulrich De Balbian - 2018 - Oxford: KDP.
    Both immanent and non-immanent (transcendent) factors related to philosophy, its nature, subject-matter, aims, objectives and methods are discussed from a meta-philosophical perspective, It will be noticed that original- and creative-thinkers in the socio-cultural practice of philosophy present us with their own, new and original ideas and patterns, sets or models of such ideas. Paradigms or models that are arrived at through the processes of theorizing. Processes that consist of a number of smaller steps or stages, stages that are multi-dimensional and (...)
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  22. added 2018-12-04
    Making Philosophically Relevant Ideas.Ulrich De Balbian - unknown
    How does anything become philosophy? How does anything become philosophically relevant? What is it that makes something, any thing, philosophically relevant? What are the ingredients or components of something philosophical? What must such a thing contain so as to be philosophically relevant? How can one make anything of relevance to the discourse of philosophy? What is it that makes anything and/or thought or idea of and about anything philosophical. and of philosophical relevance? What is the nature, the characteristics and components (...)
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  23. added 2018-07-13
    What We Can and May Know (of) REVISED: Meta-Philosophy and Meta-Epistemology.Ulrich De Balbian - 2018 - Frankfurt: Create Space.
    Human, anthropo-centered and subject-oriented social and cultural practices, specialized disciplines such as sciences, humanities and arts, as well as everyday and common sense existence employ and are constituted by means of frames of reference (and the tools and techniques they employ) are intersubjectively These things enable consciousness, knowing that and know how skills and appitudes, but simultaneously impose conditions, restrictions, assumptions and pre-suppositions. These conditions,limits and their underlying paradigms are endlessly refined, altered, modified, extended, transformed and replaced.
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  24. added 2018-06-03
    Scepticism Under New Colors? Stroud's Criticism of Carnap.Thomas Bonk - 2003 - In Language, Truth and Knowledge. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 133--147.
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  25. added 2018-06-03
    22 Skepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge Barry Stroud.Barry Stroud - 1998 - In Alcoff Linda (ed.), Epistemology: The Big Questions. Blackwell. pp. 360.
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  26. added 2018-06-03
    The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism.Richard Feldman - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):305.
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  27. added 2018-06-03
    Skepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge.Barry Stroud - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (10):545.
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  28. added 2018-05-21
    (Meta) Philosophy and I.Ulrich De Balbian - 2018 - Paris, France: Create Space.
    Many themes and topics, both immanent as well as non- immanent, concerning philosophy and meta-philosophy are dealt with. Many of these take the form of my answers to questions addressed at me. Some of the topics and themes that are dealt with are - Self-reference and Self-application Immanence and non-immanence Disagreement and diversity Primacy of the practical Philosophy good and bad Philosophy and expertise Ends of philosophy Death of philosophy Anti-philosophies Philosophy and assertion Philosophy and exposition Philosophy and style.
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  29. added 2018-03-10
    The Presidential Address: Philosophical Scepticism and the Aims of Philosophy.Helen Beebee - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (1):1-24.
  30. added 2018-03-02
    Scepticism About Scepticism.Nick Zangwill - 2016 - Philosophy 91 (1):109-118.
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  31. added 2018-02-19
    Disagreement, Self-Refutation and the Minority Report of the Meta-Skeptics.Tamás Paár - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):23-44.
    Those who I call meta-skeptics in my paper argue that one should suspend judgment about every philosophical question. Most often they use the argument from disagreement to show that the suspension of our philosophical beliefs is our epistemic obligation. In the present paper I argue against the main motivation for this view and show that since even the meta-skeptics’ stance is a contested philosophical one, their argument cannot succeed without refuting itself. Various meta-skeptics proposed counterobjections to this self-refutation objection. I (...)
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  32. added 2018-02-17
    Rethinking Disagreement: Philosophical Incommensurability and Meta-Philosophy.Richard J. Colledge - 2014 - Symposium 18 (2):33-53.
    Set in the context of the current interest among Analytic philosophers in the “epistemology of disagreement,” this paper explores the meta-philosophical problem of philosophical incommensurability. Motivated by Nietzsche’s provocative remark about philosophy as prejudices and desires of the heart “sifted and made abstract,” the paper first outlines the contours of the problem and then traces it through a series of examples. Drawing largely on the tradition of phenomenology and philosophical hermeneutics, a broadly Continental response to this formidable problem is suggested. (...)
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  33. added 2018-02-17
    The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Essays for Barry Stroud.W. Wong, N. Kolodny & J. Bridges (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    I argue that the contextualist anti-skeptical strategy fails because it misconstrues skepticism by overlooking two important aspects of skepticism: first, all of our knowledge of the external world is brought into question at one fell swoop; second, skepticism depends on certain ideas about sense-perception and its role in our knowledge of the world. Contextualists may have solved ‘the skeptical paradox’ in their own terms, but such a solution cannot in any way make skepticism less threatening to human knowledge or to (...)
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  34. added 2018-02-17
    Bonjour’s Arguments Against Skepticism About the A Priori.James R. Beebe - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):243-267.
    I reconstruct and critique two arguments Laurence BonJour has recently offered against skepticism about the a priori. While the arguments may provide anti-skeptical, internalist foundationalists with reason to accept the a priori, I show that neither argument provides sufficient reason for believing the more general conclusion that there is no rational alternative to accepting the a priori.
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  35. added 2018-02-17
    The Problem of the Criterion.G. J. Mattey - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):226-229.
    This book offers the first historical treatment and analytic analysis of the problem of the criterion. It provides analyses of the ancient and modern characterizations of the problem and a resolution of each. My purpose is to show that there are at least two versions of the problem, one posed by a Pyrrhonian sceptic and one by a dogmatic sceptic. I show that both versions have a dissolution. Then, by examining the presuppositions of the dogmatic sceptic, I demonstrate that the (...)
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  36. added 2018-02-16
    Meta-Philosophy Questioning Philosophizing.Ulrich De Balbian - 2018 - Oxford: Academic.
    Traditional philosophy is no longer viable,‭ ‬relevant and acceptable.‭ ‬It might be possible to continue doing philosophizing in traditional ways.‭ ‬It is possible to continue fabricating fictional realities in the manner of the Pre-Socratics,‭ ‬Spinoza,‭ ‬Leibniz,‭ ‬Husserl,‭ ‬Hegel,‭ ‬Plato,‭ ‬et al.‭ ‬It is possible to devise pictures of realities and depictions of‭ ‬human consciousness and cognition like Descartes or in the Kantian manner. -/- One of the major issues with traditional philosophy is its lack of self-awareness,‭ ‬the absence of meta-cognition.‭ (...)
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  37. added 2018-02-16
    Worrisome Skepticism About Philosophy.Bryan Frances - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):289-303.
    A new kind of skepticism about philosophy is articulated and argued for. The key premise is the claim that many of us are well aware that in the past we failed to have good responses to substantive objections to our philosophical beliefs. The conclusion is disjunctive: either we are irrational in sticking with our philosophical beliefs, or we commit some other epistemic sin in having those beliefs.
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  38. added 2018-02-13
    Neutralism and Conceptual Engineering.Patrick Greenough - forthcoming - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Conceptual Engineering alleges that philosophical problems are best treated via revising or replacing our concepts (or words). The goal here is not to defend Conceptual Engineering but rather show that it can (and should) invoke Neutralism—the broad view that philosophical progress can take place when (and sometimes only when) a thoroughly neutral, non-specific theory, treatment, or methodology is adopted. A neutralist treatment of one form of skepticism is used as a case study and is compared with various non-neutral rivals. Along (...)
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  39. added 2018-02-12
    Philosophers' Ideas and Their Existence.Ulrich De Balbian - 2018 - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    What, if anything, is the correlation between the specialized or technical ideas of the philosopher and the rest of his existence? His everyday life outside his philosophical role. In the specialized reality and reality constitution, when employing the discourse and discipline of philosophy, the philosopher subscribe to many things in an explicit manner and he employs a number of implicit things and assumptions that are not stated explicitly. These things concern the different branches, areas and domains of the philosophical discourse, (...)
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  40. added 2018-01-17
    Grenzen des Wissens.Joachim Bromand - 2009 - Münster, Germany: Mentis.
    Diese Studie greift die klassische philosophische Frage nach den Grenzen unseres Wissens auf und analysiert kritisch aktuell diskutierte Argumente, welche die Begrenztheit unseres Wissens erweisen sollen. Im Zentrum stehen dabei drei Argumentationsansätze: Zunächst geht es um Komplexitätsgrenzen des Wissens, wie sie G. Chaitin mit seiner algorithmischen Informationstheorie aufzeigen will. Dann wird auf Präzisionsgrenzen des Wissens eingegangen, die sich aus der epistemischen Theorie der Vagheit (T. Williamson u.a.) ergeben. Schließlich werden Grenzen unserer Selbsterkenntnis erörtert. Dabei geht es um verschiedene Argumente für (...)
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  41. added 2017-11-11
    Philosophy - Aims, Methods, Rationale.Ulrich De Balbian - 2017 - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    In this meta-philosophical study I commence with an investigation of Wisdom. I then continue with an exploration of the institutionalization of the subject and the professionalization of those involved in it. This I contrast with original and creative philosophizing. In then sows that philosophizing resembles and attempts to do theorizing. The 9 questions, etc of the Socratic Method and details of the Philosophical Toolkit occur throughout different stages of theorizing as one level and one dimension of it. Linked books are (...)
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  42. added 2017-09-10
    Similar to PHILOSOPHY = PHILO SOPHOS = LOVE OF WISDOM with Enlarged Appendices.Ulrich De Balbian - 2017 - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    Exploration of the meanings, dimensions, levels of the umbrella-notion of wisdom. I added a discussion between the academics of the notion and research into it (on Wisdom list LISTSERV@JISCMAIL.AC.UK ) as second appendix. I added on 7/09/2017 a new appendix http://www.drrogerwalsh.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/What-is-Wisdom-Cross-Cultural-Cross-Disciplin ary-Syntheses-Roger-Walsh-2015-Review-of-General-Psychology.pdf . -/- Most people involved in this discourse will be aware of the meaning of the word philosophy. The love part might be familiar to many of the human beings, although each individual will probably have his/her own superficial notion (...)
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  43. added 2017-07-06
    The Philosopher's Doom: Unreliable at Truth or Unreliable at Logic.Bryan Frances - forthcoming - In Ted Poston & Kevin McCain (eds.), tba. Brill.
    By considering the epistemology and relations among certain philosophical problems, I argue for a disjunctive thesis: either (1) it is highly probable that there are (i) several (ii) mutually independent philosophical reductios of highly commonsensical propositions that are successful—so several aspects of philosophy have succeeded at refuting common sense—or (2) there is enough hidden semantic structure in even simple sentences of natural language to make philosophers highly unreliable at spotting deductive validity in some of the simplest cases—so we are much (...)
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  44. added 2017-07-06
    Philosophical Expertise.Bryan Frances - 2018 - In James Chase & David Cody (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 297-306.
    Philosophical expertise consists in knowledge, but it is controversial what this knowledge consists in. I focus on three issues: the extent and nature of knowledge of philosophical truths, how this philosophical knowledge is related to philosophical progress, and skeptical challenges to philosophical knowledge.
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  45. added 2017-05-29
    Empirical Challenges to the Use of Intuitions as Evidence in Philosophy, or Why We Are Not “Judgment Skeptics”.Stephen Stich & Jonathan M. Weinberg - unknown
    Bealer, G. (1998). “Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy,” in M. DePaul & W. Ramsey, eds., Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
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  46. added 2017-05-15
    (META-PHILOSOPHY) PHILOSOPHY's GHOST Dead Discipline Walking.Ulrich De Balbian - 2017 - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    I have been working on meta-philosophy for quite some time and was pleasantly surprised to encounter, mid-May 2017, someone who shares this commitment (apart from his many other interests and specializations) for very similar reasons as my own. He is Dr Desh Ray Sirswal from India and one of his numerous websites, blogs, journals, etc is - http://drsirswal.webs.com/ I let him speak for himself. “My objective is to achieve an intellectual detachment from all philosophical systems, and not to solve specific (...)
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  47. added 2017-05-09
    SEEKING PHILOSOPHY – BY WORDS 2 Questions and Fake Problems.Ulrich De Balbian - 2017 - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    An exploration of philosophy, its subject-matter (and development of new objects of study and investigation or philosophizing, for example experimental ‘philosophy’, inter-disciplinary work such as in the discourse of cognitive research and philosophy of everything, i e the arts, sport, religion, sex, love, politics, etc), its methods and confines, both internal and external linits, eg cognitive biases, fallacies, -isms, one-dimensionality, uni-levelled, etc. Philosophy - institutionalization, Professionalization, subject-matter, methods, cognitive biases, fallacies.
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  48. added 2017-04-05
    Business Principles, Life Principles.Cruz Cora - manuscript
    This paper introduces (or reiterates) a paradox: if humanist (rational and egalitarian) principles of social organization are attendant upon the evolution of an educated, leisured class (be it feudal or bourgeois), how can these norms be applied from the “bottom up”? It is the paradox of democratic liberalism, the spectre behind the ideal of “participatory parity” which both entails and presupposes equality of capability, and hence of socioeconomic status. By way of a very brief genealogy of enlightenment values, against contemporary (...)
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  49. added 2017-03-22
    (Meta-Philosophy) Exercise in Experimental Philosophy (CMT, BT, CMA).Ulrich de Balbian - forthcoming - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    My new (Experimental) PHILOSOPHY (XPhi) book for FREE download -/- https://www.academia.edu/31973890/_Meta-Philosophy_Theorizing_about_Philosophy_CMT_CB_and_CM_as_an_e xercise_inXPhi -/- (Meta-Philosophy) Theorizing about Philosophy (CMT, CB and CMA) as an exercise inXPhi -/- The processes of theorizing are explored, Weick's Conceptual Metaphor Theory, Conceptual Blending Theory and Conceptual Metaphor tool are described. This Meta-Philosophy investigation of philosophy and philosophizing is an exercise in Experimental Philosophy. The Empirical Generalization or Hypothesis arrived at states that: Philosophy/izing is like or resembles the process/es of Theorizing.
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  50. added 2017-03-13
    Meta-Philosophy) Death of Philosophy Part 2.Ulrich de Balbian - forthcoming - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    1 1 Ulrich de Balbian Meta-Philosophy Research Center (Meta-Philosophy) Death of Philosophy Part 2 PART 2 Philosophy subject-matter page2 Different approaches to doing philosophy (Methods) page 164 Metaphysics, Ontology, Epistemology page.
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1 — 50 / 185